Читать книгу The Nuremberg Trials: Complete Tribunal Proceedings (V. 11) - International Military Tribunal - Страница 11

“He has given back self-confidence and confidence in their own ability to the German people, and thereby enabled them to retake, by their own strength, their sacred right refused to them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that, to approach the tremendous problems of the times with courage, and to solve them. Thus the German people and the Führer have done more for the peace of Europe and the world than some of our neighbors are able to realize today.” (Document Number Raeder-46)

Then we come to the sentence where I speak about the announcement of the fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry which has been quoted by the Prosecution. I should like to state briefly in connection with it that after the experiences of the years 1917 to 1919, communism and international Jewry had destroyed the resistance of the German people to a considerable degree and had gained an excessively large and oppressive influence in German affairs, in affairs of state as well as in economic affairs, as for example also in the legal field. Therefore, in my opinion, one could not be surprised that the National Socialist Government tried to loosen and, as far as possible, remove this large and oppressive influence. Although in pursuing this course the National Socialist Government took rather severe steps which led to the Nuremberg Laws—the exaggerations of which I regretted, of course—nevertheless, in the course of the speech which I made in public at the orders of the Reich Government, I could not find it compatible with my conscience to express my personal opinions, which were basically different. It must also be considered that such a speech had to fit into a general framework. That, however, was only one short sentence, whereas other points were considerably more in the foreground. In that connection I ask for permission to read two more short sentences:

“And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and equal respect with all other nations which alone can guarantee that the nations will live peacefully together on this earth.”

Then the last sentence, on Page 235:

“Within the bounds of German national community the Führer has assigned us our tasks as soldiers to protect our homeland and our peaceful national reconstruction and to train the young manhood, fit for military service, which was entrusted to us and which has to pass entirely through our hands.”

The next sentence was quoted by the Prosecution, because there I spoke of the fact that we should not only train these young people technically in the sense of the technical use of arms but also educate them in the sense of National Socialist ideology and philosophy, and I stated that we had to march shoulder to shoulder with the Party.

I have always taken the view that the Armed Forces should not be a completely extraneous body in the State. It would be impossible to have a republican armed force in a monarchist state or an armed force with monarchist tendencies in a democratic state. Thus our Armed Forces would have to be incorporated into the National Socialist State to the extent necessary to create a real people’s community, and it would be the task of the commanders of the Armed Forces to educate their branches of the forces in such a way that they would recognize and live up to the good national and socialist ideals of the National Socialist State. This would be done in the same way as I did it as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In this way it was possible to incorporate the Armed Forces in an orderly manner, to keep them from all exaggeration and excesses, and at the same time to form a people’s community within the State.

And then on the bottom of Page 236:

“This nation needed a new, a true peace, the peace of justice and honor, peace without hatred. The world also needs peace. Because a weak Germany could not obtain peace, a strong one has won it for herself. It is the proud task of the German Wehrmacht, to secure this peace for the German nation against everybody.”

And quite at the end of the document, the 11th or 12th line from the bottom of the page:

“But the soldier over there, whom we respect as the valiant representative of his country, may accept a soldier’s word: What Germany needs and wants is peace. These are not just words but it has been proved by practical examples. The construction work of Germany requires many years of quiet development.”

I think that this is sufficient...

DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient.

May I point out to the High Tribunal that in the English translation, on Page 236, as far as I remember, one sentence was underlined. That is: “The Wehrmacht and Party are one indivisible entity.” The Prosecution has submitted that. Apart from that, nothing is underlined.

I wish to say in passing that in reality, in the original, many other passages are underlined, particularly those sentences which Admiral Raeder has just read which deal with peace.

[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, the Prosecution has accused you with having connections with all the political activities of National Socialism. Therefore I am compelled to ask you briefly concerning your participation in actions in those countries where participation by the Navy is certainly surprising.

In what way were you connected with the measures concerning the annexation of Austria?

RAEDER: The Navy had nothing to do with the Anschluss of Austria at all and did not take part in any way.

DR. SIEMERS: Did you make any preparations?

RAEDER: No. In the case of Austria, no preparations were needed. The case of Austria was mentioned in Document C-175, but that dealt only with the directive of 1 July 1937 for the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war.

DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that C-175 is USA-69, in the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 117.

[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution considers this document important and therefore I should like you to say a few words about it.

RAEDER: It deals with a statement, which, according to my knowledge, is made in every state for every year and in which, according to the political situation, such cases are mentioned which may arise in the course of the year and for which, of course, certain preparations have to be made. For the Navy, however, that document had no sequel as far as Austria was concerned.

DR. SIEMERS: So it is a document which numerous...

THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have the reference to that right. It came through, I thought, C-157, USA-69, 10a, and then I did not get the page.

DR. SIEMERS: Page 117.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that C-157 or 175?

DR. SIEMERS: C-175.

[Turning to the defendant.] Does this concern strategic preparations for various eventualities?

RAEDER: Yes; various cases are mentioned here, for instance, the “Case Red” and the special “Case Extension Red-Green.” All these had to be dealt with but they did not necessarily lead to any consequences.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection I wanted to submit various documents, Raeder exhibits, from which it can be seen that the same type of preparations, since they are necessary for military and strategic reasons, were also undertaken by the Allies—only to show their necessity. At this moment I should like to forego that because I cannot determine so quickly which of these documents are admitted and which have been rejected. Perhaps I may therefore submit the connected documents at the end in order that no misunderstanding may occur now by my quoting the wrong figures.

[Turning to the defendant.] In what way did you and the Navy participate in measures concerning the Sudetenland?

RAEDER: In a directive...

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. May I ask you to look at the document of the Prosecution 388-PS. It is USA-126—no, excuse me—USA-26. It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 147. It is a draft for the new directive “Grün” of 20 May 1938.

RAEDER: Yes, I have the directive here. It is of 20 May 1938 and says with regard to the Navy:

“The Navy participates in the operations of the Army by employing the Danube flotilla. That flotilla is put under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In regard to the conduct of naval warfare, at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. Those measures must be confined to what is absolutely necessary, and must be carried out inconspicuously.”

The entire course of action at the end of September and beginning of October made the special measures unnecessary, so the Danube flotilla which we had taken over from Austria was put under the command of the Army.

DR. SIEMERS: What was the size of the Danube flotilla?

RAEDER: It consisted of some small river craft, one small gunboat and minesweepers.

DR. SIEMERS: That is the total extent to which the Navy participated?

RAEDER: Yes, in which the Navy participated.

DR. SIEMERS: In what way did you and the Navy participate in the preparations for the occupation of what the document calls the “remainder of Czechoslovakia”?

This concerns Document C-136, USA-104 in the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 101. It is of 21 October 1938. The Prosecution points out that according to that you had already been informed in October that Czechoslovakia was to be occupied after some time, that is in March, as actually happened. Will you please tell us something about that?

RAEDER: That directive looks suspicious at first but the way in which it is drafted shows that this again refers to possible cases. Point 1 deals with the securing of the borders of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks.

Points 2 and 3 are “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia,” “Occupation of the Memel Country.”

Number 2, “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia”: The first sentence reads, “It must be possible to shatter the remainder of Czechoslovakia at any time if her policy should become hostile toward Germany.”

That is the prerequisite in case of any action against Czechoslovakia; that did not mean that it was certain that any action would be taken.

In the same manner, under Number 3, mention is made of the occupation of the Memel country, where it says: “The political situation, particularly warlike complications between Poland and Lithuania, may make it necessary for the German Armed Forces to occupy the Memel country.”

DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. May I point out that, according to my document, the part which the witness has just read is missing in the English translation—so that you will not look for it unnecessarily.

[Turning to the defendant.] So here again this is a possible eventuality?

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: On 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the war, the Athenia was sunk. From the military point of view that case has already been clarified by Herr Kranzbühler, but I should like you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to state your position and give an explanation of the incident with special consideration of the fact that the Prosecution, especially in this case, has raised a very severe and insulting accusation. They have made the accusation that you, purposely and in violation of the truth, held England and Churchill responsible for the sinking of the Athenia, although you knew perfectly well that the Athenia had been sunk by a German U-boat. As proof, the Prosecution has submitted the article of 23 October 1939 from the Völkischer Beobachter.

Mr. President, that is Document Number 3260-PS, GB-218. Document Book 10 of the British Delegation on Page 97.

[Turning to the defendant.] I would like you to explain that point.

RAEDER: The fact is that on 3 September at dusk the young submarine commander of the submarine U-30 met an English passenger ship which had its lights dimmed and torpedoed it because he assumed, by mistake, that it was an auxiliary cruiser. In order to avoid misunderstanding I should like to state here that the deliberations of Kapitänleutnant Fresdorf, which have been mentioned here concerning the torpedoing of dimmed ships in the Channel, did not yet play any part in the Naval Operations Staff at that time and that this commanding officer could not have known anything about these deliberations. He knew only that auxiliary cruisers had their lights blacked out, and he assumed that this was an auxiliary cruiser at the entrance of the northwest channel, England-Scotland. He did not make a report since it was not necessary. The information that a German U-boat had torpedoed the Athenia was broadcast by the British radio, and we probably received the news during the night of the 3d to the 4th, and transmitted it to the various news services.

In the morning of 4 September we received that news at the offices of the Naval Operations Staff, and I requested information as to how far our nearest submarine was from the place of the torpedoing. I was told, 75 nautical miles. At about the same time, State Secretary Von Weizsäcker in the Foreign Office, who had been a naval officer in the first World War, learned of this situation and made a telephone call to the Naval Operations Staff, asking whether it was true. He did not call me personally. He received the answer that, according to our information, it could not be right. Thereupon he sent for the American Chargé d’Affaires—I believe Mr. Kirk—in order to speak to him about the matter because the radio broadcast had also mentioned that several Americans had been killed in that accident. From his experiences in the first World War it was clear to him how important it was that there should be no incident involving America. Therefore, he told him what he had heard from the Naval Operations Staff. I personally told the same thing to the American Naval Attaché, Mr. Schrader, and that certainly in good faith. I believed that I could tell him that in good faith because we had no other information. State Secretary Von Weizsäcker then came to see me personally, if I remember correctly. We were very close friends, and he told me what he had told the American Chargé d’Affaires. He apologized, I believe, for not having spoken to me personally and that concluded the case for the time being.

The matter was such that, if it had been reported in a normal way, we would not have hesitated to admit and to explain the reason. We would not have hesitated to apologize to the nations concerned. Disciplinary measures would have been taken against the officer. I also reported the incident to the Führer himself in his headquarters and told him that we were convinced such was not the case, and the Führer ordered that it should be denied. This was done by the Propaganda Ministry, which had been informed of the order by my press department.

The submarine returned on 27 September...

DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me if I interrupt. That date, Mr. President, is identified by Document D-659, which was submitted by the Prosecution, it is Exhibit GB-221 in Document Book 10 on Page 110.

RAEDER: The submarine commander returned on 27 September to Wilhelmshaven. Admiral Dönitz has already described how he received him and how he immediately sent him to me to Berlin by air.

The U-boat commander reported the entire incident to me and confirmed that it was a sheer mistake, that it was only through all these messages he had heard that he himself discovered that it was not an auxiliary cruiser that was concerned but a passenger steamer.

I reported the facts to the Führer because they could have had severe political consequences. He decided that, as it had been denied once, we had to keep it utterly secret, not only abroad but also within official circles and government circles. Consequently, I was not in a position to tell State Secretary Von Weizsäcker or the Propaganda Ministry that the facts were different. My order to the Commander of the U-boat fleet reads:

“1. The affair is to be kept strictly secret upon orders of the Führer.

“2. On my part, no court-martial will be ordered because the commanding officer acted in good faith and it was a mistake.

“3. The further political handling of the matter is to be attended to by the High Command of the Navy, as far as anything has to be done.”

With that the commander returned to Wilhelmshaven and Admiral Dönitz has already reported that he was punished by disciplinary procedure. To our great surprise, about one month later that article appeared in the Völkischer Beobachter in which Churchill was accused of being the author of that incident. I knew absolutely nothing about that article beforehand. I would certainly have prevented its appearance because, knowing that our submarine had torpedoed that ship, it was out of the question to lay the blame on the enemy, on the First Lord of the Admiralty of all people.

I found out later that the order to publish such an article was issued by Hitler and reached the Propaganda Ministry through the Reich Press Chief. As far as I remember I was told that the Propaganda Minister had himself drafted that article. Later I could not prevent it. I did not see the article nor did any of my officers of the High Command of the Navy see it. They would certainly have come to me at once so that I could have prevented its publication. We had no reason to expect such an article 4 weeks after the torpedoing of the Athenia. That is the case of the Athenia.

DR. SIEMERS: You just said that you had discovered that Hitler knew about the article. When did you discover this?

RAEDER: Here, from my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche.

DR. SIEMERS: Not at that time then?

RAEDER: No, by no means.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter past two.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.]