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DR. SIEMERS: In the meantime I have perused my documents and I am therefore in a position to carry out the original plan, that is, of submitting the documents during the examination.

In connection with the documents which we dealt with last, Document C-126, “Strategic Preparations,” I should like to submit the following documents which are contained in the White Books, documents which have been granted me for my use and which also concern strategic preparations on the part of the Allies. We are dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-33. It is the document dated 9 November 1939; and also Exhibit Number Raeder-34, General Gamelin to General Lelong, 13 November 1939; and also Exhibit Number Raeder-35, two extracts from the Diary of Jodl, 1809-PS, which concern the measures taken by the Luftwaffe regarding the Caucasus. It is not necessary for me to comment on this. I would just like to call your attention to the questions which I put to the witness Reich Marshal Göring on 18 March; he has already testified regarding the plans of the Allies for the destruction of the Caucasian oil fields. And finally in this connection, Exhibit Number Raeder-41, to be found in the Document Book 3, Page 205, and the following pages, a report of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin, dated 16 March 1940, it deals with the war plans for the year 1940 concerning the tightening of the blockade, the plans regarding the Scandinavian countries and, in addition, the plans for the destruction of the Russian oil wells in the Caucasus.

[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, before I deal with the separate campaigns of Greece, Norway, and so forth, I would like to ask you to answer a question which relates to you personally. What decorations did you receive from Hitler?

RAEDER: I received from Hitler in the autumn of 1939 in addition to the Golden Emblem, which I have already mentioned, the Knight’s Order to the Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year 1941 on the occasion of my 65th birthday I received a donation of 250,000 marks. This donation was given to me by Hitler through an adjutant and in connection with that he sent a document.

When I thanked him on the very first occasion, he told me that he was giving me this donation as a means of decoration in the same manner as the former rulers of Prussia had given their generals similar donations, whether as sums of money or as a country estate; then he emphasized that Field Marshals Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen had received donations from him as well.

DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the passage “Greece.” With regard to Greece, the Prosecution has quoted Document C-12, which is GB-226. This is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 1. This document deals with the decision on the part of Hitler which was transmitted through the OKW, dated 30 December 1939, signed by Jodl, and we read under Number 1.:

“Greek merchant ships in the area around England, declared by the United States to be a barred zone, are to be treated as enemy vessels.”

This decision on the part of Hitler was made on the basis of a report by the SKL. What caused you to make this report even though Greece was neutral at the time?

RAEDER: At that time we had received a large number of intelligence reports from our intelligence service that Greek shipping companies apparently with the knowledge of the Greek Government were allowing Greek ships to be chartered by England under favorable conditions. Therefore, these Greek ships were in the service of England and thus were to be treated in the same way as we were treating the English merchantmen. These intelligence reports were confirmed later on to an even greater degree than had been the case in the beginning.

DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I would like to submit to the High Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-53, to be found in my Document Book 3, Page 258. This document deals with the War Diary kept by the SKL in the month of December 1939.

On Page 259, under the date of 19 December, the following entry is made:

“Greece has hired out about 20 vessels to ply between the United States, Le Havre and Liverpool.”

This is confirmed by the reports just mentioned by the defendant. The next entry, on the same page under the date 30 December:

“Justified by the sales and chartering of numerous Greek ships to England it has been decreed, with the agreement of the Führer, that Greek ships in the zone from 20 degrees West to 2 degrees East and from 44 degrees North to 62 degrees North shall be considered as hostile craft by U-boats. Attacks to be made invisibly as far as possible.”

I also submit the following document, Number Raeder-54. This document is taken from the White Books. It is dated 23 January 1940, and it is a report from the German Embassy at the Hague to the Foreign Office. The heading is: “The Contemplated Chartering of 50 to 60 Greek Ships to the British Government.” It is not necessary for me to read it. I should like merely to quote the beginning of the first sentence:

“After the British press brought reports at the end of November last year”—that is, 1939—“about the alleged charterings of Greek vessels to British companies”—and so forth—then follows the statement that these 50 to 60 ships are now chartered by British companies.

Even though it is not quite accurate historically, I would now like first of all to conclude the question of Greece. In historical sequence Norway should follow now first, but for the sake of coherence I should like to deal with Greece and the occupation of Greece first.

In the Document C-152, identical with C-167 or Exhibit GB-122, in the Document Book of the British Delegation Number 10, Page 23, the Prosecution has charged you with the Figure 9 of this lengthy document, specifically Figure 9.)B.)f.). It says there:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy requests confirmation of the fact that the whole of Greece is to be occupied even in the case of a peaceful solution. The Führer: Complete occupation is a stipulation for any settlement.”

This document concerns your report to Hitler of 18 March 1941. What were the reasons for your making this proposal?

RAEDER: In the beginning I had but little knowledge of the political intentions of the Führer as far as Greece was concerned, but I did know of his Directive Number 20, dated 13 December 1940.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, I would like to mention for the assistance of the Court that we are dealing with Document 1541-PS, that is GB-117, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 270. This directive is dated 13 December 1940.

RAEDER: In this directive the Führer, for the reasons given in Paragraph 1, said that his intention was, as set forth in Paragraph 2:

“b.) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to employ this group of forces to occupy the north coast of the Aegean by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (‘Operation Marita’). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.”

The next time I heard about these things again was when I heard that the British had landed in southern Greece on 3 March. We learned that on about 5 or 6 March. For this reason I asked the Führer that he occupy all of Greece in order to prevent the British from attacking us from the rear, by air, and from erecting air bases, all of which would hamper the conduct of our war not only in Greece but also in the eastern Mediterranean.

The fact was that when a political decision had been made by Hitler of his own accord and without having consulted anyone, I, as Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, always had to draw my strategic conclusions from this political decision and then had to make to him my proposals on naval and on other warfare as far as they concerned me.

Since in December he had already considered the possibility that all of Greece would have to be occupied, the case had now actually arisen for me to make this proposal to him for the reason I have already mentioned. When I said “all of Greece,” that implied to me and the Naval Command the entire Greek coast, where the British forces might land.

DR. SIEMERS: Your proposal was made about 2 weeks after British troops had landed in Greece?

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection I would like to submit Exhibit Raeder-58, in my Document Book 3, Page 271. This is a document contained in the White Book, according to which on 4 January—I beg the Tribunal’s pardon. Sir David is right. Document 58 has been rejected and I withdraw it.

In this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Number Raeder-59. It is to be found in Document Book 3, Page 273 and is an extract from the White Book: It is the minutes of the French War Committee of 26 April 1940. This document deals with the decision of the War Committee regarding Norway, the Caucasus, Romania, and Greece.

I also submit Exhibit Number Raeder-63, in Document Book 3, Page 285, which is an address by the British Secretary of State for India, Amery, dated 1 December 1940. This document also shows plans regarding Greece, a year and a quarter before the time just mentioned by the witness.

Now I shall turn to the topic of Norway.

[Turning to the defendant.] The British prosecutor, Major Elwyn Jones, considers the attack against Norway a special case in the series of aggressive wars waged by the Nazi conspirators. In this connection he pointed out that, in this case, Hitler did not think of this himself but rather was persuaded by you. Since his point is very important, I should like to ask you to describe this event exactly, and therefore I ask you first of all: When was the first conversation about this matter between you and Hitler?

RAEDER: The first conversation between Hitler and myself concerning the question of Norway was on 10 October 1939, and that was at my request. The reason for this was that we had received reports at various times during the last week of September through our intelligence service of the offices of Admiral Canaris that the British intended to occupy bases in Norway.

I recall that after reports to this effect had reached me several times Admiral Canaris visited me himself on one occasion—something he did in very important cases only. And, in the presence of my chief of staff, he gave me a coherent explanation concerning the intelligence reports which had been received. In this connection air bases were constantly mentioned, as well as bases in the south of Norway. Stavanger was mentioned constantly with the airport Sola, and Trondheim was usually mentioned and occasionally Christiansand.

During the last days of September I had a telephone conversation with Admiral Carls who was the commander of Navy Group North and was therefore in charge of operations in the Skagerrak, the Kattegat and in the North Sea. This man had obviously received similar reports. He informed me that he had composed a private letter addressed to me, in which he dealt with the question of the danger of Norway’s being occupied by British forces and in which he was in a general way dealing with the question as to what disadvantages such a step would have for us, and whether we should have to forestall such an attempt, and also what advantages or disadvantages the occupation of Norway—that is, of the Norwegian coast and the Norwegian bases—by our forces would have.

Up until that point I had not concerned myself with the Norwegian question at all, except for the fact I had received these reports. The arrival of this letter at the end of September or the beginning of October, it must have been about then, impelled me to show it to the Chief of Staff of the SKL and to instruct him to deal with all dispatch with the question of the occupation of Norwegian bases by England, and the other questions which Admiral Carls had dealt with, and to have the questions discussed in the SKL. The advantages and disadvantages of an expansion of the war towards the North had to be considered, not only of an expansion on our part but, above all, an expansion on the part of England; what value, what advantage would accrue to us if we acted first; what disadvantages would result if we had to defend the Norwegian coast?

The result of this was the questionnaire mentioned in C-122, GB-82, where the questions were asked: What places were to be used as bases; what the possibility of defense by us would be; whether these ports would have to be developed further; and also, what advantages would result so far as our U-boats were concerned?

These questions, as I have already stated, were put to Admiral Dönitz as well, but his answers arrived only after I had made the report on 10 October. I would like to say, by way of introduction, that it was entirely clear to me that if we undertook to occupy these bases we would violate neutrality. But I also knew of the agreement which existed between the German and Norwegian Governments of 2 September regarding neutrality, and I knew the concluding sentence, in this aide memoire, which is Document TC-31, GB-79, dated 2 September 1939.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I should like to point out, Mr. President, that this document is found in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, at Page 330.

[Turning to the defendant.] You have that document before you?

RAEDER: Yes, I have it before me, and I would like to quote the concluding sentence.

DR. SIEMERS: It is the last document in the book, Your Honor, at Page 329.

RAEDER: [Continuing.] The last sentence:

“Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government change so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as would be forced upon the Reich Cabinet by the resulting situation.”

Then, within the next few days, I asked the Chief of Staff of the SKL to submit to me the data which the SKL had prepared during the preceding days and I reported to Hitler on 10 October, because I considered this problem particularly important. It was entirely clear to me that the best possible solution for us would be that Norway should maintain a steadfast neutrality, and I expressed my opinion, as may be seen in Document C-21, GB-194.

This is an extract from the War Diary of the SKL.

DR. SIEMERS: It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 6.

RAEDER: It says here, on Page 3 of the German version, the next but last paragraph, under the date of 13 January: “Situation discussion with the Chief of the SKL.”

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. C-21 was not entirely translated by the Prosecution. This document may be found in my document book under Exhibit Number Raeder-69, and I should like to submit it herewith. It is in Document Book 3, Page 62.

THE PRESIDENT: Document Book 3 only goes to 64, is that not right? It must be Document Book 4.

DR. SIEMERS: There must be a mistake in the document book then. At first, due to an oversight, the table of contents was only completed as far as 64 by the Translation Section, but since that time it has been corrected and supplemented. It is in Document Book 4, Page 317.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Page 317, at the top.

DR. SIEMERS: [Turning to the defendant.] Please comment on this document.

RAEDER: In the next but last paragraph, it says:

“In complete agreement with this point of view, the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff is therefore also of the opinion that the most favorable solution would doubtless be the maintenance of the present situation which, if strictest neutrality is exercised by Norway, will permit the safe use of Norwegian territorial waters for the shipping vital to Germany’s war effort without the attempt being made on the part of England to seriously endanger this sea lane.” (Document Number Raeder-69)

I maintained this point of view when reporting to Hitler. In that report I first mentioned the intelligence reports which we had at hand. Then I described the dangers which might result to us from a British occupation of bases on the Norwegian coast and might affect our entire warfare, dangers which I considered tremendous. I had the feeling that such an occupation would gravely prejudice and imperil the whole conduct of our war.

If the British occupied bases in Norway, especially in the South of Norway, they would be able to dominate the entrance to the Baltic Sea from those points, and also flank our naval operations from the Helgoland Bight and from the Elbe, Jade and Weser. The second outlet which we had was also gravely imperiled, affecting the operations of battleships as well as the courses of our merchantmen.

In addition to that, from their air bases in Norway, they might endanger our air operations, the operations of our pilots for reconnaissance in the North Sea or for attacks against England.

Furthermore, from Norway they could exert strong pressure on Sweden, and that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that the supplies of ore from Sweden would have been hindered or stopped by purely political pressure. Finally, the export of ore from Narvik to Germany could have been stopped entirely, and it is known how much Germany depended on supplies of ore from Sweden and Norway. They might even have gone so far—and we learned about this subsequently that such plans were discussed—as to attack and destroy the ore deposits at Lulea, or to seize them.

All of these dangers might become decisive factors in the outcome of the war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best thing for us would be to have strict neutrality on the part of Norway, I also called his attention to the dangers which would result to us from an occupation of the Norwegian coast and Norwegian bases, for there would have been lively naval operations near the Norwegian coast in which the British, even after our occupation of bases, would try to hamper our ore traffic from Narvik. A struggle might ensue which we, with our inadequate supply of surface vessels, would be unable to cope with in the long run.

Therefore, at that time I did not make any proposal that we should occupy Norway or that we should obtain bases in Norway. I only did my duty in telling the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht about this grave danger which was threatening us, and against which we might have to use emergency measures for our defense. I also pointed out to him that possible operations for the occupation of Norwegian bases might be very expensive for us. In the course of later discussions I told him that we might even lose our entire fleet. I would consider it a favorable case if we were to lose only one-third, something which actually did happen later on.

There was, therefore, no reason for me to expect that I would gain prestige by such an enterprise—I have been accused of this ambition by the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite might easily result.

DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that these things may be seen in documents which date from the time of the war, one of which is Exhibit Number Raeder-69, of 13 January 1940, which has just been handed over. This document is a study, and it is claimed that this study is based on the consideration that if England were to have the bases in Norway, the situation would be impossible for the conduct of the war by Germany and such a situation could be prevented only if we forestalled England by occupying Norway ourselves. What the witness has just said is stated in exactly the same way in the War Diary.

In the same connection, I should like to refer to the document of the Prosecution, Document C-66, GB-81, which may be found in British Document Book 10a, Page 35. This document is dated 10 January 1944. May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the fact that there, under the code name “Weserübung” (Weser Maneuver)—that was the name covering this action—the substance of the statements the witness has just made is to be found. I do not wish to read all of them since we would lose valuable time thereby.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean C-66? That is about the Plan Barbarossa. Is that the one you mean?

DR. SIEMERS: The last page, under the heading “Weserübung,” Page 39 of the English document book. Mention is made there of the letter by Admiral Carls, spoken of by the witness, and of his thoughts in connection with this matter. In the German original there is the heading, “Appendix 2.”

A clearer version is found in Document Raeder-69, since that dates from January 1940, 3 months later, and in the meantime new reports had come in. This, on the other hand, is a description dating from October 1939.

[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, I must once more refer to Document C-122, which you have already mentioned.

The Prosecution, in that document, accuses you of saying:

“The Chief of SKL deems it necessary to tell the Führer as soon as possible of the ideas of the SKL on the possibility of expanding the sphere of operations in the North.”

They think they may conclude therefrom that your primary thought was to expand the operational sphere of the Navy.

RAEDER: I have already said that by the possibility of expansion of the operational zone to the North I meant an expansion of British operations and its consequences, and also the possibility of our forestalling this, thus gaining bases which would be of certain importance to us.

DR. SIEMERS: What did Hitler reply at this discussion on 10 October 1939?

RAEDER: Hitler had not yet concerned himself with this question. The question was very far from his mind, for he knew very little about matters of naval warfare. He always remarked that he did not have an over-all picture of these things, and therefore felt somewhat uncertain. He said that he would deal with this question and that I should leave the notes with him, which I had worked out on the basis of statements made by the SKL, so that he might use them as a basis for his deliberations on this problem.

It was typical and really speaks very much against the character of the conspiracy, that on this occasion Hitler, when confronted with the problem of Norway, did not say a single word about the fact that previously, the last time evidently in the summer of that year, he had already dealt with Norwegian questions prompted by Rosenberg. I gather from a document which I saw for the first time here that on 20 June 1939, Rosenberg had submitted to the Führer a comprehensive report about his connections with Norwegian political circles, but I heard of these connections for the first time on 11 December.

It would have been a matter of course for me if the Führer, who was dealing with Norwegian strategical matters, had told me on this occasion: “I have such and such information about Norwegian matters.” But he did not do that—there was always a considerable lack of collaboration. The Führer told me that we should await the arrival of further reports and that he would deal with these questions.

DR. SIEMERS: In the subsequent period of October and November, up until 11 December, did you discuss this question with Hitler again?

RAEDER: No, the question was not discussed at all during those months, but in September Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, who had first been appointed assistant attaché in Oslo and later, naval attaché, gave me further reports at that time about conditions in Norway, and so did the intelligence service. He told me of reports which were circulating there about a possible British landing. Later on Kapitän Schreiber was actually my chief collaborator in these Norwegian problems, and he showed a particular understanding of the whole situation.

DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-107, an affidavit of the naval attaché who has just been mentioned, Richard Schreiber. This may be found in my Document Book 5, Page 464.

According to that document, Schreiber was drafted on 7 September 1939 as a reserve officer and was sent to Oslo as a naval attaché. He states that he held that post there since the autumn of 1939.

With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read a portion of this, under I, on Page 465, at the bottom.

THE PRESIDENT: We told you that we had read all these documents which were objected to. We let in this document, so it is not necessary for you to read it again.

DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then in this connection, may I refer to the first part of this affidavit, Part I?

Mr. President, I should like to point out a small but misleading error in translation on Page 466. In the second paragraph, second line, the word “deutsch,” (German) is missing: “...there were clear directives of the German Foreign Office that Norwegian neutrality should be particularly respected by the Germans...” In the English text it says: “of the Foreign Office.” It should read “of the German Foreign Office.” I should be very grateful if this mistake would be rectified.

[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, you know the affidavit given by Schreiber?

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Different reports are contained therein. You have already referred to them in part. Did any additional special reports come in during those 2 months? Was Narvik mentioned in addition to the other ports already mentioned?

RAEDER: As far as I remember it was Kapitän Schreiber who expressly mentioned Narvik for the first time. Kapitän Schreiber had very quickly made himself acquainted with conditions there. He had established good connections in Norwegian circles. A confirmation of all that I had known up to that point came on 11 December.

DR. SIEMERS: Now, would you please describe your meeting with Quisling on 11 December 1939?

RAEDER: May I first ask whether the Documents 004-PS and 007-PS, which I believe were submitted by the Prosecution, may be used in this connection? For example, the minutes of the conference of 11 and 12 December, an accompanying letter by Rosenberg referring to these minutes, and similar matters?

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I believe that you will be permitted to use these documents. But since they are known you only need to mention the points that you remember.

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: On this occasion I should merely like to ask whether you did not know the documents by Rosenberg, 004-PS and 007-PS?

RAEDER: No, I did not know those documents.

DR. SIEMERS: Did you see them for the first time here?

RAEDER: I saw them for the first time here. But the reports contained in these documents were already known to us at that time as is proved by the dates of the documents.

DR. SIEMERS: Please tell us only what you heard at that time from Quisling.

RAEDER: Up until 11 December I had neither connections with Herr Rosenberg—except for the fact that I had seen him on occasion—nor, above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about whom I had heard nothing up to that time.

On 11 December my Chief of Staff, Schulte-Mönting, reported to me that Major Quisling, a former Norwegian Minister of War, had arrived from Oslo. He was asking for an interview with me through a Herr Hagelin, because he wished to tell me about Norwegian conditions.

Herr Hagelin had been sent to my chief of staff by Herr Rosenberg. Rosenberg had already known Hagelin for some time as I have mentioned before. Since reports from such a source on Norwegian conditions seemed to be of great value to me, I declared myself ready to receive Herr Quisling.

He arrived on the same morning and reported to me at length about the conditions in Norway, with special reference to the relations of the Norwegian Government to England and the reports on the intention of England to land in Norway, and he characterized the whole situation as especially critical for, according to his reports, the danger seemed to be imminent. He tried to fix a date. He thought it should occur before 10 January, because then a favorable political situation would arise.

I told him that I was not really concerned with the political situation, but I would try to arrange to have him give his information to the Führer. I would be concerned only with the military and strategic situation, and in that connection I could tell him right away that it would not be possible to take any measures from 11 December until 10 January, first because the time was too short and secondly because it was winter.

I considered his expositions to be of such importance that I told him I would try to arrange for him to report to the Führer personally, so that these reports would reach and influence him directly.

Then on the 12th—that is on the next day—I went to Hitler and informed him of the conversation between Quisling and me, and I asked him to receive Quisling personally so that he might have a personal impression of Quisling. On this occasion I told him—and this is written down in one of the documents—that in cases of this kind one would have to be especially cautious, since one could not know to what degree such a party leader would try to further the interest of his party. Therefore our investigations would have to be especially careful. And I again called the attention of the Führer to the fact that an attempt to occupy Norway would bring with it greatest risks as well as certain disadvantages for the future situation. In other words, I carefully presented both sides of the picture in a neutral manner.

Hitler then decided to receive Quisling together with Hagelin on one of the following days. The two gentlemen then were obviously in touch with Rosenberg. I believe they stayed with him, and Rosenberg sent me, by letter, a record of a meeting which had apparently been drawn up by Quisling and Hagelin and also a description of Quisling’s personality.

In this letter, which is here as a document but which was not read by the Prosecution, it says specifically that Rosenberg knew what the political conditions were but that, of course, he would have to leave the military side entirely to me since I was the competent authority on that.

DR. SIEMERS: If it please the High Tribunal, in this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Raeder-67, to be found in my Document Book 4, Page 309. That is the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder dated 13 December 1939, which was not mentioned by the Prosecution. The Prosecution merely mentioned the appendix mentioned in the letter—that is, a note by Rosenberg, under Number C-65, the same as GB-85. According to its contents C-65 belongs to Exhibit Raeder-67.

THE PRESIDENT: You say there was another besides Raeder-67 which you were referring to?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes; I am referring to Raeder-67.

THE PRESIDENT: I got that. But you said some other document as well.

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the document submitted by the Prosecution, C-65, and that is an appendix to this letter; the two belong together. The latter document, C-65, is to be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 33. If these two documents are taken together, it can be seen that the political side is not mentioned in either document; and this explains what the witness meant when he said that he was not concerned with the political side of the question but only with the military side. It is for that reason that Rosenberg had sent it to him.

THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be a good time to break off.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the case of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, counsel and representatives of the Prosecution have been conferring with respect to his application for documents. We have agreed on a great number, but there are 20 upon which we are unable to agree.

THE PRESIDENT: 20?

MR. DODD: 20. I think we could do it in 30 minutes if the Tribunal will set some time aside; it might take a little more. Sir David has reminded me that the translators are waiting on us to go ahead with their translation work.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think the best thing would be to take it tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock.

MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. It has been suggested also that the case of Seyss-Inquart precede that of Defendant Von Papen. I understand that is the wish of the counsel, and it is very satisfactory to us as well.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. SIEMERS: We have to refer briefly to Document 1809-PS, the Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. It is GB-88 in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 289.

May I first ask when were the plans for the occupation of Norway drafted?

RAEDER: I may say that on the basis of the conference which Quisling had with the Führer in my presence on 14 December the Führer ordered the OKW to deal with the matter and study it. The Führer had two more conferences with Quisling on 16 and 18 December at which I was not present. The matter was then handled by the OKW according to the directives and an initial plan known as “North” was drafted. Document C-21, which I have mentioned before, shows that this Plan North was received by SKL on 13 January and then, in the course of January, the date 27 January was mentioned, the draft of a directive for the Plan North was made. That draft was made in the OKW in the usual way. Kapitän zur See Krancke as expert for the Navy took part in it. The directive was completed on 1 March 1940, and was issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meantime, a large number of reports had been received, and it was possible to use these as a basis for the drafting of the directive. These reports besides coming from Kapitän Schreiber now also came direct from Quisling, who sent them to the Führer. They mentioned the preparatory work carried out by the English and the French—special mention was made of the Navy Attaché Kermarrec—in Norwegian ports for finding out the possibilities of landing, measurements of quays, and the height of the bridges between Narvik and the Swedish border and similar things.

These reports which reached us showed clearly that within a reasonable time a landing was intended. Also political reports reached us which Hagelin received through his connections in Norwegian circles, reports which in part came directly from members of the Storting—and from members of the Government and their entourage.

All of these reports confirmed that the pretext of aid for Finland in the dispute between Finland and Russia played a certain role. The danger was discussed that England under pretext of aid for Finland would proceed to a bloodless occupation of Norway. The directive for the case Norway, therefore, was issued on 1 March. In the further course of the month of March more reports were received. In the meantime, the Altmark incident had occurred, and it was observed by Hagelin too that the behavior of the Norwegian commander was a pretense, and it was clear that in the case of any encroachment on the part of Great Britain, the Norwegian Government would protest only on paper.

DR. SIEMERS: You said just now the directive is dated 1 March. This is correct. The Prosecution submitted a quotation of 5 March from Document 1809-PS. That is an entry in Jodl’s Diary: “1500 hours big conference with the three commanders-in-chief regarding Weserübung. Field Marshal, having no knowledge about plans, is furious.” How is it possible, Admiral, that Reich Marshal Göring had not been consulted at a time when the directive was already issued?

RAEDER: I cannot explain that at all. I had no authority to speak about it and I cannot say why he was not consulted.

DR. SIEMERS: It is in the nature of conspiracy that the second man in the Reich would be informed about it from the beginning. Has he not ever spoken to you about that matter?

RAEDER: No, not that I remember, but that shows how little, especially in the Führer’s entourage, one can speak of a conspiracy. The Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, also was not present during any of the Quisling conferences or receptions and I had no authority, to speak to him about these matters.

DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to know your position regarding Jodl’s entry of 13 March, in which he stated: “Führer does not give the order for ‘W’ (Weserübung). He is still trying to find a justification.”

I ask you to explain these words to us as you understand them.

RAEDER: Yes. The English translation as far as I can remember says “Looking for an excuse.” But he needed neither justification nor excuse, because in the first paragraph of the directive of 1 March—that is to say, 2 weeks before that—he had stated what circumstances made it necessary to occupy Norway and Denmark with certain forces of the Wehrmacht. British encroachments in Scandinavia and the Baltic were to be prevented thereby, our ore deposits in Sweden safeguarded, and the bases against England for the Navy and the Air Force were to be expanded.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that is the Document C-174; that is, GB-89, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 113. That is the directive for case “Weserübung” of 1 March 1940, which as the witness has mentioned, already contains the justification for it.

May it please the Tribunal, to prove that the information received by the witness through the intelligence service of Admiral Canaris, through Kapitän Schreiber and so on, is objective and in agreement with facts, may I be permitted to submit several documents—and that Exhibit Number Raeder-75 from the White Book dated 17 February 1940, which mentions the landing of British troops in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik, and several appendices to it, which show the trends of thoughts at that time in regard to the Swedish ore; Document Exhibit Raeder-77...

THE PRESIDENT: This is 75, Pages 43 and 44?

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Not page, but Exhibit Raeder-75. It is Page 340. Document Book 4.

Then Exhibit Number Raeder-77, also from the White Book: “The French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs Daladier to the French Ambassador in London, Corbin.”

In Document Book 4, Page 352. I have seen that there is a mistake in the English document book. On Page 353 the heading is missing or rather on Page 354. I may point out that this document bears the date 21 February 1940. That is contained in the original document under the heading “Intervention in Scandinavia.” It concerns the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports, et cetera, and mentions again the question of the Swedish ore.

Then I come to the Document Exhibit Raeder-78; Document Book 4, Page 357, an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff of 4 March in which in connection with the case of the Altmark it is explained that a defense by Norway against British military action is not possible.

Then Exhibit Raeder-79, Document Book 4, Page 359, note by the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin. Here also there is a mistake in the translation. The heading of the document was omitted on Page 360. I would be grateful if the Tribunal would note that the original document bears the date 10 March 1940. It is top secret and is based on the fact that the general plan for armed intervention in Finland existed since 16 January and therefore as a precautionary measure the ports and airfields on the Norwegian coast should be occupied. I refer to the remaining contents of document.

Then may I submit Exhibit Number Raeder-80, a report about negotiations of the Scandinavian Commission of the Inter-Allied Military Study Commission of 11 March 1940, top secret, concerning landing at Narvik.

[Turning to the defendant.] Then, Admiral, we are finished with Norway. I believe you said already that the reports increased considerably in the month of March. When did Hitler give the final order for the occupation?

RAEDER: At the end of March or beginning of April. I cannot recall the exact date.

DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient.

RAEDER: May I also mention a particularly important report which I remember now. Quisling reported in February that Lord Halifax had told the Norwegian Ambassador in London that an operation on the part of the British for the acquisition of bases in Norway was planned for the near future. That report also reached us at that time. I should like to add, as I emphasized before, that being fully conscious of my responsibility I always tried to show the Führer both sides of the picture and that the Führer would have to be guided by my documentary proof when deciding, to take or refrain from taking that tremendous step. But that does not mean to say that because I pointed out to my Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces that particular danger, I in any way decline to accept responsibility. Of course, I am in some measure responsible for the whole thing. Moreover, I have been accused because in a letter submitted here under C-155 I had told my officers’ corps that I was proud of the way in which this extraordinarily dangerous enterprise had been executed. I should like to confirm this, because I believe I was entitled to be proud that the Navy had carried out that operation with such limited means and in the face of the entire British fleet; I still stick to that.

DR. SIEMERS: Did reports reach the SKL in March about violations of the neutrality of Norway? That is incidents in territorial waters?

RAEDER: Yes. In the second half of March repeated attacks were made by British planes and naval forces against our merchant ships bringing the Swedish ore down from Narvik.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection may I submit some more documents? Exhibit Raeder-81, Document Book 5, Page 372, War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff which contains several entries showing that towards the end these incidents became more and more frequent and that the Norwegian neutrality was violated by British air and naval forces. As that document is known there is no need to read anything from it.

Then Exhibit Raeder-82 in Document Book 5, Page 377, also War Diary of 27 March, also concerning violations of neutrality. Furthermore, Exhibit Raeder-83, Page 379, a draft resolution of the sixth session of the Supreme Council, dated 28 March 1940, which was already mentioned yesterday. It deals with vital interests from the standpoint of international law and with the laying of mines in territorial waters on 5 April.

Then Exhibit Raeder-84, Page 384, and Exhibit Raeder-85, Page 386, both of which are documents from the White Book. May I only point out that it mentions that the first transport is to leave on J.1. day, that is actually on 5 April; in other words, 4 days before the occupation by Germany.

Exhibit Raeder-86 is an excerpt from the War Diary, of which I ask you to take official notice and which concerns the chartering by England of 90 percent of the Norwegian tankers.

To conclude Norway, may I ask you to look at two Documents, C-151 and C-115. Those are Exhibits GB-91 and GB-90, respectively, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, on Pages 106 and 62. The dates are 30 March 1940 and 4 April 1940. The documents show that the ships which were to carry out the landing should carry the British flag for camouflage reasons. The Prosecution uses that document also to support its accusation.

[Turning to the defendant.] What do you say about it?

RAEDER: That is quite a regular ruse of war, that warships carry a foreign flag. A requisite for the legality of that act, however, is that at the moment of an enemy action, the moment fire is opened, their own flag must be hoisted in time. That has always been done in the German Navy, especially in the case of our auxiliary cruisers, which frequently sailed under a foreign flag in order to avoid being reported by merchant ships, but which always lowered that flag in time. That is a matter of honor. It must be added that in this case, as the War Diary shows...

DR. SIEMERS: 8 April.

RAEDER: ...that on 8 April, on account of certain considerations, we rescinded that order, because we had the report that an English action was under way, and we feared that complications would arise from that. So this order was not carried out in the long run. I believe the document can be found which contains that.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I submit, in this connection, Exhibit Number Raeder-89 (Document Raeder-89), Document Book 5, Page 400, where we find under 8 April: “The previous order is rescinded, the British flag is not to be used.”

RAEDER: You also asked about Document C-115, which says that the blockade runners camouflaged as merchant ships with dimmed lights should enter Oslo Fjord unobtrusively. This too is quite a regular ruse of war against which, from the legal point of view, no objection can be made. Likewise there is nothing to be said against English names given in answer to signals of identity.

I did not finish answering one question because I was interrupted. That was the question concerning the expression “justification” or “excuse” in the War Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. As I have shown, it was not a question of the justification, which had been expressed a long time before by Hitler, but I believe that I am right in saying that the question was that the diplomatic note which, at the moment of the execution of the enterprise, had to be presented to the Norwegian and Danish governments, giving the reason for his action, had not yet been drafted, especially as he had not yet spoken to the Foreign Minister at that time at all. The Foreign Minister received the information, as he has said himself, only on 3 April.

DR. SIEMERS: With this I should like to conclude the question of the occupation of Norway. May I still submit the approved document, Exhibit Raeder-66, which was approved for the purpose of argument? It is an opinion expressed by Dr. Mosler, and it can be found in Document Book 4, Page 291; and in this connection, concerning the use of flags, may I draw special attention to Figure 7, Page 304, from which we may see the legal reasoning. Furthermore, may I submit Exhibit Raeder-90, Document Book 5, Page 402, and the series of documents as far as they are approved: Exhibit Raeder-91, Admiral Darlan to the French War Minister Daladier on 12 April 1940; Exhibit Raeder-92, Page 412. This document contains the English-French note to the Norwegian Government of 8 April 1940. I have submitted that document because this note expresses the same legal points of view as expressed in the legal opinion of Dr. Mosler.