Читать книгу Politics and Scepticism in La Mothe Le Vayer - Ioana Manea - Страница 11

Despite arousing the admiration that we have just seen, Sextus Empiricus is not the only sceptical philosopher whose philosophy attracts La Mothe Le Vayer. Although they have significantly less occurrences than the author of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, the figures representative of the New Academy like Carneades and Arcesilas are not absent from the works of our author. As far as he is concerned, Arcesilas is mentioned with respect to his refusal to write books, which is put down to the suspension of judgement and the moderation of the mind.1 Regarding Carneades, he is mentioned especially because he does not deny individuals the possibility to reach a certain degree of knowledge:

Although we are on this natural slope towards its worse part, we do not cease to argue following Carneades the founder of this famous Academy that if all the things are incomprehensible to our spirit which is too limited to know them, it does not mean that all these things are absolutely uncertain […]

Tant y a qu’encore que nous soyons dans cette pente naturelle vers la pire partie, nous ne laissons pas de soutenir après Carnéade le fondateur de cette renommée Académie, que si toutes choses sont incompréhensibles à notre esprit trop limité pour les connaître, ce n’est pas à dire, que toutes ces mêmes choses soient absolument incertaines, […]2

Obviously, by using the personal pronoun “we”, La Mothe Le Vayer includes himself among the followers of Carneades. Hence, he is less sensitive about the possible difference between Arcesilas and Carneades with respect to the incongruity between the suspension of judgement and the “incomprehensible”, than about the consequences deriving from the existence of the latter, which consist in the acceptance of the plausible.3 In doing so, he seems to ignore that in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus makes a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the followers of scepticism and, on the other hand, the followers of the New Academy.4 Because of what has been considered as their “negative dogmatism”, which consists in defending the impenetrable character of the truth, but which leaves place for the acceptance of the plausible, the disciples of the Academic scepticism to which Carneades belongs are members of a philosophical school which is neither that of the dogmatic philosophers, nor that of the sceptics.

Unlike his master Sextus, La Mothe Le Vayer does not have scruples about reconciling Pyrrhonism and the New Academy within a philosophy that he calls simply sceptique. Despite being, at certain moments, compared to Buridan’s ass, the indecision is not cultivated by the sceptic up to the point where it would force him to give up appeasing his hunger:

The sceptical philosopher pays attention to everything and examines all but without corrupting his taste and without persisting in anything, remaining an indifferent judge of so many dishes and so many diverse sauces, like the most prominent of the dinner guests, in the middle of a table that he finds equally well served everywhere.

Le Sceptique porte sa considération et donne atteinte à tout, mais c’est sans pervertir son goût et sans s’opiniâtrer à rien, demeurant juge indifférent de tant de mets et de tant de sauces diverses, comme la plus notable personne du convive, au milieu d’une table qu’elle trouve également bien servie partout.5

Therefore, the suspension of judgement does not prevent the sceptical philosopher from looking into and, up to a certain point, appreciating the different theories that are meant to explain the phenomena of the world. It is even thanks to Pyrrhonian indifference that the sceptical philosopher, instead of persisting in the defence of a single idea, can consider them all as likely to offer a banquet for the mind, in reference to Plato’s eponymous work. For instance, in the Lettre CXXIV. Du Prix de la Sceptique, La Mothe Le Vayer argues both for the individuals’ incapacity to reach truth, which pertains to the Academic tradition and the practice of an intellectual approach which, deriving from Pyrrhonism, consists in searching ceaselessly for the truth.

On the one hand, by relying on the well-known distinction made by Plato between the two worlds, the sensitive and the intelligible, the writer reduces the knowledge attained by humankind to the opinion which, by definition, does not aspire to be true, but only acceptable: “The unchanging truth, according to Plato himself, is kept only for the intelligible world; while ours, which is the sensitive one, needs to content itself with the opinion, from which our mind cannot draw certain conclusions” (“La vérité constante, selon Platon même, est réservée pour le monde intelligible ; quant au nôtre, qui est le sensible, il faut, qu’il se contente de l’opinion, dont notre esprit ne peut tirer de certaines conclusions ”).6 On the other hand, given the fallible and uncertain character of the knowledge that people can acquire, the philosophy which is the most suitable for their condition is the one that, in reference to the significance given to scepticism by Sextus, is called “zetetic, that is which enquires and informs itself about everything, without becoming inseparably attached to anything, unwilling to mistake phenomena for realities, or appearances for certainties” (“zététique, c’est-à-dire qui s’enquête et s’informe de tout, sans s’attacher inséparablement à rien, ne voulant pas prendre des phénomènes pour des réalités, ni des apparences pour des certitudes”).7

Otherwise saying, La Mothe Le Vayer is not concerned about the incompatibility between the Academic philosophy which emphasises the inaccessible character of the truth and the Pyrrhonian or zetetic philosophy, which never stops searching for it. Moreover, by choosing the “rest” (“repos”) which comes from the épokhè as the purpose of a philosophical approach that he simply describes as “sceptical”, La Mothe Le Vayer remains foreign to the fact that the pretence to lead to the tranquillity of mind is the main difference between the Pyrrhonians and the Academics.8 While the affinity for Pyrrhon’s philosophy opens the way for the tranquillity of mind, the affinity for Carneades’ school results in the practice of the plausible.

As Orasius, the author’s spokesperson, explains it, the plausible of the sceptical philosophers holds the place assigned to truth by the dogmatic philosophers: “But you have to know that when we call something plausible, we do not understand to make it resemble any truth positively established by us, but only what is regarded as true by others” (“Mais sachez que quand nous nommons quelque chose vraisemblable, nous n’entendons pas lui donner une ressemblance avec aucune vérité positivement établie par nous, mais seulement avec ce qui est réputé vrai par les autres”).9 This means that, far from having ambitions that can be compared to those of the dogmatic philosophers, who are exclusively interested in the truth and certainty, the sceptical philosophers are satisfied, through the plausible, with the “appearances of a reasonable discourse” (“les apparences d’un discours raisonnable”).10 Thus, according to La Mothe Le Vayer, they show themselves more lucid and more honest than the dogmatic philosophers who, by pledging access to truth, make promises that they are unable to keep:

The philosophers’ most serious axioms only succeed and act on our soul (I am compelled to confess it) in a way which is similar to the recipes of the quack doctors on our bodies. It is a miracle and a pure chance when the latter work as we were promised; and everything that the subtlest philosophy can provide us is something somehow plausible, which it tries to make accepted as unchanging truths.

Les plus sérieux axiomes des philosophes ne réussissent et n’agissent sur notre âme, (je suis contraint de le confesser) qu’à la façon des recettes des charlatans sur nos corps. C’est une merveille et un pur hasard quand celles-ci opèrent comme on se l’est promis ; et tout ce que la plus subtile philosophie nous peut donner, c’est je ne sais quoi de vraisemblable qu’elle veut faire passer pour de constantes vérités.11

Obviously, the common element that makes possible the comparison between the philosophers who pretend to look after the mind and the charlatans who pretend to take care of the body is the deceit. Just like the false medicines of the pseudo-healers, whose healing action is, in fact, submitted to the unforeseen turn of events, even the most solid of the philosophers’ theories succeed only randomly in reaching an explanation that has a certain connection with the substance of the phenomena. Additionally, the distance between the ambitions and the achievements of the dogmatic philosophies brings about a ludicrousness from which none of their adepts is spared. The character of Acamatius, “who was portrayed by Suidas and who, while being nothing but a fool from the town of Heliopolis, had himself called the philosopher par excellence” (“dont Suidas nous a donné le portrait, et qui n’étant qu’un idiot de la ville de Héliopolis s’y faisait nommer par excellence le philosophe”), is certainly emblematic of the disciples of the dogmatic schools, whose slightest follower is often neither “less boastful” (“moins fanfaron”), nor “less impertinent” (“moins impertinent”)12 than he was.

As far as he is concerned, thanks to the practice of the plausible, La Mothe Le Vayer is preserved from the unfortunate consequences of the dogmatic philosophies. The plausible that asserts itself against the background of the suspension of judgement allows the sceptical philosophers to remain halfway between the “self-assurance of the pendants” (“l’affirmation des pédants”) and the “rough and shameful ignorance of the fools” (“l’ignorance honteuse et brutale des idiots”).13 Without being hostile to knowledge, La Mothe Le Vayer attacks the self-confidence of the dogmatic philosophers who, while pretending to reach the truth by means of their theories, conceal the uncertainty that is inseparable from philosophy. Consequently, the ignorance that our author claims does not come from the absence of all knowledge, but from the understanding of the limits that hinder the human access to knowledge. Through an implied reference to Nicholas of Cusa, La Mothe Le Vayer describes his ignorance as being “learned and praiseworthy” (“docte et louable”), which by “reflecting upon itself, can become aware of what prevents it from knowing” (“faisant réflexion sur elle-même, peut remarquer ce qui l’empêche de savoir”).14 Proportionate to the capacities that individuals possess in order to reach science, the plausible spares the sceptics from falling into the extreme position that their adversaries reproach them and that consists in denying the mind every ability to know: “And as regards the understanding, we do not leave it devoid of any light, when we substitute the true with the plausible” (“Et pour le regard de l’entendement, nous ne le laissons pas non plus dépourvu de toute lumière, quand au lieu du vrai nous lui substituons le vraisemblable”).15