Читать книгу Los Desafíos Jurídicos de la Transición Energética - Isabel González Ríos - Страница 71

The ever-increasing amounts and sources of energy transiting the EU make expansion of the bloc’s energy grids a necessity. As already detailed above, Europe’s evolving energy production and consumption situation creates bottlenecks within grids that have to be eliminated, or at least minimised, a process that also requires greater interconnectivity between grids than currently exists. However, the expansion of the EU’s internal energy market is a complex undertaking and implementing energy transition solutions is not a linear process to success as there are major challenges and obstacles to overcome.

These challenges and obstacle are many and varied, including questions regarding the competences of the Commission, ACER and the national regulatory authorities as well as the influence network operators are able to exert. However, the ‘embrace’ of an apparently cooperative decisionmaking process should not diminish the fact that considerable economic interests are involved and such high stakes are often accompanied by unwanted pressures and problems.

The case of the Austrian-German-Luxembourgian joint-bidding zone is a striking example of an interaction between different regulators, regulations and goals that faced a common problem but resulted in an outcome that may see as a negative result. Some may hope that this separation will remain as an isolated episode in the ongoing development of the EU’s internal energy market, irrespective of whether this proves true or not, it is an example that not all the desired goals can be achieved and sometimes stepping forward to develop a ‘genuine EU internal energy market’ requires taking a step backward first.

1. I want to thank Mr. Ian Silver, Salzburg/Berlin, for his help preparing this text.

2. Depending on different scenarios: ZB Fraunhofer IWES (2015): Wie hoch ist der Stromverbrauch in der Energiewende? Energiepolitische Zielszenarien 2050 – Rückwirkungen auf den Ausbaubedarf von Windenergie und Photovoltaik; second proposal of the German transmission system operators, Netzentwicklungsplan Strom 2035, Version 2021, p. 30.

3. Second proposal of the German transmission system operators, Netzentwicklungs plan Strom 2035, Version 2021, p. 30.

4. See: second proposal of the German transmission system operators, Netzentwick lungsplan Strom 2035, Version 2021, p. 14.

5. Austrian Supreme Administrative Court (VwGH) 14.5. 1985, 84/07/0286.

6. Art 22 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018, OJ L 328 21.12.2018, p. 82.

7. Art 16 Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity, OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 125.

8. Rec 70 Directive (EU) 2018/2001.

9. They may be able to operate networks themselves: Art 16 (4) Directive (EU) 2019/944.

10. Art 16 (1) d Directive (EU) 2019/944; Art 22 (4) c Directive (EU) 2018/2001.

11. Art 2 No 65 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity, OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 54.

12. Art 16 (8) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

13. There are different values for the flow-based approach and the net transmission capacity approach (Rec 27 and 28 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943): While the net transmission capacity approach calculates the transport capacities on the basis of a reference point in time for a longer period of time, the load flow-based approach uses the currently planned feed-ins and loads to calculate the load on individual network elements.

14. Art 15 (2) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

15. Art 15 (2) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

16. Art 15 (3) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

17. Art 16 (9) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

18. Art 16 (3) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

19. Which is done in conjunction with consultations involving the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.

20. ECJ, 6.9. 2012, C-490/10, rec 67.

21. Calliess, in Calliess/Ruffert (ed), EUV/AEUV, 5. ed. (2016), Art 194 rec 17.

22. Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, OJ L 115, 25.4. 2013, p. 39.

23. Rec 22 Regulation (EU) No 347/2013.

24. Annex 1 no. 2 Regulation (EU) 347/2013.

25. Member States concerned: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia (1), Czech Republic, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

26. Member States concerned: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Sweden (the United Kingdom).

27. Art 1 (2) b Regulation (EU) 347/2013.

28. Managed since April 2021 by the new European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA).

29. Art 1 (2) c and d Regulation (EU) 347/2013.

30. Annex 1 no. 10 and 11 Regulation (EU) 347/2013.

31. Art 51 (1) Directive (EU) 2019/944.

32. See Art 51 Directive (EU) 2019/944.

33. Art 51 (3) Directive (EU) 2019/944.

34. Art 51 (2) Directive (EU) 2019/944.

35. See: second proposal of the German transmission system operators, Netzentwicklungsplan Strom 2035, Version 2021, p. 15.

36. Art 51 (1) Directive (EU) 2019/944.

37. Art 30 (1) b Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

38. Art 51 (4) Directive (EU) 2019/944.

39. Art 51 (1) Directive (EU) 2019/944 and Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 1.

40. Storr, S., „Investitionsverpflichtung auf Anforderung?“ (2012), in: Storr (ed.), „Neue Impulse für die Energiewirtschaft – Reform des Energierechts“ pp. 73-97.

41. Art 51 (7) Directive (EU) 2019/944.

42. Federal Plan for Infrastructure Act (Bundesbedarfsplangesetz vom 23. Juli 2013, BGBl. I S. 2543; 2014 I S. 148, 271, das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 25. Februar 2021, BGBl. I S. 298, geändert worden ist).

43. German Regulatory Agency (Bundesnetzagentur), press release from 28.12.2020 (last accessed online on 3 May 2021).

44. § 3 Federal Plan for infrastructure Act (Bundesbedarfsplangesetz).

45. German “Aktionsplan Gebotszone” (action plan bidding zone) 2019, p. 1.

46. Ibid p. 2.

47. Art 2 no. 26 Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

48. Franke, P., “DieAufgaben der Bundesnetzagentur in der Energiewende“, (2017), Recht der Umwelt, Umwelt & Technik, pp. 68 – 73.

49. Schanda, R., “Aufrechterhaltung der gemeinsamen Strompreiszone mit Deutschland - Wie wird das Match Österreich gegen Deutschland, ACER, Übertragungsnetzbetreiber und Regulierungsbehörden ausgehen?“ (2017) Zeitschrift für Technikrecht, p. 1-6.

50. ACER opinion 09-2015 on the compliance of NRAs’ decisions approving methods of cross-border capacity allocation in the CEE; inadmissibility of the appeal: EuG 29.6. 2017, T-63/16 (E-Control).

51. Answer of Mr. Arias Cañete in the name of the European Commission, Parliamentary questions, 11.11.2016, P-007266/2016.

52. Comprehensively: Storr, S.,“Trennung der deutsch-österreichischen Strompreiszone – Fortschritt oder Rückschritt in der Energieunion?“ (2018) Österreichische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 66-73.

53. Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing guidelines on capacity allocation and congestion management, OJ L 197, 25.7.2015, p. 24.

54. ACER, Board of Appeal, decision 17. 3.2017, A-001-2017.

55. ECJ, 24.10.2019, T-332/17 and 24.10.2019, T-333/17.

56. Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222.

57. Art 14 (1) 1 Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

58. In accordance with the requirements of Article 16 Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

59. Art 14 (1) 2 – 4 Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

60. Rec 29 Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

61. Rec 30 Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

62. Rec 31 Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

63. § 3a Stromnetzzugangsverordnung (Electricity Grid Access Regulation) 25. Juli 2005 (BGBl. I S. 2243), zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 3 des Gesetzes vom 21. Dezember 2020 (BGBl. I S. 3138).

64. König, C./Baumgart, M., „Der EU-Binnenmarkt und die einheitliche Stromgebotszone in Deutschland“ (2018) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 491-495.

65. Art 14 (3) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

66. This process may be initiated by ACER, one or more regulatory authorities or transmission system operators or the involved Member States in a capacity calculation region: Art 32 Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222.

67. Art 14 (2) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

68. Art 14 (5) Regulation (EU) 2019/943: The relevant transmission system operators have to submit a proposal for the methodology and assumptions that are to be used in the bidding zone review process. The relevant regulatory authorities have to arrive at a unanimous decision on the proposal. If they are unable to reach a unanimous decision, the competence is transferred to ACER.

69. Art 14 (6) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

70. For example, the German “Aktionsplan Gebotszone” (action plan bidding zone) 2019.

71. Art 15 (1) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

72. Art 15 (5) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

73. Rec 31 Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

74. Art 14 (8) Regulation (EU) 2019/943.