Читать книгу This Is Epistemology - J. Adam Carter - Страница 33

^2.70 Let's tie the threads together. Recall from earlier that we distinguished between two foundationalist views:

Cartesian foundationalism: something stops the regress of justification by constituting a justifier for our foundationally justified beliefs iff this is something distinct from a belief that provides the thinker with certainty that her foundational belief is true.

Modest foundationalism: something stops the regress of justification by constituting a justifier for our foundationally justified beliefs iff this is something distinct from a belief that provides the thinker with adequate albeit fallible support for her foundational belief.

We want to know whether experience can stop the regress of justification and provide us with non‐inferential justification for our perceptual beliefs. It might be a good idea to split this question into two parts.