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1 1 For discussions and defenses of liberal foundationalism, see Huemer (2001), Pryor (2000), and Schellenberg (2013).

2 2 See, however, Sosa (2017, chapter 1) for a reading of Descartes according to which this prescription should be qualified as one concerning judgments, as opposed to what Sosa calls functional beliefs. For more on this distinction, see Sosa (2015).

3 3 James (1956) tells us that we have two goals as “would‐be knowers,” which is to seek out truth and avoid error. To think about the kind of risk that is acceptable or unacceptable, we could imagine attaching “weights” to accuracy and inaccuracy and that this can help us determine the degree of risk that is acceptable. This idea has been developed recently by Easwaran (2016) and Dorst (forthcoming). On their view, it is rational to believe what is sufficiently probable because believing what is sufficiently probable (even if it is not certain) can maximize expected epistemic value. For a helpful introduction to rationality and norms for coping with uncertainty, see Peterson (2009).

4 4 For a detailed discussion of perceptual recognitional abilities, see Millar (2008).

5 5 Of course, in some rare cases what one hallucinates turns out to be so – these cases are called “matching hallucinations.”

6 6 Naïve realism is also known as “direct” realism. For sympathetic discussions of naïve realism, see Brewer (2011), Fish (2009), McDowell (1994), and Logue (2012). For a helpful overview of the philosophical problems surrounding perception, see Crane and French (2015).

7 7 See, in particular, Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), in which he defends a form of what is called “empirical idealism.”

8 8 See Robinson (1994, p. 32).

9 9 See Goldman (1986). This view is discussed in detail in Chapter 9, which focuses on the wider debate between internalism and externalism about epistemic justification.

10 10 Barnes (1944, p. 98).

11 11 In fact, an appreciation of this very point about color exclusion arguably marked an important shift in Wittgenstein's thinking between his early and later works. See, for example, Wittgenstein (1929, p. 167). For helpful discussion on this point, see Sievert (1989).

12 12 Price (1950, p. 246).

13 13 Huemer (2001, p. 154).

14 14 See McDowell (1994) for a defense of the disjunctive view of experience. For a helpful overview of the vast recent literature on disjunctivism, see Soteriou (2014).

15 15 See, in particular, Pritchard (2012b).

16 16 For a similar, albeit critical, articulation of this kind of view, see Sosa (1980, 8).

17 17 For a discussion of the Premise Principle, see Pryor (2005).

18 18 For important recent defenses, see McDowell (1994), Schellenberg (2013), and Siegel (2010).

19 19 This kind of argument figures prominently in Siegel's (2010) defense of the Content View.

20 20 This idea plays an important role in the internalism–externalism debate, the topic of Chapter 9. See Cohen (1984) and Conee and Feldman (2004) for defense. See Schellenberg (2013) and Williamson (2000) for criticism.