Читать книгу The Medallic History of the United States of America 1776-1876 - J. F. Loubat - Страница 27

Resolutions of Congress Voting Medals to General Wayne, to Lieutenant Colonel de Fleury, and to Major Stewart, etc.

In Congress Assembled.

Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of Congress be given to His Excellency General Washington for the vigilance, wisdom, and magnanimity with which he hath conducted the military operations of these States, and which are among many other signal instances manifested in his orders for the late glorious enterprize and successful attack on the enemy's fortress on the bank of Hudson's river.

Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of Congress be presented to Brigadier-General Wayne for his brave, prudent, and soldierly conduct in the spirited and well-conducted attack of Stony Point.

Resolved unanimously, That Congress entertain a proper sense of the good conduct of the officers and soldiers under the command of Brigadier-General Wayne, in the assault of the enemy's works at Stony Point, and highly commend the coolness, discipline, and firm intrepidity exhibited on that occasion.

Resolved unanimously, That Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury and Major Stewart, who by their situation in leading the two attacks had a more immediate opportunity of distinguishing themselves, have, by their personal achievements, exhibited a bright example to their brother soldiers, and merit in a particular manner the approbation and acknowledgment of the United States.

Resolved unanimously, That Congress warmly approve and applaud the cool determined spirit with which Lieutenant Gibbons and Lieutenant Knox led on the forlorn hope, braving danger and death in the cause of their country.

Resolved unanimously, That a medal, emblematical of this action, be struck:

That one of gold be presented to Brigadier-General Wayne, and a silver one to Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury and Major Stewart respectively.

Resolved unanimously, That brevets of captain be given to Lieutenant Gibbons and Lieutenant Knox.

That the brevet of captain be given to Mr. Archer, the bearer of the general's letter, and volunteer aid to Brigadier-General Wayne.

That Congress approve the promises of reward made by General Wayne, with the concurrence of the commander-in-chief, to the troops under his command.

That the value of the military stores taken at Stony Point be ascertained, and divided among the gallant troops by whom it was reduced, in such manner and proportion as the commander-in-chief shall prescribe.

Monday, July 26, 1779.

General Washington to the President of Congress.

New Windsor, half-past nine o'clock,

July 16, 1779.

To

the President of Congress.

Sir: I have the pleasure to transmit to Your Excellency the inclosed copy of a letter from Brigadier-General Wayne, which this moment came to hand. I congratulate Congress upon our success, and what makes it still more agreeable from the report of Captain Fishbourn, who brought me General Wayne's letter, the post was gained with but very inconsiderable loss on our part. As soon as I receive a particular account of the affair, I shall transmit it.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

Geo. Washington.

General Wayne to General Washington.

Stony Point, two o'clock a.m.,

July 16, 1779.

To

General Washington.

Dear General: The fort and garrison with Colonel Johnson are ours. Our officers and men behaved like men who are determined to be free.

Yours, most sincerely,

Anthony Wayne.

General Washington to the President of Congress.

New Windsor, July 20, 1779.

To

the President of Congress.

Sir: On the 16th instant I had the honour to inform Congress of a successful attack upon the enemy's post at Stony Point, on the preceding night, by Brigadier-General Wayne and the corps of light infantry under his command. The ulterior operations on which we have been engaged have hitherto put it out of my power to transmit the particulars of this interesting event. They will now be found in the inclosed report, which I have received from General Wayne. To the encomiums he has deservedly bestowed on the officers and men under his command, it gives me pleasure to add, that his own conduct throughout the whole of this arduous enterprize merits the warmest approbation of Congress. He improved upon the plan recommended by me, and executed it in a manner that does signal honour to his judgment and to his bravery. In a critical moment of the assault, he received a flesh wound in the head with a musket ball, but continued leading on his men with unshaken firmness.

I now beg leave, for the private satisfaction of Congress, to explain the motives which induced me to direct the attempt. In my former letters I have pointed out the advantages which the enemy derived from the possession of this post and the one on the opposite side, and the inconveniences resulting from it to us. To deprive them of the former, and to remove the latter, were sufficient inducements to endeavour to dispossess them. The necessity of doing something to satisfy the expectations of the people, and reconcile them to the defensive plan we are obliged to pursue, and to the apparent inactivity which our situation imposes upon us; the value of the acquisition in itself, with respect to the men, artillery, and stores, which composed the garrison; the effect it would have upon the successive operations of the campaign, and the check it would give to the immediate depredations of the enemy at the present season; all these motives concurred to determine me to the undertaking. The certain advantages of success, even if not so extensive as might be hoped, would, at all events, be very important; the probable disadvantages of a failure were comparatively inconsiderable, and, on the plan which was adopted, could amount to little more than the loss of a small number of men.

After reconnoitering the post myself, and collecting all the information I could get of its strength and situation, I found that, without hazarding a greater loss than we were able to afford, and with little likelihood of success, the attempt to carry it could only be by way of surprize. I therefore resolved on this mode, and gave my instructions to General Wayne accordingly, in hopes that Verplanck's Point might fall in consequence of the reduction of the other. Dispositions were made for the purpose, which unluckily did not succeed. The evening appointed for the attack, I directed Major-General McDougall to put two brigades under marching orders to be moved down toward Verplanck's, as soon as he should receive intelligence of the success of the attempt on this side, and requested General Wayne to let his despatches to me pass through General McDougall, that he might have the earliest advice of the event. But by some misconception, they came directly to headquarters, which occasioned a loss of several hours. The next morning Major-General Howe was sent to take the command of those troops, with orders to advance to the vicinity of the enemy's works, and open batteries against them. I was in hopes that this might either awe them, under the impression of what had happened on the other side, to surrender, or prepare the way for an assault. But some accidental delays, in bringing on the heavy cannon and intrenching tools necessary for an operation of this kind, unavoidably retarded its execution, till the approach of the enemy's main body made it too late. General Howe, to avoid being intercepted, found himself under the necessity of relinquishing his project and returning to a place of security. I did not unite the two attacks at the same time and in the same manner, because this would have rendered the enterprize more complex, more liable to suspicion, and less likely to succeed for want of an exact co-operation, which could hardly have been expected. When I came to examine the post at Stony Point, I found it would require more men to maintain it than we could afford, without incapacitating the army for other operations. In the opinion of the engineer, corresponding with my own and that of all the general officers present, not less than fifteen hundred men would be requisite for its defence; and, from the nature of the works, which were opened toward the river, a great deal of labour and expense must have been incurred, and much time employed to make them defensible by us. The enemy, depending on their shipping to protect their rear, had constructed the works solely against an attack by land. We should have had to apprehend equally an attack by water, and must have inclosed the post. While we were doing this, the whole army must have been in the vicinity, exposed to the risk of a general action, on terms which it would not be our interest to court, and too distant to assist in carrying on the fortifications at West Point, or to support them in case of necessity. These considerations made it a unanimous sentiment to evacuate the post, remove the cannon and stores, and destroy the works, which was accomplished on the night of the 18th, one piece of heavy cannon only excepted. For want of proper tackling within reach to transport the cannon by land, we were obliged to send them to the fort by water. The movements of the enemy's vessels created some uneasiness on their account, and induced me to keep one of the pieces for their protection, which finally could not be brought off without risking more for its preservation than it was worth. We also lost a galley, which was ordered down to cover the boats. She got under way on her return the afternoon of the 18th. The enemy began a severe and continued cannonade upon her, from which having suffered some injury she was run on shore, which disabled her from proceeding. As she could not be got afloat till late in the flood-tide, and one or two of the enemy's vessels under favour of the night passed above her, she was set on fire and blown up.

Disappointed in our attempt on the other side, we may lose some of the principal advantages hoped from the undertaking. The enemy may re-establish the post at Stony Point, and still continue to interrupt that communication. Had both places been carried, though we should not have been able to occupy them ourselves, there is great reason to believe the enemy would hardly have mutilated their main body a second time, and gone through the same trouble to regain possession of posts where they had been so unfortunate. But though we may not reap all the benefits which might have followed, those we do reap are very important. The diminution of the enemy's force, by the loss of so many men, will be felt in their present circumstances. The artillery and stores will be a valuable acquisition to us, especially in our scarcity of heavy cannon for the forts. The event will have a good effect upon the minds of the people, give our troops greater confidence in themselves, and depress the spirits of the enemy proportionably. If they resolve to re-establish the post, they must keep their force collected for the purpose. This will serve to confine their ravages within a narrower compass, and to a part of the country already exhausted. They must lose part of the remainder of the campaign in rebuilding the works; and when they have left a garrison for its defence, their main body, by being lessened, must act with so much the less energy, and so much the greater caution.

They have now brought their whole force up the river, and yesterday they landed a body at Stony Point. It is supposed not impossible that General Clinton may retaliate by a stroke upon West Point; and his having stripped New York and its dependencies pretty bare, and brought up a number of small boats, are circumstances that give a colour to the surmise. Though all this may very well be resolved into different motives, prudence requires that our dispositions should have immediate reference to the security of this post; and I have, therefore, drawn our force together, so that the whole may act in its defence on an emergency. To-morrow I shall remove my own quarters to the fort.

It is probable Congress will be pleased to bestow some marks of consideration upon those officers who distinguished themselves upon this occasion. Every officer and man of the corps deserves great credit; but there were particular ones, whose situation placed them foremost in danger, and made their conduct most conspicuous. Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury and Major Stewart commanded the two attacks. Lieutenants Gibbons and Knox commanded the advanced parties, or forlorn hope; and all acquitted themselves as well as possible. These officers have a claim to be more particularly noticed. In any other service promotion would be the proper reward, but in ours it would be injurious. I take the liberty to recommend in preference some honourary present, especially to the field-officers. A brevet captaincy to the other two, as it will have no operation in regimental rank, may not be amiss.

Congress will perceive that some pecuniary rewards were promised by General Wayne to his corps. This was done with my concurrence; and in addition to them, as a greater incitement to their exertions, they were also promised the benefit of whatever was taken in the fort. The artillery and stores are converted to the use of the public, but, in compliance with my engagements, it will be necessary to have them appraised, and the amount paid to the captors in money. I hope my conduct in this instance will not be disapproved. Mr. Archer, who will have the honour of delivering these despatches, is a volunteer aid to General Wayne, and a gentleman of merit. His zeal, activity, and spirit are conspicuous on every occasion.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Geo. Washington.

P.S. Congress may be at a loss what to do with Mr. Archer. A captain's brevet, or commission in the army at large, will be equal to his wishes; and he deserves encouragement on every account. Lest there should be any misapprehension as to what is mentioned about the manner of sending despatches through General McDougall, I beg leave to be more explicit. I directed General Wayne, when he marched from his ground, to send his despatches in the first instance to the officer of his baggage guard, left at the encampment from which he marched, who was to inform his messenger where I was to be found. I left word with this officer to forward the messenger to General McDougall, and I desired General McDougall to open the despatches. The messenger, who was Captain Fishbourn, came directly on, either through misconception in General Wayne, in the officer of the guard, or in himself.

I forgot to mention that there are two standards taken, one belonging to the garrison and one to the Seventeenth regiment; these shall be sent to Congress by the first convenient opportunity.