Читать книгу Confederate Military History - Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry - Страница 10

The acquisition of Louisiana was ‘an opportunity snatched from fate.’ This terse expression accurately defines the diplomacy by which Louisiana was acquired. The United States did not command the situation, but made skillful use of the opportunity. All the military power which the United States possessed in 1803, and all the diplomatic skill of her statesmen, would have been inadequate to create the conditions which resulted in the acquisition of Louisiana. Two simultaneous revolutions were necessary: a revolution in Europe and a revolution in America. Just in time, the French Revolution swept ‘like a meteor across the sky of Europe,’ so involving other nations that it might be called, with little impropriety, the great European Revolution. Simultaneously came the revolution of political parties in the United States.

Napoleon Bonaparte became First Consul of France, and Thomas Jefferson President of the United States. Thus, the two great minds of the world turned at the same time to Louisiana. Napoleon saw in it the means of obtaining a navy, of strengthening the French party in America, and of restraining the power of Great Britain. When the treaty was completed he said: ‘I have just given to England a maritime rival that will sooner or later humble her pride:’ Jefferson saw in it the first giant stride of his country to the Pacific ocean, and the permanent triumph of the political party of which he was the father. It was, indeed, ‘an opportunity snatched from fate.’

Yet, when the minds of these two great men turned to Louisiana its transfer to the United States was not the first thought that occurred to either of them. Napoleon first looked to it as a colony for France. When Jefferson learned of its acquisition by Napoleon it excited his gravest apprehensions. His first thought was to remove the French to the west bank of the Mississippi river, and to secure that river as the national boundary. He at once began the movement to acquire Florida and the Island of Orleans, and entered on the policy which was tenaciously pursued by himself and his political associates until its consummation in 1821.

In pursuing this sagacious policy he took the initiative in the negotiations which led to the unexpected acquisition of Louisiana. Conditions beyond the control either of Napoleon or Jefferson conspired to render the transfer desirable to Napoleon and available to Jefferson.

Attention has been heretofore called to the fact that all our acquisitions of territory, except those from Mexico, have been dependent upon the condition of affairs in Europe. In fact, these conditions have been so remarkable, that they seem to reveal a law of destiny. So peculiar were the relations of Great Britain, France and Spain, that while they all strongly desired to restrain the growth of the United States, yet each, in turn, made important contributions to its territorial expansion. In the peace negotiations at Paris, on the question of the extension of her boundaries beyond the Alleghanies and the Ohio, the United States found a friend in her enemy, Great Britain, and enemies in her friends, France and Spain. The liberality and magnanimity of Great Britain placed her almost in the light of a donor.

In the crossing of the Mississippi in 1803, the positions of France and Great Britain were reversed. France was now the ceding power, while Great Britain looked on with polite envy, and Spain threatened to interfere. A few years later Spain became, in turn. the ceding power. Strange, indeed, that these three European powers should find in their relations with each other, reasons which impelled each in succession to contribute to that expansion of the United States which they all desired to prevent.

To trace the causes which led to this remarkable result, it is necessary to take a rapid review of the well-known historical events following the close of the French and Indian war, when France retired from the contest for the possession of America. In the treaty of Paris, February 10, 1763, she ceded to Great Britain all of her American possessions east of ‘a line down the middle of the Mississippi river and through the Iberville lakes to the sea,’ and confirmed to Spain all her possessions west of that line, which had been previously ceded, November 3, 1762. (Public Domain, p. 91.) Louisiana thus became the property of Spain, and so remained for thirty-eight years.

Of all the nations of Europe, Spain was the most opposed to the institutions and political doctrines of the United States. She would have repelled, as far as possible, all intercourse with the American people, and would have purposely maintained semi-hostile relations. Louisiana would, probably, have been held like her South American possessions, until filled with a population strong enough to rebel and shake off her nerveless grasp. Had it been slowly peopled, as would seem most probable, by emigrants from the United States, its future would have been uncertain. It would, perhaps, have been a refuge for ambitious men like Burr. It might have become a rival kingdom, or a rival republic, facing us across the Mississippi. It might have been broken into fragments, a multitude of petty states, blocking our expansion toward the Pacific. It might have been a means of detaching a portion of the western country from the Union. Such a result was feared about the time of the cession. It is certain that we would never have acquired it in a form so complete and so favorable for assimilation to our institutions as by the cession of 803.

In the fall of 1799, the French Revolution had assumed the phase which made Napoleon First Consul of France. He found France engaged in needless hostilities with the United States. He at once determined upon. a policy of conciliation, and appointed his brother Joseph Bonaparte at the head of a commission to treat with the newly arrived American commissioners, Murray, Ellsworth and Davie. The result was the treaty of Morfontaine, September 30, 1800, and the establishment of friendly relations. The election of Jefferson speedily followed, and Napoleon had the satisfaction of seeing the administration of American affairs pass into the hands of a political party deemed friendly to France.

Let us recount the events which led to these results. Napoleon had taken Talleyrand into his cabinet, and Talleyrand had a bobby: the recovery of Louisiana, and its organization into a French province. Napoleon permitted Talleyrand to ride his hobby, yet he manifested no especial interest in the matter until the negotiations with America were approaching a crisis, and his brother Joseph had assured him of their friendly aspect, but that they were suspended on the question of indemnity for French spoliations. He then suddenly manifested an interest in Talleyrand's plans for the retrocession of Louisiana, and ordered communications to be immediately opened with the Spanish court. Without awaiting the routine course of negotiations which were progressing favorably under the French minister at Madrid, his impatience led him to send General Berthier to hasten them. Meanwhile, he seemed disposed to restrain his brother Joseph from concluding the American treaty.

This course would indicate that he had secret views, connecting the retrocession of Louisiana with the American treaty. If he revolved in mind in 1800 the purposes which he carried into execution three years later, he did not then express them. Often frank, and apparently imprudent in the expression of his purposes, no one knew better than Napoleon how to conceal them either by reticence or by dissimulation. The only hint that can be found of ulterior purposes is his caution to Joseph that better terms could be obtained from the United States at a later date, but he assented to the conclusion of a temporary treaty, September 30, 1800. He pressed negotiations with Spain so actively that Berthier signed the treaty for the retrocession of Louisiana the following day, October 1, 1800. In compensation to Spain for this cession France engaged to create the kingdom of Etruria, composed of Tuscany and adjacent territory, and to seat on its throne the son of the duke of Parma, who was son-in-law of the king of Spain.

Napoleon was now master of the situation. Whatever plans he may have formed, it was in his power to execute. How far he agreed with Talleyrand in the policy of making Louisiana valuable to France by the slow process of colonial development is very doubtful. His temperament was too eager to await the tardy returns of invested capital. He needed all his resources for present gambling and quick profits. Europe was his battle ground, and the conquest of England his immediate object. All else was subsidiary. If England could be subdued he was then, indeed, master of the world. He was not indifferent to the glory of restoring to France the American possessions, the loss of which had been for many years a source of national humiliation. Neither was he insensible of the wisdom of Talleyrand's colonial policy, yet such a policy made peace with England a necessity. He knew that France had been compelled to give up her American possessions for lack of a navy, and his penetrating genius could not fail to see that France could not hold colonies across the ocean three thousand miles away, in the face of the navies of Great Britain. He had not forgotten the Egyptian campaign, which he had warmly urged in its inception, but which .he had opposed at the last moment, even to the point of tendering his resignation, but to which he had been forced by Talleyrand's Directory, and which had taught him the power of the British navy. （Allison's History of Europe, vol. 6, pp. 241-2.)

It is probable that before beginning negotiations for the retrocession of Louisiana, Napoleon contemplated an early war with England, and that he entertained the purpose of using Louisiana as a lever on the United States, though perhaps under conditions different from those which circumstances subsequently shaped. He began these negotiations just at the time when all indications pointed to the coming revolution in American politics, and the transfer of power to the Republican party. Affairs in America soon assumed a form to strengthen in his mind the conviction that the United States could be made a valuable ally. Whatever may have been his purpose in 1800, he was the engineer in 1803 who put in motion the train of events which, beginning with the cession of Louisiana, led the United States to the second British war.

Let us now trace the political revolution in the United States. It is needless to recite that the Federalist party came first into possession of the government, and controlled its policy for twelve years. All are familiar with the quarrels in Washington's cabinet, and the rise of the Republican party, now generally designated as the Democratic-Republican party, to distinguish it from the Republican party of the present day. This new party differed from the Federalist party on the great question of State rights; the Federalist party favoring such a construction of the Constitution as would strengthen the power of the general government; the Republican party favoring such a construction as would protect the rights and powers of the States.

There was another question of the day which touched men's hearts. In the great contest that was going on across the water, England and France were about to engage in a death grapple. The sympathies of this country were aroused, one party favoring England and the other favoring France. We may well understand how deeply it stirred the sympathies of our ancestors. On the one side was France, our friend, the friend of our infancy; France, who stood by us in our conflict for freedom; France, the blood of whose sons was mingled with ours upon the plains of Yorktown; France, our sister republic, who had changed all her institutions in admiration and love for the institutions and people of America. Her cause was espoused by Jefferson, followed by his new party.

On the other side was our mother country. The war was over, and its passions were subsiding. Our independence was established. Jay's treaty, although unpopular at first, had served to reopen the avenues of trade and communication with England, and to excite hostilities with France. The hearts of our ancestors were turning back with softened sentiments to the land of their fathers, and were renewing the associations of kindred and friendship.

It seemed that the Federalist party, the friend of England, was striking the popular chord. Yet, just at this critical moment, the Federalist leaders committed a political blunder. They enacted what are known as the Alien and Sedition laws. The great political leader, Thomas Jefferson, skillfully seized the advantage. The tide was turned. Jefferson was elected President of the United States, and the Republican party, the friend of France, came into power. Looking over the field, the chief of the victorious party saw that the party triumph was but temporary, and he sought for means to render it permanent.

The recent presidential election had assumed a sectional aspect, as may be seen from the following table of the electoral vote of 1800:

The vote of New England was a unit, 39 for the Federalists. The vote of the South was nearly a unit, 48 for the Republicans and 4 for the Federalists. The vote of the Middle States was nearly equally divided, 25 for the Republicans, 22 for the Federalists. Of the Republican majority of 8 votes, the West furnished 7. What was known in that day as ‘the West,’ embraced the ceded country between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi river. In this country were two States. Kentucky had been made a State by consent of Virginia in 1792, and Tennessee, ceded by North Carolina in 1790, had been admitted by Congress in 1796, being the first State erected out of Federal territory. The rest of this country was still in territorial apprenticeship, but Ohio was approaching statehood and other territories were growing rapidly. A strong bond of sympathy, social and political, bound the Western people to their parent States, while Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia felt motherly pride in their Western daughters.

The question of absorbing interest with the Western people was the navigation of the Mississippi river. They resented the indifference which the United States had shown to their interests, under the control of the Federal party. They were indignant against the people of the Northeast for the jealousy so plainly manifested toward the navigation of the Mississippi. General Wilkinson and others had endeavored to turn this feeling of indignation to the interest of Spain. A party of Separatists was formed, one faction of which desired to establish a government under the protection of Spain and the other to form an independent Western republic. The mass of the people, however, were attached to the Union, but dissatisfied with the government. They could with difficulty be restrained from seizing New Orleans and forcing the United States into war with Spain.

They now looked to the Republican party for relief. Unless Jefferson could find a peaceable solution, he must choose between a Spanish war or the disintegration of his party. In addition to this, another question was growing in importance and would demand attention in the near future. The territory included in the Georgia cession, soon to become the States of Alabama and Mississippi, was attracting population. The rivers of this section ran through Florida directly into the Gulf of Mexico. Outlets would .soon be needed to the Gulf. While the present pressure was directed to secure the great outlet of the Mississippi river, yet the other demands were sure to follow.

The one solution of all these troublesome questions could be found in the possession of the Floridas and the Island of Orleans. No way seemed open to secure this much desired end except a war of conquest. The free navigation of the Mississippi had been provided in the treaty of 1795 with Spain, but was subject to frequent infractions on the part of the Spanish authorities. The West was quiet for the present, relying upon the friendly purposes of the new administration. That Jefferson was worthy of this confidence had been demonstrated by his previous sympathy with Western interests, manifested for many years. （Jefferson's Complete Works, H. A. Washington, vol. 2, p. 107.)

As early as January 30, 1787, he wrote to Madison from Paris: ‘I will venture to say that the act which abandons the navigation of the Mississippi is an act of separation between the Eastern and Western country.’ His matured purpose to use peaceful means, and his reasons for avoiding war, if possible, are shown in the following letter to Dr. Hugh Williamson, written as late as April 30, 1803:

(Jefferson's Complete Works—H. A. Washington, vol. 4, P. 483.)

‘Although I do not count with confidence on obtaining New Orleans from France for money, yet I am confident in the policy of putting off the day of contention for it till we have lessened the embarrassment of debt accumulated instead of being discharged by our predecessors, till we obtain more of that strength which is growing on us so rapidly, and especially till we have planted a population on the Mississippi itself sufficient to do its own work without marching men fifteen hundred miles from the Atlantic shores to perish by fatigue and unfriendly climates.’ * * *

These two letters, written so far apart, clearly reveal his sentiments and the fixed purpose which he steadfastly maintained and finally carried to complete success: 1. The navigation of the Mississippi river should never be abandoned. 2. It was to be protected as long as possible by negotiation and appeals to justice. 3. War was to be used as the last resort, and to be avoided, if possible, while the country grew in strength.

This patient policy would have secured its object, the navigation of the Mississippi, but the door to far greater success was unexpectedly opened. Before the end of the first month of his administration as President, whispers of the sale of Louisiana to France began to circulate in court circles and were communicated to the American government by their foreign ministers. The first intimation came from Mr. King, in a letter, March 29, 1801. The French minister, Talleyrand, refused to throw any light upon these rumors. They gained credence, however. (Annals of Congress, 1802-1803, p. 1017.)

Mr. Rufus King, the minister at London, in a subsequent letter, dated November 20, 1801, put all doubts at rest by forwarding to the secretary of state, James Madison, a copy of the treaty for establishing the prince of Parma in Tuscany, which made allusion to the secret treaty ceding Louisiana to France.

Previous to this letter, Mr. Madison, under date of July 29, 1801, wrote to Mr. Pinckney, minister at Madrid, instructing him to obtain information and to use what influence he could to dissuade Spain from the cession, if not already completed. September 28th, Mr. Madison wrote to Mr. Livingston, minister at Paris, instructing him, if the cession had ‘irrevocably taken place,’ to make overtures for the cession of the Floridas, especially of West Florida, to the United States, but to be very careful to avoid irritating France in the methods of negotiation. Mr. Livingston, in obedience to these instructions, began the negotiations, which lingered more than a year, receiving no encouragement from France. (Ibid, 1013, 1014.)⁵

As these tidings began to spread, the Western country was thrown into a state of feverish excitement and anxiety. Grave fears were entertained of the purposes of Napoleon, and a sentiment of hostility to France began to develop. Alexander Hamilton, in a series of newspaper articles, advocated the policy of taking immediate possession of New Orleans and the Floridas. Such a course would lead inevitably to a war with France and Spain, and to alliance with Great Britain, an event congenial to Federalist policy. The Western excitement was intensified by the action of the Spanish intendant, Don Juan Morales, closing the port of New Orleans.

Congress convened December 10, 1802, and the administration was subjected to fierce attacks from the Federalist minority. The leaders of this party joined the Western war cry, aiming to force on Jefferson a choice between adopting the Federalist policy of hostility with France and Spain or a breach with his Western allies. Jefferson, however, was not to be coerced nor deceived. He was firm in his own course, and it was well for the country that he was firm. His policy was not only right, it was successful. The dilemma on which the Federalists sought to impale him was skillfully avoided. This political Scylla and Charybdis had left a middle space wide enough to admit of safe passage, and Jefferson had learned from Ovid, in medio tutissimus ibis.

War could be delayed for some hostile act of France, while the attachment of the Western people to the Republican party and their confidence in Jefferson were too firm to be easily shaken. The temper of the West was plainly shown in the debates upon the resolutions introduced into the Senate by Mr. Robert Ross, of Pennsylvania, February 16, 1803. These resolutions authorized the President ‘to take immediate possession’ of New Orleans; to call into service the militia of South Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi Territory; to employ the military and naval forces of the United States; and use for these purposes the sum of $5,000,000, appropriated from the treasury. The administration opposed these resolutions, on the ground that there was no cause as yet to justify an act of war, and that favorable results were in prospect from negotiation. The Western senators sustained this policy. (Annals of Congress, 1802-1803, pp. 95, 119.)

Mr. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, offered a substitute placing the entire control of the matter in the hands of the President, and empowering him, if necessary, to call out the militia, not only of the vicinity but of all the States. (Ibid, p. 255.)

This substitute was finally adopted by a vote of 15 to 11, all the Western senators present voting in its favor. The resolutions as amended were then adopted unanimously, February 25, 1803. (Annals of Congress, 1802– 1803, p. 107.)

It may be interesting to note the sentiment of the Western people, as expressed by their senators. Said Mr. Anderson, of Tennessee: ‘Gentlemen wished to treat the people like little children. * * * He care from a part of the country which was greatly interested in the subject, and he knew the people were not such fools as the gentlemen would make them. They will not believe that those who know them, and have taken the most effectual measures to procure safety and security for them, are plotting evil for them.’ (Annals of Congress, 1802-1803, p. 214.)

‘He knew this people and that they wished for peace, though, if justice required it, they would be in the ranks of battle while those who asperse them would perhaps be at their toilettes. The resolutions substituted would according with the wishes of his constituents. He, would therefore support them.’ ( Ibid. pp. 140, 142.)

Mr. Cocke, of Tennessee, expressed his ‘confidence in the administration’ ‘from real respect and knowledge of the Executive for thirty years past.’ He spoke tauntingly of the newly awakened interest of the leaders of the Federal party in behalf of the West, as follows:

‘Why, this is very generous of them, and is more remarkable because it is an uncommon thing with them. But it is very certain we do not stand in need of their pledges nor of their assistance. On former occasions they did not display any of this liberality, and he could not help suspecting their sincerity now.’

Mr. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, said: ‘The time was, indeed, when great dissatisfaction prevailed in that country as to the measures of the general government.’ * * * ‘Distrust and dissatisfaction have given place to confidence in and attachment to those in whom the concerns of the nation are confided.’

Previous to these proceedings in the Senate, a resolution in the House providing for the appointment of a committee to inquire what legislation is necessary with reference to the navigation of the Mississippi river, had been voted down. January 7th, by a vote of 50 to 25, a resolution was adopted that, ‘relying with perfect confidence on the vigilance and wisdom of the Executive, they will wait the issue of such measures as that department of the government shall have pursued.’ (Ibid, pp. 117, 342, 368.)

A resolution offered by Mr. Griswold, of Connecticut, January 4th, calling on the Executive for information with reference to the negotiations concerning Louisiana, was defeated January 11th by a vote of 51 to 35. An act was passed by both houses and approved February 26th, appropriating $2,000,000 to provide for foreign negotiations.

Meanwhile Jefferson had been in negotiation with Spain and France. These negotiations were actively pressed. Spain, France and Great Britain were approached through the American ministers resident at the respective courts, through the foreign ministers at Washington, and through unofficial channels. Mr. Monroe, in whom the President reposed implicit confidence, was sent as minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to Paris to act in conjunction with Mr. Livingston. (Annals of Congress, 1802-1803, pp. 1095-1108.)

The instructions to Monroe and Livingston were full and were intended to cover every contingency that might arise. The ministers were to urge a cession of the Island of Orleans and of the Floridas. In case that France should refuse a cession, they were to gain all that was possible to secure the navigation of the Mississippi river. The free navigation of this river was the ultimatum. The desideratum was, to make the Mississippi the national boundary. Considerations were suggested which might influence the French government. If they should have formed any plan of seducing the Western people to separate from the Union, the fallacy should be pointed out. The commercial advantages of a cession should be shown, etc. It was indicated that ‘to incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with the citizens of the United States on an equal footing, being a provision which cannot now be made,’ must be left for future action. ‘The instability of the peace of Europe, the attitude taken by Great Britain, and the languishing state of the French finances,’ were mentioned, as rendering the present time favorable for negotiation.

These instructions show that Jefferson and Madison, while prudently refraining from any public expression of sanguine expectation, foresaw the coming struggle in Europe, and were founding hopes upon it. Yet there is no evidence that either of them dreamed that the full fruition of their hopes was so near at hand.

Meanwhile, the negotiations with Spain were speedily successful. In April the Spanish minister, Yrugo, announced the disavowal by Spain of the orders of her intendente in closing the port of New Orleans against American commerce. Thus one cause of irritation was removed, and interest centered in the negotiations with France. Very little confidence was felt in their success, but the West was willing to wait, and Jefferson maintained his policy. Only one of his acts indicates any intention of departing from it. Some restlessness is shown in the instructions to Livingston and Monroe, written April 18, but which did not reach Paris till after the treaty had been signed. These instructions indicate an apprehension of hostility on the part of Napoleon, and direct the two ministers, in the event that such purpose should be shown by France, immediately to open secret negotiations with Great Britain with a view to alliance. They are cautioned to take no such step unless a hostile purpose of France is evident. This step plainly shows that Jefferson intended to resort to war, if it became necessary as a last resort. He would, if necessary, become the ally of Great Britain, though preferring peace and the friendship of France.

Viewed in every aspect, whether as a patriot seeking the good of his country or as a political leader conducting his party in the paths of patriotism and victory, Jefferson undoubtedly pursued a wise and skillful course. The Federalist leaders had not only been thwarted but had been handicapped. If negotiation should succeed, their party was ruined. If war became necessary, they were committed to its support. Their course in Congress had stirred up the whole country, and the war would have the sanction of all sections. But the Federalist leaders had aided Jefferson by their agitation in a way which they had not contemplated.

Napoleon was watching American politics. The imperious will of the ‘proudest warrior of Europe’ would have brooked no threat of war from the ruling powers of the United States. Jefferson could not approach him with any intimation of hostile purpose. But Napoleon was not only an imperious warrior. When not blinded by passion or drunk with ambition, he was also the profoundest statesman of Europe. He was, at the time, in the calmest period of his political life. He had decided to be Emperor of France and to dictate to Europe. He was then revolving in his mind the steps to be taken. He was preparing for war with England. Should he yield this purpose to plans which could be successful only by peace with England? Just at this time threats reached his ear of the prospect of war from America, if he attempted to occupy New Orleans. Fortunately these threats came in a form not to arouse his pride but to warn his judgment.

The party which had, when in power, shown hostility to France and friendship for .England were now, as a minority party, urging the United States to steps which must involve war with France. This party had been, for the time, restrained by the party in power, who were recognized as friendly to France. The government of the United States had made no arrogant demands. The resident minister, Mr. Livingston, under instructions from a friendly President, had assiduously urged that the Mississippi river should be made the boundary line between Louisiana and the United States, but had shown cogent and friendly reasons for the request, and had manifested no desire to acquire the entire province. The whole matter had come before Napoleon in the best possible form, and at the best possible time. He needed money for the approaching war with England, and he needed, if not the alliance, at least the neutrality of the United States. His decision was made. With characteristic impetuosity he proceeded to put his plans into execution.⁶

The world is indebted to M. Barbe Marbois, the agent employed by Napoleon in the subsequent negotiations, for recording the private interviews in which Napoleon revealed his thoughts. Ignoring Talleyrand, who had heretofore been in charge of the negotiations, he summoned two of his ministers and opened his mind. With the exception of a previous conversation which he had with Talleyrand, but of which no record exists, the first expression of his purpose was made to Marbois and Decres April 10, 1803. He thus abruptly addressed them: ‘I know the full value of Louisiana, and I have been desirous of repairing the fault of the French negotiator who abandoned it in 1763. A few lines of a treaty have restored it to me, and I have scarcely recovered it when I must expect to lose it. But if it escapes from me, it shall one day cost dearer to those who oblige me to strip myself of it than to those to whom I wish to deliver it. The English have successively taken from France, Canada, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, New Foundland, and the richest portions of Asia. They are engaged in exciting trouble in St. Domingo. They shall not have the Mississippi, which they court. Louisiana is nothing in comparison with their conquests in all parts of the globe, and yet the jealousy they feel at the restoration of this colony to the sovereignty of France acquaints me with their wish to take possession of it, and it is thus they begin the war. They have twenty ships of war in the Gulf of Mexico; they sail over those seas as sovereigns, whilst our affairs in St. Domingo have been growing worse every day since the death of Leclerc. The conquest of Louisiana would be easy, if they only took the trouble to make a descent there. I have not a moment to lose in putting it out of their reach. I know not whether they are not already there. It is their usual course, and if I had been in their place I would not have waited. I wish, if there is still time, to take away from them any idea that they may have of ever possessing that colony. I think of ceding it to the United States. I can scarcely say that I cede it to them, for it is not yet in our possession. If, however, I leave the least time to our enemies, I shall only transmit an empty title to those republicans whose friendship I seek. They only ask me for one town in Louisiana; but I already consider the colony as entirely lost, and it appears to me that in the hands of this growing power it will be more useful to the policy, and even to the commerce, of France than if I should attempt to keep it.’

The two ministers were requested to express their opinions freely. Marbois strongly urged the cession, and gave his reasons at length. Decres opposed it, and favored the colonial policy of Talleyrand. The conference lasted till midnight, when the ministers were dismissed. It will be remembered that Marbois had taken an active part, in 1783, in favor of limiting the boundaries of the United States to the Alleghany mountains. He was now to be the instrument for extending them beyond the Mississippi. He was summoned at daybreak on the following morning (April 11th), when Napoleon, after alluding to what had appeared in the London papers in reference to the measures proposed in the United States for seizing New Orleans, thus addressed him:

‘Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I will cede, it is the whole colony without any reservation. I know the price of what I abandon, and have sufficiently proved the importance that I attach to this province, since my first diplomatic act with Spain had for its object its recovery. I renounce it with the greatest regret. To attempt obstinately to retain it would be folly. I direct you to negotiate this affair with the envoys of the United States. Do not even await the arrival of Mr. Monroe; have an interview this very day with Mr. Livingston. But I require a great deal of money for this war, and I would not like to commence it with new contributions. For a hundred years France and Spain have been incurring expense for improvements in Louisiana, for which its trade has never indemnified them. Large sums, which will never be returned to the treasury, have been lent to companies and to agriculturalists. The price of all these things is justly due to us. If I should regulate my terms according to the value of these vast regions to the United States, the indemnity would have no limits. I will be moderate, in consideration of the necessity in which I am of making a sale. But keep this to yourself. I want fifty millions, and for less than that sum I will not treat. I would rather make a desperate attempt to keep these fine countries. Tomorrow you shall have full power.’ * * * ‘Perhaps it will also be objected to me that the Americans may be found too powerful for Europe in two or three centuries; but my foresight does not embrace such remote fears. Besides, we may hereafter expect rivalries among the members of the Union. The confederations that are called perpetual only last till one of the contracting parties finds it to his interest to break them, and it is to prevent the danger to which the colonial power of England exposes us that I would provide a remedy.’ * * * ‘Mr. Monroe is on the point of arriving. * * * Neither this minister nor his colleague is prepared for a decision which goes infinitely beyond anything they are about to ask of us. Begin by making the overture without any subterfuge. You will acquaint me day by day and hour by hour of your progress. * * * Observe the greatest secrecy, and recommend it to the American ministers.’

April 11th, the day of the conversation between Napoleon and Marbois, Talleyrand dropped a hint to Mr. Livingston by inquiring whether the United States desired the whole of Louisiana, and what price they were willing to pay for it. Mr. Livingston says (Letter of Livingston to Madison, Annals of Congress, 1802-3, p. 1126): ‘I told him no; that our wishes extended only to New Orleans and the Floridas; that the policy of France should dictate to give us the country above the river Arkansas, in order to place a barrier between them and Canada.’ Mr. Monroe, who had sailed March 8th, reached Paris April 12th, the day after Napoleon's conference with Marbois, and at once entered into conference with Mr. Livingston. On the night of the 12th, Marbois made to Livingston the informal overtures, as directed by Napoleon. (Annals of Congress, 1802-3, pp. 1128-9, 30, 31, 32.)

Mr. Livingston details the interview in a letter to Mr. Madison. He received the overtures with caution and took occasion to repeat the assurance which he had frequently given: ‘I told him the United States were anxious to preserve peace with France; that, for that reason, they wished to remove them to the west side of the Mississippi; that we should be perfectly satisfied with New Orleans and the Floridas, and had no disposition to extend across the river.’

The negotiation now passed into the regular channels, and was conducted by James Monroe, as ‘minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary,’ and Robert R. Livingston, ‘minister plenipotentiary,’ on the part of the United States; and ‘the French citizen., Barbe Marbois, minister of the public treasury,’ on the part of France. After a few skirmishes in settling the price and minor stipulations, the treaty was signed May 2nd, but dated April 30, 1803. The treaty consisted of three separate conventions. The first ceded Louisiana to the United States. The second provided for the payment of 60,000,000 francs to France. The third provided for the assumption by the United States of claims due from France to American citizens. The whole sum was equivalent to $18,738,268.98, exclusive of interest. The area of the whole province was 1,182,752 square miles. (Pub. Domain, p. 12.)

When the treaty was signed the ministers shook hands and pronounced this the noblest act of their lives. Yet they were not without apprehensions. They had, indeed, done a work which deserved the gratitude and applause of their countrymen, but they had exceeded their authority. How would their action be received at home? The joint letter of Monroe and Livingston, announcing the treaty, reads more like a letter of apology and explanation than a letter of triumph.

Let us see how it was received at home. At this day we can hardly believe that this acquisition met with active and violent opposition; yet such was the case. Jefferson and the Republican leaders received the news with delight. The policy of negotiation had triumphed beyond their most sanguine expectations. War was averted and the West was bound to them by new ties of gratitude. Their party had laid the foundations of future greatness for the United States and of political power for themselves. Yet there was one source of disquietude. In the contests in Washington's cabinet, between Jefferson and Hamilton, both of these great men had gone to extremes which both were afterward compelled to abandon. Jefferson had maintained that the general government had no powers beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. The power to acquire foreign territory was not so enumerated. He foresaw the opposition of the Federalists. He felt secure of the ratification of the treaty, but he was sensitive to the charge of inconsistency in reference to the construction of the Constitution, which he knew would be brought against him. He wished to preserve the strict construction, which he believed to be the safeguard of the rights of the States. Yet Louisiana was ‘an opportunity snatched from fate.’ It secured the expansion of the United States and the triumph of the Republican party. The opportunity must not be lost. The treaty must be ratified. Cobwebs must be brushed away.

He wrote to the members of his cabinet and to the Republican leaders, suggesting arguments and proposing a constitutional amendment to the effect: ‘Louisiana, as ceded by France, is made a part of the United States.’ His letter to Senator John Breckinridge, of Kentucky, explains his views (Jefferson's Complete Works, H. A. Washington, vol. 4, pp. 499, 500):

‘Objections are raising to the eastward against the vast extent of our boundaries, and propositions are made to exchange Louisiana, or a part of it, for the Floridas. But, as I have said, we shall get the Floridas without, and I would not give one inch of the waters of the Mississippi to any nation.’ * * * ‘These Federalists see in this acquisition the formation of a new confederacy, embracing all the waters of the Mississippi, on both sides of it, and a separation of its western waters from us.’ * * * ‘The Constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for the incorporation of foreign nations into our Union. The Executive, in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much advances the good of their country, have done an act beyond the Constitution. The Legislature, in casting behind them metaphysical subtleties and risking themselves like faithful servants, must ratify and pay for it and throw themselves on their country for doing for them, unauthorized, what we know they would have done for themselves had they been in a situation to do it. It is the case of a guardian investing the money of his ward in purchasing an important adjacent territory, and saying to him when of age, “I did this for your good; you may disavow me, and I must get out of the scrape as I can. I thought it my duty to risk myself for you.” But we shall not be disavowed by the nation, and their act of indemnity will confirm and not weaken the Constitution, by more strongly marking out its limits. We have nothing later from Europe than the public papers give. I hope yourself and all the Western members will make a sacred point of being at the first day of the meeting of Congress; for, vestra res regitur.’

Congress was convened by proclamation October 17, 1803. Jefferson, as we have seen, advised a constitutional amendment. This advice was not accepted by his party associates. They thought that the Constitution already gave sufficient power. Under this theory they proceeded to confirm the treaty, and to introduce the legislation necessary to occupy and organize the territory. Upon this ground the Federalists attacked them, and memorable debates ensued. It would be outside of our purpose to follow these debates through a detailed discussion of the constitutional questions involved. They come within our purview only so far as they furnish testimony of public sentiment and locate the influences which aided or opposed the acquisition of Louisiana and the policy of territorial expansion. A general glance at the attitude of the two parties on the constitutional questions will, however, conduce to a clear comprehension of the sectional aspects of the contest.

The first battle came in the Senate. (Annals of Congress, 1803-1804, p. 308.) The treaty was confirmed in executive session, October 20th, by a vote of 24 to 7. Those voting against confirmation were Messrs. Hillhouse and Tracy, of Connecticut; Pickering, of Massachusetts; Wells and White, of Delaware; Olcott and Plumer, of New Hampshire; all Federalists and from the Northeast.

The public debates occurred on the resolutions and acts for taking possession of the territory, providing for the expenses of the treaty, and establishing a temporary government. (Ibid, p. 488.) The test vote in the House was taken October 25th, on the resolutions to provide for carrying out the treaty. The resolutions were adopted by a vote of go yeas to 25 nays. Of these 25 nays 17 were from New England, 3 from New York, 1 from Maryland, and 4 from Virginia. Hot debates ensued in the Senate and in the House, turning largely on the constitutional questions; the Federalists denying and the Republicans affirming the power of the government to make a treaty annexing foreign territory to the United States. All shades of opinion were expressed, but the two parties have been criticized as substantially reversing their positions as to the powers of the general government. The student of history is never surprised to find two political parties shifting their positions on theoretical questions. General theories, followed out to their logical consequences, invariably lead to the reductio ad absurdum. Political theories form no exception. Limitations are as necessary to theories as to all other human productions. What is sometimes mistaken for inconsistency is the necessary adaptation and amendment of opinion to new environments. Yet it does seem strange to view the Federalist party posing as the champion of strict construction and State rights, while the party of Thomas Jefferson is aggressively demanding a liberal construction of the Constitution and the extension of the powers of the general government.

By common consent and general custom the right of being inconsistent and of throwing rocks at the majority is accorded to the minority party, as a sort of political license, for which they are not held responsible until they come again into power. The party in power, however, is subject to indictment for inconsistency, and thus the Republican party has been the party on trial.

Whatever inconsistency there may have been was apparent rather than real, and was applicable to the arguments used rather than to the course pursued. The previous contests in behalf of strict construction had been directed to protecting the States, in their domestic relations and individual rights, from encroachments on the part of the general government. In the domestic relations between the general government and the several States, the Republicans regarded a strict construction as the palladium of freedom. It did not follow that the same strict construction should be applied for enfeebling the operations of the general government within its own sphere. The citizens who constituted the Republican party had aided in establishing the Constitution. They helped to create the general government for general purposes, and they could have no interest in an insane and unpatriotic effort to render it incapable of performing its functions. Expressed in homely phrase, they did not wish to tie the hands of the general government, but they did wish to keep its hands off the States.

There is no inconsistency in maintaining, on the one hand, a rule of strict construction, as applied to conflicts between the general government and the individual States, concerning the powers which the United States can exercise within the several State jurisdictions; and, on the other hand, a rule of liberal construction for exerting the powers of the general government in its unquestioned constitutional sphere, outside of the States. If there be any real inconsistency in these two positions, it has survived in the creeds of the Republican party and its successor, the Democratic party, to the present day.

Among those who have blamed both parties for inconsistency, the able and brilliant author of the ‘Winning of the West’ has arrived at the happiest conclusion. After scoring the Federalists of 1803 for their present part of the ‘inconsistency,’ and the Republicans for their past part of the ‘inconsistency,’ he says of the ‘Jeffersonian Republicans’: ‘Nevertheless, at this juncture they were right, which was far more important than being logical or consistent.’

The reader who desires to pursue the investigation of the constitutional questions involved is referred to the Annals of Congress, 1803-1804, which contain a record of the debates in the Senate and in the House on the various questions connected with the acquisition of Louisiana.

From these debates it plainly appears that whatever inconsistency may be chargeable to the Federalists was incurred in opposition to the acquisition of foreign territory; and whatever inconsistency may be chargeable to the Republicans was incurred in defense of the policy of foreign acquisition and territorial expansion. The following extracts from the speeches delivered in the Senate during this famous debate will serve to locate the center of opposition to the policy of territorial expansion, and to present some of the reasons of that opposition. The seven votes against the confirmation of the treaty were all from the Northeast. All the opponents urged constitutional objections. Some of them also expressed strong objections to the treaty on the grounds of public policy and sectional interests. (Annals of Congress, 1803-1804, pp. 33, 34.) Said Mr. Samuel White, of Delaware: ‘But as to Louisiana, this new, immense, unbounded world, if it should ever be incorporated into this Union, which I have no idea can be done, except by altering the Constitution, I believe it would be the greatest curse that could at present befall us * * * Louisiana must and will become settled, if we hold it, and with the very population that would otherwise occupy part of our present territory. * * * We have already territory enough, and when I contemplate the evils that may arise to these states from this intended incorporation of Louisiana into the Union, I would rather see it given to France, to Spain, or to any other nation of the earth upon the mere condition that no citizen of the United States should ever settle within its limits. * * * Supposing that this extent of territory was a desirable acquisition, $15,000,000 was an enormous sum to give.’ What would Senator White say if he were now living and could read the tax lists of the states erected from this territory for just one year?

Mr. Uriah Tracy, of Connecticut, said: ‘And this universal consent can never be obtained to such a pernicious measure as the admission of Louisiana, of a world, and such a world, into our Union. This would be absorbing the Northern States and rendering them as insignificant in the Union as they ought to be if, by their own consent, the measure should be adopted.’

These extracts serve to illustrate the sentiment largely prevailing in the Northeast. There was a determined and obstinate hostility to Southern or Western expansion of territory, a feeling that such a policy would lessen the influence of the Northeastern States in the Union, and would retard their growth in population and wealth. They especially feared that the unimpeded navigation of the Mississippi would injure their commercial interests.

This sentiment was no sudden ebullition of party zeal. The jealousy was seen in the efforts of several of the States of this section, in the formation of the Union, to claim an interest in the Western lands as ‘a common stock,’ secured by ‘the blood and treasure of all.’ Having been ceded and made ‘a common stock,’ its settlement and organization into states formed from this territory were now in alliance with the South, and had just aided in the triumph of the new party. Political power seemed to be slipping away from the Northeast. Ohio had just entered statehood and brought reinforcements to the Republicans, and now the Mississippi was crossed and the westward extension was boundless. Thus, in 1803, the feeling at the Northeast had reached a high point of irritation.⁷

That it was not suddenly allayed is established upon testimony which cannot be doubted. The continued opposition to everything connected with the Louisiana purchase found eloquent expression in the famous words of Josiah Quincy, on the floor of Congress, as late as 1811, when speaking on the bill for the admission of the Territory of Orleans as the State of Louisiana.

But this sentiment was not unanimous in New England. There were a few men of influence who favored the treaty and its policy of expansion. The people of the Northeast generally were opposed to western acquisitions, and were dissatisfied with the present state of political affairs, but were too conservative and too much attached to the United States to be hurried into any rash act. Conspicuous among the first class was John Quincy Adams. Worthy of his illustrious father, who had borne a leading part in 783 in extending the territorial limits, and himself possessed of vigorous intellect and patriotic instincts, he looked beyond the horizon of sectional jealousy and petty partisan opposition. He had not entered Congress in time to vote on the first test, the confirmation of the treaty, in executive session, October 20th. On the next day he presented his credentials as senator from Massachusetts. He voted silently, October 26th, possibly for technical reasons, against the bill authorizing the President to take possession of the territory. When the bill to create the stock and to provide for the payments under treaty was put upon its passage, the opponents of the measure seized the opportunity as the occasion for the memorable debate to which allusion has been made. While this debate was at its hottest stage, Mr. Adams arose and in an able speech announced his intention to vote for the measure. He agreed with Jefferson in the opinion that a constitutional amendment was needed. After discussing the constitutional questions, he thus expressed his opinion on the policy of the measure: ‘I trust they will be performed, and I will cheerfully lend my hand to every act necessary for the purpose. For I consider the object as of the highest advantage to us; and the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Breckinridge) himself, who has displayed, with so much eloquence, the immense importance to this Union of the possession of the ceded country, cannot carry his ideas further than I do.’ (Annals of Congress, 1803– 1804, pp. 65-68. History of the United States, Henry Adams, vol. 2, pp. 117, 118.)

Mr. Adams also expressed the opinion that a constitutional amendment to provide for making Louisiana a part of the United States should receive unanimous consent. He subsequently offered his services to the administration to support such a measure.

It now became necessary for Congress to provide a form of government for the acquired territory. A motion was made in the Senate, November 28th (Annals of Congress, 1803-1804, p. 106), for the appointment of a committee to prepare a form of government. This motion was adopted, December 5th, and Messrs. Breckinridge, Wright, Jackson, Baldwin and Adams were appointed as the committee. A bill was reported from this committee, December 30th, which, after discussion and amendments, was passed by the Senate, February 18, 1804, by a vote of 20 to 5. When this bill came to the House it gave rise to animated discussion and met with opposition, not only from the Federalists, but from a number of staunch Republicans. After important amendments, it finally passed March 17th by a vote of 66 to 21. These amendments were rejected by the Senate, and an amendment made by which the act was limited to expire at the end of one year. The House refused, at first, to recede from its amendments, but upon the report of the conference committee of the two houses, it was decided to yield, and the bill was passed March 23rd and became a law by the President's approval, which was attached March 26, 1804. (Annals of Congress, 1803-1804, pp. 211, 223, 256, 1229, 1293, 1300.)

The opposition was caused by a sentiment that the act gave almost autocratic powers to the President. The test vote in the House, 51 to 45, shows that this opinion was shared by many Republicans. This power, however, was necessary to organize a territory foreign to American institutions, and to prepare the way for a permanent government, and it expired by its own limitation in one year.

Under the act, approved October 31, 1803, the President had already taken possession of the new acquisition. The American commissioners (see Gayarre's History of Louisiana), Wilkinson and Claiborne, received the province from the French commandant, Laussat, December 20, 1803. Amid public demonstrations and the exchange of international courtesies, the people were introduced to their new rulers. The French prefect declared them absolved from allegiance to France, and the American governor welcomed them to the United States as brothers. The French flag was lowered from the staff, while the American flag ascended. When they met half way, salvos of artillery resounded from the land batteries and were answered from the war vessels in the river. Amid all these demonstrations the people stood mute and testified no emotion. On the same day, W. C. C. Claiborne issued his proclamation as governor of Louisiana, congratulating the people and pledging the faith of the United States that they should be protected for the present enjoyment of all their rights, and should be admitted as soon as possible to all the rights of American citizens. Thus, without war or constitutional amendment, ‘Louisiana, as ceded by France, is made a part of the United States,’ and remains a joint monument to the genius of Napoleon Bonaparte and Thomas Jefferson.

Napoleon recast the map of Europe. At his downfall this map was erased, as the teacher erases from the board the map which has been used by the class; but across the Atlantic ocean, far removed from the theater of his exploits, still remains Louisiana, the only handwriting of Napoleon now left on the map of the world. Napoleon shaped in Europe, while Jefferson shaped in America, the conditions which made the acquisition possible. Napoleon had the power to grant or withhold it. He granted it of his own volition. Jefferson had no power to compel it and no grounds to demand it. He could only so direct American policy that Napoleon would find an advantage in conferring this mark of his friendship. When it was offered, unasked, Jefferson recognized the immense value of the acquisition and snatched the opportunity from fate. He staked upon its acceptance his personal and political influence and risked the fate of his party. The event justified his foresight.

If what politicians call the ‘verdict of the country’ has any weight, surely Jefferson and his party were acquitted on all counts in the indictment for “inconsistency,” ‘timidity,’ etc., and were awarded public approval and gratitude by the sweeping victory of the next year. (Annals of Congress, 1804-1805, p. 1195.)

The party which acquired Louisiana, beginning as a Southern party, winning the Western States and equally dividing the Middle States, had by its great act won national confidence, gained the political support of all but two of the States and laid the foundation for national greatness. In this great national work, can it be denied that the South was the leading factor?

The following table shows the electoral vote in 1804: