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Chapter 2

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The consideration of this subject involves a discussion of the title of all claimants to the territory between the Alleghany mountains and the Mississippi river from the Florida line to the Great Lakes, and the final cession to the United States of all this territory, except Kentucky, which was erected into an independent state by consent of Virginia. There were three distinct classes of claimants.

First.—The charter claimants:

Second.—Claimants by virtue of alleged grants or purchases from the Indians.

Third.—Foreign claimants.

There was, also, a class of indirect claimants who urged the United States to set up a claim of original right to the jurisdiction and soil of this entire region.

It was urged that the United States ought to seize this entire country as the property of the general government; that this territory, ‘if secured by the blood and treasure of all the States, ought in reason, justice and policy to be considered a common stock.’ This agrarian argument aroused the indignation of the charter claimants and threatened to prevent the formation of the Union. Congress, however, was not deceived by the fallacy, and acted with wisdom and justice. By no act or declaration, under the Continental Congress, or under the Confederation, or under the Constitution, did the United States ever assert such a claim, or sanction the policy of spoliation. Since the United States never appeared as a claimant, the consideration of such claims might be dismissed, were it not for the fact that the persistence with which they were urged upon Congress by outside parties has made the controversy historic, and led to important results. It will, therefore, be necessary at the proper place to trace the origin, progress and final defeat of an effort which, if it had been successful, would either have prevented the Union or would have engrafted upon its fundamental law a pernicious and fatal doctrine.

The charter claimants were six in number: Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, the two Carolinas and Georgia. Their several charters constituted the only legal and valid titles to any portion of this western country. Their conduct was eminently wise and patriotic through the whole controversy. They engaged in no unseemly squabbles, and met with dignity the noise that was made by those who had neither legal title nor equitable rights. They ended the controversy by the patriotic cession of the whole country to the United States.

Virginia claimed the whole territory from her southern boundary line extending to the Mississippi and up northward to the Great Lakes, including Kentucky and all the country which afterward became the Northwest Territory. This claim was based upon her charter of 1609, and upheld by actual possession and by civil and military occupation. She remained in actual possession until the country was ceded to the United States. Her claim was undisputed by any charter claimant as far north as the 41st parallel.

Massachusetts and Connecticut claimed that their charters extended westward to the Mississippi, covering the narrow belts running across the territory in possession of Virginia, and embraced in the westward extension of their respective northern and southern boundary lines. Neither of these States had ever occupied any portion of the territory up to the time of the cessions, and neither made any attempt to occupy it. Had either of them desired to test their claims, the tribunal was within easy reach, to which Georgia and South Carolina referred their territorial dispute—the tribunal provided under the ninth article of the confederation. There was no necessity, however, as they all contemplated ceding their claims to the United States.

North Carolina, alone, possessed an undisputed claim. Her western territory was co-extensive with the present State of Tennessee.

A conflict of title between South Carolina and Georgia was submitted to Congress under the ninth article of the confederation, but was settled by friendly compromise before the court appointed by Congress was ready to begin the trial. It was decided that a strip about twelve miles wide, extending from the present limits of the State westward to the Mississippi, and running along the southern border of Tennessee, should belong to South Carolina. All south of this strip to the Florida line should belong to Georgia.

The second class of claimants, under alleged grants and purchases from the Indians, were the State of New York and several land companies. The claim of New York was vague and shadowy, covering a large and indefinite tract of country without specified boundaries, and based upon no acknowledged principles of custom, law or equity. New York made skillful use of this claim, and did the only thing which it was possible to do with it, except to abandon it. She ceded it to the United States. The land companies, especially the Indiana and the Vandalia companies, proved to be arrogant, persistent and aggressive claimants. Hoping to realize immense profits from the lands which they had pretended to acquire for a trifle, they resorted to all the arts of the lobbyist. Having acquired an undue and sinister influence in Congress, they used it to promote discord, and even to imperil the Union. They were ultimately defeated, and their claims justly ignored.

The foreign claimants were Great Britain and Spain. Spain proposed as the price of alliance with the United States, that the region from the Alleghany mountains to the Mississippi river, and from Florida to the Ohio river, should constitute an Indian reservation, of which the western half should be under the protection of Spain and the eastern half under the protection of the United States; that Spain should be permitted to occupy this country with her troops, so that she could claim it from Great Britain under the principle of uti possidetis. This reservation would have covered the present States of Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee and Kentucky. France sustained Spain in this demand and urged it upon Congress.

Great Britain, in addition to her ancient title to the entire territory of the colonies, laid especial claim to the country northwest of the Ohio river, by virtue of her act of parliament in 1774, commonly known as the ‘Quebec Act,’ by which she had annexed all that region to Canada. In assertion of this claim, she took possession of the country early in the war, and occupied it with British troops. At the suggestion and under the guidance of her illustrious citizen, General George Rogers Clarke, Virginia organized an expedition composed of Virginia soldiers, in Virginia pay, without assistance from the United States, expelled the British from the territory, and held it at the close of the war, in the name of the State.

These foreign claims came up for settlement, not before Congress, but by treaty with foreign nations; yet the uncertainty served to render the whole question still more complicated. The two charter claimants, Virginia and North Carolina, were the only States who supported their titles by actual settlement, and by civil and military occupation. The settlements along the Mississippi, the Wabash and the Ohio, and in Kentucky, and the military occupation by George Rogers Clarke, on the part of Virginia; and the settlements along the Watauga and the Cumberland, and the operations of Robertson and Sevier on the part of North Carolina, supported and maintained the charter rights of all the claimants to the western lands. The cabin and the rifle of the pioneer guarded the charters of the States, and enabled our commissioners in negotiating the treaty of peace to add to the abstract charter titles the plea of possession, and thus to prevent the limitation of the boundaries to the Alleghany mountains or the Ohio river. (Roosevelt's Winning of the West, Vol. 2., p. 373; Vol. 3, p. 243.)

At the treaty of Paris, the United States was fortunate in the services of three of her ablest diplomats, John Adams, John Jay and Benjamin Franklin. After Great Britain signified her willingness to grant independence, negotiations were delayed on several important questions, the most important of which was the question of boundary. The three commissioners were united in demanding boundaries which should include every foot of land within the charter limits of every State. They differed only in the methods of negotiations to secure the end. Dr. Franklin was disposed to confide in France, and to work in harmony with her representatives. Jay was distrustful of the designs of France, and favored direct negotiations with England without the privity of France. Adams, upon his arrival, warmly sided with Jay, and Franklin yielded. Whether the course favored by Franklin would have been successful, can only be conjectured. The course pursued at the suggestion of Jay and Adams was eminently successful, and achieved a brilliant diplomatic victory.

The purposes of Spain, though aided by France, were thwarted, and Great Britain acceded to the demands of the United States. (See Narrative and Critical Hist. of Am., VII. 2, and Lecky's Hist. of Eng., Vol. 4.)

After the fortunate expedient of Jay in sending Vaughan to confer with Lord Shelburne, Great Britain seemed suddenly to adopt a policy at variance with her former obstinate and haughty tone toward America, and there was no longer any trouble about the western boundaries. In addition to the views which the British negotiators expressed, we may well conjecture that there were others to which no public expression was given.

It was no part of British policy to build up either France or Spain in America, and it was, perhaps, fortunate that France took a decided and active part in urging the claims of Spain. The British leaders saw in it an attempt to gain a foothold east of the Mississippi over territory which Great Britain had been accustomed to regard as her own. It was less galling to her pride to yield it to America than to extend the dominions of Spain at the demand of France. In addition to this, the British statesmen believed that the American republics could not hold together, and confidently expected that in a short time some, if not all of them, would return to the mother country. They were already quarreling among themselves over this very territory, and doubtless the quarrel was considered abroad as more dangerous than it really was. Was it not better for Great Britain to leave them this bone of contention than to cure their quarrels by removing the cause? It had already delayed the Union for many years and was still an unsettled question. Would not the quarrel be renewed with greater violence as soon as the pressure of a foreign war was removed? If these states should return they would bring this territory back with them. Besides, a liberal policy and the decision of this point in her favor against the wishes of France and Spain, would tend to detach America from her allies, and restore confidence in the mother country. On the other hand, Great Britain could not hope, and perhaps did not wish, to establish permanently cordial relations with France and Spain. Influenced by considerations of this nature, and in accordance with the heroic British character, which is as positive and magnanimous in concession as it is bold and haughty in aggression, Great Britain consented that the boundaries should be established in accordance with her charters to the several States, and in the case of the northwestern boundary, yielded her claims under the ‘Quebec Act’ to the principle of uti possidetis, which Virginia so happily supplied by the success of her expedition under George Rogers Clarke. The boundaries were established to extend to the Great Lakes, the Mississippi river and the Florida line, embracing all the western territory within the charter claims of Georgia, the Carolinas, Virginia, Connecticut and Massachusetts, the claim of Virginia alone extending to Lake Superior.

Let us now review the controversy which a few of the States without color of title and the land companies so long waged in Congress against the charter claimants, especially against Virginia, and let us begin at the beginning. This controversy started in 1776 between Maryland and Virginia, and grew out of the proceedings connected with the instructions to the Virginia delegates to move in Congress for independence, confederation and foreign alliances. Virginia was the leader in these three propositions. Maryland instructed her delegates to oppose them all.

The conventions of the two States were in session at the same time. Let us examine their proceedings to arrive at the origin of the controversy.

The Virginia convention met at Williamsburg, May 6, 1776. Some of her leaders were absent. Washington was in command of the army. Jefferson, Richard Henry Lee and George Wythe were in Congress. Yet many of her ablest men were present, some of whom were already famous, and others were to gain fame in this assembly. Patrick Henry was there in the plenitude of his powers, the ruling spirit of the convention. Edmund Pendleton. presided over the deliberations. Thomas Nelson was the mover of its most important resolutions. George Mason was the author of its ‘Declaration of Rights.’ Other delegates, scarcely less illustrious, were among its members. Two young men, James Madison and Edmund Randolph, here began their careers.2

May 15th the following resolutions were adopted:

Resolved, unanimously, That the delegates appointed to represent this colony in General Congress, be instructed to propose to that respectable body to declare the United Colonies free and independent States, absolved from all allegiance to, or dependence upon, the crown or parliament of Great Britain, and that they give the assent of this colony to such declaration, and to whatever measures may be thought proper and necessary by the Congress for forming foreign alliances, and a confederation of the colonies, at such time, and in the manner, as to them shall seem best; Provided, that the power of forming government for, and the regulations of the internal concerns of each colony, be left to the respective colonial legislatures.

Resolved, unanimously, That a committee be appointed to prepare a Declaration of Rights, and such a plan of government as will be most likely to maintain peace and order in this colony, and secure substantial and equal liberty to the people. (Life of Patrick Henry, by W. W. Henry, Vol. I, Ch. 16; American Archives, Fourth Series, Vol. 6, p. 1524.)

These resolutions, prefaced by a strong preamble, were offered by Thomas Nelson, and were seconded by Patrick Henry in words of burning eloquence. Copies were sent to the several colonial legislatures and were presented to Congress May 27th.

In obedience to these instructions, Richard Henry Lee, on behalf of the Virginia delegates, offered the following resolutions in Congress June 7, 1776:

That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.

That it is expedient forthwith to take the most effectual measures for forming foreign alliances.

That a plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the respective colonies for their consideration.

Thus was outlined the policy of Virginia. By the adoption of the motion of her delegates, July 2, 1776, it became the policy of the United States. (Am. Arch., Fourth Series, Vol. 6, p. 1699.)

Let us now examine the policy of Maryland. Her state convention met May 15, 1776, the day on which the convention of Virginia adopted the instructions in favor of independence. May 21, 1776, the Maryland convention gave to its delegates the following instructions:

‘Resolved, unanimously, That, as this convention is firmly persuaded that a reunion with Great Britain on constitutional principles would most effectually secure the rights and liberties, and increase the strength and promote the happiness of the whole empire, objects which this province has ever had in view, the said deputies are bound and directed to govern themselves by the instructions given to them by this convention in its session in December last, in the same manner as if said instructions were particularly repeated.’ (Am. Arch., Fourth Series, p. 463.)

The previous instructions to her deputies in Congress, adopted January 12, 1776, and referred to above, contained strong expressions of attachment to Great Britain and the ardent desire for reconciliation. They comment on ‘the mildness and equity of the English Constitution, under which we have grown up to, and enjoyed a state of felicity not exceeded among any people we know of, until the grounds of the present controversy were laid by the ministry and parliament of Great Britain.’

After these preliminary expressions, the legislature proceeds to give explicit instructions on three points: independence, foreign alliance and national union. These instructions are so interesting that they are quoted below, as follows:

‘As upon the attainment of these great objects, we shall think it our greatest happiness to be thus firmly united to Great Britain, we think proper to instruct you that, should any proposition be happily made by the crown or parliament that may lead to, or lay a rational and probable ground for reconciliation, you use your utmost endeavors to cultivate and improve it into a happy settlement and lasting amity; taking care to secure the colonies against the exercise of the right assumed by parliament to tax them, and to alter and change the charters, constitution and internal policy without their consent—powers incompatible with the essential securities of the colonists.’ (American Archives, Fourth Series, p. 463.)

‘We further instruct you, that you do not, without the previous knowledge and approbation of the convention of this province, assent to any proposition to declare these colonies independent of the crown of Great Britain, nor to any proposition for making or entering into alliance with any foreign power, nor to any union or confederation of these colonies which may necessarily lead to a separation from the mother country, unless in your judgment, or in the judgment of any four of you, or a majority of the whole of you, if all shall be then attending in Congress, it shall be thought absolutely necessary for the preservation of the liberties of the United Colonies; and should a majority of the colonies in Congress, against such your judgment, resolve to declare these colonies independent of the crown of Great Britain, or to make or to enter into alliance with any foreign crown, or into any union or confederation of these colonies, which may necessarily lead to a separation from the mother country, we instruct you immediately to call the convention of this province, and repair thereto with such proposition and resolve, and lay the same before the said convention for their consideration; and this convention will not hold this province bound by such majority in Congress, until the representative body of the province in convention assent thereto.’

The resolutions of the Virginia delegates, embracing the three propositions of independence, foreign alliances and confederation, were debated June 8, 1776. A report of these debates is given by Mr. Jefferson in the Madison papers, Vol. I, p. 9, et seq.

Messrs. Wilson, Robert R Livingston, E. Rutledge, Dickenson and others, although personally favorable to the measures proposed, argued for delay. The middle colonies, they argued, ‘were not yet ripe for bidding adieu to Great Britain, but they were fast ripening;’ ‘some of them had expressly forbidden their delegates to consent to such a declaration;’ ‘that if such a declaration should now be agreed to, these delegates must retire, and possibly their colonies might secede from the Union.’

The other side was argued by J. Adams, Lee, Wythe and others, who urged prompt action, and argued: ‘There are only two colonies, Maryland and Pennsylvania, whose delegates are absolutely tied up, and that these had by their instructions, only reserved the right of confirming or rejecting the measure;’ ‘that the backwardness of these two colonies might be ascribed partly to the influence of proprietary power and connections, and partly to their having not yet been attacked by the enemy;’ ‘that the conduct of some colonies, from the beginning of this contest, had given reason to suspect it was their settled policy to keep in the rear of this Confederacy, that their particular prospect might be better even in the worst event.’

It was decided to wait for the colonies ‘not matured for falling from the parent stem.’ So the final decision was postponed to July 1, and a committee was appointed to prepare a ‘Declaration of Independence.’

Fortunately for the country, the deliberations in regard to independence came to a speedy conclusion. All opposition vanished. July 4, 1776, the remarkable result was reached, which was ultimately attained by every vital issue of the ‘Critical Period’—unanimity. Before this result was achieved, and closely connected with it, an event occurred which hastened the Declaration of Independence, and delayed the consummation of confederation. This event led to acrimonious controversy, and the revival of the old colonial feud between Virginia and Maryland.

This feud originated with the settlement of Maryland. The grant to Lord Baltimore was made by the crown out of lands within the charter limits of Virginia. It was regarded by the colonists as an arbitrary violation of their charter rights, against which they made unavailing protest. In addition to this they were indignant that a colony of Catholics should be established in their vicinity. Partaking in the prejudices of the times, they felt indignation and feared danger at the prospects of papists for neighbors. They were, also, jealous of certain commercial privileges accorded to this new colony in which they were not permitted to share. When the new settlers arrived to take possession of their grant, they were not received with the proverbial Virginia hospitality. The Marylanders were not slow to resent this unfriendly disposition, and the relations between the two colonies assumed a hostile aspect. Acrimonious controversies and personal encounters marked its earlier stages. Virginia never relinquished her claim to the territory during her whole colonial life, and made several efforts to recover its possession. Before the Revolution, however, her people had become accustomed to the situation, and cordial relations began to grow up between the two colonies. These relations were strengthened by their mutual participation in the Revolution.

These old quarrels are now happily healed, and the people of no two states in the Union are now bound by ties of more cordial friendship than the people of Virginia and Maryland. The mention of this historic feud now excites a smile rather than angry sentiments, because it long ago reached friendly adjustment, and its solution produced results beneficial to the whole country, and of which both states are proud.

The event alluded to, which revived this colonial feud, was the capture by Virginia of letters from Lord George Germaine, the English secretary of state, addressed to ‘Robert Eden, Esq., deputy governor of Maryland.’ Governor Eden was the brother-in-law of the last proprietor of Maryland. (Maryland, William Hand Brown.)

The sixth Lord Baltimore, dying in 1771, leaving no legitimate issue, bequeathed Maryland to his natural son, Henry Harford. After the beginning of the Revolutionary war, Governor Eden occupied a peculiar position. He remained as governor of Maryland, and exercised his functions as the representative of the proprietary interest, with the concurrence of the convention, and enjoyed a high degree of confidence and popularity, although making no secret of his attachment to the interests of England. The exemption of Maryland from British attack was attributed to his presence, and excited the suspicion of the other colonies.

Lord George Germaine, under date of December 23, 1775, wrote to Governor Eden two letters which were captured by Captain Barron on the Chesapeake bay, from a British vessel, sometime in April, 1776, and were delivered to the Virginia committee of safety. These intercepted letters were forwarded to the authorities of Maryland, and their contents communicated to Congress. Thereupon, the president of Congress wrote to the Maryland council of safety, urging the immediate arrest of Governor Eden and inclosing the ‘Resolve of Congress’ to the following effect:

That information had come to Congress that the governor carried on a correspondence with the ministry highly dangerous to American liberty, which was confirmed by some letters to him from Lord George Germaine, lately intercepted and sent up to Virginia, by which it appears to them that the public safety requires his person and papers to be seized; that they recommend it to this council of safety to secure him and them immediately and send them to Philadelphia. (Am. Arch., Fourth Series, Vol. 6, p. 735.)

About the same time, General Charles Lee ordered the commanding officer of the troops at Annapolis to arrest Governor Eden. This order was conveyed through Mr. Samuel Purviance, chairman of the Baltimore committee, and steps were taken for the arrest. The Maryland council of safety interposed at this point, and prevented further proceedings. The matter was referred to the Maryland convention, which, May 24, nine days after the instructions of Virginia to move independence, took action censuring Mr. Purviance, and adopting resolutions containing, among others, the following:

It is the intention of this convention to preserve, as far as may be, the ostensible form of government, in hopes it may have some influence toward a reunion with Great Britain. * * *

Therefore, the request is, that the governor will not take an active hostile part; or, until the event of the commissioners is known, that he will not correspond with administration, or those who may be carrying on hostilities in America, directly or indirectly.

If the governor thinks himself at liberty to enter into such engagement, it is much the inclination of the convention that he should continue in the province in his station. (Am. Arch., Fourth Series, Vol. 6, p. 736-7.)

To this communication, after some delay, Governor Eden replied, declining to accept the terms proposed, and requesting permission to return to England. To this communication the convention replied, commending the course of the governor, granting the request and inviting his services in behalf of reunion with England. A committee was appointed to wait on him and present the following address:

To his Excellency Robert Eden, Esq., Governor of Maryland:

May it please your excellency: We are commanded by the convention to wait upon your excellency, and to communicate to you the resolutions they have this day entered into; and we are instructed to assure your excellency that the convention entertains a favorable sense of your conduct, relative to the affairs of America, since the unhappy differences have subsisted between Great Britain and the United Colonies, as far as the same hath come to their knowledge, and of their real wish for your return, to resume the government of this province, when we shall happily be restored to peace, and that connection with Great Britain, the interruption and suspense of which have filled the mind of every good man with the deepest regret.

From the disposition your excellency hath manifested to promote the real interest of both countries, the convention is induced to entertain the warmest hopes and expectations that, upon your arrival in England, you will represent the temper and principles of Maryland with the same candor you have hitherto shown, and that you will exert your endeavors to promote a reconciliation, upon terms that may be secure and honorable both to Great Britain and America.

To which his excellency returned no answer, but received assurances that he might send down to the Capes for a man-of-war, having engaged by letter to Mr. Carroll, that it should commit no hostilities whilst up for him. (Am. Arch., Fourth Series, Vol. 6, p. 737-8.)

A copy of the proceedings of the convention relative to Governor Eden, together with a request for a passport from Virginia, were sent to the president of the Virginia committee of safety, in a letter from the president of the Maryland convention, dated May 25, 1776. This letter was laid before the Virginia convention May 31, and aroused a strong feeling of indignation. This sentiment will be readily understood when it is remembered that the letters of Lord George Germaine to Governor Eden had been intercepted by the Virginia authorities and by them conveyed to the authorities of Maryland and to Congress.

These intercepted letters furnished indubitable evidence that Governor Eden had heretofore conveyed to the British ministry information which they deemed valuable, and that he was expected by them to use the anomalous official position in which the Maryland convention persistently retained him, to furnish information to Great Britain, and to aid in measures for the subjugation of Virginia and other Southern colonies, while Maryland was left free from invasion. The letters did not prove that Governor Eden assented to the Southern invasion, but they did show that the British government relied on him to aid in such purposes, and that he had heretofore furnished important information. This is clearly shown in the following intercepted letter:


Whitehall, December 23, 1775.

Sir:—It was not until the 27th of November, that your dispatch to Lord Dartmouth, of the 27th of August, was received here, when I had the honor of laying it before the King. And I have it in command from his Majesty to express to you his Majesty's approbation of your zeal for the publick service, and of the unalterable attachment you have shown to his person and Government, from the first commencement of the present unhappy disputes, which have involved his Majesty's faithful servants in the Colonies in difficulties and distress that are only to be equaled by the fortitude with which they are borne.

Your letter contains a great deal of very useful information, and your confidential communication of the characters of individuals, more especially of such as come over into England, is of great advantage; and you may rest assured that every possible precaution will be used that no part of your letter shall transpire.

An armament, consisting of seven regiments and a fleet of frigates and small ships, is now in readiness to proceed to the Southern Colonies in order to attempt the restoration of legal Government in that part of America. It will proceed, in the first place, to North Carolina, and from thence either to South Carolina or Virginia, as circumstances of greater or less advantage shall point out; if to the latter, it may have very important consequences to the Colony under your government, and therefore you will do well to consider of every measure by which you may, in conjunction with Lord Dunmore, give facility and assistance to its operations.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

George Germaine.

To Robert Eden, Esq., Deputy-Governor of Maryland.

Copy.

J. Pendleton, C. C. Safety for Virginia.


When, therefore, the action of the Maryland convention was announced to Virginia, accompanied with a request for passports to enable Governor Eden to join Lord Dunmore and the British fleet, it is not, surprising that the proposition excited surprise and alarm. The Virginia convention, May 31st, took the following action:

Resolved, unanimously, That the committee of safety be directed to write a letter to the president of the convention of Maryland in answer to his letter of the 25th inst., expressing the deepest concern at the proceedings of that convention respecting Governor Eden, and our reason for not becoming accessory thereto, by giving him a passport through this colony or the bay adjoining. That we would with reluctance, in any case, intermeddle in the affairs of a sister colony; but in this matter we are much interested, and the convention of Maryland, by sending their proceedings of the committee of safety here, have made it the duty of the convention to declare their sentiments thereon. That, considering the intercepted letter from Lord George Germaine to Governor Eden, in which his whole conduct and confidential letters are approved, and he is directed to give facility and assistance to the operations of Lord Dunmore against Virginia, we are at a loss to account for the council of safety of Maryland, their having neglected to seize him, according to the recommendation of the general Congress, and more so for the convention having promoted his passage to assist in our destruction, under a pretense of his retiring to England, which, we conceive from the above letter, he is not at liberty to do; that, supposing he should go to Britain,, it appears to us that such voyage, with the address presented to him, will enable him to assume the character of a public agent, and, by promoting diversion and disunion among the colonies, produce consequences the most fatal to the American cause; that, as the reasons assigned for his departure, ‘that he must obey the ministerial mandates while remaining in his government,’ are very unsatisfactory, when the convention declare that in his absence the government, in its old form, will devolve on the president of the council of state, who will be under equal obligations to perform such mandates, we cannot avoid imputing those proceedings to some undue influence of Governor Eden, under the mask of friendship to America, and of the proprietary interest in Maryland, where the members of that convention were betrayed into a vote of fatal tendency to the common cause, and we fear to this country in particular, and feel it an indispensable duty to warn the good people of that province to guard against the proprietary influence.

Resolved, That the foregoing resolution be forthwith published in the Virginia Gazette. (Am. Arch., Fourth Series, vol. 6, pp. 1544-45.)

This protest of Virginia was timely. Its publication produced important effects, all of which were ultimately salutary, though exciting temporary irritation. June 11th the delegates of Maryland in Congress wrote to the Maryland council of safety:

‘We are astonished at the ungenerous and malevolent turn given to the proceedings of our convention by that of Virginia, and hope that they will be as unsuccessful in their nefarious attempt to stir up the people of Maryland against their representatives as they have hitherto been in their endeavors to render the councils of that province suspected.’

They thought it important, however, in the same letter to urge advice similar to the suggestion of Virginia, though not couched in the same plain language. They say: ‘It will be necessary that the convention of Maryland should meet as soon as possible to give the explicit sense of the province on this point (the Declaration of Independence); and we hope that you will accordingly exercise your power of convening them at such time as you think the members can be brought together.’

The council of safety had already acted, and by circular of June 9th had summoned the delegates to meet in convention at Annapolis June 20th, and to be punctual, ‘as the business is very urgent and will not admit of a moment's delay.’ The convention met at the time appointed. Their action is thus described in the interesting history of Maryland by William Hand Brown. (Commonwealth Series, p. 280.)

‘They summoned their deputies back from congress, and then laid the question before the freemen. These, meeting in their sovereign political capacity in their several counties, instructed their representatives in the convention to rescind the restrictions imposed upon the deputies in Congress, and to allow them to unite with those of the other colonies in declaring independence and forming a confederation.’

The Maryland convention defended its previous action upon the ground of lack of authority, claiming that its powers were limited to carrying out the non-importation agreements; ‘that it had been empowered to exercise its functions with a view to reconciliation with Great Britain, and that it had no power to declare independence —for that it must go to the people.’

This view of passive obedience does not accord with the vigor and warmth of the instructions to her delegates, issued by the convention in the previous month, nor with the earnestness with which they implored the offices of Governor Eden with the British ministry. How far the convention was influenced by the proprietary interests, as charged by Virginia, cannot be determined. One thing, however, is clear: The convention had been very slow ‘to go to the people.’ The blunt letter of Virginia, rebuking not the people of Maryland but its convention, was an important factor ‘to stir up the people’ as well as the convention. As soon as the opportunity was afforded them, the people of Maryland responded nobly, and the convention caught their spirit. Action was prompt. There was no quibbling or shuffling to preserve consistency. The convention went to the people and obeyed their voice. The policy was instantly reversed, and Maryland's vote was made ready for independence. July 1st her delegates laid before Congress the resolutions of the Maryland convention, adopted June 28th.

By these resolutions the previous instructions were revoked, and the restrictions therein contained removed; and the deputies were ‘authorized and empowered to concur with the other United Colonies, or a majority of them, in declaring the United Colonies free and independent States, in forming such further compact and confederation between them, in making foreign alliances, and in adopting such other measures as shall be adjudged necessary for securing the liberties of America; and that said colony will hold itself bound by the resolutions of a majority of the United Colonies in the premises, provided the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and police of that colony be reserved to the people thereof.’

The next day, July 2nd, the motion of the Virginia delegates of June 7th was adopted in Congress, and the vote of Maryland is recorded in the affirmative. Thus, the first effect of the revival of the old colonial feud was beneficial to the country. But the feud did not end here.

The Maryland convention having obeyed the voice of the people and placed the State in its true position, now turned attention to censure Virginia for what they styled the appeal ‘to the good people of this province against their convention.’ Waiting two days for the rejoicings of July 4th to subside, the Maryland convention, July 6th, adopted a series of resolutions defending their own course with regard to Governor Eden, and censuring Virginia for publishing the resolutions of May 31st. These resolutions of Maryland are too long to quote. They are strongly worded, and, though courteously expressed, evince a feeling of deep resentment. (American Archives, Fourth Series, vol. 6, pp. 1506, 1727.)

The opportunity to repay Virginia in kind was now at hand. The convention of Virginia did not stop with instructing her delegates in Congress to move for independence and confederation. Without waiting on the result, the convention entered upon the work of preparing the State for independence and union. Her ‘Declaration of Rights’ was adopted June 12th, and her ‘Constitution or form of government’ was adopted, with like unanimity, June 29th. Article XXI of this instrument was intended to pave the way to confederation by releasing all title to the territory of other States, which had been carved out of her territory by grants of the crown, and which had occasioned colonial disputes, especially with Maryland. This article reads as follows: ‘The territories contained within the charters erecting the colonies Maryland, Pennsylvania, North and South Carolina, are hereby ceded, released and forever confirmed to the people of those colonies respectively, with all the rights of property, jurisdiction and government, and all other rights whatsoever which might at any time heretofore have been claimed by Virginia, except the free navigation and use of the rivers Potowmack and Pohomoke, with the property of the Virginia shores or strands bordering on either of the said rivers, and all improvements which have been made or shall be made thereon. The western and northern extent of Virginia shall in all other respects stand as fixed by the charter of King James the First, in the year one thousand six hundred and nine, and by the publick treaty of peace between the courts of Great Britain and France in the year one thousand seven hundred and sixty-three; unless, by act of legislature, one or more territories shall hereafter be laid off, and governments established westward of the Alleghany mountains. And no purchase of lands shall be made of the Indian natives but on behalf of the publick, by authority of the general assembly.’ (Henning's Statutes of Virginia.)

Judge Haywood remarks on this action: ‘Here was magnanimously cut off and surrendered all the territory which had been taken from Virginia to satisfy the grants to the Lords Proprietors.’ ( Haywood's Hist. of Tenn., p. 6.)3

Haywood is just in calling this action magnanimous. While Virginia could not, perhaps, have maintained a successful claim to the possession of those territories to which her abstract prior title had so long lain dormant, and had been weakened, if not destroyed, by so many capricious grants from the same power by which it was created, yet her position offered strong temptations to pursue the time sanctioned European policy, the policy which European statesmen consider sagacious, which has built up all the great powers of Europe at the expense of their neighbors, and which is pursued now and ever has been pursued throughout the whole history of their diplomacy. That policy would have been to nurse her claims, to hold them as a perpetual thorn in the side of her neighboring States, to prevent the formation of the union, to make herself the great central absorbing power, and gradually to encroach on the lesser States. Such a policy was feared by several of the smaller States, especially by Maryland. Had a monarch ruled the destinies of Virginia, such would have been the inevitable tendency of events. With wealth, population and resources then superior to any of the States, the prospect was certainly alluring, had the ambition of Virginia aimed at empire. But a far different spirit animated her people. Fired with the love of liberty, and struggling for their own freedom from the grasp of Great Britain, no thought entered their minds of aggression against the brethren fighting by their sides. Impelled by this spirit of her people, she devoted her efforts to bind the States in a fraternal compact, to remove all causes of jealousy, and to build up a great and permanent Federal republic, and she hastened to surrender all claims to the territory of her sister States.

The Maryland convention, however, was in no frame of mind to recognize the magnanimity of Virginia. On the 29th of October the Maryland convention entered upon its journal the following note: ‘This convention, being informed that in the constitution or form of government agreed upon by the delegates of Virginia, a claim is made by them injurious to the inhabitants of this state,’ (American Archives, Fifth Series, vol. 3, p. 133), ‘Ordered, That the same be read, and the same was read, as follows, to wit:’ The twenty-first section of the Virginia constitution, as above quoted, was then read, and the convention resolved to consider the matter on the next day, October 30th. The consideration was resumed at the time appointed, whereupon a series of three resolutions was adopted. These resolutions make no acknowledgment of the effort of Virginia to terminate the old colonial disputes by the cession of her charter claims, but seem rather to resent it. The first resolution is in the following words: (Ibid., p. 134.)

‘Resolved, unanimously, That it is the opinion of this convention that the State of Virginia hath not any right or title to any of the territory, bays, rivers, or waters included in the charter granted by His Majesty Charles the First to Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore.’ (Am. Arch., Fifth Series, vol. 3, pp. 133, 134.)

The second resolution is devoted to boundary claims, asserting ‘sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the said river Potowmack,’ etc. The third resolution is the one which demands our attention. It is as follows:

‘Resolved, unanimously, That it is the opinion of this convention that the very extensive claim of the State of Virginia to the back lands hath no foundation in justice, and that if the same or any like claim is admitted, the freedom of the smaller States and the liberties of America may be thereby greatly endangered; this convention being firmly persuaded that, if the dominion over those lands should be established by the blood and treasure of the United States, such lands ought to be considered as a common stock, to be parceled out at proper times into convenient, free and independent governments.’4

This resolution marks the beginning of the controversy which delayed the formation of the Confederation for nearly five years, and threatened, at one time, to defeat it. The spirit of retaliation against Virginia is manifest upon its face, yet it ultimately led to good results. Just as the timely thrust of Virginia had awakened the people of Maryland to the patriotic action which hastened the Declaration of Independence, so the retaliation of Maryland, though failing signally, as we shall hereafter see, in the measures proposed by the State, yet had the effect to draw attention to the subject, and ultimately induced Virginia to reconsider the territorial policy announced in her constitution, and to make the voluntary cession of her western possessions the most magnanimous act of history.

The territorial policy of Virginia had been foreshadowed in her constitution of June 26th, 1776, which was passed by the unanimous vote of her convention. This instrument declares that her western and northern extent shall stand as fixed by her charter, ‘unless by act of legislature one or more territories shall hereafter be laid off and governments established west of the Alleghany mountains.’

This policy, so solemnly incorporated into her fundamental law, although the purpose of organizing the territory into new States is contingently expressed, furnishing the first official suggestion of additional States, was voluntarily made without pressure from others, and has been faithfully carried out. In one respect alone has Virginia departed from the policy outlined in her constitution. Instead of organizing all of her territory ‘west of the Alleghany mountains’ into States by the direct agency of her own legislature, she subsequently committed a portion of that duty to the United States by ceding the Northwest Territory, under express stipulations that it should be organized into States. She reserved the portion south of the Ohio, and, by direct action of her own legislature, erected it into the State of Kentucky in 1792, ten years before the United States was able to begin redeeming its pledge of organizing the Northwest Territory into States by creating the State of Ohio in 1802.

Maryland's resolution of October 30, 1776, contained the excellent suggestion that Congress could make good use of these western lands, and would be the best agent for organizing them into independent States; but her reasoning as to any title of the United States was fallacious, and the coercive measures hinted at, and subsequently urged, were unwarrantable. The resolution was speedily followed up by bringing the matter before Congress. November 9th, 1776, the convention took up the consideration of a letter from the president of Congress, urging them to rescind the action of Maryland ‘to pay ten dollars in lieu of the hundred acres of bounty land determined by Congress to be given to such noncommissioned officers and soldiers as shall enlist to serve during the war.’

In reply to this letter the convention resolved that the president of the convention be directed to write to Congress and inform them that Maryland had no public lands which could be pledged to the soldiers, and knew of no such lands owned by Congress; that Maryland declined to pledge the faith of the State to offer one hundred acres as bounty for enlistment until ‘the honorable Congress will specify any Land belonging to the United States as common stock to be divided among the soldiery.’

Then comes the climax: ‘That this convention are under the strongest impression that the back Lands claimed by the British Crown, if secured by the blood and treasure of all, ought, in reason, justice and policy, to be considered as a common stock, to be parceled out by Congress into free, convenient and independent governments, as the wisdom of that body shall hereafter direct; but if these (the only lands as this convention apprehend that can) should be provided by Congress at the expense of the United States to make good the proffered bounties, every idea of their being a common stock must thereby be given up; some of the states may, by fixing their own price on the Land, pay off what of their quota of the public debt they please, and have their extensive territory settled by the soldiery of the other states, whilst this state and a few others must be so Weakened and impoverished that they can hold their liberties only at the will of their powerful neighbors.’ (Am. Arch., Fifth Series, vol. 3, p. 1569.)

This letter was read in Congress November 13, 1776, and elicited no action except an order that the president inform Maryland that the faith of the United States is pledged for the bounty land. to the soldiers. But Maryland was resolute to follow up the attack. October 15, 1777, her delegates moved in Congress ‘that the United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power to ascertain and fix the western boundary of such states as claim to the Mississippi or South Sea and lay out the land beyond the boundary so ascertained, into separate and independent States, from time to time, as the numbers and circumstances of the people may require.’ (Journals, vol. 2, p. 290.)

This motion fully developed the Maryland idea. Coercion was to be used. This was proposed even before a confederation was established. The unorganized United States should seize the territory of the States, and deprive them of jurisdiction and property. The argument was, that some of the smaller States did not own public land, and felt it to be a hardship to lack this resource while others possessed it; that this land, if secured by ‘the blood and treasure of all,’ should be a ‘common stock’; therefore, the United States should arbitrarily limit the western boundaries of the claimant States without regard to their charter rights, and take possession of all territory which they saw fit to sequester. No wonder that such a proposition received only the vote of Maryland, and neither then nor subsequently obtained the sanction of the United States. It was abhorrent to all the principles so recently announced in the Declaration of Independence, the only charter under which the United States could, at that time, claim existence.

When the thirteen colonies became States by the Declaration of Independence, their several territorial limits remained unchanged. ‘These United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States.’ What colonies? ‘These.’ The several colonies as they were on the 4th of July, 1776, with their respective boundaries and charter rights, became States. What defined ‘these’ colonies? Their several charters. In the same series of resolutions of October 30, 1776, in which Maryland began the assault on the rights of Virginia, she asserted her own territorial rights, and based them upon ‘the charter granted by His Majesty Charles the First to Caecilius Calvert.’

The declaration to which the several States plighted ‘our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor,’ bound them to respect and defend each other's chartered rights by ‘the blood and treasure of all.’ But for whose benefit were these chartered rights to be respected and defended? Was all the territory of the States to become the property of Congress, and form a common stock? Every sentiment of justice revolts at the thought.

Had the war been unsuccessful, each State would have returned to its colonial condition without change of boundary. Had independence been achieved, and no union established, certainly each State would have retained its charter boundaries. In the case of conflict of title under charter claims, as in the case of Virginia's conflict with Massachusetts and Connecticut, the matter would have been settled between the claimant States, either by war or by treaty.

When independence was achieved and union was established, the charter rights of the claimants were in no way affected, except that a tribunal was provided for the peaceable adjustment of conflicting claims. This was done by the unanimous consent of the States, and was carefully guarded to prevent the United States from abusing the position of umpire.

But it was argued that these western lands were unoccupied and unsettled, and therefore different from other lands; that the settled lands, although ‘defended by the blood and treasure of all,’ were not claimed as a common stock, but inured to their respective States and were covered by their respective charters; these lands, however, were different, and the charters of their States did not protect them. The fallacy of this argument appears on its face. The charter protected the entire jurisdiction of the State. The war was undertaken to secure to each State its rights of person and property. No right accrued to the United States to usurp the jurisdiction and abridge the charter limits of any State.

Later on, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Delaware, though not going to the extreme position of Maryland, came to her aid. The land companies, which had been repudiated by Virginia, joined the alliance, and the argument was revived in a modified form.

Conceding that the jurisdiction of the several States was protected by their charters, it was urged that the property rights in the soil were not thus protected; that the King of Great Britain owned the property right to all ungranted lands within the charter limits of the several colonies until they became States, and therefore the general government, as the successor to the king, became at once the owner of these unoccupied or ‘crown lands,’ holding them within the jurisdiction of the several States. This argument, yielding half the controversy, was more plausible and less repulsive than the former, but was totally unsound.

If it applied to the unoccupied lands in the west, it must apply with equal force to all unoccupied lands in all portions of the United States, yet it was proposed that this rule should be applied only to ‘the western boundaries of such States as claim to the Mississippi or the South Seas.’ In its general application it would have been resisted by every State, and even by Maryland itself. If it applied to the crown lands, it must equally apply to proprietary rights; yet Maryland confiscated the proprietary rights and quit rents, and never proposed that the United States should inherit them. If it applied to lands, it must apply to all other species of property. If it applied to property, it must apply to all other rights and powers of the crown, and a general government, as yet unborn, was heir to all the rights and powers of the British crown. If this doctrine prevailed, what was the use of framing articles of confederation? Why was unanimous consent required? There was already a nebulous sovereignty whom nobody could locate, inheritor of the crown, and king of America.

The sentiments of the people of the United States could be reconciled to no such doctrine, in whole or in part. The strong common sense of their representatives had declared, not that all political connection between the states and Great Britain has descended to an heir, but that it ‘is totally dissolved.’ They inherited no general government, they created one, and took five years to frame one to suit them. After a discussion as to whether it were better to form a confederation before declaring independence, it was decided to declare independence first; in order that the free and independent States, and not the English colonies, might determine the conditions of permanent union. When this Confederation was established, it was vested with rights and powers conferred and defined by the States, and possessed not a trace of hereditary rights or powers descended from the British crown. The claim that Congress inherited from the British crown the right to limit the boundaries of the several States or to sequester lands, whether settled or unsettled, covered by their several charters, was, therefore, untenable, and was never sanctioned or seriously contemplated by the United States.

On the contrary, the recognition of the jurisdiction of the several States over all land, settled or unsettled, within their respective charter limits, some of which has never been ceded to, and none of which has ever been claimed by, the United States; the repeated invitations to the States to make cessions of their western lands; the care with which the terms of each cession were scrutinized; the scrupulous observance of the stipulations of these cessions, especially in the cases of Georgia and Connecticut, and of the request to Virginia to amend the terms of its cession so as to permit the Northwest Territory to be organized into more than three States; the incorporation into the articles of confederation of the provision by which the United States can take cognizance of the boundaries or jurisdiction of States only as ‘the last resort on appeal,’ when the case shall be brought before Congress by ‘the legislative or executive authority or lawful agent’ of one of the States ‘in controversy’; the adoption of the guarding clause, ‘No State shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States’; the language of the ordinances of 1784 and 1787; subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on collateral questions growing out of the cession; all abundantly show that the United States has uniformly respected the charter titles of the States to their western territory.

The events connected with the origin of this dispute have been given in some detail, for the reason that, although essential to a just estimate of the acts and motives of the leading parties to the controversy, they have not been adequately set forth by previous writers. The events which follow have been discussed by many historians, who agree on the main facts but differ in their opinions and reflections.

The motion of the Virginia delegates, offered June 7, 1776, embraced a clause ‘that a plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the respective colonies for their consideration.’ July 11th Congress resolved to create a committee for the purpose, which was appointed the next day, consisting of one member from each State. This committee reported a plan of confederation July 12th, which was debated at intervals until August 20th, when the committee presented an amended report. April, 1777, it was decided to devote two days in each week to the consideration of the subject. It was during the progress of these debates that Maryland offered, October 15, 1777, the motion heretofore quoted. The Articles were adopted by Congress November 15, 1777, not to be valid until ratified by all the States, and a circular was addressed to the States urging ratification. (Journals, vol. 1, pp. 408, 507, 618; vol. 2, p. 598.)

While the ratification was pending, Maryland continued her contest relative to the western lands by offering, June 22, 1778, a series of amendments to the Articles. Among these was an amendment intended to break down the safeguard which guaranteed to the States the protection of their territory from infraction by the United States. The proposed amendment was in the following words: ‘Article 9; after the words “shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States,” insert “the United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the power to appoint commissioners, who shall be fully authorized and empowered to ascertain and restrict the boundaries of such of the confederated States which claim to the river Mississippi or South Sea.” ’ This amendment was rejected, receiving five votes, Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Delaware and Pennsylvania. Against it were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, South Carolina and Georgia. New York was divided, and North Carolina absent.

July 9, 1778, the delegates of all the States in accordance with instructions, signed the articles in ratification of their respective States, except the delegates of New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland. Rhode Island, although signing in ratification, proposed an amendment, that the crown lands ‘shall be deemed, taken and considered as the property of these United States, and be disposed of and appropriated by Congress for the benefit of the whole Confederacy, reserving, however, to the States within whose limits such crown lands may be, the entire and complete jurisdiction thereof.’ New Jersey presented a memorial setting forth the views of her legislature on a number of matters. On the subject of the western lands New Jersey expressed views similar to those of Rhode Island; that the crown lands belong to the United States, the jurisdiction being reserved to the States within whose charter limits the land may lie. New Jersey acceded to the Confederation November 25, 1778. Delaware acceded February 23, 1779, but filed a protest, affirming the right of Delaware and all the other states to a share in the western lands. Congress permitted this protest to be filed with a condition ‘that it shall never be considered as admitting any claim by the same set up or intended to be set up.’ Maryland refused to become a member of the Confederation unless the articles should be amended to contain a provision in conformity to her views in reference to the western country. She seemed to persist in her course, notwithstanding that she had been defeated at every step. December 15, 1778, her legislature adopted ‘A declaration and a letter of instructions to her delegates in Congress,’ both of which were devoted to the subject of the western lands and were laid before Congress May 21, 1779. (Journals of Congress, vol. 2, pp. 601-605; vol. 3, pp. 281-2-3, 289. Henning's Statutes of Virginia, vol. 10, appendix.)

These documents reiterate the former claims and arguments of Maryland, extending and elaborating them. They complain that ‘the alterations and amendments proposed by our delegates to the Confederation in consequence of the aforesaid instructions by us to them given, were rejected, and no satisfactory reason assigned for the rejection thereof.’ They declare that unless amendments be made to ‘the third article of the Confederation, and the proviso to the ninth (according to which no State is to be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States),’ that ‘we mean not to subject ourselves to such guaranty.’ * * * ‘We declare that we will accede to the Confederation, provided an article or articles be added thereto, giving full power to the United States, in Congress assembled, to ascertain and fix the western limits of the States claiming to extend to the Mississippi or South Sea, and expressly reserving or securing to the United States a right in common in and to all lands lying to the westward of the frontiers as aforesaid, not granted to, or surveyed for, or purchased by individuals at the commencement of the present war.’ Allusion is made to States ‘grasping for territories to which, in our judgment, they have not the least shadow of exclusive right.’ A picture is painted of the great advantages Virginia would enjoy by selling these lands, and attracting the population of other States. The probability that Virginia would organize this territory into independent States is made the occasion of severe arraignment, and the charge of establishing a ‘sub-confederacy,’ an ‘imperium in imperio,’ and of a movement ‘to lull suspicion to sleep, and to cover the designs of a secret ambition.’ Her former allies in the effort to establish the western limits, who had subsequently joined the Confederation, are touched up as follows:

‘Although the pressure of immediate calamities, the dread of their continuing from the appearance of disunion, and some other peculiar circumstances, may have induced some States to accede to the present Confederation contrary to their own interests and judgments, it requires no great share of foresight to predict that when these causes cease to operate the States which have thus acceded to the Confederation will consider the first occasion of asserting their just rights and securing their independence.’

Her delegates are instructed ‘not to agree to the Confederation unless an article or articles be added thereto in conformity with our declaration. Should we succeed in obtaining such article or articles, then you are hereby fully empowered to accede to the Confederation.’

While very desirous to complete the Confederation, Congress would not and could not surrender the great principles at stake. The coercive measures of Maryland had failed. What was to be done? Neither Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, Massachusetts nor Connecticut would submit to have their charter rights invaded, nor would Congress consent to invade them. Virginia and Connecticut had instructed their delegates to proceed to form the Confederation without waiting longer on Maryland. These instructions were presented on the same day with the Maryland memorial, and the Virginia delegates presented resolutions in pursuance thereof. More patient councils prevailed, and the Confederation remained in suspense.

At this stage the land companies, which, since the refusal of Virginia to recognize their claims, had been operating unseen in the effort to wrest these lands from Virginia and place them in the hands of Congress, where they hoped to have more weight, threw aside the cloak and appeared as open antagonists. Virginia had, May 18, 1779, passed an act to open a land office and sell a portion of the land claimed by these companies. The land companies now addressed memorials to Congress, September 14, 1779, in which they claimed that the western lands were the property of the United States as successors to Great Britain, and prayed Congress to decide their controversy with Virginia These memorials were referred to a committee, before which the delegates of Virginia indignantly refused to appear or plead. The movement was followed up by a motion introduced by two delegates of Maryland, which, after amendment, was adopted, and was as follows:

Whereas, The appropriation of vacant lands by the several States, during the continuance of the war, will, in the opinion of Congress, be attended with great mischiefs; therefore,

Resolved, That it be earnestly recommended to the State of Virginia to reconsider the late act of assembly for opening their land office; and that it be recommended to the said State, and all other States similarly circumstanced, to forbear settling or issuing warrants for unappropriated lands, or granting the same during the continuance of the present war. (Journal, vol. 3, P. 335.)

The tone of Maryland was beginning to change. Her present motion does not ask Congress to use coercive measures to prevent Virginia from selling her lands. It is now a request or recommendation addressed to the State. Virginia made prompt and generous response by adopting, December 10th, her famous remonstrance. This able document so lucidly presents her case that the reader will be interested to peruse it in full:

The General Assembly of Virginia, ever attentive to the recommendations of Congress, and desirous to give the great council of the United States every satisfaction in their power, consistent with the rights and constitution of their commonwealth, have enacted a law to prevent present settlements on the northwest side of the Ohio river, and will on all occasions endeavor to manifest their attachment to the common interest of America, and their earnest wish to remove every cause of jealousy, and to promote that mutual confidence and harmony between the different States so essential to their true interest and safety.

Strongly impressed with these sentiments, the General Assembly of Virginia cannot avoid expressing their surprise and concern upon the information that Congress had received and countenanced petitions from certain persons, styling themselves the Vandalia and Indiana companies, asserting claims to lands in defiance of the civil authority, jurisdiction and laws of this commonwealth, and offering to erect a separate government within the territory thereof. Should Congress assume a jurisdiction, not only unwarranted by but expressly contrary to the fundamental principles of the Confederation, superseding or controlling the internal policy, civil regulations and municipal laws of this or any other State, it would be a violation of public faith, introduce a most dangerous precedent which might hereafter be urged to deprive of territory or subvert the sovereignty and government of any one or more of the United States, and establish in Congress a power which, in process of time, must degenerate into an intolerable despotism.

It is notorious that the Vandalia and Indiana companies are not the only claimers of large tracts of land under titles repugnant to our laws; that several men of great influence in some of the neighboring States are concerned in partnership with the Earl of Dunmore and other subjects of the British king, who, under purchases from the Indians, claim extensive tracts of country between the Ohio and Mississippi rivers; and that propositions have been made to Congress evidently calculated to secure and guarantee such purchases; so that, under color of creating a common fund, had those propositions been adopted, the public would have been duped by the arts of individuals, and great part of the value of unappropriated lands converted to private purposes.

Congress has lately described and ascertained the boundaries of these United States as an ultimatum in their terms of peace. The United States hold no territory but in right of some one individual State in the Union; the territory of each State from time immemorial hath been fixed and determined by their respective charters, there being no other rule or criterion to judge by; should these in any instance (when there is no disputed territory between particular States) be abridged without the consent of the states affected by it, general confusion must ensue; each state would be subjected in its turn to the encroachments of the others, and a field opened to future wars and bloodshed; nor can any arguments be fairly urged to prove that any particular tract of country, within the limits claimed by Congress on behalf of the United States, is not part of the chartered territory of some one of them, but must militate with equal force against the rights of the United States in general, and tend to prove such tract of country (if north of the Ohio river) part of the British province of Canada.

When Virginia acceded to the Articles of Confederation, her rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction within her own territory was reserved and secured to her, and cannot now be infringed or altered without her consent. She could have no latent views of extending that territory, because it had long before been expressly and clearly defined in the act which formed her new government.

The General Assembly of Virginia have heretofore offered Congress to furnish lands out of their territory on the northwest side of the Ohio river, without purchase money, to the troops on continental establishments of such of the confederated States as had not unappropriated lands for that purpose, in conjunction with the other States holding unappropriated lands, and in such proportion as should be adjusted and settled by Congress, which offer, when accepted, they will most cheerfully make good to the same extent, with the provision made by law for their own troops, if Congress shall think fit to allow the like quantities of land to the other troops on continental establishment. But, although the General Assembly of Virginia would make great sacrifices to the common interest of America (as they have already done on the subject of representation), and will be ready to listen to any just and reasonable proposition for removing the ostensible causes of delay to the complete ratification of the Confederation, they find themselves impelled by the duties which they owe to their constituents, to their posterity, to their country, and to the United States in general, to remonstrate and protest; and they do hereby, in the name and on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia, expressly protest against any jurisdiction or right of adjudication in Congress, upon the petitions of the Vandalia or Indiana companies, or on any other matter or things subversive of the internal policy, civil government or sovereignty of this or any other of the United American States, or unwarranted by the articles of the Confederation. (Henning's Statutes, vol. 10, pp. 557-559.)

This remonstrance plainly showed that Virginia understood her rights and intended to maintain them. It further distinctly stated that Virginia was willing to make great sacrifices, and invited propositions for removing the ostensible cause of delay in completing the Confederation. In short, it showed plainly that Virginia might be persuaded, but could not be coerced.

Maryland's plan of coercion having failed, Virginia having supplied the hint, New York now set the example of voluntary cession. She stepped forward as a mediator in the quarrel between her two Southern sisters. Her course was judicious, patriotic and adroit. Her legislature, by act of March 7, 1780, authorized her delegates in Congress to cede all her claims to the United States. This cession of New York could have no effect except the force of example. She assumed to give away what did not belong to her, yet she gave it with admirable grace and with suggestive purpose. Why could not the situation be relieved by voluntary cessions from other States?

The effect was happy. The way was opened to a friendly solution. The early suggestion of Maryland had drawn the attention of the whole country to the value of the unsettled western lands as a national domain, to be organized into new states by Congress, and her persistence had kept alive public interest in the matter.

Her rashness in urging coercive measures had repelled confidence in the movement, and had left her no supporters except the land companies. Rhode Island, New Jersey and Delaware, declining to follow her into extreme measures, had acceded to the Confederation, leaving her in an awkward predicament. From this painful condition the judicious action of New York and the generous cession of Virginia came in time to extricate her.

The Virginia statesmen had arrived at the conclusion that the purpose announced in their State constitution of 1776, of organizing their western possessions into independent States, could be better carried out by the United States than by the parent State. While irritated at the unjust assaults upon her title, and the threats of coercion, and while they could not concede that any portion of this land belonged to the smaller States, as a common stock, yet they recognized that these States were sadly in need of some such resource, which it was in the power of Virginia, by a wise and generous policy, to supply them. Such a policy would appease all jealousies, and would assure the great national purpose which Virginia had proposed and still ardently cherished, the completion of the Confederation.

Now that all efforts at coercion had signally failed, Virginia could be magnanimous; yet there was necessity for caution. The Confederation was not complete, and it would manifestly be unwise to cede her territory to an inchoate government. This territory must be guarded from the grasp of the land companies, which had acquired a strong influence in Congress. The claim that the United States possessed title to any territory within the charter limits of Virginia or any other State, to be enforced at the pleasure of Congress, upon the plea that it had been defended by the common blood and treasure, or upon any other specious plea, was a dangerous doctrine, and any concession of Virginia must be so guarded that it could not be construed into a precedent to sanction such a claim. Impelled by patriotic impulses, and restrained by wise considerations of caution, Virginia decided to cede to the United States all the territory within her charter limits north of the Ohio river, and to guard this cession by conditions to protect those principles which she had so firmly maintained.

Congress was also now ready to act upon the hint supplied by New York. Resolutions were adopted, September 6, 1760, urging all the States who owned western lands to make ‘a liberal surrender of a portion of their territorial claims so necessary to the happy establishment of the Federal union,’ and earnestly requesting Maryland to accede to the Confederation. This was followed in Congress, October 10, 1780, by additional resolutions, providing that the territory ceded should be held for the common benefit of the Union, and formed into republican States.

The response of Virginia was prompt. In fact, Virginia had informally invited this action of Congress, as may be seen from the letter of Colonel Mason, author of the ‘Remonstrance,’ written from the Virginia Assembly, July 27, 1780, to Mr. Joseph Jones, in Congress. (Life of Patrick Henry, by W. W. Henry, vol. 2, p. 85.) In this letter, Colonel Mason says that the members of the legislature ‘wish for such reasonable propositions from Congress as they can unite in supporting.’ Her general assembly entered promptly upon the discussion of the proposed cession of the western lands. After debating its provisions through the Christmas holidays, the legislative forms of the act were completed January 2, 1781, by which Virginia tendered to the United States the most magnificent Christmas gift which history records, resigned the sovereignty of the largest tract of territory in the annals of the world ever voluntarily surrendered without price or bloodshed by a powerful state able to defend it.

First of the States holding charter title to tender the jurisdiction and soil of her western lands, she invited the others to follow her example, and thus made possible the local governments and magical development of the West, averting the jealousy and possibly the anarchy and bloodshed that might have followed the assertion of her claims. As we see her thus voluntarily stripping herself of her territory until she shrinks up between the Ohio river and the Atlantic, shall we view her with that kindly pity which we feel for the man whose good-natured weakness has permitted greatness and fortune to fall from his grasp? Does not her course rather reveal a broad wisdom and a philanthropy which looked to the good of mankind, and not to the grasping of power or the extension of state lines? Whether we consider her magnanimous or weak, we cannot refuse the praise which poets and historians may bestow with kindling warmth, but which the world echoes with faint applause:


All thou hast been reflects less fame on thee,

Far less, than all thou hast forborne to be!


But all magnanimity was lost on the land companies. The conditions of this cession, if accepted by Congress, would forever preclude the recognition of their claims. They, therefore, set up a clamor to prevent the acceptance of the cession. The effect on Maryland was different. Just one month later, February 2, 1781, Maryland authorized her delegates to accede to the Confederation, and accompanied her act with a mild declaration that she did not thereby relinquish any rights that she might have in the western lands. Her delegates ratified the articles May 1st.

As in 1776, so again in 1781, Maryland acted with patriotism, and wisely receded from her former extreme declarations. She had notified Congress that she would not join the Confederation unless an article or articles should be added thereto limiting the boundaries of the States claiming to extend to the Mississippi river. Yet no such articles were ever added. In addition to this, the cessions of Virginia, New York and Connecticut had not been accepted, and no other charter claimant had even tendered a cession. Maryland had taken a sober second thought. She had discovered the impossibility of coercive measures and never afterward urged them, leaving the other claimant States to make cessions at leisure, or not at all, except of their own volition. The fact seems to be that she had nursed an unfounded suspicion of the ‘secret ambition’ of Virginia, and being now convinced of Virginia's patriotic intentions, she abandoned the contest, and her relations with Virginia became pacific and soon afterward cordial.

The land companies, however, continued the fight against the acceptance of Virginia's cession, which contained conditions that would forever bar their claims. They obtained influence enough to procure the appointment of a committee favorable to their interests. Either through the exertions of the agent of the Indiana Land company, who was besieging Congress, or by some other means, a report was secured from this committee which was suspiciously favorable to the Indiana company.

This report, made November 3, 1781, recommended that the title of the Indiana Land company be confirmed; that the cession of New York be accepted, as investing Congress with the jurisdiction of the entire western country; and that the cession of Virginia be rejected, for six reasons assigned, among which are the following:

‘First.—All the lands ceded or pretended to be ceded to the United States, by the State of Virginia, are within the claims of the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York, being part of the lands belonging to the said Six Nations and their tributaries.’

‘Sixth.—The conditions annexed to the said cession are incompatible with the honor interests and peace of the United States.’

The report offers a series of resolutions, among other things, that Congress recommend to Virginia and other states to cede ‘all claims and pretensions of claims to said western territory without any conditions or restrictions whatever.’ This report was the nearest approach to recognition which the claims of the land companies ever received in Congress, but it was a victory of short duration, and destined to an ignominious end, as shown by the following extract from the Fourth volume of Journals of Congress:

April 18, 1782.—* * * ‘The order of the day for taking into consideration the report of the committee on the cessions of New York, Virginia and Connecticut, and the petitions of the Indiana, Vandalia, Illinois and Wabash companies, being called for by the delegates for Virginia, and the first paragraph being read, a motion was made by Mr. Lee, seconded by Mr. Bland [both Virginia delegates], “That previous to any determination in Congress, relative to the cessions of the western lands, the name of each member present be called over by the secretary; that on such call, each member do declare upon his honor, whether he is or is not personally interested, directly or indirectly, in the claims of any company or companies, which have petitioned against the territorial rights of any one of the States, by whom such cessions have been made, and that such declaration be entered upon the journals.” ’

The intelligent reader will not be surprised to find that this resolution never came to a vote. On various pretexts, the consideration of this motion and the report of the committee were postponed from day to day until May 6, when it was indefinitely postponed. From this date this committee disappears from the records of Congress. The portion of the report relating to the cession of Virginia was subsequently referred to another committee.

Meanwhile a committee, called the Grand Committee, which consisted of one member from each State, appointed to consider the most effectual means of supporting the credit of the United States, made several ineffectual attempts to secure action on the cessions of Connecticut, New York and Virginia.


A step forward was taken when Congress, October 29, 1782, on the motion of Maryland, accepted the cession of New York. June 4, 1783, Congress took up the report of a committee to which had been referred the motion of Mr. Bland, to accept the cession of Virginia. This committee recommended that Congress should take up the old report of November 3, 1781, which had slumbered on the journals since the effective narcotic administered by Mr. Lee. Whereupon Congress ordered: ‘That so much thereof as relates to the cession made by the Commonwealth of Virginia, on the 2nd day of January, 1781, be referred to a committee of five members.’

This committee reported June 20, 1783, recommending changes in the cession of Virginia. Pending the proceedings, the delegates of New Jersey filed a remonstrance from the general assembly of their State, protesting against the acceptance of the Virginia cession, unless the said State will ‘make a liberal surrender of that territory of which they claim so boundless a proportion.’ This remonstrance revives the old claim of the rights which had accrued to the other States by reason of the defense of the country by the common blood and treasure, an argument which had lost what little plausibility it ever had, for Virginia had some time before rescued the territory from the British by the blood and treasure of Virginia alone.

The committee to whom the cession of Virginia had been referred, reported September 13, 1783, recommending the acceptance of the cession, as soon as the State should agree to repeal the seventh and eighth conditions of the cession. The remaining six conditions were approved, although the first was considered unnecessary, and an amendment was suggested to the second to more fully carry out its provisions. The seventh was considered to be really embraced in the sixth, but its repeal was urged. The real objection was to the eighth condition, which was wrong in principle, and its repeal was important. Of these two conditions whose repeal was desired, the seventh declared all purchases from the Indians void, and the eighth required the United States to guarantee to Virginia all her remaining territory.

The report of this committee was decisive, and was adopted, September 13, by the votes of all the States represented, except New Jersey and Maryland. Virginia readily accepted the amendments proposed. The condition in reference to purchases from the Indians was unnecessary, being embraced in the other conditions which had been approved. The condition requiring that the United States should guarantee all remaining territory was intended to apply to Kentucky, and to operate as a contract with the United States to protect the State against claims that might arise under the cession of New York or the revival of the plea of ‘common stock.’ In her anxiety to put a quietus on all such claims, Virginia had gone too far, and had framed this condition at variance with her own theories. Maryland, in the instructions to her delegates to accede to the Confederation, had protested against this condition, and Maryland was right. Its acceptance would have operated as an ex parte adjudication or a prejudication of all claims against the State, and would have barred all proceedings under the ninth article of the Confederation, to which any claimant State might be entitled. There were no adverse charter claimants, and the shadowy claims of New York had been ceded to the United States. There was no probability that any State would appear as a contestant. Still, it would besetting a precedent wrong in theory that any State might secure from Congress a guarantee to its territory, and thus acquire an exemption from the jurisdiction of the tribunal, provided by the ninth article of the Confederation for the trial of contests between the States. At the next meeting of her legislature, Virginia promptly instructed her delegates to execute to the United States a deed of cession conforming to the amendments proposed by Congress. This deed was accordingly executed by her delegates and accepted by Congress, March 1, 1784, New Jersey alone voting against acceptance; Maryland, Georgia and New York being absent, South Carolina divided; all the other States voting for it.

The acceptance of the deed met with petty opposition from a peculiar source. Mr. George Morgan, the agent of the Indiana Land company, who had all along been besieging Congress, now appeared in a new role. He filed a petition in the name of the State of New Jersey, as its agent, praying Congress to take jurisdiction under the ninth article of Confederation and try the case as between two states. He recites that a hearing had been ‘obtained before a very respectable committee of Congress,’ alluding to the report of November 3, 1781, and presents his credentials as agent of New Jersey. A motion by Mr. Beatty, of New York, to refer this petition to a committee was voted down, as also a motion by Mr. Williamson, of North Carolina, to appoint a committee to prepare an answer to the State of New Jersey.

It was immediately following this action that the deed of Virginia was presented and accepted, as above related. ‘Simultaneously with this acceptance,’ Jefferson submitted his famous plan for the subdivision and government of the Northwest Territory, and such other western territory as might be obtained by cessions expected from the other states. The adoption of this report, April 23, 1784, and the subsequent acts of Congress, show that the main cause of jealousy was removed, and the title of the United States to the Northwest Territory was considered assured by this cession of Virginia and its acceptance. Virginia had fought and won the battle directed against her charter rights, and had made generous use of her victory. We hear no more of ‘common stock,’ ‘blood and treasure of all,’ and limiting the ‘western boundaries.’

As yet, however, the cession of Connecticut had not been accepted, while Massachusetts, the two Carolinas and Georgia were sleeping on their claims. All threats of coercion, all acrimonious controversy had ceased. The history of the subsequent cessions involves only the recital of successive patriotic acts, taken by the remaining charter claimants, at leisure. They were subjected to no pressure except the example of New York and Virginia, the force of public opinion, and their own patriotism. They seemed to be in no hurry.

North Carolina vacillated, her legislature passing an act in June, 1784, to cede Tennessee, and repealing the same in November before Congress could accept it.

November 13, 1784, Massachusetts authorized her delegates to cede her claims, and her cession was accepted April 19, 1785, the anniversary of Lexington. This cession was free from reservations or conditions of a selfish character, and bore on its face the evidence of its patriotic purpose.

As early as October 10, 1780, Connecticut had offered to cede the rights of soil in a portion of her western claim, reserving to herself the jurisdiction to the entire claim. The acceptance of such a proposition would have had the effect of confirming her title and establishing her in jurisdiction. In May, 1786, her legislature modified the terms of the original offer, in accordance with which her delegates in Congress executed a deed of cession, September 13, 1786. The next day Congress, in order to complete the title of the United States to the Northwest Territory, accepted the cession of Connecticut, notwithstanding the reservation by which that State sought to convert the surrender of her abstract claims into a real establishment of possession. Reserving both soil and jurisdiction to the strip of land about 120 miles long lying south of Lake Erie, she surrendered the rest of the territory to the United States. Thus she was the only state that gained possession of land by making cession to the United States. After granting a large portion of this reserve to her citizens, and selling the remainder for the benefit of her school fund, she ceded jurisdiction to the United States, May 30, 1800.

The title to the Northwest Territory being now freed from all claimants, the pressure was directed against the Carolinas and Georgia. It is not surprising that Georgia should cling to her western territory with more tenacity and yield it with more reluctance than any of her sister States. Separated from it by no mountain barriers, and lying in immediate contact, these western possessions seemed more a part of herself, and no adverse interests urged her few western settlers to demand a separation.

Besides all this, a new complication had now arisen, which disposed the Southern claimants of western territory to look with less favor upon a cession of their claims to the United States. This was the spirit manifested by the Northern States to concede to the claims of Spain the temporary control of the Mississippi river as high as Natchez, which was then occupied by Spanish troops. In August, 1786, panting for the revival of trade on any terms, seven Northern States, by their delegates in Congress, approved a plan submitted by Jay to yield to the claims of Spain temporary control of the Mississippi river, and the possession of the disputed territory. The five Southern States opposed it, and it was only defeated by lacking the constitutional majority of nine States. Georgia and the Carolinas resented this disposition to abandon their territory to Spain, and refused to listen to any proposition to cede territory to the United States.

These events occurring in 1785, and the sectional spirit which they aroused, put an end for the time to any cessions of southwestern territory. In 1787, after the excitement and sectional jealousy had been somewhat allayed, although the affairs with Spain were still unsettled, the pressure upon North Carolina and Georgia was revived by the first cession of any southwestern territory to the United States. This was the cession by South Carolina of a strip of land about 400 miles long and about twelve miles wide, lying along the southern boundary of the present State of Tennessee. It would seem that South Carolina desired to bring to bear on North Carolina and Georgia the same pressure which New York had so successfully exercised on Virginia. There may have been also some feeling of pique against Georgia in the action of the Hotspur State, caused by the suit then pending between the two States. The following are the circumstances of the cession:

In the year 1785 South Carolina instituted suit against Georgia, before Congress, under the ninth article of the Confederation. On June 1, of this year, Georgia was summoned to appear on the second Monday of May, 1786. The following is a portion of the petition of South Carolina:

To the United States of America in Congress assembled: The petition of the Legislature of South Carolina sheweth that a dispute and difference hath arisen and subsists between the State of Georgia and this state Concerning boundaries. That the case and claim of this state is as follows, viz.:

Charles II., king of Great Britain, by charter, dated the 24th March, in the fifteenth year of his reign, granted, etc. * * * That on the 30th day of June, in the seventeenth year of his reign, the said king granted to the said lords proprietors a second charter, enlarging the bounds of Carolina, etc. * * * That Carolina was afterward divided into two provinces called North and South Carolina. That by a charter dated the 9th day of June, 1732, George II., king of Great Britain, granted to certain persons therein named all the lands lying between the rivers Savannah and Altamaha, and lines to be drawn from the heads of those rivers respectively to the South Seas, and styled the said colony of Georgia. * * * That South Carolina claims the lands lying between the North Carolina line and a line to be run due west from the mouth of the Tugaloo river to the Mississippi, because, as the State contends, the river Savannah loses that name at the confluence of Tugaloo and Keowee rivers, consequently that spot is the head of Savannah river; the State of Georgia, on the other hand, contends that the source of Keowee is to be considered at the head of Savannah river.

The petition recites other disputed points of boundary, and concludes with a prayer to Congress to take jurisdiction and try the case under the Articles of Confederation. The case was adjourned from time to time, until September 4, 1786, when both States appeared by their agents. Proceedings were then instituted and a court appointed to try the case, which was to sit in New York, June 4, 1787. No judgment was ever rendered by this court in consequence of the compromise of the suit between the parties.

Both states appointed commissioners, who met at Beaufort, S. C., clothed with full powers to make a final settlement. And now comes a singular part of the history, and the origin of the twelve-mile strip. These commissioners—Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Andrew Pickens and Pierce Butler, on the part of South Carolina; and John Habersham, Lacklan McIntosh, a majority of the commissioners, on the part of Georgia—April 28, 1787, signed an agreement and convention establishing the line as it now exists between the two States, running along the Savannah river and its most northern branch, the Tugaloo, and the most northern branch of the Tugaloo, the Chatuga, to the point where it intersects the North Carolina line. This would have granted all the twelve-mile strip to Georgia. It so happened, however, that the legislature of South Carolina was at the same time in session.

On March 8th of the same year, just one month and twenty days before the completion and signature of the convention at Beaufort, the South Carolina legislature passed a bill conveying to the United States the territory bounded by the Mississippi river, the North Carolina line, and a line drawn along the crest of the mountains which divide the waters of the East from the waters of the West, from the point where these mountains intersect the North Carolina line to the headwaters of the most southern branch of Tugaloo river, and thence west to the Mississippi river, thus mapping out the twelve-mile strip. The delegates of South Carolina were directed to make a deed conveying the same.

These two apparently inconsistent acts of South Carolina both needed the confirmation of Congress. They were accordingly presented to Congress on the same day, accompanied by the deed of cession, August 9, 1787. The action of Congress bears marks of worldly wisdom. The cession to the United States was accepted on the same day. The motion to confirm the convention of Beaufort was referred to a committee which never reported. This report was, perhaps, prevented by the absorbing interest in the Constitutional Convention then in session, and which completed its labors in the following month by adopting the present Constitution, and the Congress of the Confederation soon after passed out of existence, and with it the ninth article, under which the suit of South Carolina was instituted. Thus, the twelve-mile strip became the territory of the United States, and intervened as a wedge between Georgia and North Carolina, affording for several years a suggestive invitation to cede their western lands.

The example was followed by North Carolina in 1790, when, after her patience was exhausted by the attempt to establish the State of Franklin, she ceded her froward daughter, Tennessee, to the United States; thus making the first cession under the Constitution.

Kentucky anticipated the expected second cession of Virginia, and became a State in 1792, without undergoing the territorial apprenticeship.

This left the full pressure of the demand for western cessions to fall on Georgia. This sturdy state resisted until 1802, when her cession, by no means a free gift, proved to be a shrewd bargain. She then ceded the Territory of Mississippi, nearly all of which was covered by Indian titles, and received in return that portion of the South Carolina cession immediately north of her boundary, $1,250,000 in money from the proceeds of the sale of public lands, and what ultimately proved very costly to the United States, a guarantee for the extinction of all Indian claims in her present limits. The remaining portion of the twelve-mile strip, all of which, after the admission of Tennessee, was styled in legislation the territory of the United States south of the State of Tennessee, was in 1804 added by Congress to Mississippi Territory, and now constitutes the northern portion of the States of Alabama and Mississippi.

Thus, the whole territory west of the Alleghany mountains, embracing the portion north of the Ohio, which had been claimed by Great Britain, and the southern portion which Spain and France had attempted to erect into an Indian reservation, was now ceded to the United States by all claimants except the land companies. These companies continued the struggle until finally repulsed from the Supreme court of the United States.

The following conclusions seem to be irresistible:

First.—The extension of the original United States beyond the Alleghany mountains, in opposition to the claims of Great Britain and the active efforts of France and Spain, was due alone to the titles of the charter claimant States, supported by an actual adverse possession on the part of Virginia and North Carolina.

Second.—Virginia, by expelling the British from the country north of the Ohio, by her expedition under George Rogers Clarke, and by taking military possession of the country, not only maintained her own charter claims, but also supplied the United States with the argument of uti possidetis, which successfully met the claims of Great Britain under the Quebec Act.

Third.—The whole country owes a debt of gratitude to all the charter claimants for ceding the only valid titles to this immense territory, and for their firmness and wisdom in resisting and defeating the effort to engraft on the fundamental law the dangerous principle that Congress should have power to abridge the limits of the States, invade their jurisdiction and sequester their territory.

Fourth.—The territory ceded by all charter claimants amounted in area to 404,955.91 square miles, all of which was embraced in the cessions of the four Southern States, Virginia, the two Carolinas and Georgia. The claims of Massachusetts and Connecticut, extending in belts across the claim of Virginia, amounted to 94,315.91 square miles. Thus, the undisputed area of the cessions by the Southern States amounted to 300,640 square miles. If the area of Kentucky be added, which was erected into a State in 1792, before the completion of the western cessions, the undisputed contribution of the South was 361,040 square miles. The total contribution of the South, disputed and undisputed, including Kentucky, was 445,355.91 square miles.

The cessions of all other charter claimants amounted to 94,315.91 square miles, all of which was disputed. If the area of Vermont and Maine be added, which were independently erected into States, the total contribution of all other charter claimants, disputed and undisputed, would amount to 136,807.91 square miles.

Fifth.—The four Southern States, Virginia, the two Carolinas and Georgia, were the only States which ceded a foot of land in actual possession and covered by actual jurisdiction. The other States, acting with patriotic motives, conveyed only unadjudicated claims—which was all they had to convey. The Southern States, being in possession, were able to confer possession on the United States. How different might have been the fate of America, had the four great Southern States adhered to their western territory with the tenacity usually shown by powerful states able to defend their possessions. In the language of the first great cession, ‘preferring the good of their country to every other object of smaller importance,’ they laid the foundation of national greatness by voluntary sectional sacrifice, and furnished history its most instructive lesson in the building of nations.

Reference is given to Madison Papers, Vol. 1; Benton's Thirty Years, Vol. 2; Narrative and Critical History of America. Vol. 7; Lecky's History of England, Vol. 4; American Archives, Fourth Series; on the cessions of western lands consult Journals of Congress, Vols. 1, 2, 3 and 4; for the acts of cession, Henning's Statutes, Vol. 10; for various deeds of cession, Public Domain; for Spanish intrigues, Roosevelt's Winning of the West; consult also Life of Patrick Henry, by W. W. Henry; Maryland, by Wm. Hand Brown; Haywood's History of Tennessee.

A decision of the Supreme Court, touching on these cessions, was rendered as late as April 3, 1893, in the case of Virginia against Tennessee. relative to boundary. The court recites the titles of Virginia and North Carolina, as based upon their charters, extending to the South seas, and alludes to ‘the generous public spirit which on all occasions since has characterized her (Virginia's) conduct in the disposition of her claims to territory under different charters from the English government’ United States Reports, 148, October Term, 1892, p. 503.

Among the older historians who have treated this subject are Bancroft, Hildreth and Pitkin. It has, also, been ably treated, in some of its aspects, by modern historians. Among the works which have touched upon the subject more or less in full, are the following:

The Old Northwest, by B. A. Hinsdale.

Fisk's Critical Period of American History.

The Narrative and Critical History of America contains, in Vol. 7, a lucid discussion of the several cessions, and a valuable list of references to various books and pamphlets which discuss phases of the subject.

The Public Domain, Donaldson, is an invaluable government publication, in which important information on this subject is collected.

The settlement and development of this territory are related and questions connected with the cessions are discussed by Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, in a work of great ability and lucid style, entitled ‘Winning of the West.’

Maryland's Influence on Land Cessions, by Mr. Herbert B. Adams, id the Johns Hopkins Papers published at Baltimore, Md., is an article eulogistic of Maryland, and attributing to that state the chief influence in establishing the Public Domain.

Mr. W. W. Henry, in his Life of Patrick Henry, devotes Chapter 17 of Vol. 2, of his able and interesting work, to the Cession of the Northwest Territory. He clearly demonstrates Virginia's title to all the territory which she claimed.

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