Читать книгу The Turkish Arms Embargo - James F. Goode - Страница 11

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Killing America’s Children

The Heroin Crisis

Conditions on Cyprus did not cause the next crisis in US-Turkey relations. Rather, it was American concern about the renewed cultivation of the opium poppy that set the two nations on a collision course. For many members of Congress, this threat outweighed all others.

The United States experienced an epidemic of illegal drug use in the late 1960s. Chief among these drugs was heroin, a derivative of opium. This proved to be a serious problem, especially in the poorer areas of major urban centers. One of the worst affected locations was Harlem in New York City, dubbed the “drug-trafficking center of the nation.” Drug sales there, it was reported, constituted the major economic activity. In New York City as a whole, it has been estimated that there were 160,000 heroin users in the early 1970s.

It was widely but erroneously assumed that most of the heroin entering the United States came from the poppy fields of Turkey. Repeatedly, authorities claimed that 80 percent of the American supply originated from that source via the French connection in Marseilles, a major processing center. Despite the lack of official confirmation, this figure appeared prominently in the speeches and warnings of community leaders and politicians. No one seemed to question its accuracy. According to a US diplomat with long experience in Turkey, “every American official … became a walking encyclopedia on the subject and both socially and professionally their Turkish contacts heard about little else.”¹

Hollywood bookended this period with two blockbuster films about drugs, displaying Turkey in the worst possible light. The French Connection (1971), winner of the best-picture Oscar, showcased two New York City detectives determined to intercept a large shipment of heroin from Marseilles before it reached the streets. Filmgoers likely suspected that most of the raw material came from Turkey. Midnight Express (1978) detailed the harrowing experience of American Billy Hayes, who was imprisoned in Turkey under horrendous conditions for attempting to smuggle hashish out of the country. During his trial, he makes an impassioned attack on the Turkish people in general. In his review of the film in October 1978, well-known critic Roger Ebert argued that it was hard to feel much pity for Hayes, who took his chances and lost. But then Ebert went on to say, “It is possible, however, to discover the irony in the fact that Turkey, whose economy is richened by an opium poppy crop that supplies much of the world’s heroin, should have such draconian drug laws at home.”² All this illustrates the difficulty of abandoning long-held (mis)understandings.

The Nixon administration wanted a victory in the war on drugs, and the president’s Ad Hoc Committee on Narcotics focused its attention on Turkey because, of all the opium producers in the world, including Mexico, the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran), and the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand), it seemed the most susceptible to US pressure. As a member of NATO, Turkey received large amounts of American military equipment and economic aid, and there was much talk in Washington in 1969–1971 of using a carrot-and-stick approach to obtain the desired result: the banning of poppy cultivation. The area in Turkey where the poppies grew was relatively compact and easily accessible, unlike the mountainous and isolated areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Southeast Asia, and even neighboring Mexico. In addition, the government in Ankara had better control over its countryside than did any of the other producing nations’ governments. Thus, the campaign continued despite the fact that, at the time, there was no reliable way of identifying the foreign source of American heroin. Nevertheless, committee members claimed publicly that Turkey supplied most of the heroin in the United States, and the media and politicians, including congressmen representing poor urban districts, repeated this statement. The crusade continued through 1970. Washington constantly urged US Ambassador William J. Handley (1969–1973) in Ankara to take a more forceful approach with the civilian government, which continued to resist American efforts to end opium production.³

After the Turkish military took control in March 1971 in the so-called coup by memorandum, Washington found it easier to work out an agreement. The Nixon administration, which would soon establish the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), negotiated with the Turkish generals and worked out a complete ban on cultivation of the opium poppy in return for a $35 million subsidy for Turkish farmers. Urban leaders in the United States applauded. It would be easier, they thought, to restrict foreign supply than to control domestic demand.

The ban lasted three years, or until the Turkish military withdrew from power and called for democratic elections. The new civilian government became subject to increasing pressure, especially from rural areas, to allow poppy cultivation again, which had a long history in Turkey. Peasant farmers found many culinary uses for the plant; especially prized was oil from the seeds, which was used for cooking. They fed their cattle the harvested stalks and other leftovers, making for very contented cows. Opponents of the ban argued that no foreign country should tell Turkish farmers what they could grow. The issue assumed nationalistic overtones.⁴

By the spring of 1974, rumors abounded that the government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit was preparing to rescind the ban, raising concerns in both houses of Congress. Representatives from major cities welcomed the decline in the availability of heroin in their districts since 1971 and warned of dire consequences for America’s urban youth should production be resumed.⁵ Among these congressmen were Lester Wolff, representing New York’s Sixth Congressional District and chair of the Subcommittee on International Narcotics Control of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Charles Rangel, also of New York City, who represented Harlem and served as chair of the Congressional Black Caucus (1974–1976). Rangel and Wolff, both Democrats, undertook a junket to Turkey in March 1974 to familiarize themselves with the local situation and to express their concerns directly to the Turkish government.

On their return, Rangel spoke out about the likelihood of this issue leading to a confrontation between Turkey and the United States, and he criticized the State Department for ignoring rumors rather than seeking to negotiate a better arrangement that would satisfy Turkish demands. Rangel explained that the Turks did not consider the poppy a poison, and the idea of its misuse was foreign to them. For centuries, farmers had grown the poppy as a staple. Thus, if the ban continued, the State Department would have to devise a program to improve the quality of life for Turkish poppy growers. The two congressmen declared their intention to meet with President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to discuss this very serious issue.⁶

The thirteen members of the Congressional Black Caucus, all of whom represented poor, urban districts, supported their colleagues’ complaints, as did other big-city congressmen such as Joseph Addabbo (D-NY) of Queens, Edward Roybal (D-CA) of Los Angeles, and Morgan F. Murphy of Chicago (D-IL). More surprising, perhaps, was the attitude of Otto Passman of Louisiana, the powerful Democratic chair of the House Foreign Aid Appropriations Subcommittee. He recommended taking a hard line with Ankara, reminding the Turks that they owed their independence to US assistance following World War II and threatening to cut off military aid “if Turkey violated its understanding with the United States over poppies.”⁷

In the Senate, too, there were angry bipartisan protests against a possible end to the opium poppy ban. Senators Walter Mondale (D-MN) and William Buckley (R-NY) introduced a concurrent resolution, calling on the administration to enter into immediate negotiations with the Turkish government. If they failed to reach an agreement, the president should terminate all economic assistance to Turkey. At a press conference called by concerned congressmen and senators, Wolff charged that Turkish officials had ties to organized crime, and Rangel noted that their own House resolution to cut off aid to Turkey already had thirty-two cosponsors.⁸

The US embassy in Ankara quickly recognized the seriousness of the issue. Writing to provide background information for the secretary of state’s upcoming meeting with Turkish foreign minister Turan Gunes, Ambassador William Macomber (1973–1977) counseled, “While we have a range of US-Turkish bilateral problems to deal with here, only one, the Turkish threat to rescind the ban on the growing of opium poppies, is of sufficient potential consequence to require your personal attention in any depth at this time.”⁹ Three days later, at their meeting in New York City, Kissinger raised the thorny issue, indicating its importance “in terms of American public opinion.” Gunes replied that he was “fully aware of the implications of the opium problem” and firmly suggested that they must find a solution that satisfied both American and Turkish public opinion. As he so often did, Kissinger ended the discussion on a jocular note, observing that he had learned more about opium in recent weeks than he really wanted to know. “I may go into the business myself,” he remarked lightheartedly to the Turkish diplomat. Kissinger proved adept at using humor to relieve tension and increase the sense of collaboration with his opposite number.¹⁰

As these talks suggested, there was a good deal of pushback from Turkish officials. Gunes himself was noncommittal in his meeting with Kissinger. “I cannot say categorically,” he stated, “that we are not going to grow opium poppies.” Following this diplomatic double negative, Gunes assured the Americans that his government would exercise “the fullest control possible.”¹¹

Barely three weeks later, Prime Minister Ecevit took a less evasive position, announcing to the Turkish press that “poppy cultivation is a domestic affair of Turkey. Turkey itself decides what to cultivate and what not to cultivate on its territory.” He made much of the fact that his was a democratically elected government and responsible to the people, unlike the military government that had signed the 1971 ban.¹²

The issue captured the attention of the American press, and major newspapers featured articles and editorials on the subject. A column in the New York Post advocated “bombing of the poppy fields by the United States Air Force.” On a more realistic note, a May 4 New York Times editorial called for a de-escalation of the confrontation between the United States and Turkey, its NATO ally, over this sensitive issue. The editorial suggested a revision of the poppy ban, with the United States providing small-scale industrial projects for families that had abandoned their poppy crops.¹³

It was too late, however, to apply such measures in the hope of resolving the crisis. On July 1 Prime Minister Ecevit publicly announced the end of the poppy ban. Turkish nationalism had won out over American threats.

Staff at the US embassy thought Ecevit had been moving toward the US position, and Ambassador Macomber expressed his “bitter disappointment.” In a midnight meeting with the prime minister, Macomber used some very undiplomatic language, barely managing to control his anger. He complained that American diplomats had learned of this key development through a public broadcast. He asked Ecevit to reconsider this decision, which would do enormous damage to the US-Turkish security relationship. This decision, he warned, would bring relations to their lowest point since World War II and increase the odds that “US military assistance to Turkey was finished.” Congress, rather than the executive branch, would take action now. In parting, Macomber revealed that his government was considering recalling him to Washington for consultation to show its concern.¹⁴

Confronted by the ambassador’s uncharacteristically strong language, Ecevit did not flinch. He stated boldly that “reconsideration was out of the question. He thought US-Turkish relations were deeper than the ambassador suggested. Although the decision was final, his government would be prepared to discuss effective methods of controlling the crop with the United States.” Turkish civilian leaders believed that a basic principle of Turkish independence was at stake, and they would take action regardless of the impact on their relations with the United States.¹⁵

In Washington, the legislative campaign to punish Ankara made progress, much to the dismay of the National Security Council (NSC) staff. In the Senate, Mondale hoped to bring to the floor his amendment cutting off aid to Turkey; in the House, hearings on the Wolff resolution, which also called for President Nixon to suspend aid to Turkey, were scheduled before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The latter took place on July 16, and many of those testifying used the occasion not only to challenge the recent Turkish decision but also to raise broader questions about Turkey and the US-Turkish relationship. The sponsor of the resolution, Congressman Wolff, spoke first. He claimed that there would be “100 to 200 tons of excess production that will find its way into the veins of the kids of this Nation.” He went on to say, “Gentlemen, which is more important, our commitment to Turkey or your commitment to your constituents?”¹⁶

When asked why the United States had approved an increase in India’s opium production, committee member Robert Steele (R-CT) explained that India could control its production because of the British origin of its bureaucracy, which made it more efficient and effective than the Turkish bureaucracy, which was a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. He observed that Indian officials were eager to track down even the smallest amount of leakage into the illicit market, whereas Turkish officials just did not seem to care. No one questioned his superficial and misleading analysis, which fit prevailing stereotypes.¹⁷

Representative Rangel used the occasion to raise doubts about the entire US-Turkish relationship. He believed that the security benefit the United States derived from its bases in Turkey had been exaggerated. “We are doing them a favor by being there,” he argued. “The strategic value of Turkey to the United States is a myth,” especially when Turkey reciprocates by bringing “human suffering and misery upon the American people.” Rangel and his colleagues accused the Nixon administration of failing to respond adequately to this threat from Turkey. The New York City congressman then reflected on a recent meeting with Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger’s assistant at the NSC. Scowcroft, he remarked, appeared to be completely ignorant of the fact that Ankara was considering lifting the opium ban, even though “it was on the front page of all of our major newspapers.” The hearings allowed for all kinds of criticism, some of it well reasoned, but much of it misguided.¹⁸

In light of these developments, the NSC staff urged Kissinger to act immediately to forestall congressional action. Such punitive steps, they believed, would seriously weaken the ability to work with Turkey to prevent heroin smuggling into the United States. Senator Mondale agreed to revise his amendment to the DEA budget bill, calling not for an immediate cutoff of aid to Turkey but rather the suspension of aid after January 1975 unless the president could certify that the Turks had taken effective safeguard measures. This version of the amendment passed the Senate by a lopsided vote of 81 to 8.¹⁹

Thus, only days before the Cyprus crisis, key members of Congress were considering punishing the Turks for their unhelpful behavior. The groundwork had already been laid for a strong response. Ecevit’s decision to resume poppy cultivation had antagonized many in Congress, and it seemed likely that his critics would judge Ankara’s future actions with this most recent unpleasant experience clearly in mind.

Although historians have generally considered the opium issue a minor one in US-Turkey relations in the 1970s, one can reasonably argue that without it, the Turkish arms embargo would not have been imposed. A considerable number of legislators were willing to punish Turkey solely for its reckless and defiant policy on cultivation of the opium poppy. It required the twin issues of drugs and the illegal use of US weapons in Cyprus to persuade a greater number to vote for an embargo. Had members of Congress been faced with only a single challenge from Ankara, they might have been less likely to oppose the White House.²⁰