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The goal of this chapter is to define how the term topos83 should be understood in the rest of this work, and to explore the specific topos of divine testimony.84 Examples of the topos of divine testimony from ancient speeches and treatises will then be provided. The chapter will finally conclude with an assessment of the persuasiveness of this particular topos in the first-century Mediterranean milieu in which Luke-Acts was composed and heard. Defining what I mean by topos is necessary for two reasons. First, in the ancient rhetorical handbooks, the term topos (or locus) was used differently by various authors and, indeed, in some cases by the same author. Thus, as will be demonstrated, the term as used by the ancient rhetoricians (and philosophers) enjoyed a somewhat wide semantic range.85 Second, the term in modern NT scholarship has continued on this same trajectory; in general, biblical scholars’ application of a topos to the study of NT passages tends to focus on E. Curtius’s definition of a topos as a universal theme or cliché, applicable to any type of literature.86 In this study, however, rather than a stock theme, I will consider the topos as a source of proofs, used in composing a speech for the purposes of defending or prosecuting one accused of some crime. In the following analysis, through a survey of the appropriate rhetorical treatises as well as examples of the topos of divine testimony found in forensic speeches and other works, it will be demonstrated that this is certainly a possible understanding of topos.

In the section that follows, I will first summarize the definition and application of the concept of topos in NT scholarship during the previous approximately sixty years. It is to this history of research that I now turn.87

The Concept of topos in Contemporary NT Scholarship

The definition of topos and its use in the NT originally emerged out of form criticism and neglected the ancient rhetoricians’ definitions of topos. In 1953, D. Bradley offered this definition of topos: “the treatment in independent form of the topic of a proper thought or action, or of a virtue or a vice, etc.”88 Terence Mullins found Bradley’s definition lacking and offered his own: “The Topos is a form with three essential elements: injunction, reason, and discussion. Two optional elements, analogous situation and refutation, might be used. Its purpose was to urge a type of behavior or attitude and there was no limit to the range of behavior discussed” (emphasis in original).89 Mullins (as did Bradley before him) simply applied a form critical analysis to ancient texts and the New Testament to formulate his definition, and did not rely on evidence from the ancient rhetorical handbooks.90

J. Brunt, however, reversed this trend, using the rhetorical handbooks as evidence to correct the definitions of topos offered by both Bradley and Mullins.91 Brunt argued that it had become a common misconception to view a topos as a “stereotyped, recurring motif.”92 Instead, Brunt offers a definition quite similar to what we will see in the ancient rhetorical handbooks, especially those of Cicero and Quintilian: “topoi are stereotyped arguments that are applied to specific cases.”93

During this same time, others are also seeking independently to define and apply the topos to the study of the NT. For example, W. Wuellner94 reviews modern research on the topos as part of literary criticism, while recognizing that modern Toposforschung is “rooted” in the ancient rhetorical handbooks. Wuellner begins with Curtius’s definition of topos, noting that Curtius recognized that both the structure and content of the argument being made could be understood under the umbrella of topos. Thus, Wuellner rightly admits that the topos is a “komplexes Phänomen.” Wuellner, however, makes a contribution to the application of the topos to NT studies by recognizing that the author’s choice of topos/topoi is culturally conditioned and therefore can provide insight into both the audience which is the target of the persuasive discourse, as well as the rhetorical issue being argued. The value, therefore, in Wuellner’s work is seen in his emphasis on the topos as an argumentative element, as well as his focus on the audience.

Recently, the issue of topos and how it relates to NT scholarship has been revisited by J. Thom. Thom seeks to provide a definition of the term topos by surveying both primary sources and the voluminous secondary literature on the topic.95 As it stands, Thom’s work is the most up-to-date and comprehensive treatment of this topic.

Thom argues that topoi in ancient rhetoric served as “‘places’ in which arguments may be found, that is, the general headings under which one may search for material for one’s argument. As such, it forms part of the inventio.”96 He goes on to note that even in Aristotle’s work, the term topos was not specific; rather, its meaning is better viewed as a continuum, “ranging from the more formal to the more substantive.”97 According to Thom, Quintilian’s statement differentiating “commonplaces” (i.e., complete, self-contained arguments) from loci (storehouses for arguments; cf. Inst. 5.10.20) indicates that he is reflecting the breadth of understanding in the ancient world concerning the topos.

In defining the topos, Thom argues first that topos is clearly used in a different manner by modern literary theorists than what was meant by the term in antiquity. Second, Thom recognizes that even in antiquity the term had a relatively wide semantic range, and that the meanings within this range were “culturally determined.” However, the foundation of these meanings is a “notion of an ordered cognitive space.”98 In other words, while the concept of topos in antiquity is better viewed on the basis of a spectrum or continuum (and where one finds oneself on this continuum is somewhat dependant on culture), all the possible meanings are grounded in a common idea.

Thom does not concretely flesh out this common ground; he does, however, offer three different categories or types of topoi. The first he calls the “logical or rhetorical topos,” which represents a certain method of argumentation.99 The second is the “literary topos”; topoi of this type “consist of literary themes or motifs that are used over and over again, often only as an allusion, and not in a worked out form.”100 However, Thom maintains that because of the “non-literary nature of most NT texts,” this category is “not that well-represented in the NT.”101 Finally, the third type proposed by Thom is the “moral or philosophical topos.” This type is much like the literary topos; the difference is, however, that there are extended treatments of these topoi in Hellenistic moral writings.102

Through his survey of primary and secondary sources, Thom’s work has extreme value in the study of ancient topoi. There are, however, areas of his work which can be improved. One of these areas would be a more precise reading of Theon, especially in taking into account all of Theon’s preliminary exercises and not only the exercise of “commonplace.”103 As I will show, by carefully considering the contexts in which Theon uses the word τόπος and its derivatives, one notices that Theon acknowledges that a topos can be either a complete, structured argument or a source of arguments particular to a certain case.104 Secondly, Thom’s analysis could be augmented profitably through the inclusion of Cicero’s work on topoi; Cicero is not mentioned in Thom’s essay.

Given this understanding of the concept of topos in current NT scholarship and those aspects thereof found to be deficient or incomplete, I will now survey the ancient rhetoricians’ ideas concerning rhetorical topoi. From this analysis, a definition of topos will emerge that will require the current definitions of topos in NT circles to be expanded to include a topos as a source of proofs which includes documents, oaths, witnesses, and testimony.

Definition of topos

Topos in Aristotle

Although the concept of a rhetorical topos predates Aristotle,105 his works are a convenient starting place for an attempt to wrap one’s mind around the ancient rhetoricians’ conception of a topos. The two main works in which Aristotle discusses topoi are his Topica and Rhetorica.

In his work Topica, Aristotle asserts his purpose in the opening statement of the document: “The purpose of the present treatise is to discover a method by which we shall be able to reason from generally accepted opinions about any problem set before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying anything contradictory” (1.1.18). He continues by providing a definition of “reasoning” (συλλογισμός):

Reasoning is a discussion in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results through them. Reasoning is demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) when it proceeds from premises which are true and primary or of such a kind that we have derived our original knowledge of them through premises which are primary and true. Reasoning is dialectical which reasons from generally accepted opinions. (1.1.25–31; emphasis in original)

Thus, from this purpose statement it is clear that Aristotle is dealing with dialectic, rather than rhetoric. What he has to say concerning dialectical argumentation does, however, help one to understand the ancient concept of a topos.

In Book I of Topica, Aristotle explores the various ways one can argue a dialectical problem and concludes with this statement: “Such then are the means by which reasonings are carried out. The commonplaces [τόποι] for the application of which the said means are useful are our next subject” (1.18.33–35). What follows in Books II-VII is a description of various τόποι and how one is to apply each of them when formulating a dialectical argument. For example, Aristotle writes, “One commonplace [τόπος] is to look whether our opponent has assigned as an accident something which belongs in some other way” (2.2.34–36). A second example is found in his discussion of a polyvalent term which is used in a certain way. Aristotle advises that one “ought to demonstrate one of the several meanings if it is impossible to demonstrate both.” He continues by adding, “This commonplace [τόπος] is convertible for both constructive and destructive purposes” (2.3.29–30). These examples are indicative of Aristotle’s usage of the term τόπος throughout Books II-VII of the treatise, and demonstrate that Aristotle, in this treatise, considered a τόπος to be a method of dialectical argumentation.

In Rhetorica, Aristotle provides his definition of rhetoric, stating that “Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever . . . But Rhetoric, so to say, appears to be able to discover the means of persuasion in reference to any given subject” (Rhet. 1.2.1). In discussing the methods of actually being persuasive, Aristotle lists two. Inartificial proofs are those not “furnished by ourselves but were already in existence, such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, and the like.”106 Artificial proofs are those “that can be constructed by system and by our own efforts. Thus we have only to make use of the former [inartificial], whereas we must invent the latter [artificial]” (Rhet. 1.2.2). These proofs fall under three categories, those of ἦθος, πάθος, and λόγος (1.2.3–6), and can be generated, according to Aristotle, by one of two methods, either inductively (primarily through the use of examples) or logically, by employing enthymemes (1.2.8–9). Aristotle then begins his discussion of topoi, which he describes in this way: “I mean by dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms those which are concerned with what we call ‘topics’” (1.2.21). Aristotle distinguishes between general/universal topoi which can be applied to argumentation within any subject matter, and specific topoi, which are “the propositions peculiar to each class of things” (1.2.21–22).

Later in the treatise, after a discussion of the three types of rhetoric (forensic, deliberative, and epideictic), Aristotle specifically mentions twenty-eight different topoi which are available to the rhetor for the construction of enthymemes. Examples of the topoi found in this list include those arguments which are generated from opposites, the more and the less, the definition of terms, and induction (2.23.1–29). As was seen in Aristotle’s Topica, these topoi represent methods of rhetorical argumentation, rather than the content of the arguments themselves.107

As I have previously stated, the concept of the topos was already familiar to the Greeks of his day; therefore, this list represents Aristotle’s attempt to systematically categorize topoi. Aristotle’s contribution to this aspect of rhetoric was to classify and generalize the use of the various topoi.108

For the purposes of the present study, however, it is important to examine briefly Aristotle’s concept of inartificial proofs,109 specifically focusing on what he says concerning witnesses. For Aristotle, witnesses fall into two categories: ancient and recent. Ancient witnesses are the most reliable, because it is no longer possible to refute or discredit them; they have, in effect, stood the test of time. Appropriate ancient witnesses include poets, “men of repute whose judgments are known to all” (here, Aristotle provides Homer as an example), “interpreters of oracles for the future” (i.e., Themistocles’s interpretation of the wooden wall), and proverbial wisdom (παροιμία, 1.15.13–19).110 Witnesses who are contemporaries of the orator include “all well-known persons who have given a decision on any point” (these decisions can be used in similar cases) and “those who share the risk of the trial, if they are thought to be perjurers.” Witnesses such as these, however, can only help establish if something occurred or not; they are not reliable in establishing “the quality of the act” (1.15.15–17).

In sum, Aristotle views topoi as generally agreed-upon methods of argumentation, useful both to those engaging in dialectic and those who would construct arguments through the use of rhetoric. Some topoi, the use of which is not tied to a particular field of inquiry, are beneficial for all cases. Others, those which Aristotle calls specific (ἴδια), are to be used only in particular types of arguments. In the area of rhetoric, topoi for Aristotle constitute the sources of enthymemes and are therefore useful for logical reasoning.111

With Aristotle’s view of topos as a background, I will now focus on the Latin rhetoricians’ views concerning the topos, or locus, beginning with Cicero and then considering the treatments found in Rhetorica ad Herennium and Quintilian.112

Locus in Cicero

I begin with Cicero’s De inventione rhetorica, considered to be a work written by Cicero in his younger days.113 In the introductory section of the treatise, Cicero justifies his work in the area of rhetoric by noting that many rhetors abuse the use of rhetoric, thus actually doing harm to the state.114 For Cicero, this negative effect on the state is motivation for the training of orators in the proper use of rhetoric. He writes:

Therefore, in my opinion at least, men ought none the less to devote themselves to the study of eloquence although some misuse it both in private and in public affairs. And they should study it the more earnestly in order that evil men may not obtain great power to the detriment of good citizens and the common disaster of the community . . . For from eloquence the state receives many benefits, provided only it is accompanied by wisdom, the guide of all human affairs. (1.4.5)

Here in the opening of Inv., one sees that Cicero at an early age considers the practice of rhetoric to be a means to an end; namely, it is to be employed in service to the state.

Regarding the loci, in Inv. Cicero does not provide a general definition of locus for his readers.115 One can infer, however, what Cicero understands under the term locus through his discussion of the part of the speech he calls “confirmation.”116 In the introduction to this section, Cicero states:

Now it seems desirable to give in turn the rules about confirmation as is demanded by the regular order of the speech. Confirmation or proof is the part of the oration which by marshalling arguments lends credit, authority, and support to our case. (1.23.33–24.36; emphasis in original)

Cicero then lists the “attributes of persons or of actions” (1.24.34). The attributes concerning the person include qualities such as the person’s name, his or her nature, manner of life, and financial standing.117 In regards to actions, Cicero lists (and explains in each case) the place at which the action in question took place, the time (when it occurred as well as the duration of the action), occasion for the action, etc. Cicero prefaces the list of attributes and his explanations of them through a short explanation of his understanding of these attributes and how they can possibly function within the confirmatory proofs in the speech:

But I think that it will be not inconvenient to set forth . . . a kind of raw material for general use from which all arguments are drawn, and then later to present the way in which each kind of case should be supported by all the forms of argumentation derived from this general store. (1.24.34)

Within the list of attributes of actions, Cicero elaborates on the “performance of the act” and writes, “In connection with the performance of the act (which was the second topic [locus secundus] under the heading of attributes of actions)” (1.26.38). From this use of terminology one can infer that in this context, Cicero considers these attributes to be loci. At the end of this section, one sees the same idea being expressed; Cicero concludes by stating, “All argumentation drawn from these topics which we have mentioned [ex eis locis quos commemoraviums sumetur] will have to be either probable or irrefutable” (1.29.44). After an extended discussion of what constitutes probable and certain arguments, Cicero offers this summary: “Now the sources of confirmatory arguments have been revealed as the occasion offered, and explained as clearly as the nature of the subject required” (1.30.49).

Considering these passages in the context of this section of the work, it seems that Cicero considers the loci to be the fundamental building blocks from which persuasive arguments are composed. And his concept of topos/locus differs significantly from Aristotle in that for Cicero, in many cases the loci are not the form of the argument; rather, they comprise the actual content of the arguments and proofs that are being constructed. This idea is confirmed in Cicero’s later rhetorical treatises.118

De oratore is considered to be one of Cicero’s major works from the latter phase of his life.119 The three books that comprise De or. are composed as a dialog between various prominent orators in the Roman Empire, and in it Cicero describes the ideal orator. In the opening to the treatise, Cicero, in expounding on the importance of oratory, remarks (in the voice of Crassus) that

there is to my mind no more excellent thing than the power, by means of oratory, to get a hold on assemblies of men, win their good will, direct their inclinations wherever the speaker wishes, or divert them from whatever he wishes. In every free nation, and most of all in communities which have attained the enjoyment of peace and tranquility, this one art has always flourished above the rest and ever reigned supreme. (1.8.30)

Here one sees, as was the case in Inv., that Cicero connects the practice of oratory with that of statecraft, arguing that informed, educated orators (cf. 1.8.32) are essential to the well-being of the state.

Cicero introduces the subject of loci in Book II of De or. The context is one in which the dialog partners are discussing how the orator generates arguments. Antonius emphasizes that study is essential for the orator, especially the origins of arguments. Cicero has Antonius say that “we ought to bring this stock of cases and types down to Court with us, and not wait until we have accepted a brief, before we search the commonplaces [locos] from which to dig our proofs” (2.34.146).120 He then makes the point that there are three aspects necessary for the discovery of arguments: “acuteness,” “theory, or art,” and lastly, “painstaking” (2.35.147), the most important of which is the last. An element of “painstaking” is that “the mind should dwell upon those commonplaces [Deinde ut in eis loci] which I shall set forth presently” (2.35.149). Cicero then links the concept of loci to Aristotle’s Topica,121 a work in which Aristotle “set forth certain commonplaces [quosdam locos], among which every line of argument might be found not merely for philosophical debate, but also for contentions in the Courts” (2.36.152).

After a short digression, in which Cicero discusses the merits (and disadvantages) of philosophy, he turns his attention to a discussion of the discovery of arguments. Cicero maintains (through Antonius) that an essential facet of the orator’s education would include bringing the nascent orator

to that source where no sequestered pool is landlocked, but from it bursts forth a general flood; to that teacher who will point out to him the very homes of all proofs, so to speak, illustrating these briefly and defining them in terms. (2.39.162)

These proofs would include those that are “derived from the essential nature of the case” and those “adopted from without” (2.39.163), a dichotomy that was also emphasized in Inv. Cicero further defines these two ideas:

Intrinsic arguments, when the problem concerns the character of the subject as a whole, or of part of it, or the name it is to bear or anything whatever relating to the subject; extrinsic arguments, on the other hand, when topics are assembled from without and are not inherent in the nature of the case. (2.39.163)

What follows is in a similar format to the materials in Inv.; Cicero lists arguments available for use in various cases, starting first with the intrinsic and finishing with the extrinsic. He then concludes the discussion:

I [Antonius] have sketched these topics as shortly as possible. For if I wished to reveal to somebody gold that was hidden here and there in the earth, it should be enough for me to point out to him some marks and indications of its positions, with which knowledge he could do his own digging, and find what he wanted, with very little trouble and no chance of mistake: so I know these indications of proofs, which reveal to me their whereabouts when I am looking for them; all the rest is dug out by dint of careful consideration . . . with these commonplaces [locis] firmly established in his mind and memory, and roused into activity with every topic proposed for discussion, nothing will be able to elude the orator either in our own contentions at the Bar, or in any department whatever of speaking. (2.91.174–75)

Concerning the evidence found in De or., the concept of locus is described in much the same way as in Inv. Loci are described as sources of arguments which are either inherent in the case being argued or external to the case. The various loci are available to the orator, and must only be applied to the case being argued. Cicero purposely links the concept to Aristotle, but his descriptions of the various loci demonstrate that for Cicero, unlike in Aristotle, the loci constitute the content of the arguments, rather than their form.122

Cicero provides the most detailed explanation of a locus in his work Topica.123 In the beginning of this treatise, Cicero opens a dialog with Trebatius, a jurist who has sometime in the past happened upon Aristotle’s Topica and questioned Cicero concerning Aristotle’s work. Cicero notes, “And when I had made clear to you that these books contained a system developed by Aristotle for inventing arguments so that we might come upon them by a rational system without wandering about, you begged me to teach you the subject” (Top. 1.2). Thus, with this introduction, Cicero sets out to explain his interpretation of Aristotle’s system of topoi.124

Cicero first provides a definition for locus:

A comparison may help: It is easy to find things that are hidden if the hiding place is pointed out and marked; similarly if we wish to track down some argument we ought to know the places or topics: for that is the name given by Aristotle to the “regions,” as it were, from which arguments are drawn. Accordingly, we may define a topic [definire locum] as the region of an argument, and an argument as a course of reasoning which firmly establishes a matter about which there is some doubt. (Top. 2.7–8)

From this definition one notices that Cicero links his concept of locus to that of Aristotle.125 What is also clear is that Cicero considers loci to be sources of arguments; as in De or., the locus itself is the place or region of a particular argument.126

Following this definition, Cicero states that the loci can be divided into two categories: “Of the topics [locis] under which arguments are included, some are inherent in the very nature of the subject which is under discussion, and others are brought in from without” (2.8). Again, as was seen in the previous treatises, Cicero argues that there are internal and external loci. Internal loci are particular to the subject matter which is being argued; external loci must be derived from sources outside of the subject itself. The next section of the treatise (2.9—4.23) provides an elaboration of the internal loci. Among others, these include arguments from genus and species, arguments based on similarity and difference, and arguments from consequences and effects. After all the internal loci have been listed and briefly described,127 Cicero makes only a short statement concerning external loci. He asserts, “Extrinsic arguments depend principally on authority. Therefore, the Greeks call such means of argumentation ἄτεχνοι, that is, not invented by the art of the orator” (4.24). He then provides an example of an extrinsic argument, namely the testimony of one with knowledge of the law.

A final piece of evidence which helps illuminate Cicero’s concept of a locus is found in his treatise Partitiones oratoriae. The treatise is composed as a dialog between Cicero and his son. The younger Cicero asks the elder what the overall purpose of the orator is, to which the elder answers, “To discover how to convince the persons whom he wishes to persuade and how to arouse their emotions” (2.5). In answer to the question concerning through what method one is able to persuade, the elder Cicero states, “Arguments, which are derived from topics [ex locis] that are either contained in the facts of the case itself or are obtained from outside” (2.5). The younger Cicero then asks about topics [Quos vocas locos?], to which the elder answers, “Pigeonholes in which arguments are stored” (2.5). Later, one reads that the elder Cicero maintains the same differentiation between “internal” and “external” arguments, which are described as arguments inherent to the case itself (internal) and testimony (external).

After describing the evidence of witnesses and testimony, a topic to which we will return, the elder Cicero then lists several loci from which internal arguments can be drawn, a list that is similar to the loci described in detail in Top. [Part. or. 2.7; cf. Top. 2.8—4.23; 5.26—18.71]. The younger Cicero then asks if all the loci are to be used when arguing a case. The answer he receives is that the orator should

examine them and seek for arguments from them all; but we shall use our judgment always to reject those of little value and also sometimes to pass over those that are of general application and not intimately related to our case. (Part. or. 3.8)

Here one notes that the loci are not only sources of arguments for Cicero; they also provide a methodology for evaluating the appropriateness of a particular set of arguments.

In summarizing Cicero’s concept of locus as found in his rhetorical treatises, Cicero considers the loci to be the sources of arguments for an orator arguing a case. In particular, Cicero is focused on what was indeed the emphasis in his own career, namely arguing mostly forensic cases in service to the State. The loci can be subdivided into internal and external arguments, internal arguments being those that are connected to the facts of the case being argued; external arguments are those from outside the case and are mostly concerned with witnesses and testimony. These various loci are concerned with the contents of the arguments themselves, and are to be scrutinized by the orator in order to assist in the process of crafting the most persuasive speech possible.128 Thus, there is an emphasis in Cicero on the practicality and utility of the loci, rather than the theory of argumentation as was seen in Aristotle.129

While this is certainly the primary sense for the term locus in Cicero’s writings, it is, however, not the only one. For example, Cicero can use the term to imply a common theme to which one might refer while giving a speech. In De or. he writes,

And indeed when, while a man is speaking—as often happens—such commonplaces [loci] have cropped up as demand some mention of the immortal gods, of dutifulness, harmony, or friendship, of the rights shared by citizens, by men in general, and by nations, of fair-dealing, moderation or greatness of soul, or virtue of any and every kind. (De or. 1.13.56)

Later in De or., Crassus encourages Antonius to go beyond what seems to be the current understanding of locus, saying,

[R]ather please omit that part of your programme which none of our friends here wants, touching the commonplaces [locis] which supply us with what we have to say in our cases: although you discuss these things with brilliant originality, they are for all that really rather easy and widely current in maxims. Produce for us the sources of what you so often handle and always in inspired fashion. (De or. 2.29.127)

Here, at the very least, Cicero provides evidence that he is familiar with an understanding of a locus as a proverb or maxim, or perhaps (as seen above) a stock theme, exemplary model, or pattern to which orators often refer.

A second, slightly different view of locus is found in Inv. Here, Cicero describes a “common” locus, “common” distinguishing an argument that can be used in multiple cases. It is, therefore, an argument of a more general nature. Cicero writes,

In every case some of the arguments are related only to the case that is being pleaded, and are so dependent on it that they cannot advantageously be separated from it and transferred to other cases, while others are of a more general nature, and adaptable to all or most cases of the same kind. These arguments which can be transferred to many cases, we call common topics [locos communes]. A common topic either contains an amplification of an undisputed statement . . . or of a doubtful statement against which there are also plausible lines of argument . . . A speech, however, is occasionally rendered distinguished or brilliant by introducing common topics and some topic [locis communibus et aliquo loco] backed up by arguments when the audience is already convinced. (Inv. 2.14.47–15.48)

In this passage, what Cicero infers through the phrase locis communibus et aliquo loco is that there are “common” loci (as described above) and simply loci; the difference between the two is that common loci are arguments applicable to any case, while loci are particular to the case being argued.130 Also, Cicero argues that the common loci are to be carefully constructed and embellished (note in the quote above he calls for them to include “an amplification”), which provides the impression they are arguments in a more complete form than simple loci.131

Locus in Ad Herennium

I will now explore the concept of locus as described in other Latin and Greek authors, beginning with the rhetorical treatise Ad Herennium. In Rhet. Her., in the author’s discussion of amplification, he lists ten areas from which to draw loci in support of summarizing statements (epilogoi) found in the speech. The author writes:

Amplification is the principle of using Commonplaces [per locum communem] to stir the hearers. To amplify an accusation it will be most advantageous to draw commonplaces from ten formulae. (Rhet. Her. 2.30.47)

The greater context of this statement is the description of the summarization that a rhetor is to do periodically within the speech.132 These summaries have a threefold purpose: summarizing the previous points, reinforcing and building on what has been stated (“Amplification”), and inciting the emotions of the audience (Rhet. Her. 2.30.47).

Locus in Quintilian

In Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria one finds a similar perception of locus. Quintilian discusses the locus in the context of the part of the speech he calls the proof, and which he considers the most significant.133 Quintilian makes the same distinction as was seen in Aristotle and Cicero, categorizing proofs as either “nontechnical” or “technical,” corresponding to Aristotle’s “inartificial” and “artificial” proofs.134 The sources for the inartificial proofs include judgments rendered in previous cases, rumors, statements made by those being tortured, documents, oaths, and the testimony of witnesses. After discussing these forms of proof in some detail, Quintilian turns his attention to the “technical” proofs, those invented by the orator.

Quintilian categorizes technical proofs into “signs,” arguments, or examples (Inst. 5.9.1). He discusses loci in the context of arguments. For Quintilian, loci are “Places where Arguments are found,” and are not “what are nowadays commonly meant by loci, namely set pieces against luxury, adultery, and the like, but the area in which Arguments lurk and from which they have to be draw out” (Inst. 5.10.20–21). Three things are significant here. First, Quintilian, like Cicero, argues that the loci represent sources of arguments from which the orator must select in order to argue the case at hand (“so every Argument is not found everywhere, and we have therefore to be selective in our search” [Inst. 5.10.22]). Second, Quintilian, again in a similar fashion to Cicero, albeit more explicitly, distinguishes his definition of locus from (what Cicero termed) the common loci, which Quintilian describes as stock arguments against (or, presumably, for) certain familiar themes.135 The third point comes from the greater context. Quintilian, in this case unlike Cicero, does not call the inartificial proofs “loci”; he restricts loci to those proofs inherent to the case which must be discovered and selected by the orator.

Topos in Theon

Theon, in the Progymnasmata, provides evidence of a similar distinction between two concepts of locus/topos already seen in Cicero and Quintilian. Within the Progymnasmata there is an exercise entitled ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΠΟΥ. Within this exercise Theon defines what he means by τόπος:

Topos (topos)136 is language amplifying something that is acknowledged to be either a fault or a brave deed. It is of two kinds: one is an attack on those who have done evil deeds, . . . the other in favor of those who have done something good . . . It is called a topos because starting from it as a “place” we easily find arguments (epkheiroumen) against those not admitting that they are in the wrong. For this reason some define it as a starting point for epicheiremes. (Theon, Progymnasmata 106 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 42])

A commonplace is therefore a source of a formal argument directed at one who has made a particularly bad (or good) moral decision. It is ‘formal’ in that Theon suggests a specific structure for a commonplace (see Theon, Progymnasmata 107 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 44]). In this passage one sees the structure which Theon proposes, as well as suggestions for the proofs. Although he does not specifically use the term topos, the language that Theon utilizes concerning the selection of proofs sounds much like the description of a topos that I have been considering.

In the descriptions of other preliminary exercises, however, Theon does use the term topos in the sense of a particular theme or motif used within an argument. For example, in his discussion of refutation and confirmation (found within the section on narrative in Kennedy’s edition of the Progymnasmata), Theon states:

As for refutation and proof, we said that the same topics [οἱ αὐτοὶ τόποι]137 are useful in fables, but in narratives the topics of the false and impossible [ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀδυνάτου τόποι]138 are also fitting. (Theon, Progymnasmata 93 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 40])

Theon’s use of the term topos is certainly different here than in the section on commonplace. Here, rather than being a complete formal argument, the topoi constitute the subject matter used to construct the refutation or confirmation of the narrative. This usage of the term topos is more akin to the predominant definition of locus in Cicero’s writings and as seen in Quintilian.139 Thus, to understand Theon’s use of the term topos correctly, the context in which Theon uses the term is extremely significant. For Theon, a topos can be a formal exercise in which a person is blamed (or less often, praised) for a particular moral choice. This exercise requires a fairly rigid structure, which Theon describes. He also, however, uses the term topos in a manner similar to Cicero; namely, a topos can be the source of a line of argumentation, used in support of any of a number of preliminary exercises. These topoi are many and varied, one of which is the testimony of others.

Topos in other Rhetorical Treatises

Theon’s view, namely that a topos is a form of proof that provides the content of epicheiremes, is echoed in the treatise by Anonymous Seguerianus. The writer of ΤΕΧΝΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΥ ΛΟΓΟΥ, a document most likely written around the beginning of the third century,140 discusses topoi in the section of the treatise entitled ΠΕΡΙ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΝ. The author makes the same distinction between artistic and non-artistic proofs141 that we have seen in other ancient rhetoricians. It is in the subsection describing the artistic proofs (that is, the proofs that are composed by the orator) that the author describes the topos. For this author, the topoi represent those proofs from which one composes epicheiremes.

A second treatise written at approximately the same time as Art of Political Speech and entitled Art of Rhetoric is attributed to Apsines of Gadara.142 In this treatise, the author also discusses the concept of topos. In the first section in which the author treats the prooemium, he lists several θεωρήματα out of which one can compose the prooemium. The way in which these are described is similar to the lists of topoi/loci seen in Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, as the author provides various arguments that can be used within the prooemium to address a specific situation within the speech.143 For example, the author suggests that the θεώρημα of “from what follows” is an appropriate argument when the judge has made a previous judgment on a case from which the current case is derived. Thus these themes suggest possible arguments of which the orator can take advantage in the prooemium of the speech.

Later in the work the term τόπος is explicitly used in several contexts. The refutation “by reversal is supported from the following topics [ἐκ τόπων τούτων]” (Apsines, Art of Rhetoric 5.1). What follows is a listing of possible proofs, both artistic and inartistic, that will assist the orator in refuting the claims of the opponent through the negation of the charges. In the chapter entitled ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΩΝ ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΨΗΣ, Apsines writes: “[N]ow let us look at the most important headings, considering from what topics they are composed [ἐκ τοίων τόπων σύγκειται] and by what kind of arguments they are confirmed, and first let us speak about final headings” (Art of Rhetoric, 9.1). Here, one sees that each heading144 can be elaborated through the use of various topoi; in each case the topoi are suggested arguments one can employ to demonstrate the legality, rightness, advantage, etc. of one’s case.

Finally, in the section on epilogues, topoi are mentioned once again. Here, the concept of topos has the widest range of meanings in the treatise. For example, the author claims that the epilogue itself is a topos (“The epilogue is a topic in three parts [Ὁ ἐπίλογος τόπος τριμερής ἐστιν]” [Apsines, Art of Rhetoric 10.1]). The epilogue has three subdivisions: “recapitulation [ἀνάμνησις],” “pity [ἔλεος],” and “indignation [δείνωσις]” (Apsines, Art of Rhetoric 10.1). However, of these three, both recapitulation and pity are called topoi.145 And in the section in which the author discusses pity, he mentions the “common topic from judgment and actions of the past [ἀπὸ κρίσεως καὶ ἀπὸ ἔργων γεγενημένων τὸν κοινὸν τόπον τοῦτον]” (Art of Rhetoric, 10.16). Therefore, for this author, a topos is a major part of the speech (the epilogue), which is subdivided into topoi, and each of these topoi can be supported through other (common) topoi!

This survey of the ancient rhetoricians’ views of topos/locus has demonstrated that this concept enjoyed a rather wide range of meaning. For Aristotle, the topos represented a source of logical argumentation, the topos serving as the structure of the argument. For Cicero and Quintilian, a locus was the place in which the orator would find a source of arguments from which the orator would select the ones appropriate for arguing the case at hand. But Cicero and Quintilian both differentiate between loci as sources of arguments and loci communes, which were stock, self-contained arguments useful for any case. Also, Cicero demonstrates that he is familiar with the locus being used as a theme or example to which the orator refers in the course of the speech.

Theon and other rhetoricians show that they are familiar with this range of meanings as well. Theon describes the preliminary exercise of topos, in which the student is instructed to blame, or praise, a person or thing through the use of a specified, structured argument. But he also uses the term topos more in line with Cicero and Quintilian’s predominant use of locus, that of a source of possible arguments. These uses (and others) are also found in later treatises authored by Anonymous Seguerianus and Apsines. Given the rather wide semantic range for the term topos among the ancient rhetoricians, it is not surprising that a multiplicity of meanings for the term topos can be found in modern NT scholarship, as was demonstrated earlier.

Above, in my review of J. Thom’s investigation of topos, I noted that his study did not include Cicero’s concept(s) of loci. From the analysis of Cicero’s treatment of loci in Topica, one sees that his complete concept of locus does not perfectly fit any single criterion within Thom’s schema. Internal loci, those which are inherent to the subject of the argument, line up with Thom’s first category, the strategic, or rhetorical topoi. However, Cicero’s external loci, those arguments that are drawn from outside of the subject, are more difficult to categorize. They do not seem to fit any of the types that Thom suggests. The external loci as envisioned by Cicero are not literary themes which are rehearsed over and over (Thom’s second type), nor are they moral topoi (the third type). One can say that the external topoi are strategic or rhetorical in that they are employed to persuade an audience or jury; but, given Thom’s example of his first type of topos (arguing from the greater to the lesser), the external loci do not exactly fit this category either. Therefore, I propose that Thom’s continuum should be extended to include Cicero’s external loci; I will demonstrate that these external loci focus on witnesses and testimony.

To summarize the findings of this analysis to this point, I am arguing that the current understanding in NT scholarship of the term topos should be expanded to include what Cicero calls external arguments or proofs and what Quintilian labels inartificial proofs.146 Arguments drawn from these loci focus on documents, oaths, witnesses, and testimony. These loci are more substantive than formal in nature, as they represent the content of the argument selected by the orator rather than the form of the argument. Also, especially in Cicero and Quintilian, the loci are used to facilitate the development of arguments in legal cases; there is a strong emphasis on the outcome of the speech, namely the goal of persuading a judge of the validity of one’s case. I will now investigate a particular aspect of the external loci, specifically that of divine testimony.

The topos of Divine Testimony

In Topica, when introducing the external arguments, Cicero states, “External arguments depend principally on authority” (Top. 4.24). He then gives a more detailed explanation of the external loci later in his treatise. After a short introduction to those loci which “are extrinsic or brought in from without” (Top. 19.72),147 he writes:

This form of argumentation, that is said not to be subject to the rules of art, depends on testimony. For our present purpose we define testimony as everything that is brought in from some external circumstance in order to win conviction. Now it is not every sort of person who is worth consideration as a witness. To win conviction, authority is sought; but authority is given by one’s nature or by circumstances. (Top. 19.73)

Thus, Cicero’s concept of an external locus is based almost exclusively on the testimony of others.148 He warns, however, that effective testimony is produced only by those who exhibit some type of authority, either through the nature of the witness or the circumstances in which the witness finds him or herself. Cicero then continues, defining what he means by authority through nature or circumstances:

Authority from one’s nature or character depends largely on virtue; in circumstances there are many things which lend authority, such as talent, wealth, age, good luck, skill, experience, necessity, and even at times a concurrence of fortuitous events. For it is common belief that the talented, the wealthy, and those whose character has been tested by a long life, are worthy of credence. (Top. 19.73)

Thus, authority from character can only be attributed to those who are virtuous, while authority from circumstances is based on wealth, talent, and a character which has been proven through many experiences in life, for “people generally put faith in those who are experienced” (Top. 19.73).

After a short digression in which he discusses the loci of necessity (which is a sub-topic of experience), and “the concurrence of fortuitous events,” Cicero turns his attention back to the testimony of one who possesses authority due to a virtuous character. He states,

The testimony which produces conviction through virtue is of two kinds; one sort gets its efficacy by nature, the other acquires it by hard work. That is to say, the surpassing virtue of the gods is the result of their nature, but the virtue of men is the result of hard work. The testimony of the gods is covered thoroughly enough by the following: first, utterances, for oracles get their name from the fact that they contain an utterance (oratio) of the gods; secondly, things in which are embodied certain works of the gods. First, the heavens themselves and all their order and beauty; secondly, the flight of birds through the air and their songs; thirdly, sounds149 and flashes of fire from the heavens,150 and portents given by many objects on earth, as well as the foreshadowing of events which is revealed by the entrails (of sacrificial animals). Many things also are revealed by visions seen in sleep. The testimony of the gods is at times adduced from these topics in order to win conviction. (Top. 20.76–77)

A human is virtuous through hard work; the gods, however, are virtuous simply because of who they are.151 And the virtuous testimony of the gods is possible through several ways listed above, examples of which I will provide in this chapter and explore throughout chapters three through six of the present study.

Other ancient authors also demonstrate that the concept of divine testimony was not limited to Cicero.152 The author of Rhet. Her. is familiar with this form of proof. In the section in which he describes the epilogoi within the speech (noted above), ten sources of loci are listed for use within the epilogos. The first listed is the locus of authority, and includes a form of divine testimony:

The first commonplace [Primus locus] is taken from authority, when we call to mind of what great concern the matter under discussion has been to the immortal gods, or to our ancestors, or kings, states, barbarous nations, sages, the Senate; and again, especially how sanction has been provided in these matters by laws. (Rhet. Her. 2.30.48)153

Quintilian also mentions divine testimony as a source of proofs, and seems to follow the author or Rhet. Her. closely. He does so after his introduction to loci (Inst. 5.10.20; cf. the discussion above) and in the context of arguments drawn from outside the subject matter. The general category in which divine testimony is found is that of authority (Inst. 5.11.36). Specifically, proofs from authority are “opinions which can be attributed to nations, peoples, wise men, distinguished citizens, or famous poets” (Inst. 5.11.36–37). After discussing these categories, and also including proverbial wisdom, Quintilian then states:

Under this head, and indeed as the first item, some put the Authority of the Gods, which is derived from oracles . . . This is a rare thing, but can be of use . . . When these belong to the Cause, they are called “divine testimonies”; when they are adduced from other sources, they are Arguments. (Inst. 5.11.42)154

Thus Quintilian, while his description is not nearly as comprehensive as Cicero’s, does demonstrate that he was aware of this form of proof.

Finally, the author of Art of Political Speech is also aware of this method of proof. In the section on proofs (περί πιστεύων) and within the context of discussing the most typical topoi, the author concludes his list of topoi with the following: “Judgment will be taken from that of gods, heroes, prose writers, philosophers, poets [Κρίσις δὲ ληφθήσεται άπὸ θεῶν, ἀπὸ ἡρώων, ἀπὸ συγγραφέων, άπὸ φιλοσόφων, άπὸ ποιητῶν]” (Anonymous Seguerianus, Art of Political Speech 181 [Dilts and Kennedy]). This is similar to Quintilian’s statement above, indicating perhaps that Quintilian is one of the author’s sources, or that they are both drawing from a common tradition.155

Therefore, Cicero and other authors of ancient rhetorical handbooks emphasize a particular topos/locus, one that is “inartificial” or “external” to the case being argued, and is based on the testimony of one in authority. The authority of the witness is based on many factors, including the witness’s age, social standing, wealth, experience, and virtue. According to Cicero, because the gods are virtuous by their very nature (while human beings have to work to achieve virtue), they are the ultimate authorities which one can call as witnesses. The gods, therefore, can be tapped as a source of “divine testimony” [divina testimonia]. This testimony comes in many forms, including through oracles, sounds and visible emanations from the sky, dreams and visions, and the entrails of sacrificial animals. Many examples of these forms of testimony can be found in ancient speeches and treatises; it is to these examples that I now turn.

Application of the topos of Divine Testimony in Speeches and Treatises

Oracles as Divine Testimony

In his discussion of proof through divine testimony, Quintilian provides the example of the oracle at Delphi stating that Socrates was the wisest of all human beings (see Inst. 5.12.42). The specific statement to which Quintilian refers is found in Plato’s Apology (20e-21a) in the context of Socrates’s defense before his Athenian accusers.156 Cicero also refers to this statement in various contexts. For example, in De amicita, Cicero argues against the non-traditional view that “soul and body perish at the same time, and that all things are destroyed by death” (4.13). In doing so, he cites Socrates’s view that human souls had their origins in God; he prefaces this remark by stating that Socrates was judged to be the wisest of all human beings by the oracle of Apollo (4.13).157 Another oft-quoted oracle which serves as proof in speeches and treatises is the famous inscription at Delphi, γνῶθι σεαυτόν. Seneca, in addressing Marcia’s grief over the loss of her son, argues that all humans are mortal, and should therefore become accustomed to the idea that all will one day pass away. He then cites the Delphic inscription, stating that this “clearly, is the meaning of that famous utterance attributed to the Pythian oracle” (Marc. 11.2–3).158

There are many examples of the use of other, less famous oracles in speeches and treatises. In Lycurgus’s speech against Leocrates, in which Lycurgus accuses Leocrates of deserting Athens in a time of need,159 Lycurgus cites examples from the past of brave Athenians in order to contrast them with Leocrates’s behavior. One such example is that of Codrus, who was obedient to an oracle received by the Peloponnesians, who were marching on Athens. The oracle, as told to the Peloponnesians, stated that they would be successful in their attack on Athens as long as the king of Athens was spared. When Codrus was informed of the oracle, he disguised himself as a simple peasant and went outside the city walls, where he was killed by the Peloponnesians, thus sacrificing himself in order to save the city. Lycurgus, therefore, casts aspersions on his opponent by comparing him to this virtuous Athenian who, in obedience to an oracle, did not leave the city and even sacrificed himself in order to save the city (Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 83–89).

A second example is found in Dio Chrysostom’s oration concerning his exile in Athens. Chrysostom justifies his banishment through the use of oracles as evidence of his innocence, both indirectly and directly. First, he cites the example of Croesus, king of the Lydians, who received an oracle from Apollo which told him to leave his kingdom. In addition, Croesus should leave without feeling shame (37.6).160 Chrysostom uses this example to draw a parallel to his own situation; he, too, is in exile and feels no shame. He goes on to explain that he also received an oracle, which told him “to keep doing with all zeal the very thing wherein [he was] engaged, as being a most honourable and useful activity” (37.9). Thus, Chrysostom defends his exile by citing the example of another who was in exile in obedience to an oracle, and, in addition, directly citing an oracle that he himself received and to which he was obedient.

Aristides, in his In Defense of Oratory, also employs the topos of divine testimony by referencing oracles. In this treatise, Aristides argues against Plato’s statement in Gorgias (463a-465c) that the practice of oratory does not require art.161 In order to refute this claim, Aristides states, “I invoke [καλῶ δ’] Hermes, God of Oratory, Apollo, Leader of the Muses, and all the Muses, to be my guides” (In Defense of Oratory 19), thus summoning the gods as witnesses. He does so “because of the two following circumstances: we argue neither against the meanest of the Greeks nor in defence of the meanest of subjects [οὒτε γὰρ πρὸς τὸν φαυλότατον τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔθ’ ὑπερ τῶν φαυλοτάτων οἱ λόγοι]” (In Defense of Oratory 19). Because of the stature of his opponent, Aristides feels impelled to marshal the most significant of witnesses.

Aristides uses the witness of the gods through oracles in several ways in his defense of the practice of oratory.162 First, he argues that Greek statesmen such as Lycurgus163 and even Plato himself164 consulted the oracle at Delphi in crafting legislation for the state (In Defense of Oratory 23–41); this is evidence of the value of the gods’ testimony through oracles,165 which, he further argues, is not provided through any type of “art.” Therefore, how can Plato argue that oratory is worthless because it also does not depend on art?166 Second, he argues that Plato considers inspired prophecy and poetry to be the result of madness [μανία], but madness of divine origin,167 which is capable of resulting in much good. Therefore, Aristides argues, if madness is an outlet for divine inspiration (and is artless) and is therefore a source of worth, then why should all forms of artless activities be censured? (see In Defense of Oratory, 50–57). Finally (see 78–83), Aristides introduces the Delphic oracle which proclaimed Socrates to be the wisest of all humans. He states that Socrates claimed to know nothing, yet the oracle proclaimed him to be the wisest person alive. Assuming both to be true, Aristides harmonizes the two statements by arguing that Socrates “did not know anything through an art [τὸ μὴ τέχνη]” (In Defense of Oratory 81). He then summarizes this part of the argument with the following statement:

[A]nd through Socrates the God has borne witness [καὶ διὰ τοῦ Σωκράτους ὁ θεὸς μεμαρτύρηκεν] about both points [that Socrates was not ashamed to be “artless,” and that he did not know anything through art], when he gave the oracle that Socrates was the wisest of men. Therefore he confirms with his own testimony that twofold testimony of Socrates [ὥστε διπλῆν οὖσαν τὴν τοῦ Σωκράτους μαρτυρίαν ἑτέρᾳ κυρίᾳ τῇ παρ’ αὐτοῦ βεβαιοῖ]. (In Defense of Oratory 81)

Therefore, in Aristides one finds an extended example of the use of oracles being considered as the testimony of the gods and being used as supporting evidence in the defense of the practice of oratory.

A final example168 is found in the lesser declamations of Quintilian, considered to be school exercises through which students practiced declamation. In this clearly fictitious case,169 a priest is accused of aiding and abetting Alexander and his army by dedicating a temple. In the narrative within the declamation, one learns that Alexander’s campaign was successful until he burned down a particular temple. Once he did, a plague swept through his army. In order to stop the plague, Alexander sought an oracle, which told him he must rebuild the temple that he destroyed. When Alexander requested that the priest dedicate the newly built temple, the priest agreed on the condition that Alexander would withdraw from the city. In his defense against the charges of aiding the enemy, the priest cites the oracle to Alexander; he claims that both he and Alexander were obedient to the oracle, Alexander in building the temple and he in dedicating it.

Before moving on to other forms of divine testimony found in ancient speeches and treatises, it is appropriate to mention one other aspect which relates to oracles as forms of proof. Very often in ancient writings poets and other famous figures are cited and their words given the significance of oracles. For example, the Elder Seneca writes to his sons, who are aspiring orators, and urges them not to use their contemporaries as role models. He describes the younger generation thusly: “they are lazy, their intellects asleep; no-one can stay awake to take pains over a single honest pursuit. Sleep, torpor and a perseverance in evil that is more shameful than either have seized hold of their minds” (Seneca the Elder, Controversiae 1. pref. 8). He then cites Marcus Cato’s statement that “an orator, son Marcus, is a good man skilled in speaking” (Controversiae 1. pref. 9). But he prefaces this remark by stating:

That well-known saying of Cato was really an oracle . . . for surely an oracle is the divine will given human expression; and what high priest could the gods have found more holy than Marcus Cato, not so much to teach mankind as to scold it. (Controversiae 1. pref. 9)

In this passage, one notices that the Elder Seneca is citing a human authority (a widespread topos among the ancient rhetoricians), but also seeks to add significance to that authority through the claim that the source of the speaker’s words is the gods themselves. This is a common methodology that was often practiced in antiquity.170

Divine Testimony through Deeds and Other Means

Other forms of divine testimony (as described by Cicero in Top. 20.76–77) are found in ancient speeches and treatises as well. Quintilian, in mentioning divine testimony as a form of proof, cites Cicero’s speech against Catiline as an example.171 In this speech, which Cicero delivers to the people of Rome and not the Senate,172 Cicero describes to the people how he was able to thwart Catiline’s plot to take over the Republic. Cicero explains his ability to do so by attributing his success to the gods:

If I were to say that I foiled them [Catiline and his co-conspirators], I should be taking too much credit for myself—an intolerable presumption. It was Jupiter, the mighty Jupiter, who foiled them; it was Jupiter who secured the salvation of the Capitol. . . . The immortal gods have been my guides in my purpose and determination and have led me to this vital evidence. (Cat. 3.22)173

Even before action was taken, Cicero claims to have had foreknowledge from the gods of the situation. He emphatically states:

Even so, citizens, my conduct of this whole matter may be thought to display both foresight and action that depended upon the wisdom and the will of the immortal gods. We can make this assumption . . . because so closely have the gods stood by us at this time to bring us their help and assistance that we can almost see them with our eyes. Even if I do not mention those portents, the meteors that were seen in the west at night and lit up the sky, even if I leave out the thunderbolts and the earthquakes, even if I omit the other portents which have occurred so frequently in my consulship that the immortal gods seemed to be foretelling these events which are now coming to pass. (Cat. 3.18)174

Cicero, through this passage, builds up to the ultimate evidence of the involvement of the gods.

This evidence is described in the next passage. Cicero relates to the people how, in view of many portents similar to those described in the previous passage,175 the seers ordered that a more prominent statue of Jupiter be erected; the new statue, however, was to face east, rather than west (as was the case of the previous, smaller statue), in order that the portended plot to overthrow the Republic would become visible to the senate and the people. According to Cicero, there were many delays in actually erecting the statue, resulting in the statue being put in place that very morning, concurrent with the plot being made known and subsequently foiled (Cat. 3.20–21). Cicero considers this undeniable evidence of the gods’ favor and intercession.176

Another example of thunder and/or lightning being used as divine testimony is found in a discourse by Dio Chrysostom. The context of the discourse is that Dio is chiding the Alexandrians for their frivolity and lack of seriousness. Part of the issue, he explains, is that the Alexandrians welcome orators who “declaim speeches for display, and stupid ones to boot” (32.9). Dio himself, however, feels that he is addressing them “by the will of some deity [ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ δαιμονίον τινὸς γνώμης]” (32.12). He strengthens this statement by adding,

For when divine providence is at work for men, the gods provide, not only good counselors who need no urging, but also words that are appropriate and profitable to the listener. And this statement of mine should be questioned least of all by you, since here in Alexandria the deity is most in honour, and to you especially does he display his power through almost daily oracles and dreams. (32.12)

Dio thus establishes his authority through divine testimony. First, he tells his leaders that if he is indeed speaking on the behest of the god, his words will be “appropriate and profitable” for his hearers. Second, he reminds his readers that the god who has commanded him to speak is the same one who speaks to the Alexandrians on a regular basis through oracles and dreams.

Later, in the speech, Dio is rebuking his auditors for their conduct at the chariot races in the stadium. According to Dio, the crowds’ excitement and subsequent behavior is completely inappropriate. As proof of the inappropriateness of their behavior, Dio first quotes a passage from the Iliad, which describes a race during which the crowds stood by and watched in silence (32.79–80; cf. Il. 23.368–72, 448). He then reminds the auditors that Ajax “behaved in rather unseemly fashion as a spectator by abusing Idomeneus with reference to the horses of Eumelus” (32.80). Dio goes on to say that Ajax “also was guilty of impiety toward Athena at the capture of Troy and on that account was himself smitten with a thunderbolt [κεραυνωθεὶς] and thereby caused the storm and shipwreck that befell them all” (32.80). Through the citation of Homer, which is used as an example of divine testimony, Dio provides supporting evidence of the people’s need to change their behavior.177

An example of divine testimony through dreams is found in Cicero’s philosophical treatise Laelius de Amicitia, directly following a passage to which I have already referred. The immediate context of the reference is the death of Laelius’s friend Scipio and his subsequent argument that the soul does not perish along with the body. Laelius maintains that Scipio himself was convinced of this, “making use of arguments which he had heard, he said, from Africanus the Elder through a vision in his sleep” (Amic. 4.14).178 Laelius therefore uses Scipio’s arguments that he received in a dream to bolster his own view that the soul lives on after the death of a human being.

A second example of dreams being used as divine testimony is found in Artistides’s treatise In Defense of Oratory, a treatise in which, as has already been seen, one finds divine testimony through oracles used as a source of proof. In the same section referenced above, Aristides cites the dreams that Asclepius provided as a means of healing (see In Defense of Oratory 58–65). Aristides’s argument is that human doctors are practitioners of an art. There are those patients, however, who receive healing through means such as the cult of Asclepius;179 this healing through dreams is not performed in connection with art. Therefore, just as healing can come through dreams and not through art, oratory can be useful even if it is not an art, as Plato argues. Oratory can be useful in that it can also be inspired by the gods:

Then if dreams free the companies of Asclepius from the art of medicine, and the Bacchants of Dionysus transform the gifts of the Nymphs, whenever they become inspired, why is it shameful or beyond the realm of nature to accept the idea of men inspired in oratory, and to believe that they can refer to the Gods as patrons? (In Defense of Oratory 75)

Many examples of divine testimony through auspices are found in the speeches of Cicero. Most of these examples center on the lex Aelia Fufia, a law, or laws,180 which were enacted in order to curtail political assemblies when the auspices were unfavorable.181 The examples cited below are relatively tangential, but they do involve the testimony of the gods through signs and portents in the sky and illustrate how an orator could use (and perhaps abuse) this practice to discredit his opponent, albeit somewhat indirectly.

One example of Cicero’s use of this concept can be found in his speech against M. Antonius in the Philippic orations. Specifically, Cicero accuses Antonius of violating the lex Aelia Fufia by allowing decisions to be made in opposition to the auspices. He writes:

Our augur [Antonius] is too bashful to interpret the auspices without his colleagues. And yet those auspices need no interpretation; for who does not know that, when Jupiter is thundering, no transaction can legally be carried out? (Phil. 5.7)182

Here, Jupiter’s thundering is considered by Cicero as an ill omen, through which Jupiter displays his displeasure with the proceedings. According to Cicero, it is common knowledge that the gods testify in this fashion and that such a testimony should not be ignored.

A second example comes from Cicero’s speech against Vatinius. Cicero begins this particular line of questioning with the statement, “And, since all important things have their beginning with the Immortal Gods [Et quoniam omnium rerum magnarum ab dis immortalibus princiia ducuntur]” (Vat. 5.13). Next, he accuses Vatinius of being a Pythagorean, therefore demonstrating “contempt for the auspices under which this city has been founded, upon which the whole State and its authority depend” (Vat. 6.14). The accusation that Cicero brings against him in this regard is couched in terms of rhetorical questions and explanatory comments183 preceded by a strong string of invectives.184 Specifically, Cicero’s charge against Vatinius is that he disregarded the laws governing the use of augury, indirectly accusing Vatinius of being impious towards the gods and their testimony, and thereby discrediting him.185

Another example of divine testimony comes from Cicero’s defense of Milo. In the speech, Cicero does not argue that Milo is not responsible for the death of Clodius. Rather, his defense is that because Clodius was actually conspiring to kill Milo, the death of Clodius at the hands of Milo’s slaves was justified (see, e.g., Cicero, Mil. 11). Also, Cicero portrays Clodius as one who desired to rule over Rome as a dictator, claiming rights to the property of the Roman citizens (Mil. 77–78).186 Therefore, Cicero presents Clodius’s death as a benefit to Rome for which Milo should be praised, not punished. In fact, Cicero argues that it is actually by the gods’ favor that this act has occurred:

But for this blessing [the death of Clodius], gentlemen, the fortune of the Roman people, your own happy star, and the immortal gods claim your gratitude. Nor indeed can any man think otherwise, unless there be any who thinks that there is no such thing as divine power and control, who is not stirred by the greatness of our empire or by yonder sun or the march of the constellated heaven or by nature’s round of ordered change or (last and greatest) by the wisdom of our ancestors, who themselves paid strict observance to worship and rites and auspices, and have handed them on to us their descendants . . . Wherefore it is this very power, which has often shed upon this city wealth and blessing beyond all thought, that now has uprooted and abolished this scourge, having first roused such a mood in him that he dared to prove with violence and challenge with the sword the bravest of men, and so was vanquished by one over whom, had he won the victory, he stood fair to enjoy impunity and licence for all time. (Mil. 83–84)187

Cicero argues that it was the gods, whose favor for Rome is as evident as the order of universe, who incited Clodius to attempt to murder Milo, which in turn resulted in Milo’s slaves killing Clodius.188 Thus the gods testify, in a sense, against Clodius by provoking him to attempt a crime for which he was (justly) murdered.

Cicero also employs the locus of divine testimony in a more general fashion. An example cited by Quintilian (Inst. 5.12.42) is Cicero’s defense of Ligarius, in which Cicero references the judgment of the gods. Quintus Tubero has accused Ligarius of consorting with the enemy; it seems, however, that in actuality Ligarius’s offense amounted to something of a more personal nature rather than a crime (cf. Lig. 2–17). In remarks addressed to Caesar, who is judge over the case being argued, Cicero draws an analogy between Caesar and Ligarius (who was serving in Africa) during the onset of the civil war. Cicero reminds Caesar that in the beginning Caesar “held that that movement was a secession, not a war, not an outburst of hatred between foes, but of dissension between citizens, a dissension in which either party had the welfare of the state at heart, but in which each . . . swerved from the interest of the general body” (Lig. 19). Cicero continues:

Between the two causes it was at the time difficult to decide, for the reason that on either side there was something to approve; to-day that cause must be adjudged the better, whereto the gods added their assistance. (Lig. 19)

Thus, Cicero argues that only in retrospect is it possible to see which cause was the “right” cause, and only because the gods have given their testimony. In the greater argument of Ligarius’s innocence, Cicero is maintaining that because it was difficult to ascertain which side was the “enemy,” Ligarius is guilty perhaps of bad judgment, but certainly not a crime.

The final example of divine testimony cited by Quintilian is Cicero’s speech against Clodius now known as De haruspicum responso. This speech includes a plethora of examples of divine testimony, beginning with Cicero’s explanation of the event that triggered the speech. An odd sound was heard and interpreted by the seers as being from the gods and that “sacred and hallowed sites were being turned to secular purposes” (Har. resp. 9). Cicero claims that Clodius is behind this interpretation, and that specifically what is in view is Cicero’s own home, built for him by the State (Har. resp. 9–10; 16). Cicero, in rebuttal, interprets the ominous noise differently:

I am glad to have been given an opportunity . . . of speaking on the general theme of this prodigy, which I am inclined to believe is the most solemn that has been announced to this order for many years past; for you will find that this prodigy [toto prodigio] and the response occasioned thereby are nothing but a warning to us, uttered almost by the voice of Jupiter Best and Greatest, concerning Clodius’ mad wickedness and the terrible dangers that threaten us. (Har. resp. 10)

Cicero understands the noise which was heard to be a warning from the gods, and attributes this warning to various misdeeds of his opponent Clodius. Thus the noise itself, according to Cicero, is a divine testimony, and Cicero uses divine testimony to further implicate Clodius.189

A few further examples of Cicero’s use of divine testimony will suffice to provide a sense of its application in this speech. In arguing that the prodigy is evidence of the gods’ anger over Clodius’s desecration of the Megalesian games,190 Cicero calls out to the gods: “Ye immortal gods! How could ye speak with us more clearly, if ye were with us and moving in our midst? Ye have signified and ye openly declare that the games have been desecrated” (Har. resp. 25). A second example is found in Cicero’s charge that the prodigy is a warning that the gods are angry over the neglect of sacrificial rites. He quotes the soothsayers’ report in this regard: “Ancient and secret sacrifices have been performed with laxity, and have been desecrated” (Har. resp. 37). His comment on this is in the form of a rhetorical question which links this statement to testimony from the gods themselves: “Is it the soothsayers who utter these words, or the gods of our ancestors and of our households?” (Har. resp. 37). He then goes on to associate Clodius with this matter. In this same section, Cicero claims that Clodius is deranged, and that this is so due to the punishment of the gods.191

Finally, in the conclusion of this speech, Cicero calls for Clodius to be punished, reiterating his position that the noise was a warning from the gods (Har. resp. 61). He reinforces this by asking another rhetorical question: “And if other manifestations, less impressive, perhaps, though more widely bruited, have not failed to move us, shall not the feelings of all of us be stirred by the actual voice of the immortal gods? (Har. resp. 62; emphasis mine). Cicero then makes reference to an earthquake, which occurred in a nearby town at approximately the same time. This, too, he deems a “portent,” which is “as a voice, nay, an eloquent appeal, of the immortal gods that this must be viewed, when the world with its seas and lands shudders with a weird motion, and by a sound beyond experience and beyond belief conveys to us tidings of the future” (Har. resp. 62–63).192

A final example from Cicero comes from De legibus, his treatise on the law. Here Cicero is arguing for the divine origin of Rome’s laws. In an argument quite similar to the one already seen above in his defense of Milo, Cicero argues that the people must understand that “the gods are the lords and rulers of all things, and that what is done, is done by their will and authority; that they are likewise great benefactors of man” (Leg. 2.7.15). He goes on to say that the observation of nature should motivate humanity to thank the gods for their goodness and that nature gives evidence of a greater reason which governs it (Leg. 2.7.16). Finally, this same reason is the basis for Rome’s legal system. Cicero concludes this section by stating:

Who will deny that such beliefs are useful when he remembers how often oaths are used to confirm agreements, how important to our well-being is the sanctity of treaties, how many persons are deterred from crime by the fear of divine punishment, and how sacred an association of citizens becomes when the immortal gods are made members of it, either as judges or as witnesses [quamque sancta sit societas civium inter ipsos diis immortalibus interpositis tum iudicibus, tum testibus]. (Leg. 2.7.15)

Thus Cicero associates the goodness of Rome’s laws with the gods who are active participants in the legal system through their testimony and judgment.

The examples above demonstrate that the topos of divine testimony was used abundantly as proof or evidence in ancient speeches and philosophical treatises. The examples also show the breadth of situations in which ancient rhetors were able to apply the topos in forensic and deliberative cases involving law, politics, and even in philosophical works. The method of the present study, as explained in chapter one, is to consider how the topos of divine testimony would have been heard and understood by an ancient audience, especially in the case of Luke-Acts. Therefore, it is appropriate at this time to consider, albeit briefly, the question of the persuasiveness of this particular topos in the ancient world. It is to this question I now turn.

The Persuasiveness of the topos of Divine Testimony

First, it is important to remember that the primary goal of ancient rhetoric was to persuade one’s audience of the validity of one’s case.193 For example, Cicero in De inventione says, “The function of eloquence seems to be to speak in a manner suited to persuade an audience, the end is to persuade by speech [finis persuadere dictione]” (Inv. 1.5.6).194 Similarly, in De oratore, he maintains that “the duty of an orator is to speak in a style fitted to convince” (De or. 1.31.138). Quintilian also expresses this idea; in considering the different definitions of rhetoric, among the diversity of opinions he finds this one area of agreement: “They almost all believe that the function of oratory lies in persuading or in speaking in a way adapted to persuade.” He then concludes, “So the commonest definition is that ‘rhetoric is the power of persuading’” (Inst. 2.15.3, 5). Given this emphasis on the results of rhetoric,195 namely to persuade an audience and to adapt one’s presentation to the audience in order to do so,196 one can argue that simply the fact that the topos of divine testimony appears in these speeches and treatises noted above is evidence of their persuasiveness in the context in which they were written and/or spoken.197 If the rhetorician indeed desired to persuade the audience, then these arguments must have been considered to be convincing.

The emphasis on the orator’s consideration of the audience is even more significant when one considers other ancient writings in which authors describe their individual attitudes towards the gods and divination. One example is from Cicero himself. In the first half of De divinatione, Cicero, through the character Quintus, Cicero’s younger brother, espouses the contemporary Stoic worldview concerning divination and augury,198 one in which these aspects of religion were acceptable and beneficial to the people.199 The second half of the treatise is spoken through the character of Marcus Cicero himself, and consists of a complete refutation of what Quintus has put forward as a defense of divination and augury.200 The negative attitude toward divination and augury described by Marcus Cicero in this treatise has caused scholars to question where Cicero himself actually stood on this issue.201 For my purposes in this study, however, I would argue that the question of the “historical” Cicero’s opinion of divination is insignificant, and it is insignificant for two reasons.

First, I have already discussed the significance for the rhetorician of persuasion and adapting one’s case to the audience. Thus, the important question for the rhetor is not, “What do I believe?” Rather, the more significant question is, “What proofs and evidence will convince my audience?”202 Thus, Cicero can write,

Now nothing in oratory, Catulus, is more important than to win for the orator the favour of his hearer, and to have the latter so affected as to be swayed by something resembling a mental impulse or emotion, rather than by judgement or deliberation. For men decide far more problems by hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute [quam veritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus]. (De or. 2.42.178)

For the present discussion, it is important to note that Cicero places a higher value on convincing his audience by emotional appeal than “reality” (veritas).203 Quintilian makes a similar statement; in the context of the appeal to emotions within a speech, he says, “But where force has to be brought to bear on the judges’ feelings and their minds distracted from the truth, there the orator’s true work begins” (Inst. 6.2.5). Therefore, given this emphasis on conviction at all costs, Cicero’s personal views concerning augury and divination are not significant.204 What is significant is the judge’s (or audience’s) opinion of the evidence, and it is this second point noted above that I now address.

In the first chapter of this study I explained in the section describing the proposed methodology that I would focus on the implied audience of Luke-Acts and other extra-biblical works of the same period. Thus the methodology of this study and Cicero’s (and Quintilian’s, as well as others’) focus on the audience reception of the proofs and evidence presented in speeches line up in conjunction. And the evidence from antiquity, from Cicero himself and from numerous others,205 clearly points to the fact that in the ancient world, it was accepted that the gods were intimately involved in the affairs of humanity, which included their pronouncing judgment on human beings as well as guiding their affairs. From the first half of De divinatione, it is readily apparent that there was a worldview in Cicero’s time that included human-divine communications, a worldview which Cicero seems to desire to counter in the second half of the treatise.206 Because this attitude toward and acceptance of the divine existed, it is no surprise that an orator would exploit it in order to win conviction.

A second example is found in the Plutarch’s De superstitione, in which he satirizes dreams207 and ridicules the idea of a soul being tormented after death. As will be demonstrated in the chapter five, however, dreams are extremely important in Plutarch’s Lives, especially when the subject of the bios is near death. Also, in De superstitione, Plutarch attacks eclipses as portents,208 but in the Lives, eclipses are seen as both scientific/natural phenomena as well as omens for the subject of the Life.209 I have shown that in the writings of Cicero, even though he was possibly not personally convinced of the validity of augury and divination, he was not reserved in his use of divine testimony as proofs. In chapter five, I will demonstrate the same point for Plutarch: although in Superst. Plutarch expresses reluctance in completely believing that natural phenomena represented portents, he, too, is quite willing to cite them as proofs in his writings.

Before moving into the analysis of the use of the topos of divine testimony in ancient narratives, including Luke-Acts, it is important to return to the work of W. Wuellner.210 Wuellner argues that the choice of topoi by ancient authors from which they built their arguments was a culturally-conditioned process and was determined by the rhetorical situations they faced.211 Therefore, given first-century culture, a culture which is dominated by the concept of gods who are intimately involved in the lives of human beings and who communicate their pleasure and displeasure through various methods, it is easy to understand why a speaker or author in the first century would select the topos of divine testimony as evidence of what that person is trying to prove.

In sum, in this chapter I first addressed how the term topos is currently being applied to NT studies. The conclusions from this study were that the term topos, when applied to NT studies, is somewhat polyvalent. It can refer to a line of argumentation, literary themes, or moral topoi that receive extensive treatment in philosophical treatises, categories that overlap to some degree. I then surveyed the ancient rhetoricians in order to ascertain their definitions of topos/locus. I have shown that one possible definition for topos is a source of proofs from which an orator can draw in order to bring evidence in a forensic or deliberative speech. In the Latin rhetoricians, and particularly in Cicero, there is a strong emphasis on legal applications of topoi and the use of rhetoric in service to the State. My argument here is that this particular definition is underrepresented in NT studies involving rhetoric and topoi.

I then moved to a particular topos described in many rhetorical writings, the external topos of divine testimony, which receives its fullest explanation in Cicero’s Topica. Through many examples I demonstrated that the testimony of the gods, which occurs through various means, was widely applied in ancient speeches and treatises when arguing a case or seeking to persuade an audience. Specifically, orators often applied this form of testimony in order to praise one’s client, or, conversely, to denigrate an opponent. Likewise, the testimony of the gods was used to demonstrate the gods’ support or lack thereof for a potential course of action. Finally, I argued that ancient audiences would have perceived this particular form of evidence as extremely persuasive.

Given this position, the next task is to examine Luke-Acts and other similar extra-biblical works in order to investigate if and how the topos of divine testimony is applied in these more narrative genres. In the next four chapters of this study, I will attempt to demonstrate that the topos of divine testimony was used rhetorically by ancient authors of narratives, including histories and biographies, in order to praise and denigrate characters, and to convince readers of the validity or inconsistency of a particular course of action.

83. Locus in Latin. When referencing those ancients who wrote in Greek, the word topos will be used; when discussing the Latin rhetoricians, locus will be used. Ultimately, the two terms reference the same general concept.

84. A summary of how the term topos has been particularly understood in NT scholarship will introduce this analysis.

85. For short summaries of the concept of topos, see, e.g., Cope, Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 124–33; J. Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 107–19.

86. Curtius, in his influential work, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, 79–105, argues that the ancient rhetoricians considered the topics a “stockroom” of universally applicable concepts, to be employed in the composition of speeches and other forms of literature. For example, he cites the use of the topos of “affected modesty” (ibid., 83–85), and maintains that as early as Cicero this topos was used to ingratiate the orator to the judge overseeing the case. This topos, however, is also found in other literature, including both early Christian and non-Christian.

87. Many of the articles and essays reviewed here are also engaged by Thom, “Defining the topos,” 555–73; Thom makes many of the same points as I in this review of previous scholarship.

88. Bradley, “The Topos,” 238–46. The connection of topos and form criticism is clear in Bradley’s work. He states, “For one such form . . . I have employed as a descriptive name the Greek word topos” (“The Topos,” 240).

89. Mullins, “Topos,” 541–47, esp. 547. Mullins basically takes Bradley’s definition and compares to it several ancient writings, including Greco-Roman, Jewish, and early Christian. Specifically, Mullins agrees with Bradley’s definition of the function of a topos (as seen in the NT), but disagrees with his treatment of the form of the topos.

90. More recently, see also von Lips, “Die Haustafel,” 261–80. Von Lips argues that rather than a Gattung, the familiar Haustafel passages in the NT should be considered a topos; in this he sympathetically cites Bradley’s work. A. Malherbe also argues for this particular view of the topos. He maintains that a topos is a “stock treatment of subjects of interest to the moralist, ” and his analysis concentrates on the topos of friendship as found in Seneca, Plutarch, Musonius, Epictetus, and Dio Chrysostom, as well as Paul in the NT; see Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists,” 267–333, esp. 320–25. An example of topoi being applied in the analysis of the New Testament is found in H. D. Betz’s commentary on Galatians (Galatians). In his introduction to the commentary, Betz refers to Paul’s argument in 4:12–20 as a “string of friendship topoi” (ibid., 32). In his comments on the passage in question, Betz restates this expression; he says that Paul is making his argument using “a string of topoi belonging to the theme of ‘friendship.’” He continues by claiming that the theme of friendship was quite well known in the ancient world, and cites several ancient documents as evidence (ibid., 221). See also L. Johnson, “James 3:13—4:10,” 327–47.

91. Brunt, “More on the Topos,” 495–500.

92. Ibid., 496. Brunt admits that the form discussed by Bradley and Mullins certainly exists in classical writings as well as the New Testament; he argues, however, that it is incorrect to call it a topos.

93. Ibid., 498. Brunt (ibid., 497) also explains that Aristotle connected the use of topoi to enthymemes, which are syllogistic in nature. However, while a syllogism is a complete argument, in an enthymeme one premise of the argument is missing. The topoi represent the source of the enthymemes.

94. Wuellner, “Toposforschung und Torahinterpretation,” 463–83.

95. Thom, “Defining the topos,” 555–73. He cautions that his work should not be considered the final word on the topic; rather, his essay represents “an exploratory survey,” and that “[A]t most [he] will attempt to indicate some of the lines of investigation that need to be developed further” (ibid., 557).

96. Ibid., 561.

97. Ibid. By “formal,” Thom is referring to topoi that are used as “strategies of argumentation,” while “substantive” topoi are those that represent topics for arguments.

98. Ibid., 566.

99. Ibid. He offers the example of an argument from the lesser to the greater, found in Matt 6:30.

100. Ibid., 566–67. An example, according to Thom, is the “younger-son motif in the Parable of the Prodigal Son.” This definition is also emphasized by J. McDonald, Kerygma and Didache, 70–72. Two examples noted by McDonald include:

Seneca, Ep. 34.19: “I remember one day you were handling the well-known commonplace [Memini te illum locum aliquando tractasse],—that we do not suddenly fall on death, but advance towards it by slight degrees; we die every day.”

Seneca the Elder, Suasoriae 1.7.9: “He then spoke the commonplace [Dixit deinde locum] on the variability of Fortune. He described how nothing is stable, everything fluid, now raised, now depressed in unpredictable change.”

101. Thom, “Defining the topos,” 567.

102. Ibid. Thom lists Plutarch as an example of the Hellenistic moral writers (he specifically mentions the Moralia).

103. In examining the later development of the topos, Thom devotes a paragraph of his study to Theon’s treatment of topos in the Progymnasmata. Thom confines his comments to the formal elementary exercise of topos.

104. This same distinction as seen in Cicero and Quintilian, as will be demonstrated below.

105. Kennedy (Classical Rhetoric, 61) notes that the idea had already surfaced in the writings of Isocrates; he states in particular that Isocrates mentioned the topos of possibility/impossibility and arguments which cite authoritative sources (Hel. enc. 4, 38). In his encomium to Helen, Isocrates writes concerning those who would, through the use of rhetoric, attempt to prove those things which are agreed upon to be false: “Nevertheless, although these men [Georgias, Zeno, Melissus] have shown that it is easy to contrive false statements on any subject that may be proposed, they still waste time on this commonplace [περὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον]” (Hel. enc. 4). In the same treatise, Isocrates continues, commenting on the appropriateness of praising Helen: “But lest I seem through poverty of ideas to be dwelling unduly upon the same theme [περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον] and by misusing the glory of one man to be praising Helen, I wish now to review the subsequent events also” (Hel. enc. 38). For a somewhat tentative discussion (admittedly; cf. the title of the work) of the origins of the concept of the topos, see D’Angelo, “The Evolution of the Analytic Topoi,” 50–68, esp. 54–61.

106. Aristotle specifically lists five inartificial proofs: laws, witnesses, contracts, that which is revealed by someone being tortured, and oaths.

107. Ryan’s comment is helpful; concerning enthymemes and topoi, he states: “To say, then, that an enthymeme is derived from a topos does not mean that the enthymeme is constructed from the topos as from a premise . . . Instead, the enthymeme follows the structure of the topos . . . The topos is not part of the argument, but it is the argument’s pattern” (Ryan, Aristotle’s Theory, 48–49).

108. J. Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 107.

109. Inartificial proofs, according to Aristotle, are those which are particularly appropriate for forensic speeches (1.15.1–2).

110. For a similar, albeit much later view of quoting and/or imitating ancient sources, see Longinus, [Subl.] 13.2–4. In this passage, the author, concerning the μίμησις of ancient sources, argues that referring to others’ works is another path to the “sublime.” The author uses the analogy of the steam which came from the earth at Delphi and intoxicated the pythia; the pythia is “impregnated with the divine power and is at once inspired to utter oracles.” In this same way, by the imitation of historians and poets the reader is “carried away” by this use of others’ work. By analogy, readers are captivated by the wisdom of the ancients (“old writers [ἀρχαίων]”). The author goes on to say that quoting or imitation is not plagiarism; rather, it is like “taking an impression from fine characters as one does from molded figures or other works of art.”

111. See Kennedy, Rhetorical Criticism, 20–22, who briefly summarizes Aristotle’s concept of topos; cf. a similar discussion in Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion, 100–103.

112. This is certainly not to say that the concept of topos disappears between Aristotle and Cicero; on the contrary, many ancient rhetoricians address this subject matter. The evidence is such, however, that Reinhardt can correctly note: “In light of the scanty evidence for the post-Aristotelian development of dialectical τόποι, we may assume that Cicero’s loci reflect a post-Aristotelian tradition of rhetorical τόποι which have been rearranged and supplemented with the help of Top. and other sources” (Reinhardt, Topica, 28–29; emphasis original). See Reinhardt, Cicero’s Topica, 18–35, for a brief overview of the various understandings of topos from Aristotle to Boethius. See also Kemper, “Topik,” 17–32, for a summary of the topoi from Aristotle to Cicero.

113. See Kennedy’s discussion of the situation surrounding Cicero’s writing of Inv. in The Art of Rhetoric, 106–11. Kennedy argues that Cicero and his contemporaries followed the ancient convention of not mentioning a living person to whom they were indebted; only those authorities who were deceased were cited. In Inv. 2.50.111, Cicero does mention Crassus, but makes no reference to Antonius anywhere in the work. According to Kennedy, both of these men would have been well respected by Cicero. Thus Kennedy argues that Inv. was completed after Crassus’s death (91 BCE), but while Antonius was still living (he died in 87 BCE).

114. “For the more shamefully an honourable and worthy profession was abused by the folly and audacity of dull-witted and unprincipled men with the direst consequences to the state, the more earnestly should the better citizens have put up a resistance to them and taken thought for the welfare of the republic” (Inv. 1.3.5).

115. He does define what he means by “common topics”; see below.

116. In this rhetorical treatise, Cicero argues that the following are the parts of a well-organized speech: exordium (1.14.19–18.26), narrative (1.19.27–21.30), partition (1.22.31–23.33), confirmation (1.24.34–41.77), refutation (1.42.78–51.97), and peroration (1.52.98–56.109).

117. The complete list also includes “habit, feeling, interests, purposes, achievements, accidents, speeches made” (1.24.34).

118. Grimaldi also recognizes that the loci in Cicero are focused on the content of the arguments rather than on the form of the argument. He goes so far as to state that Cicero misunderstood Aristotle’s method; see Grimaldi, “The Aristotelian Topics,” 176–93, esp. 178. Emrich, in questioning Curtius’s definition of a topos as a cliché, argues that the term locus is a metaphor which helps to explain the concept as seen in the Latin rhetoricians (primarily Cicero and Quintilian). Emrich notes that in these writers, a locus is a place at which arguments can be found (“der Sitz des Beweises”), but can also be the argument or proof in itself. See Emrich, “Topik und Topoi,” 90–120, esp. 102–20.

119. Kennedy argues that it was written in 55 BCE and published in the year following its composition. He also claims that De or. “is one of [Cicero’s] most admired works and stands beside or only slightly behind Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Quintilian’s De institutione oratoria as a rhetorical classic”; see Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric, 205 n. 84.

120. Antonius goes on to say that “the mind must needs return to those headings and those commonplaces [locos] which I have often mentioned as such already, from which every device for every speech whatever is derived” (2.34.146).

121. Cicero differentiates the task of an orator from dialectic as practiced by philosophers through Antonius’s statement: “For we notice the overflowing copiousness of the diction of the philosophers who, I think . . . prescribe no rules for speaking, but none the less undertake to discuss with overflowing copiousness, whatever subject is laid before them” (2.35.151). The context is one of oratory vs. philosophy; therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that when Cicero mentions Aristotle’s work, one which concerns the discovery of arguments, Aristotle’s Top. is in view.

122. According to Schütrumpf (“Non-Logical Means of Persuasion,” 95–110), another significant difference between Aristotle and Cicero is that Aristotle differentiates between those elements in the argument for which the orator is responsible (ἔντεχνος; earlier these were called the “artificial” means of persuasion) and those for which the orator is not directly responsible (ἄτεχνος; the “inartificial”). Those arguments that fall under the heading of ἔντεχνος include arguments from ethos, pathos, and logical arguments. In Cicero’s De or., however, what he considers ἄτεχνος actually falls under the heading of logical proof. Schütrumpf concludes: “In Cicero, therefore, the ‘non-technical evidence’ does not constitute a means of persuasion in its own right, as in Aristotle; rather it is classified as subordinate to one of the three means of persuasion which for Cicero are the only means of persuasion” (ibid., 105).

123. An excellent overview of the content of Top. can be found in Gaines, “Cicero’s Partitiones oratoriae and Topica,” 469–70.

124. Or perhaps he does not. Gaines argues that the phrase in question should be rendered “I began to write a Topica in the manner of Aristotle” (Gaines, “Cicero’s Partitiones oratoriae and Topica,” 469); see also Stump, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, 21–22.

125. Bornscheuer (Topik, 63) notes that Aristotle did not consider the topos as a source of arguments; rather, he saw topoi as being elements of an argument; see also McAdon, “Probabilities,” 226. Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 2.2.13: “Let us now speak of the elements of enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I mean the same thing).” As seen in the citation from Rhet. 1.2.21 above, Aristotle conceived of topoi as being elements of syllogisms and enthymemes. Stump notes that Cicero’s concept of loci is much different from that described in Aristotle’s Topics. In Top., Aristotle presents an organization of topoi useful for dialectical argumentation. Aristotle emphasizes the process of developing an argument, rather than the rote memorization of possible arguments. Stump contrasts this with Cicero, who, she argues, is developing a system for forming arguments for legal cases. Thus, for Cicero, the significance of the loci is found in their use within oratory and rhetoric, which make use of dialectic for the purposes of arguing legal cases. Here, one notes an emphasis on the practical nature of the loci in Cicero. See Stump, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, 18–23. Leff also points out the practical nature of loci in the Latin rhetoricians. He, however, compares the descriptions of loci in Cicero and Quintilian to the later Boethius in forming this conclusion. See Leff, “Up from Theory,” 203–11. On this see also the work of Van Ophuijsen (“Where Have the Topics Gone?,” 131–73), who notes that Critolaus makes a statement in which he rejects rhetoric. Van Ophuijsen maintains that “far from being directed at Aristotle’s more rarefied conception of the subject, this is likely to have been an assertion of its [the peripatetic school at Lyceum] claims in the face of an unphilosophical rhetoric encouraged by the new demand for unadorned and intellectually unambitious but practically effective legal speeches created by the extension of Roman jurisdiction” (ibid., 133).

126. Kemper notes that this is a shift in emphasis from that in Rhet. Her. (see below) and Inv. In these two works, loci are predominantly meant to be the arguments themselves. See Kemper, “Topik,” 27.

127. Cicero also provides an example for each one; each example is derived from a forensic issue.

128. In comparing Cicero’s idea of locus to Aristotle’s presentation of topoi, Bornscheuer persuasively argues that the main difference is one of means and ends. For Aristotle, according to Bornscheuer, it was important for the orator to know the means of persuasion for every eventuality. Bornscheuer contrasts this with Cicero, who, he argues, is much more practical and therefore sees an intimate connection between the speech and the situation in which the speech is offered. Cicero ultimately makes this connection through the selection of loci. Bornscheuer also notes that the emphasis on the practicality of oratory in Cicero is a direct result of his involvement in Roman politics, so that his system of rhetoric is governed by political and public ends. See Bornscheuer, Topik, 71–90. Reinhardt somewhat similarly argues that Cicero developed his concept of locus as a result of the Roman legal system becoming more formalized. Around the second century BCE, trials in Rome became more structured, which led to an increased emphasis on the arguments being made, rather than the reputation of the one making the arguments. This occurred along with an increase in legal literature, which included the classification of cases. Thus, Cicero’s system of loci served the legal system as a τέχνη which would assist orators in becoming more familiar with the legal system and equip them to argue cases more persuasively. See Reinhardt, Topica, 53–66.

129. Hohmann argues that in Cicero, dialectic becomes a tool which supports rhetoric. For example, in Cicero’s Top. 6, dialectic is used to evaluate the various arguments available to the orator. For Hohmann, therefore, Top. is a rhetorical work (rather than dialectical), in which the emphasis falls on application of loci and the practicality of using them within a speech. Hohmann, “Rhetoric and Dialectic,” 41–51.

130. This same distinction will be found in Theon’s Progymnasmata as well. Pernot, in his study of topos and commonplace, concludes that topoi represented a system of examining a plethora of cases with a limited number of patterns or examples, while through a commonplace a rhetor could treat a specific issue as a general question. See Pernot, “Lieu et lieu commun,” 253–84.

131. Leff’s comments are apposite and should be cited in full (see Leff, “Common-places and Argumentation,” 448):

Obviously, the commonplace is an argument elaborated more carefully and fully than other types of argument. But the distinction between loci and loci communes should not be understood as a distinction between two kinds of argument, since, for Cicero, the loci are not arguments, but resources used in discovering materials for arguments; they provide individual pieces—the timbers and planks as it were—which enter into the construction of arguments. The loci communes are finished products that integrate logical argument, emotional appeal, and style into a single structure. They are “minor forms” that contribute to the general development of a discourse but can be detached and appreciated as independent units.

132. Conclusions (epilogoi) are found “in the Direct Opening, after the Statement of Facts, after the strongest argument, and in the Conclusion of the Speech” (Rhet. Her. 2.30.47).

133. “For neither the Prooemium nor the Narrative has any function except to prepare the judge for the Proof . . . Lastly of the five parts into which we divided the forensic speech, any one of the other four may sometimes be unnecessary for the Cause; but there is no dispute which does not need proof” (Inst. 5.pr.).

134. Quintilian indeed cites Aristotle at this point; cf. Inst. 5.1.1.

135. See Thom, “Defining the topos,” 555–73, who makes a similar point as the one I am making here.

136. As noted above, the Greek here reads Τόπος; the Greek text is from Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 106.6.

137. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 93.6.

138. Ibid., 93.8.

139. Notice that in Kennedy’s translation, he chooses the word “topics” rather than topoi as in the section on the preliminary exercise of commonplace. This same distinction is seen in Theon’s exercises concerning encomion and invective (Theon, Progymnasmata 111 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 51]; cf. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 111.11), prosopopoeia (Theon, Progymnasmata 117–18 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 49]; cf. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 118.1), and thesis (Theon, Progymnasmata 121 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 56]; cf. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 121.14–15, 24).

140. Kennedy bases this estimate on the sources that appear in the document; see Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises, xiii.

141. The author lists the following as examples of non-artistic proofs (which are generally defined as originating “from material at hand”: “witnesses, decrees, contracts, oracles.” These are summarized as being “such things, as many are written down” (Anonymous Seguerianus, Art of Political Speech 145, in Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises). The author does, however, qualify the use of these inartistic proofs through the following statement: “Overall, invention in the case of these proofs is non-artistic, but the use is artistic” (ibid., 145).

142. Kennedy notes that the treatise, in the form in which we now have it, shows evidence of having been edited by a later editor/redactor; see Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises, xvii.

143. Kennedy argues that θεώρημα in this section refers to “a topic from which an idea or argument can be drawn,” and notes that later in the treatise the term τόπος will be employed in referring to a similar concept (Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises, 77 n. 5). For Kennedy, this is evidence that the original treatise has been edited (cf. ibid., xvii).

144. Several headings are discussed, including what is legal [περὶ νόμου], customary [περὶ ἔθου], just [περὶ δικαίου], advantageous [περὶ συμφερόντος], possible [περὶ δυνατοῦ], and honorable [περὶ ἐνδόξου].

145. “The narration and the demonstration (apodeixis) are grouped under the pragmatic, the prooemium and the epilogue under the pathetical. How then, since we have said that the epilogue belongs to the pathetical aspect, do we say that reminder, being a topic of it, is part of the pragmatic? [τὴν ἀνάμνησιν τόπον οὖσαν αὐτοῦ μέρος πραγματικῆς εἶναί φάμεν;]” (Art of Rhetoric 10.2). And on pity, the author writes: “Whenever we are going to arouse pity (eleos), we shall prepare the judges ahead of time so this will be useful for us; for one ought not to enter on this topic suddenly, but after some preparation [οὐ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιχειρεῖν δεῖ τούτῳ τόπῳ, ἀλλὰ μετὰ παρασκευῆς]” (Art of Rhetoric 10.15).

146. Although Quintilian does not specifically label these types of arguments as loci, he discusses them within a context of proofs used in a speech. Thus, his concept of inartificial proofs parallels that of Cicero, for whom the inartificial proofs are loci.

147. Cicero at this point adds the following comment: “[L]et us say a few words about these topics from without, although they bear no relation to your discussions of the law [etsi ea nihil omnino ad vestras disputationes pertinent]” (Top. 4.72). Cicero’s comment is not meant to infer that these loci are unnecessary for arguing forensic cases; rather, he is implying that Trebatius, a jurist, would normally be his own authority and would not normally require an outside authority to lend credibility to his case. See Reinhardt, Topica, 342.

Here I am confining the discussion to authoritative witnesses being invoked for the purpose of persuasion. There is, however, a second, very significant aspect to the concept of authority, namely the authority of the one speaking. For an interesting treatment of this topic, in which Cicero’s use of authority in his speech Pro Sulla is analyzed, see Goodwin, “Cicero’s Authority,” 38–60. Goodwin likens Cicero’s use of authority in this speech to an honor-shame transaction, in which the auditors are “blackmailed” into accepting Cicero’s authority (and therefore his position) rather than insult his dignity by disagreeing with him.

148. The statement “everything that is brought in from some external circumstance in order to win conviction [Testimonium autem nunc dicimus omne quo dab aliqua re externa sumitur ad faciendam fidem]” (Top. 4.73) certainly allows for other forms of evidence than simply testimony of witnesses. Cicero, however, chooses to focus his treatment on witnesses, both human and divine.

149. Cf. Pliny the Elder, Nat. 2.58.148: “We are told that during the wars with the Cimbri a noise of clanging armour and the sounding of a trumpet were heard from the sky, and that the same thing has happened frequently both before then and later.”

150. Seneca writes: “Hear what I think about those fires which the atmosphere drives across the sky.” In the same context he continues, “Also, we have more than once seen a flaming light in the shape of a huge ball which was then dissipated in mid-flight. We saw a similar prodigy about the time of the death of the deified Augustus” (Nat. 1.pref. 17.2–3). See also Nat. 1.15.5: “Among these you may also include a phenomenon which we read about frequently in history: the sky seems to be on fire.” He then goes on to give an example which occurred during the reign of Tiberius Caesar. Cf. Pliny the Elder, Nat. 2.58.148: “It has often been seen, and is not at all surprising, that the sky itself catches fire when the clouds have been set on fire by an exceptionally large flame.” Here, however, Pliny does not connect this to a specific event. He does, however, associate “a burning shield scattering sparks” which “ran across the sky at sunset from west to east” to the time of Lucius Valerius and Gaius Marius, albeit not to a particular incident during their rule (Nat. 2.34.100). Here one must include lightning, which is, according to the ancients, a form of fire in the heavens. See Seneca, Nat. 2.12.2; in his discussion of lightning (both “flashes” and “bolts”) and thunder, he writes: “It is further agreed that both lightning flashes and lightning bolts are either fiery or have the appearance of fire.” Later, he continues: “It is generally agreed that a lightning bolt is fire and so is a lightning flash, which is merely fire that would have become a lightning bolt if it had acquired more force” (Nat. 2.21.1). Seneca also argues that lightning, when rightly interpreted, foretells future events; see Nat. 2.32.1–51.1 for his discussion of interpreting lightning as well as other forms of augury. Especially pertinent to this study are his remarks concerning Jupiter and lightning (Nat. 2.41.1–46.1). Seneca first states the position of the Etruscans, namely that Jupiter sends lightning for three reasons: to warn; to do good (but this can also do damage); and for destruction. Seneca himself disagrees. He promotes his Stoic viewpoint by stating that “lightning bolts are not sent by Jupiter but all things are so arranged that even those things which are not done by him none the less do not happen without a plan, and the plan is his. For, although Jupiter does not do these things now, it is Jupiter who brought it about that they happen. He is not present at every event for every person but he gives the signal, the force, the cause, to all” (Nat. 2.46.1). For Pliny the Elder’s discussion of this topic, see Nat. 2.52.137–54.141.

151. Cicero states this despite the claims of Euhemerus, who, appealing to intellectual elites, had argued (early in the third century BCE) that most of those recognized as gods had originally been mortal human beings, who were then deified after their deaths. See the discussion in Seznec, Survival of the Pagan Gods, 11–13.

152. Topica is not the only work of Cicero in which he mentions divine testimony. In Part. or. 2.6, the following dialog between the elder Cicero and his son appears after the elder Cicero states that what brings conviction in a speech are “[A]rguments, which are derived from topics that are either contained in the facts of the case itself or are obtained from outside” (Part. or. 2.5):

“Son: How then do you distinguish between the two kinds of arguments you speak of?

Father: Arguments thought of without using a system I term arguments from outside, for instance the evidence of witnesses. . . .

[At this point there is a question and answer concerning internal arguments.]

Son: What kinds of evidence are there?

Father: Divine and human. Divine evidence is for instance oracles, auspices, prophecies, the answers of priests and augurs and diviners; human evidence is what is viewed in the light of authority and inclination and things said either freely or under compulsion—the evidence that includes written documents, pledges, promises, statements made on oath or under examination” (Part. or. 2.6).

153. Cf. the discussion above concerning Aristotle and the use of authority as an inartificial proof.

154. Quintilian then gives several examples of Cicero’s use of divine testimony in treatises and speeches, some of which will be examined below.

155. In his section on θέσις, Theon also references the topos of authority as a way of providing proofs for one’s thesis; he does not, however, mention the gods. He writes: “A more advanced student should include in each of the topics just mentioned the evidence of famous men, poets and statesmen and philosophers . . . and one should not make mention of these things randomly or by chance, but amplifying the examples, first from what has been done by an individual, private man, then by those in authority or a king” (Theon, Progymnasmata 122 [Kennedy]).

156. “And, men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting; for the word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person of weight [ἀξιόχρεων]. For of my wisdom—if it is wisdom at all—and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a witness . . . Well once [Chaerephon] went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; . . . he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser.” Note here that Plato connects the oracle itself with divine speech, a theme to which I will return.

157. Cicero also references this oracle in Amic. 2.7, 10; Sen. 21.78; and Acad. 1.4.16. See also Valerius Maximus, who also references this oracle in his Memorable Doings and Sayings (3.4.ext. 1). In this particular section, Valerius discusses those who despite lowly origins rose to positions of prominence. As a non-Roman example, Valerius names Socrates, using the oracle as proof of his intellectual and virtuous stature.

158. Cicero makes use of this oracle in a second argument for the immortality of the soul (Tusc. 1.22.52). Here, Cicero claims that a body is simply a container for the soul; one’s existence is therefore defined by the soul, not the physical body. The Delphic inscription, which he attributes to Apollo, is therefore the god’s command to know one’s soul, not one’s physical body. Cf. also Dio Chrysostom, 10.22; 67.3; Plato Charm. 164b-65b; [Alc. maj.] 1.124a-b. Aristides also references this oracle in his In Defense of Oratory 78–83; see the analysis of this passage below.

159. Specifically, Leocrates fled Athens and went to Megara when Philip won a victory over the Athenians at Chaeronea.

160. At this point, Dio Chrysostom quotes the oracle in full:

“Wait till the time shall come when a mule is monarch of Media:

Then, thou delicate Lydian, away to the pebbles of Hermus;

Haste thee and no longer stay, nor have awe of being a coward” (37.7).

161. “[Oratory] seems to me, Gorgias, not to be an artistic practice [εἶναι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὖ], but that of a soul taking aim, courageous, and naturally clever in associating with men. Its total effect I call flattery” (Aristides, In Defense of Oratory 22).

162. Aristides emphasizes his use of evidence in this section; he states, “Then my argument will be made not from lack of taste, but for proof [ἔπειτ’ οὐ τοῦ φορτικοῦ χάριν εἰρήσεται, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως], which we claim is lacking in these [i.e., Plato’s] arguments” (In Defense of Oratory 27–28).

163. “Men go to Delphi and inquire about constitutions. And then they legislate according to the voice which comes from the Pythian priestess, beginning with Lycurgus, who came after many others, but must be called first for the sake of argument” (In Defense of Oratory 38).

164. “[A]nd [Plato] says that then he must act, ‘if the Pythian priestess assents,’ but before that he does not dare” (In Defense of Oratory 41; cf. Plato, Resp. 540c).

165. Aristides summarizes this section with the statement, “So be it! Here is the evidence for our argument, from Delphi and Pythian Apollo [αὓτη μὲν ἐκ Δελφῶν ἡ μαρτυρία τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παρὰ Ἀπόλλωνος (τοῦ) Πυθίου]” (In Defense of Oratory 42).

166. This is basically an argument from the greater to the lesser, the greater being the “artless” testimony of the gods through oracles. Aristides summarizes: “Therefore, evidence and support has come . . . from all the gods [οὐκοῦν παρὰ . . . τῶν θεῶν μαρτυρία ψῆφος ἐπῆκται], that such an argument is worthless, which either seeks art or belittles whatever does not have it” (In Defense of Oratory 45).

167. Cicero will cite the gods as the source of madness as well; the context, however, is quite different. See comments below in connection with his speech against Clodius, De haruspicum responso.

168. Other examples could be cited; Demosthenes cites the law, and then quotes oracles in his case against Meidias, thus providing evidence for the illegality of Meidias’s actions (striking Demosthenes) and for his impiety (see Mid. 47–55).

169. The author of the declamation references an attack made by Alexander against Athens.

170. See, e.g., Cicero, who quotes a verse from Ennius’s Annales and then states, “Our poet seems to have obtained these words, so brief and true, from an oracle” (Resp. 5.1). See also Aeschines (Ctes. 135–36), who quotes Hesiod and then states, “If you disregard the poet’s meter and examine only his thought, I think this will seem to you to be, not a poem of Hesiod, but an oracle directed against the politics of Demosthenes [ἀλλὰ χρησμὸν εἰς τὴν Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν]” (Ctes. 136); Lycurgus (Against Leocrates 92), who prefaces a quotation of poetry by stating, “For the first step taken by the gods in the case of wicked men is to unhinge their reason; and personally I value as the utterance of an oracle these lines, composed by ancient poets and handed down to posterity [καὶ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἀρχαίων τινὲς ποιητῶν ὧσπερ χρησμοὺς γράψαντες τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις τάδε τὰ ἰαμβεῖα καταλιπεῖν].” Here, however, one must exert caution, as the various terms translated “oracle” can carry a wide range of meanings, not unlike the term topos.

171. See Quintilian, Inst. 5.12.42. The other examples that Quintilian cites in this passage are discussed below.

172. The significance of this is that this speech is therefore technically not a species of forensic rhetoric in that it is not a formal accusation of Catiline. It is, rather, Cicero’s report to the people of what has taken place, and in places sounds much like a self-encomium (cf. Dio Cassius’s statement: “[Cicero] was the greatest boaster alive and regarded no one as equal to himself” (Hist. Rom. 38.12.7; see also Plutarch, Comp. Dem. Cic. 2.1: “[W]hereas Cicero’s immoderate boasting of himself in his speeches proves that he had an intemperate desire for fame”). Heibges argues that while this speech is deliberative in nature, the citation of the direction of the gods is nonetheless employed by Cicero in order to persuade his audience more effectively that he has taken the correct course of action; see Heibges, “Religion and Rhetoric,” 833–49.

173. Cicero employs the same strategy in a forensic speech, through which he defends Sulla against the accusation that he was a part of this same conspiracy. In that speech, Cicero states: “Thwarted on this charge, Torquatus returns to the attack and makes another accusation against me. He says that I falsified the entry in the public records of what was said. Immortal gods!—for I grant you your due and cannot with honesty claim for myself the sole credit for distinguishing unaided the number, variety and speed of the dangers in that storm which burst so furiously upon the State—it was surely you who then kindled in my mind the desire to preserve my country, you who turned me from all other considerations to the single thought of delivering the Republic, you in short who amid the deep shadow of uncertainty and ignorance illumined my thoughts with the brightness of your light” (Sull. 40).

174. Pliny the Elder also records a lightning strike which he interprets to be an omen with respect to Catiline; see Nat. 2.52.137.

Cicero’s statement recorded here is an excellent example of the rhetorical figure of speech known as paralipsis (occultatio), as described in Rhet. Her. 4.27.37: “Paralipsis [occultatio] occurs when we say that we are passing by, or do not know, or refuse to say that which precisely now we are saying.”

175. “You remember, of course, that in the consulship of Cotta and Torquatus a large number of objects on the Capitol were struck by lightning, images of the gods were overthrown and statues of men of old overturned and the bronze tablets of our laws melted; even the statue of Romulus, the founder of Rome, was struck . . . On that occasion the soothsayers assembled from the whole of Etruria and said that murder and arson, the end of the rule of law, rebellion and civil war, the destruction of the whole city and of our empire were upon us, unless the immortal gods were placated by every means and used their power virtually to alter the path of destiny” (Cat. 3.19).

176. “Who here can be so blind to the truth, so impetuous, so deranged in his mind as to deny that, more than any other city in the whole world that we see about us, Rome is governed by the will and the power of the immortal gods?” (Cat. 3.21) Heibges expresses some doubt as to the timing concerning the erection of the statue and the coup being averted. She intimates that this confluence of events may have been manipulated in order to bring about the desired results; see Heibges, “Religion and Rhetoric,” 844.

177. Another speech falsely attributed to Dio Chrysostom, which includes multiple instances of the topos of divine testimony, is the oration to the Corinthians. The central issue with which the speech is concerned is a bronze statue of the speaker which has ostensibly been removed. The speaker begins by relating the story of Arion, a passenger on a ship sailing to Corinth, whom the ship’s crew threatened to throw overboard. Arion began to sing, and dolphins, which heard the song, surrounded the ship. He jumped overboard and was carried by a dolphin to safety. The sailors were put on trial and executed; Arion erected a bronze statue in Taenarum (where the dolphin delivered him), the statue depicting himself on the dolphin. He then relates the story of Periander, “whom the Greeks were wont to call tyrant, though the gods called him king” (37.5). He then provides evidence of this by quoting an oracle (37.5). But even though Periander was held in so high regard by the gods, no statue was erected to him in Corinth. Herodotus also visited the city, but the city did not provide remuneration for him. The speaker uses these examples as evidence that the Corinthians do not value what is truly valuable; what is truly valuable, in the case of Arion and Periander, is that for which the gods show high regard and to which they testify through the miraculous deed and oracle mentioned. Not content to rest his case, the speaker continues his accusations by claiming that Daedalus himself crafted the statue (37.9), and that it was erected in a place that belongs to both Helius and Poseidon (37.12), to which the Sibyl sang praises (37.13). The speaker uses all of these varied (somewhat indirect) methods of divine testimony to bolster his case that his statue was wrongfully removed.

178. Laelius continues by saying: “If the truth really is that the souls of all good men after death make the easiest escape from what may be termed the imprisonment and fetters of the flesh, whom can we think of as having had an easier journey to the gods than Scipio?”

179. Quite possibly Aristides was one of these; cf. the discussion of the Asclepius cult at Pergamum and Aristides’s involvement with it in Behr, Aelius Aristides, 23–90.

180. Cicero mentions this in several different contexts; see, e.g., Vat. 7.18; Har. resp. 48; Phil. 2.32.81–34.84.

181. A passage from Dio Cassius is helpful for understanding this practice; in Hist. Rom. 38.13.3–6, Dio explains that, although he does not know the exact origins of the practice, at some time the Romans began searching the heavens for omens in conjunction with significant political decisions. According to Dio, if one consulted the heavens and saw some type of ominous portent, the assembly was by law not allowed to consider any legislation on that day. He adds that this practice was certainly abused by some in order to prevent legislation they opposed to be enacted. Gardner has an excellent explanation of the lex Aelia Fufia and the subsequent repeal of this law by Clodius. See Gardner, “The Lex Aelia Fufia in the Late Republic,” in Cicero, Volume XIII, 309–22. See also works cited by Gardner, including Greenridge, “Repeal,” 158–61; W. McDonald, “Clodius,” 164–79; and Weinstock, “Clodius,” 215–22. More recent studies, which have appeared since Gardner’s summary, include: Mitchell, “Leges Clodiae,” 172–76; Linderski, “Römischer Staat und Götterzeichen,” 444–57; and Tatum, “Cicero’s Opposition,” 187–94. All of these essays grapple with the question of exactly what aspect of the Lex Aelia Fufia did Clodius’s law repeal.

Cicero attributes great significance to this practice. In De legibus, he sheds light on this tradition when he states: “But the highest and most important authority in the State is that of the augurs, to whom is accorded a great influence” (Leg. 2.12.31). He then continues by asking a series of rhetorical questions: “What is of graver import than the abandonment of any business already begun, if a single augur says, ‘On another day?’ What power is more impressive than that of forcing the consuls to resign their offices? What right is more sacred than that of giving or refusing permission to hold an assembly of the people or of the plebeians, or that of abrogating laws illegally passed?” (Leg. 2.12.31).

182. It is possible, however, that here Cicero is invoking Jupiter somewhat ironically.

183. “Do you know of any tribune of the commons since the foundation of Rome who transacted business with the commons, when it was well known that an announcement had been made that the heavens had been watched? I should like you to answer this. During your tribunate of the commons, the Aelian and Fufian Laws still existed in the State, those laws which often checked and crippled revolutionary tribunes, those laws which on one except yourself has ever ventured to resist . . . I ask you, did you ever hesitate, contrary to those laws, to transact business with the commons and summon a Meeting? Have you ever heard that any of the most seditious tribunes of the commons was so audacious as to summon a Meeting in defiance of the Aelian or the Fufian Law?” (Vat. 7.17–18).

184. “What audacity was yours, what violence! What your nine colleagues held should be regarded with awe, you alone, one sprung from the mud, the lowest of the land in every way, regarded as contemptible, trivial, ridiculous!” (Vat. 7.17). Craig studies Cicero’s use of and the audience’s reception of invective in his speech Pro Milone in “Audience Expectations,” 187–213.

185. A similar accusation is found in Cicero’s speech against Clodius. Here, Cicero argues that Clodius’s tribunate is actually invalid, in that it was established while the augurs were searching for omens in the skies. See Dom. 14.39–41.

186. Concerning Clodius, Cicero states, “It is impossible to express in words or even to form a conception of all the guilt, all the capacity for destruction, that were in him” (Mil. 78).

187. A. R. Dyck argues that Cicero is attempting to “situate the event [Clodius’s murder] rather in a larger cosmic context.” See Dyck, “Narrative Obfuscation,” 219–41, esp. 233.

188. Later in the speech, Cicero will state: “Then it was that the immortal gods, as I remarked a while ago, instilled into [Clodius’s] reckless and desperate brain the thought of laying a plot against my client” (Mil. 88). Here, Dyck’s comments are appropriate: “Milo, on trial de vi, is reduced to a tool of the divine vis, which holds in check the vis of Clodius by infatuating him and leading him to his destruction” (“Narrative Obfuscation,” 235).

189. In stating that he will first dispense with Clodius’s case against his home, but then further accuse Clodius, Cicero says: “I shall even be delighted, to comply with the portents of the immortal gods [portentis deorum immortalium] and the obligations which they impose” (Har. resp. 11).

190. Cicero accuses Clodius of inviting a rabble of slaves to the games: “So these games, the sanctity whereof is so deep that it has been summoned from distant lands and planted in this city . . . were performed by slaves, viewed by slaves, and were indeed converted under Clodius’ aedileship into a Megalesia of slaves” (Har. resp. 24). This last part of this statement (hos ludos servi fecerunt, servi spectatverunt, tota deniue hoc aedile servorum Megalesia fuerunt) is an example of conduplicatio (i.e., reduplication), a figure of speech described in Rhet. Her. 4.28.38: “Reduplication is the repetition of one or more words for the purpose of Amplification or Appeal to Pity.”

191. Cicero vehemently states (note the use of conduplicatio, which serves to heighten the punishment by the gods): “It was by mortals [Homines] that you were defended in this loathsome business, from mortals [homines] that your deep guilt and degradation drew praise, mortals [homines] who gave you a verdict of acquittal though you all but avowed your sin, mortals [hominibus] who expressed no resentment at the affront which your adultery had inflicted upon them, mortals [homines] who put into your hands weapons to be used either against me, or later against our invincible fellow-citizen; mortals [hominum], I grant you freely, have done you benefits that could not be exceeded. But what punishment could be visited upon a man by the immortal gods severer than madness and infatuation?” (Har. resp. 38–39).

192. For earthquakes considered as portents, see Pliny the Elder, Nat. 2.181.191–192, 86.200. After noting several earthquakes, he writes: “Nor yet is the disaster a simple one, nor does the danger consist only in the earthquake itself, but equally or more in the fact that it is a portent; the city of Rome was never shaken without this being a premonition of something about to happen” (Nat. 2.86.200).

193. See Litfin, St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation, 91–108, 109–36. In these two chapters, Litfin analyzes the importance of persuasion as described by Cicero and Quintilian (ibid., 91–108), and by other ancient rhetoricians (109–36). He also helpfully includes a discussion of the role of the audience and the need for rhetoricians to adapt their speeches to the intended audience in order to be persuasive. I am indebted to Litfin for the primary references in this section.

194. In comparing the emphases of philosophy and rhetoric as seen in the writings of Cicero and Quintilian, C. Neumeister (Grundsätze der Forensischen Rhetorik, 23–24) argues that for the rhetor, “Zweckmäßigkeit” was paramount, as opposed to a determination of the “Wahrheit” in the case of the philosophers.

195. The practical nature of this aspect of rhetoric is reinforced by Cicero’s statement in De inventione (which directly precedes Cicero’s concept of the function of rhetoric given above): “Therefore we will classify oratorical ability as a part of political science” (Inv. 1.5.6). This is a linkage which has already been noted.

196. See Litfin, Paul’s Theology of Proclamation, 92–97, 104–6. In these sections, Litfin discusses the views of Cicero and Quintilian regarding adapting a speech to the audience. For example, Litfin cites Quintilian, Inst. 12.10.56, in which Quintilian states: “The judge’s attitude to what he hears is also very important— . . . his face is often itself the speaker’s guide. You must therefore press points you see are to his liking, and retreat smartly from those which are not well received.” Cf. Cicero’s thoughts on adapting the style of the speech to the audience in De or. 3.55.210–12. Here, I am extrapolating from Cicero’s admonition to modify the style of the speech to correspond to the audience to include the choice of content in a speech as well.

197. See Brunt, Roman Imperial Themes, 297: “The frequency of [Cicero’s] public appeals to religion is surely proof that belief was still widespread.”

198. Beard, “Cicero and Divination,” 33–46, esp. 33.

199. At the beginning of the treatise, Cicero has Quintus state: “My own opinion is that, if the kinds of divination which we have inherited from our forefathers and now practice are trustworthy, then there are gods and, conversely, if there are gods then there are men who have the power of divination” (Div. 1.5.9).

200. Beard emphasizes the polemical tone of the second half of the treatise when she states that Cicero “ridicules” his brother’s positions. Beard attributes Marcus’s position on divination to his rationalism; see Beard, “Cicero and Divination,” 33.