Читать книгу Will South Africa Be Okay? - Jan-Jan Joubert - Страница 6

Why do people keep voting for the ANC?

AFTER THE 2016 municipal election, it seemed as if the ANC might be heading for defeat in the 2019 general election. Although the party again attracted more than 50% of the vote in 2019, the result represented by far its biggest slide in support and the lowest number of votes it has ever received in a general election, as this table shows:

ANC share of the national vote 1994-2019
1994 (general):	62,7%
1999 (general):	66,4%
2000 (municipal):	59,4%
2004 (general):	69,7%
2006 (municipal):	66,3%
2009 (general):	65,9%
2011 (municipal):	62,9%
2014 (general):	62,2%
2016 (municipal):	53,9%
2019 (general):	57,5%

What is evident from the above is that there were only two outlier results that disrupted the general trends. One was the municipal election of 2000. That result is easy to explain, for at that stage the ANC’s growth trajectory was bedevilled by excitement over the emergence of the DA – the election took place only about six months after the Democratic Party, the New National Party (NNP) and the Federal Alliance had merged to form the Democratic Alliance (DA) as a new, strong, united opposition to the ANC. Moreover, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) was still in a position of power in KwaZulu-Natal. Owing to the NNP leadership’s exit from the DA and the decline of the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal, the ANC was able to resume its growth trajectory in 2004.

The other outlier (and which it is, time will tell) was either the 2016 result or the 2019 result. If the ANC were to advance again in the future, the 2016 result would prove to be the outlier, maybe because former president Jacob Zuma was then at his most unpopular and the divergent opposition parties banded together for once – before President Cyril Ramaphosa and his administration embarked on efforts to fix the country. On the other hand, if the ANC were to regress again, the outlier would be the 2019 result, when Ramaphosa as new president filled the country with hope in a period of Ramaphoria and the opposition split temporarily before they would eventually again stand together against the ANC. Which of the two scenarios will prove to be the correct one is currently obscured by uncertainties about what the future holds.

Irrespective of which of the above scenarios is the more likely one, it is highly unlikely that any other political party will surpass the ANC as the largest party in the foreseeable future. If the ANC is ever to be unseated nationally, or in any province other than the Western Cape (in this regard KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng are by far the strongest contenders), it would have to flow from a coalition of opposition parties.

This is in spite of the fact that the ANC truly doesn’t govern well where the party is in control. There is surely no party in the history of modern democracy that enjoyed the moral high ground over its opponents to a greater extent than the ANC did at the time of South Africa’s democratisation in 1994. And there is surely no other political party that has destroyed its dearly gained moral supremacy through corruption, maladministration and cronyism to the extent that the ANC has done.

Yet South Africans keep voting for the ANC in their millions, especially black South Africans in rural areas. Some opposition party supporters just can’t get their heads around this. In their view, their ANC-supporting fellow citizens are somewhere between masochistic and politically daft.

Why then do people keep voting for the ANC, even though the governing party is mired in a cesspool of self-enrichment and corruption, even though ANC supporters are literally killing each other for positions (notably in KwaZulu-Natal), even though it is ANC-affiliated unions that weaken education in the majority of schools and keep the unemployed out of jobs, even though virtually all ANC-governed municipal councils are going to the dogs, even though the problem of state capture is rooted in the ANC, even though the ANC has run once-proud state-owned entities like Eskom, SAA and Denel into the ground through cadre deployment and mismanagement, and even though the economy sinks faster than the Titanic under the ANC’s captaincy?

These ANC disasters are not just perceptions. Unfortunately, the cold, hard, indisputable facts prove each and every miserable one of them. The 2019 municipal audit report released by the office of the auditor-general, Kimi Makwetu, found that only 18 of the country’s 257 municipalities received clean audits as a result of quality financial statements and performance reports, and by complying with all key legislation. Of these, 13 were under DA control and only 5 under ANC control.

As is the case with most phenomena, there are positive and negative aspects that determine the ANC’s relative electoral success. Let’s first look at a number of key positive aspects that lure voters to the ANC.

The party has done very well after 1994 in providing people with access to services that for long had been withheld from them, such as housing, electricity and sanitation. To that can be added the more or less successful roll-out of the world’s largest antiretroviral treatment programme to combat HIV/Aids, the land reform programme (notably the restitution part that returns land to specific communities), and social grants for the poor.

Anyone who tries to deny that these ANC-driven plans are fairly successful is either politically insensitive or clueless about what really matters in grassroots South African political discourse. The enduring popularity of the ANC – despite all its mistakes, flaws and corrupt behaviour – isn’t due to the fact that the South African electorate is stupid or even masochistic. The ANC is in power not because the majority thinks it is an excellent government, but because the electorate believes that other parties will serve their interests to an even lesser degree than the ANC.

In the 2019 general election, the ANC’s successes trumped its failures for most voters. Let’s list some of these vote-winning ANC successes: there are many South Africans who no longer live in makeshift shacks because they have the roof of an RDP house – for which they paid little or nothing – over their heads. This couldn’t have happened before the ANC made it state-driven policy. There are many people who no longer see their children studying by candlelight, or run the risk that a toppled candle may cause a fire that destroys their meagre possessions, because they now have access to electricity. There are many who no longer have to suffer the indignity of being dependent on an outside, pit or bucket toilet because they have greater access to sanitation facilities and water in their houses. This was not the case before the ANC made it state-driven policy.

Among the ANC voters are people for whom HIV is no longer necessarily a death sentence that leads to the scourge of child-headed households, for they now have access to the world’s largest state-driven antiretroviral treatment programme. It was the ANC – admittedly too late and only after they had booted out the HIV/Aids denialist Thabo Mbeki – that introduced this.

Those who keep voting ANC are also the people for whom social grants keep the wolf from the door, even though economists and those above the tax threshold grumble about the unsustainability of the social security net. If that grant is all that stands between you and hunger, you’re not going to vote for those who in your opinion may reduce or stop the grants.

And, lastly, ANC voters are also the people who either have had the land restored to them that their forebears lost after 1913 due to the Natives Land Act and the policy of segregation and later apartheid, or who have seen other communities getting their land back and live in hope that they will also be able to recover what they regard as their homes and their ancestral land. None of this was possible before the ANC made it state-driven policy.

The above examples are directed at the many South Africans, particularly in the middle and affluent classes, who so readily and unkindly underestimate the intelligence of ANC voters and have scant regard for the reasons why they remain loyal to their party. I have cited only a few of the reasons why a vote for the ANC isn’t merely mindless or a reflex. Many South Africans who vote for the ANC are by no means blind to the party’s mistakes. They do, however, acknowledge what has already been achieved despite these mistakes – maybe in the hope that someday they will benefit from the system created by the ANC, even if it may not have happened yet.

The other reasons why people keep voting for the ANC regardless of its failings are perhaps less positive. One is that the ANC, as a nasty offshoot of the already reprehensible policy of cadre deployment, wages a reign of terror in many municipalities and provinces whereby nobody gets government contracts or government positions unless they are ANC members or supporters. It is enforced by violence in some places, specifically in KwaZulu-Natal, and has already led to many murders. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that in many impoverished rural ANC-controlled municipalities public revenue, municipal job opportunities, municipally driven piecework and taxi routes are actually the only sources of income – the only route out of starvation. This is a grim truth that isn’t acknowledged widely enough – in our country everyone carries on about state capture, where the individual makes officials of the state dependent on him or her, but little is said about the converse, which is just as bad: where the ruler in the municipality makes the impoverished residents dependent on the government kitty, to which that ‘petty dictator’ holds the only key.

It’s a dirty way of retaining power, and ultimately the ANC will regret it. You reap what you sow, and the ANC should have learnt this in 2016 when they were challenged by a group of ideologically diverse opposition parties who were united only by their strong resistance to the thuggish manner in which the ANC all too frequently chooses to govern. One also witnesses this in the way in which voters, once they have voted against the ANC in a specific area, don’t easily return to the party. In Western Cape municipalities it is becoming commonplace that DA councillors of dubious moral stature are persuaded by the ANC in the course of the council’s term to leave their party in the lurch and hand over power to the ANC, usually followed by a well-paid position for themselves, although of course the person concerned always claims it played no role in this betrayal of the voters’ preference.

There is another significant reason why the ANC retains power, and it’s rooted in the Bill Clinton quote about the most important question in politics: ‘Compared to what?’ While one may level a great deal of criticism at the ANC’s national cabinet, it’s not always clear that any other party would be able to come up with one that is much better.

The only two parties in any way big enough to even try are the DA and the EFF – the rest are really just homes for niche interests with no hope of governing. And if you had to put the DA’s or the EFF’s national spokespersons one by one next to the members of the current cabinet and make a direct comparison, it’s not obvious that the red or the blue shadow cabinet would be much of an improvement on the governing one. There are of course instances where the shadow ministers totally outclass the governing ministers, and if there ever had to come a day that the opposition parties manage to stand together, between them they could definitely appoint a better coalition cabinet than the current ANC-led one. But that day still seems to be far off, if it should ever arrive.

If you had to set down the ANC next to the DA, it is hard to believe at this stage that the DA would be able to put together a comprehensive cabinet of, say, 25 top people. Every party has its passengers, and while the DA has several outstanding people at its disposal, and several of the shadow ministers would be improvements on the serving cabinet members, there are reasons why the DA remains in opposition.

In any case, the DA has learnt, and this is true specifically in the coalition governments in the north of the country since 2016 (Johannesburg, Tshwane, Thabazimbi and the Modimolle municipality in what used to be Nylstroom), that governing in a coalition is much harder than being in opposition. One got the feeling DA supporters had imagined that with the change of government, Johannesburg and Pretoria would instantly turn into Cape Town-like models of excellence. But it’s not so easy. Being in government means making tough choices and compromises, both morally with your conscience and pragmatically with your coalition partners who hold different ideological views. When the DA came to power in Johannesburg, all potholes and broken traffic lights in the DA heartland in the northern suburbs couldn’t just be given priority overnight, and all grass in those areas couldn’t just be cut immediately as if the indigent rest of the city didn’t exist. The poorer and needier areas obviously had to take precedence, which meant that on the surface the DA-led city government didn’t appear to be that dramatically different from its ANC predecessor.

One heard the same feedback from the DA-supporting suburbs of Pretoria – day-to-day life didn’t change all of a sudden under DA control. Realistically, surely this wouldn’t have happened in any case, even though the DA might have created such an impression in election propaganda. Because, as a new government, you build your house on the foundations laid by your predecessor. And especially when your predecessor’s policy is cadre deployment – appointing officials on the basis of political loyalty rather than competence – you’re not going to put in place a stellar administration just by snapping your fingers. Those cadre-deployed officials are in the first place political and not professional appointees – the ANC comes first, not the public or service delivery. In historiography and other aspects of the study of history as a discipline, it has been repeatedly and empirically documented that public servants, and in this case specifically municipal officials, have over the centuries proved to be one of the biggest stumbling blocks in the way of dynamic change and the improvement of societies worldwide. As a generally deeply undynamic social force, they know every trick of red tape in the book that silently stifles initiative and vigour and promotes disheartening mediocrity. In the case of the switch-over from the ANC to the opposition governments, this behaviour on the part of ANC cadres employed as officials or workers in newly opposition-run municipalities was in truth much worse and far more malicious, because many of those cadres actively sabotaged the efforts of the newly elected municipal leadership to improve life and service delivery for its citizens. Dirty tricks, destruction of infrastructure and refusal to implement or delaying implementation of the decisions of the newly elected municipal political leadership are also a blatant and completely unacceptable denial of the democratic will of the majority of the population, who were fed up with pathetic and corrupt ANC mismanagement. When it comes to public servants as a species, those ANC-minded officials and workers are the lowest and most despicable form of life. They are the dregs of the public service.

One must, however, give credit where it is due. Each of the dozens of councils taken over by the opposition parties has been undoubtedly and demonstrably better run than when the ANC had been in charge. It was to the overall good of every single one, without exception. If I were the ANC, none of the jaw-droppingly incompetent, wasteful and crooked things I have done since 1994 to ruin my once-noble name and turn it into a laughing stock would make me as ashamed as the way the opposition coalitions are so clearly and indisputably governing better than the ANC. Of course the coalition governments could have done better, especially regarding some disappointingly incompetent and infuriating errors in Tshwane, but what the former opposition partners did specifically for the financial management and viability of, for example, the Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay metros by not stealing and squandering as heinously as the ANC governments did, is an outstanding achievement for which these DA-led coalitions surely deserve more recognition and gratitude.

The astounding consequences of this are that nearly all the coalitions have remained intact for so many years, even though the co-operation is between parties that have nothing in common except their goal to just make their town a better, cleaner, more efficient and more honest place than it was under the ANC. One can hardly believe that of all the coalition municipalities between the DA, EFF, FF Plus, ACDP, Cope and the UDM, only two – Metsimaholo (Sasolburg) and Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth) – collapsed within the first three years (which means by 3 August 2019). Moreover, in both cases it happened under somewhat strange circumstances. The Metsimaholo coalition collapsed after the SACP had misled voters in a by-election by claiming that their candidates were standing in opposition to the ANC, only to do a highly unethical about-turn after the election and hand their support to the ANC. The ANC thereby gained control of the municipality, even though 67% of the voters had voted against the party.

In Nelson Mandela Bay, the UDM – in contrast to elsewhere in the country – fell out with the DA, and then withdrew their support from the coalition. The opposition could well have remained in control if the then DA mayor, Athol Trollip, hadn’t flatly refused to co-operate with the EFF in that council. This was an unfortunate instance of personal political stupidity which cost the local DA dearly and delivered the hapless residents of Port Elizabeth into the hands of a coalition where the EFF (which the DA had excluded) now supports a dubious local UDM leader. This leader co-operates with the very ANC that over many years had brought the metro to the brink of collapse through corruption, wastage and common low-class thieving (summed up in the title of Chippy Olver’s in-depth study How to Steal a City: The Battle for Nelson Mandela Bay). The governing coalition had performed miracles in improving the situation, but within a year of the return of ANC-dominated municipal leadership the auditor-general’s report showed accurately and shockingly how the same mismanagement, corruption and self-enrichment had made a comeback. What a soul-destroying pity.

But because the coalitions didn’t make the voters aware of their successes, because the backlogs made it impossible to immediately duplicate the shining example of Cape Town, and because the various parties in the coalitions became seriously divided on all sorts of other policy matters, the coalition governments did not provide enough voters with a reason to stop supporting the ANC. In 2019 the ANC achieved better results in Tshwane, Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay than it had done in 2016, although in all three of those metros the party’s support is still below 50%.

Another reason why people keep voting for the ANC is that the party leader is no longer Jacob Zuma, but Cyril Ramaphosa. It is beyond doubt that Ramaphosa is an improvement on Zuma, even if it’s only because Zuma was a disaster, a disgrace and an embarrassment and just about anybody would have been an improvement on him. That sentiment that the ANC – as incompetent as they are – is at least on the mend (a sentiment that is in my view unfounded, but is a general feeling among many voters nonetheless) would have made many ANC voters think twice and decide they might just as well give the party another chance.

A further reason why people vote ANC despite the party’s shortcomings is that they are motivated by loyalty to and respect for the ANC’s incomparably proud history, stature and contribution to democratisation. In the same way that many people voted DA in 2019, and will undoubtedly do so again enthusiastically because of the DA’s track record and liberal, non-racial grounding despite its inept and alienating behaviour in the 2019 election, people will vote ANC because their blood is green as much as the blood of many DA voters is blue. This is not knee-jerk loyalty – to them, at the core and despite shortcomings, it is still the best option.

In this regard, anyone will have to concede that although the ANC isn’t exactly an inspiring model of integrity, the ruling party’s retention of power in 2019 was undoubtedly assisted by the pathetic internal defects that characterised the opposition parties. Firstly, as has already been explained, the opposition parties have to team up to unseat the ANC nationally or in any province apart from the Western Cape. But since 2016 the opposition has largely lost that common vision and that strategic leadership of a post-ideological, magnanimous cooperation agreement in aid of clean governance, better financial management and better service delivery. The lazy answer is that Zuma is no longer there as a common enemy. The fact that this is such a general answer is a disappointing reflection of the level of general political discourse and analysis in our country, because it’s rubbish. There are several reasons why the opposition was unable to work together in 2019 as they had done in 2016. The biggest of these is the self-importance, unpleasantness and hot-headedness of the DA’s strategic brains trust (currently, clearly no longer as brainy as before, or in hibernation), which is loath to give coalition partners opportunities and recognition in government, and in fact chased away the parties that had been so willing to co-operate with them despite their all-too-often insulting manner and totally unjustified superciliousness. This important phenomenon is discussed in more detail in the chapter that looks at what is wrong with the DA.

Not only was the ANC boosted by the decay in the united opposition front, but the situation within most of the big opposition parties was also so unappealing that it didn’t inspire doubting ANC voters with an urge to switch to the opposition. At times it almost seemed as if the DA, with their lack of direction and their spitefulness, wanted to give people reasons not to vote for them. This would have encouraged many ANC voters to keep voting ANC instead. That so many DA voters refused to put such unattractive messiness above the deeper and strictly positive principles of constitutionality, nation building, non-racialism, reconciliation and clean governance probably says more about the positivity of the DA voters than it does about the DA itself.

The EFF’s strengths caused their support to grow, but they, too, have failings that make it harder for them to woo away ANC voters. Firstly, many people find their frequently uncouth behaviour and sowing of racial division totally unacceptable. Secondly, their economic and land policies especially are too extreme for many people. In the many countries where such policies were adopted, they invariably not only failed but also led to disaster, collapse and misery. Thirdly, the EFF and some of its top leaders have a number of giant question marks over them in respect of alleged and sometimes proven corruption and other morally dubious behaviour. A few examples in this regard are the On-Point tender fraud, accepting donations of large sums of money from the likes of alleged tobacco smuggler Adriano Mazzotti and, last but not least, the VBS debacle. The IFP has been experiencing an upsurge on every level in the past few years, and in 2019 the party, for the first time in 25 years, undoubtedly took KwaZulu-Natal votes away from the ANC in a national and provincial election. It did the same in the 2016 municipal election, and is in better shape as far as the present as well as the future is concerned. The other noteworthy parties are really just limited niche parties that don’t have a big influence on the ANC’s support levels. The FF Plus in particular probably has no effect whatsoever on their support.

So there are many reasons why people still vote for the ANC, despite the party’s serious failings. It’s not simply an uninformed or mindless vote cast out of habit. But the general trend in ANC support seems downward, as shown by the figures at the beginning of this chapter. The number of people who keep voting ANC is falling, and the ANC’s position has generally weakened. Unless the ANC urgently and noticeably improves its shockingly deteriorating behaviour, people will stop voting for it and the party will probably go down the same ignominious road of collapse as the NNP, for many of the same reasons.