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What is wrong with the DA?

THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTION saw the Democratic Alliance (DA), South Africa’s second-largest and by far its most multiracial party, losing support and seats for the first time in its existence of nineteen years and seven elections.

The party slipped nationally from 22,3% support and 4 091 584 votes in 2014 to 20,8% and 3 621 188 votes in 2019. Consequently, the DA’s number of seats in the National Assembly dropped from 89 to 84. On top of that, the DA lost its position as the official opposition in two provinces, Mpumalanga (to the EFF) and KwaZulu-Natal (to the IFP), and failed to meet its objectives of pushing the ANC down to below 50% support in Gauteng (by a whisker) and the Northern Cape (by a country mile).

How did this happen, is the decline a lasting trend, and what does the future hold for the DA?

The DA is the only party that attracts significant support from all South African population groups. Interestingly, the party’s Coloured and Indian support, as well as its support among white English speakers, largely remained stable at the previously high levels. In fact, the Indian and white English-speaking support remained the same to an astonishing extent from voting station to voting station, but the Coloured vote in the Western Cape in particular and specifically on the Cape Flats shifted around considerably, with the ACDP and Good (Patricia de Lille’s new party) increasing their share of the Coloured vote – Good, as a new party, naturally off a zero base. The shift of Coloured votes was quite complicated, but the big loser there was the ANC, not the DA.

The DA’s black support, despite mammoth efforts to expand it, also remained largely unchanged, although in many instances it manifested itself in totally different places than had been the case before (more about this interesting and unusual trend a bit later). The difference was that the party’s support from white Afrikaans-speaking voters declined dramatically, specifically in Gauteng and parts of the North West. That support mainly went to the FF Plus, and while it stands to reason that it is impossible to prove whether it is really such a neat sum, it comes as no surprise that the number of seats lost by the DA and those gained by the FF Plus are almost identical.

But before we examine those white Afrikaans speakers’ votes, let’s look at what is happening with the black DA vote. It is quite a strange story. As has been noted, the DA’s share of black voter support remained more or less the same, but especially outside the Western Cape it occurred in random spots, totally different from those of 2014. In many cases the party failed to hold on to black support in areas where the DA had shown encouraging growth in 2014, while new manifestations of significant black growth cropped up in completely different places without any clear geographic pattern.

I sought insight into this phenomenon from DA veterans. They didn’t find it surprising. Their explanation was that the DA’s black support depends to a large extent on individual strong black DA leaders in specific communities; the support follows the leader, and when the leader moves on to another area, the support will again crop up there, or in new places where new strong black leaders join the DA. Hence it is more to do with support of an individual than of a party, with the individual leaders and the party using one another in practice (of course not formally) to canvass support – quite often an opportunistic relationship of a transient nature. So the DA support flares up in certain places, sometimes dies down to a few embers, and then emerges again elsewhere.

This erratic pattern is of course far from desirable for the DA, and it is interesting to explore the difference in places where the DA’s black support is more stable and lasting. A good example is Kayamandi, the predominantly Xhosa-speaking township on the outskirts of Stellenbosch, where the DA’s figures have been increasing slowly but steadily. One of the main reasons for this is the continuous constructive involvement of the Stellenbosch DA in poverty alleviation in Kayamandi. It is not a project here and there before elections that makes the difference, but the knowledge among a growing number of residents that the party helps them keep the wolf from the door.

This isn’t really the usual role of a political party elsewhere, but such community involvement is what is required in South Africa to draw sustained voter support. The political party needs to be present on the ground and to be part of the community, all the time and with conviction. This may be more true in South Africa, but the principle actually applies worldwide. It is known as constituency work, and it is how elections are won – in between elections, not at election time. And it’s not news to the DA. Years ago the party’s former chief strategist Ryan Coetzee already confirmed this with thorough research, and concluded aptly that a councillor shouldn’t just be like a fire engine that comes swooping in with bells clanging after the crisis has already arisen. The councillor should be on the ground and involved all the time.

This is what the DA manages to do well specifically in the Coloured community and the white English-speaking community – the party’s public representatives are truly community leaders, people know who their councillor is and they make that councillor work for them, which is how it is supposed to be. Time and again it is reported in Die Son, the most popular daily among Coloured Afrikaans speakers in the Western Cape, that a family in crisis ‘contacted the councillor’ for assistance, for instance to rush a critically ill child to hospital. My favourite councillor in the country is Maude Goliath from Malmesbury in the Western Cape, who is deputy mayor of the Swartland municipality. For the beloved Auntie Maude, as everyone in her ward knows her, councillorship is a calling. A resident of the ward, the journalist Johann Maarman, is fond of recounting that on days the refuse truck fails to arrive, Auntie Maude drives from door to door in her car and transports the rubbish to the waste disposal site herself. This is but one example of how she serves her community. In my view, she is a model for all municipal councillors.

The DA often also manages to do this successfully at council level in other communities, including predominantly white communities in rural and suburban areas. For several of my friends and relatives, the local DA ward councillor’s WhatsApp group is the quickest source of community news, and people participate in it energetically. It depends a lot on the quality of the councillor, and an outstanding councillor is an asset to any party. Accordingly, in the 2019 elections the DA fared relatively well in many places countrywide where the DA councillor is particularly good. But this is not an absolute rule – the political dynamics of some places make it tough going for a councillor whose party in the first place strives after reconciliation, non-racialism and strict governance. Besides, by 2019 the constant bickering at provincial, national and leadership level in the DA had reached a point where even the most service-oriented local DA representative had to work much harder to convince his or her voters that the DA was still the party of professionalism, reconciliation, good governance and excellence.

As noted earlier, this was more of a problem for white Afrikaans-speaking and black voters than for voters in other communities, so let’s focus on those two electorates. I don’t profess to be much of an expert on the DA’s showing among black voters. In brief, however, as far as I could establish from feedback from DA leaders and news coverage of black township voters from print, electronic and social media sources, as well as anecdotal feedback from black friends and acquaintances, the reasons why the DA failed to reach their envisaged growth in black communities are all too familiar. The biggest challenge is that the DA indeed does reasonably well among the urban black middle class in particular, but has failed to make even modest inroads among poor black voters in rural areas and specifically in tribal areas, and has also not made much headway among black township voters. We have already looked at the phenomenon of individual local black leaders that cause DA support to flare up or wane, and at the necessity of sustained community involvement rather than the fire-engine model, but the DA’s lack of growth among blacks is actually attributable to a much more extensive cause and one that cannot easily be changed.

In a nutshell, poor black voters don’t see the DA as a party that primarily cares about them. The perception is that the DA is not in principle indifferent or opposed to poor black voters’ interests and problems, which is the perception they harbour of the FF Plus, but that the DA puts the interests of minorities and the middle class above those of poor blacks. This perception is reinforced by the fact that DA councillors almost exclusively represent wards that are made up of minority areas (like Coloured and Indian population centres), middle-class areas and, in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Northern Cape, rural areas where black people don’t form a majority. Since there is competition for limited municipal resources, any councillor worth their salt would do their best to ensure as much expenditure and development as possible for the ward they represent. This inevitably pits the DA ward councillor against the interests of the poor, black ward, usually represented by the ANC.

Moreover, the DA struggles to communicate with poor black voters in a way that resonates with them. Besides DA leaders from minority groups, this also applies to many of the DA’s black leadership figures at the national level in particular, who generally represent middle-class rather than township or rural sentiment, and who tend to speak English in public – mostly without an accent of an indigenous language. Many of the younger black DA leaders attended former Model C schools and studied at the best local (or international) universities. None of these aspects are without considerable advantages. The disadvantage, however, is that poor black South Africans frequently report that they find it hard to identify with DA leaders, and also believe that DA leaders don’t really identify with them in the poverty-stricken reality of their lives. In addition, the DA’s generally laudable emphasis on merit, competence and qualifications in the appointment of candidates unintentionally acts as a definite barrier and even a ceiling to the advancement of community leaders who may have low educational levels and lack qualifications. The points outlined in this paragraph are extremely tough issues to tackle because they carry with them so many shadows and echoes of South Africa’s history.

I don’t want to delve too deeply into this aspect, but something that comes across as jarring is that during speeches at its mass rallies, the DA has people who shout interjections in support of the speaker over the sound system in an organised fashion. Because of the nature of my job I have probably attended hundreds of political rallies of all kinds and of every conceivable party at every conceivable place in this country, but I have never encountered this annoying, alienating and frankly impolite practice in any community. One wonders where the DA got it from.

A further challenge for DA growth among black voters is that the DA has lost its position as the only big countrywide alternative to the ANC. The EFF has grown to such an extent that the DA is no longer the inevitable recipient of disgruntled black votes.

Lastly, the DA as a party that stands for strict governance tends to clash more directly with voters when they battle to pay for services such as electricity. In this regard the DA is undoubtedly right, and it is the ANC that, in addition to mismanagement, corruption and the deployment of under-qualified cadres, is also largely responsible through lax discipline for the collapse and bankruptcy of municipalities due to the culture of non-payment. That strict governance costs the DA support in poor areas is undeniably true, albeit at a price any proper government must be willing to pay.

For the DA to grow its poor black support, the party therefore needs to be fully present and empathic. It has to attract and retain poor black community leaders who truly represent the party’s values and policies and enjoy popular support, and make sure that they prioritise the wellbeing of those poor communities. The party may also have to accept that some voters who do not feel strongly about the reckless and populist squandering of public assets should not really be voting for the DA. The DA will also have to communicate in a comfortable, authentic and friendly way in the language and language variant of the voter’s preference in order to win and to retain such a person’s vote.

A big ask, certainly, but no one said it would be easy.

An equally important task for the DA is to figure out what is wrong with the party to have caused about 250 000 of its white Afrikaans-speaking voters to turn to the FF Plus in 2019. This is where the party’s decline lay, and without a precise, honest plan to appeal in particular to the kind of white Afrikaans voter who defected to the FF Plus, the loss of support and seats won’t be reversed. Judging by those voters’ comments in the formal media and on social media, the switch from the DA to the FF Plus was often accompanied by a measure of aggression and bitterness towards the DA.

It is firstly important to realise that the vast majority of white Afrikaans voters already vote for the DA, and that in its attempts to win back the lost voters, the DA has to guard against throwing out the baby with the bathwater. The DA should always be the party of racial reconciliation. It won’t do any good if the DA tries to out-FF Plus the FF Plus – not that there is much likelihood of this happening. The FF Plus has a hard core of right-wing voters, and they don’t belong in the DA. For the DA, the focus should fall on those former DA voters who subscribe to the ideals of reconciliation and non-racialism, but didn’t see themselves, their aspirations and their fears reflected in the DA’s behaviour and campaign in the lead-up to the 2019 elections.

In the chapter that deals with where the FF Plus votes come from, we shall consider in detail how the DA’s behaviour drove some voters into the arms of the FF Plus. Hence we won’t explore it extensively here as well but, to sum up, it centred on six issues in particular: the Nick Mallett–Ashwin Willemse incident, the Patricia de Lille saga, the Gauteng DA’s handling of Panyaza Lesufi, the Hoërskool Overvaal events, the controversy at Schweizer-Reneke, and the hullabaloo around MultiChoice, Steve Hofmeyr and the Ghoema music awards.

The common denominator in all these matters is that the DA dealt with them in such a poor, rushed and ill-considered manner that the party alienated some of its white Afrikaans supporters. On top of that, in all of the cases the negative consequences were unnecessary and avoidable. A few proactive steps could lead to huge improvements.

In the first place, language is important to Afrikaans-speaking people, and specifically the need to be addressed in Afrikaans. Former president Nelson Mandela understood this well when he said that when you speak to Afrikaans people in Afrikaans, you go straight to their hearts. If the DA wishes to regain its lost Afrikaans voters, it will be worth the party’s while to also issue its press statements in Afrikaans, to have its public representatives attend significant Afrikaans cultural events, and to regularly let its Afrikaans-speaking public representatives (but also others, and the party leader in particular) communicate properly and coherently in Afrikaans, at public appearances and on social media. And I don’t mean just a greeting or an occasional throwaway sentence. I mean the proper formulation of a well-thought-out argument. Public representatives of the DA who write comfortably in Afrikaans can, for example, communicate bilingually on social media with their non-racial circle of friends, many of whom may be unable to understand Afrikaans. One of the DA’s national spokespersons should also be able to express himself or herself in excellent Afrikaans, and be a mother-tongue speaker of the language. That is, if the DA is serious about recapturing those lost Afrikaans votes and wants to prevent the loss of more such votes in the future. One can rightly ask: is the DA serious about Afrikaans?

Secondly, the DA is in need of a more likeable or at least agreeable image, and the easiest way to achieve this is to become a more likeable party – a group that acts in a genial and good-natured manner towards themselves and others. At present the image of the DA is that of a speed cop. You know that speed cops enforce the law, that they fulfil a necessary role and prevent deaths and injuries, but you’re never happy to see a speed cop, and few people want to become one. It is to the DA’s credit that it is the only party that tackles ANC corruption effectively, and it has many other positive aspects, as we will see below. But something of the speed cop mentality vis-à-vis the ANC has rubbed off on their general attitude and their internal dynamics. It is extremely unappealing to be confronted with a political party that is always fighting, especially with itself. It creates the impression of a limited upbringing and class, a lack of social graces and, above all, a lack of gravitas. Decency costs nothing, and the attractiveness of good manners comes naturally to anyone who has been raised properly. Afrikaans-speaking voters of all races have the need to feel at home in their party in every sense – something I think may be less of a need on the part of white English speakers, for instance. If the DA wants to remain the home of the vast majority of Afrikaans people, there has to be an observable pursuit of decency in the party. This also applies to the handling of the six Afrikaner issues, mentioned above, that specifically caused voters to stream to the FF Plus. The DA can offer strong and well-considered (rather than overhasty) leadership with calm, expert advice and reconciliatory solutions that will distinguish the party from the ANC, the EFF and the FF Plus.

The speed cop mentality among some in the DA reached a nadir with the Patricia de Lille debacle. Let’s face it: like most of us, Auntie Pat – the former Western Cape DA leader and mayor of Cape Town – is no angel; she is a human being. But there are many people within the DA as well as supporters of the party, and they are often Afrikaans speakers, who reckon the DA went overboard in its treatment of her. Ultimately, after all kinds of public accusations from within the DA that she had been corrupt and had enriched herself were proven to be false and came to nothing, it boiled down to her having apparently sent an SMS telling councillors who had to decide on the matter, who she wanted as city manager, and that they had to vote for him. While this was undoubtedly wrong behaviour on the part of De Lille, there are many who believe this wasn’t the end of the world and that a public reprimand together with a warning would have been sufficient punishment. Finally, however, she had had enough of fighting and resigned to establish her own party, Good. De Lille as well as her thousands of supporters is the DA’s loss. The DA has to ask itself whether internal disputes cannot be handled better.

Apropos of the speed cop mentality, it is simply astounding how readily DA parliamentarians in particular become embroiled in squalid mudslinging matches with other people and even with each other on social media, mostly without first contacting the other person privately and verifying the facts. If there is something about modern life that boggles my mind, it’s the consuming urge of some people to parade their entire lives on social media. Mrs Mora van Zyl, an ex-teacher of mine, used to have a big notice at the front of her classroom with the message ‘Just think again …’. This is good advice for all of us, especially as far as email and social media are concerned. You don’t always have to react first. You need to react wisely and in a solution-oriented manner. Because politicians are no angels, the DA, if they wish to tackle this chink in their armour, need to introduce clear, strict rules with regard to conduct on social media in particular, with specific penalties. The problem obviously won’t solve itself.

Thirdly, it is now really high time that the DA publishes proper policy on government issues, as befits an official opposition. The finalisation of some policy proposals, particularly about contentious issues, has been dragging on for years. One could see the evidence of this lack of direction in the DA’s posters for the 2019 elections. What exactly does ‘Fair access to jobs’ or ‘One South Africa for all’ mean? No, I don’t know either. With properly defined policy options, proper discipline can put a stop to contradictory pronouncements. But what proper policy amounts to, and what requires leadership, is that there should not only be policy options but that certain options should be explicitly excluded. Many people are of the opinion – and the Sunday paper Rapport pertinently warned the party about this in an editorial – that the DA’s obsession with garnering as many votes as possible to unseat the ANC as government means they don’t want to alienate any voters and therefore don’t exclude any policy options. Well, they will just have to bite the bullet; in politics, if you try to be all things to all people, you’ll soon be nothing to anyone.

One of the issues the DA urgently needs to clarify in the interest of its Afrikaans-speaking supporters of all races is the party’s stance on language in education. And it’s really not so difficult, because the Constitution makes the situation crystal clear. If the DA were to actively, and in a reconciliatory way, live up to the clearly defined provisions in the Constitution and the South African Schools Act, a large part of its Afrikaans problem would already be solved. But that would require the party’s spokespersons on education, particularly in Gauteng, to acquaint themselves thoroughly with the Constitution and the South African Schools Act, specifically as far as language as the medium of instruction in schools is concerned. Once again: is the DA serious about this?

Fourthly – and it’s the same as what we have said already about black voters – if the DA wants white Afrikaans voters to care about the party, the DA should be demonstrably and continuously involved in the everyday lives of white Afrikaans voters. There are many white Afrikaans people who – rightly or wrongly – feel excluded and targeted in South African society. As a reader put it recently in a letter to the Sunday Times, under the previous dispensation in South Africa it was a sin to be black. So is it now a sin to be white? he asks. In short, Afrikaans people want to feel at home and that they belong. Of course, caring in particular about one grouping in no way has to mean that that group will be advantaged above another, or that anyone will be neglected.

Fifthly, there is the serious and notable trend that more and more white and Coloured Afrikaans speakers feel physically threatened by crime. Among the rich and the middle class, it is theft and robbery in particular – which may lead to other crimes such as assault, rape and murder – that strike fear into people’s hearts. Among the working class, it is specifically gang violence that fans terror. Part of the problem is the almost total lack of political will and capacity on the part of the ANC government to resolve it. This leaves the DA a gap to organise community policing in DA wards as a sign of empathy and as a practical contribution to the resolution of the problem. The other crime issue that affects white Afrikaans speakers in particular emotionally is farm murders. If the DA wants to prevent and reverse the defection of some of its Afrikaner voters, the party should, as a top priority, show empathy and, secondly, come up with a community-driven solution for farm murders.

If the DA sticks to the same path it has been on, its trajectory won’t change. One of the country’s senior journalists I admire the most told me in 2019 that ‘the DA holds the ideal of a non-racial South African constitutional democracy in its hands’. This is a huge honour and responsibility, if that observation is correct. For its supporters, the DA is the only party that offers a practical alternative to the ANC – a way to govern the country better and more honestly for the good of everyone regardless of race, language, gender, belief or origin. It is the millions of people that view the DA in this light who would hope the party pulls itself together with practical policy decisions and behavioural change – for the good of South Africa as a whole.