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Introduction

It was the early apologist Tertullian who uttered the famous words, “What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?”1 He penned those words in the context of opposing all attempts which he saw as muddying the waters of Christianity through an unstable hybrid of Greek philosophy and the gospel. Van Til certainly acknowledged an appreciation for his emphasis on the distinction between believing and unbelieving thought.2 Not surprisingly, the sole formal festschrift for Van Til bears the very title, Jerusalem and Athens.3 The title of the present chapter points us in a different direction, though the underlying issues associated with it remain.

What does Van Til have to do with hermeneutics? Taking a cursory glance at his body of work, one will find only one book directly devoted to the issue of hermeneutics—The New Hermeneutic.4 Yet, this work, while dealing with the new hermeneutic of Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling in particular (among others), will perhaps disappoint those looking for a more direct and extensive treatment of the hermeneutical issues raised—at least according to the standards of more contemporary work in the field.5 For example, Gadamer, who many consider a giant in philosophical hermeneutics, is given a mere seven page treatment, largely taken up with his philosophical influences (R. G. Collingwood in particular).6 Gadamer is seen not as an innovator, but as merely being symptomatic of deeper philosophical undercurrents—hence, his brief treatment. Van Til’s treatment takes on much of the same form and tenor of his forays into the field of apologetics. These forays demonstrate his characteristic presuppositional/transcendental method. In short, Van Til argued for the truth of Christianity from the impossibility of the contrary.7 The only “proof” for the Christian position is that unless its truth is presupposed, there is no possibility of proving anything at all.8 God himself is the source of possibility, intelligibility, and applicability.9 Van Til remarks elsewhere that “unless one offers at the outset the totality interpretation of all reality as given in Scripture as the presupposition of the possibility of asking any intelligent question, one has not really offered the Christian position for what it is.”10 In spite of appearances, Van Til appeals to an inner-logic in his evaluation of the philosophical currents active in and around the new hermeneutic. His assessment reveals a different emphasis, if not an expected one. Writing about his general presuppositional approach, he says: “to argue by presupposition is to indicate what are the epistemological and metaphysical principles that underlie and control one’s own method.”11 Clearly, he is engaging in this type of argumentation in the New Hermeneutic. Rather than arguing according to the emphases as dictated by hermeneutical philosophy, it is primarily the doctrine of God which drives his critique of such figures as Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and the new hermeneutic.

Macro-Hermeneutics

Van Til, while directing his attention elsewhere in terms of apologetic method, often makes macro-hermeneutical12 assertions throughout his works which have potentially vast implications for biblical interpretation. However, many of these implications are left unnoticed and undeveloped.

Consider the following cross-section of statements scattered throughout Van Til’s works. First, in introducing the doctrine of God for his theology and apologetic method, he emphasizes that who God is precedes that God is.13 In other words, we must know something of the nature of God in order to discuss and reason concerning his existence in the proper manner.14 Hence, who God has revealed himself to be must necessarily affect how we think about him (i.e., ontology informs epistemology).15 Van Til argues that:

Christianity offers the triune God, the absolute personality,16 containing all the attributes enumerated . . . the conception of God is the foundation of everything else we hold dear . . . For us everything depends for its meaning upon this sort of God.17

All our interpretive efforts are ultimately rooted in our notion of the nature of God.18

Second, he often emphasizes God’s pre-interpretation of all created things as they exist in the plan of God. Consider the following statement in his discussion of God’s omniscience:

God’s knowledge of the facts19 comes first. God knows or interprets the facts before they are facts. It is God’s plan or his comprehensive interpretation of the facts that makes the facts what they are.20

The category of interpretation precedes existence. In other words, for God, interpretation precedes creation. The reality of God’s pre-interpretation of all things necessarily makes man’s interpretation, “correspond to the interpretation of God . . . our thought is receptively reconstructive” of God’s thoughts (to be correct).21 “God is the ultimate category of interpretation.”22 Man’s interpretation is a response to God’s pre-interpretation. Indeed, the Bible needs to be interpreted by man, yet only with divine enablement (Holy Spirit) and according to divine pre-interpretation. Elsewhere, Van Til expresses this principle in terms of the self-attesting Christ—“In all things, and in every field, man must live by the previous interpretation of Christ as God . . . The self-attesting Christ is the presupposition of all intelligible predication.”23 In the words of Bahnsen, “According to Van Til only Christ can testify to himself and interpret His acts and words.”24 Since the fall, there are essentially two opposing interpretive principles at work:

The Christian principle of interpretation is based upon the assumption of God as the final and self-contained reference point. The non-Christian principle of interpretation is that man as self-contained is the final reference point.25

Human autonomy “distorts the doctrine of Scripture itself by finding the ultimate exegetical tool in the subjective experience of human freedom” rather than acknowledging the authority of Scripture and the Holy Spirit to confront the souls of men.26 The real issue is whether sinful man will recognize and submit to God’s pre-interpretation as original or not.

Third, he often speaks of the nature of Scripture in the very terms he uses to describe the nature of God. Rather than seeking a general concept of revelation from which to reason back to God, “When we seek to determine the nature of the Christian-theistic concept of revelation we turn again to our concept of God.”27 With a view to special revelation, for instance, he relates the self-attesting nature of Scripture to “the self-sufficient and self-explanatory character of the Triune God.”28 When setting forth a distinctively Christian epistemology concerning the necessity of Scripture for illuminating both the object and subject of knowledge, he states that:

. . . the concepts of an absolute God, an absolute Bible, and absolute regeneration go together. The concept of absolute Scripture as a necessity for the illumination of the object of knowledge and of the subject of knowledge go together.29

Tied to the absolute nature of both God and the Bible is the absolute authority with which God speaks to us in and through Scripture. Van Til is quick to point out that dealing with an absolute authority necessarily involves circular or spiral reasoning on man’s part.30 Interestingly, this creates a situation which parallels discussion in contemporary hermeneutics concerning the hermeneutical spiral and the nature of reading and interpretation as a dialogue. In terms of the subject-object relationship (another key issue in hermeneutics), Van Til observes that since nothing has “existence and meaning independently of God, it is impossible to think of the object and subject standing in fruitful relation to one another that they actually do unless God is back of them both.”31 In another place, he addresses the issue of allowing men to interpret “facts” without God as the Achilles’ heel in apologetics, and argues to the contrary:

The real issue is whether God exists as self-contained,32 whether therefore the world runs according to his plan, and whether God has confronted those who would frustrate the realization of that plan with a self-contained interpretation of that plan. The fact that Christians . . . can never do more than restate the given self-contained interpretation of that plan approximately does not correlativize that plan itself or the interpretation of that plan . . . the self-contained circle of the ontological trinity is not broken up by the fact that there is an economical relation of this triune God with respect to man. No more is the self-contained character of Scripture broken up by the fact that there is an economy of transmission and acceptance of the word of God it contains.33

I will address particular emphases exhibited in this lengthy quote in later chapters, but at this point it is sufficient to highlight how Van Til speaks of God, Scripture, and God’s interpretation almost seamlessly, with a view to their unique shared quality of complete self-sufficiency, even as they come into contact with man and man’s interpretation. At the same time, he maintained a nuanced understanding of the unity and interplay between general and special revelation, both being revelation of the same God:

it is, according to Scripture itself, the same God who reveals himself in nature and in grace . . . revelation in nature and revelation in Scripture are mutually meaningless without one another and mutually fruitful when taken together.34

For Van Til, both general and special revelation exhibit corresponding qualities of: necessity, authority, sufficiency, and perspicuity.35 As far as special revelation is concerned, these attributes are so important that if any were missing, we would have none of them. “The whole matter centers on an absolutely true interpretation that came into a world full of false interpretation.”36 A genuinely Christian philosophy of history must not only recognize a distinction between the two (general and special), but also must not separate them. Indeed, history is not properly self-interpreting but, rather, needs special revelation (even more so, since the fall) in order to complement and interpret it. Again, he explicitly ties these corresponding attributes of general and special revelation to the nature of God who reveals both.37 God is self-interpreting and so is Scripture.38 If Scripture was dependent upon any other principle for its own interpretation, then it would not be ultimately authoritative. Likewise, if God were dependent on anyone or anything other than himself for his own self-explanation, he would cease to be the ultimate authority.

Fourth, Van Til often speaks of the necessity of Scripture after the fall,39 with a view to redemptive history. Consider the following statement:

no valid interpretation of any fact can be carried on except upon the basis of the authoritative thought communication to man of God’s final purposes in Scripture, as this Scripture sets forth in final form the redemptive work of Christ. Every fact must be interpreted Christologically.40

In particular, he presupposes the storyline of Scripture as the context for understanding its message as a whole, implying that this message functions as an interpretive lens through which fallen man must view interpretation in general. Interpretation must be exercised in light of the telos of the redemptive-historical message of Scripture.41 He urges that “Scripture must be interpreted in analogy with Scripture itself . . . all interpretation must be subordinated to Scripture as a whole.”42 In response to an essay by Richard Gaffin on the hermeneutical value of Vos’ The Pauline Eschatology, he says that after receiving revelation from God, man must submit all his reasoning “at every point to the teleology of Scripture.”43 Moreover, opposing the claim of Howard Roelofs and Jesse De Boer that the facts and redemptive-historical interpretation recorded in Scripture are inherently ambiguous pointers to the Christ, Van Til affirms that “Scripture gives an infallible interpretation of the events it records.”44 In the same context, he makes reference to the “interpretation found in the canon of the Old and New Testaments,” which men (like Roelofs) wrongly seek to stand above and judge by the criterion of their own reason.45 This speaks of a distinct canonical awareness in Van Til’s interpretive approach.

Fifth, he emphasized the exhaustively personal and covenantal environment in which man exists and interprets.46 Likewise, God’s revelation, both general and special, is exhaustively personal and covenantal.47 As we shall see later, this idea is rooted in his doctrine of the Trinity, in which the three persons are covenantally related.48 However, for now, consider the implications for biblical interpretation. For example, Van Til insists that “covenant theology furnishes the only completely personalistic interpretation of reality.”49 This means that a biblical ontology is ultimately personal and covenantal—and must inform one’s epistemological approach to interpreting Scripture. Hence, reflecting the Trinity, theology and hermeneutics are inherently ethical activities. Either one interprets as a covenant keeper or as a covenant breaker in relation to the triune Creator.50 All of this resonates with issues in contemporary hermeneutics which center on whether the reader has an ethical obligation to the original author,51 and if so, what is the nature of that obligation?

Lastly, and closely related to the previous category of statements, there is a persistent concern in Van Til’s writings that men must submit to the pre-interpreted word of God or else it will only mean what they want it to mean.52 He vividly brings this point home when discussing the room left open for human autonomy in the hermeneutics of Bultmann, Fuchs, and Ebeling. Ultimately, these theologians, regardless of their particular emphases, are “following the example of Adam . . . modern theologians demythologize the voice of God and reduce it to ventriloquism.”53 It is clear that his concern parallels that of many contemporary evangelicals in response to postmodern trends in hermeneutics.54

Many more statements like these, appearing in various apologetic contexts, could be added to the list. However, my immediate concern here is not to be exhaustive but, rather, suggestive of macro-hermeneutical trajectories in his thought. As the above quotations show, Van Til repeatedly made reference to the concepts of meaning and interpretation in his writings, albeit in ways uncommon to most contemporary treatments.

Hermeneutical Response to Van Til

The general hermeneutical response to Van Til’s ideas has been lackluster to say the least. He has either received decidedly short and mixed reviews among some scholars, or from others, no review at all. Most fall into the latter category. In what follows, we will mention how Van Til has been spoken of and attempt to provide a succinct evaluation and response. Our aim here is not to be exhaustive, but to paint a picture in broad but accurate strokes.

First, let us consider a few examples of those who bring Van Til’s name up in hermeneutic discussion, yet are quick to dismiss his relevance for one reason or another. At the outset of his seminal work, The Two Horizons, Anthony C. Thiselton seeks to defuse possible objections to his explicitly philosophical approach to hermeneutics. He argues that such an approach is fitting due to the wider issues that have become part of the hermeneutical discussion.55 Curiously, after helpfully providing examples of this significant shift, he singles out Van Til as one who would oppose “any attempts” at such an endeavor. While agreeing that Christian revelation must have preeminence for all aspects of life, Thiselton warns against rejecting philosophical categories (apparently including Van Til as a proponent of such a view) in New Testament interpretation.56 He argues that to borrow certain conceptual tools from philosophy does not necessarily entail a subscription to a philosopher’s particular worldview.57

In response to Thiselton, it would seem that his fears, though understandable, are ultimately unfounded. Even a cursory glance at Van Til’s writings reveals a thorough working knowledge of philosophical categories and actual use of many “conceptual tools,” as Thiselton calls them. In particular, Van Til borrows largely from idealism in service of his theological formulation—e.g., concrete universal, limiting concept, implication, and linear inference.58 One example of a philosophical emphasis found in idealism which he found to be particularly helpful was that there needs to be comprehensive knowledge somewhere for there to be any true (partial) knowledge anywhere.59 He even articulates an interesting corollary to this thought related to the issue of dialogue between God and man in discussing the thought of Martin Buber: “One cannot find signs of God’s address to man anywhere unless one finds them everywhere and unless one finds them as controlling the whole of history from its very beginning.”60 To be sure, Van Til self-consciously re-defined such terms and concepts on the basis of a Christian worldview, but if anything, he sought tirelessly after a comprehensive Christian philosophy, covering the same ground as any nuanced secular system in terms of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.61 After all, in order to challenge unbelief at every point where it is found and function consistently with the precedent set in Scripture (1 Pet 3:15; 2 Cor 10:5), the apologetic method must address all legitimate categories. He even defined apologetics in the following manner, “the vindication of the Christian philosophy of life against the various forms of the non-Christian philosophy of life.”62 He argued that due to the comprehensive nature of what is involved in stating and vindicating a Christian theology, one necessarily must state and defend an entire Christian philosophy.63 Van Til did emphasize the antithesis between Christian and non-Christian thought, yet not in a way which ignored conceptual tools but, rather, in a way that involved the very use of them. He explicitly states that it is not wrong to make formal use of categories of thought from any thinker.64 Van Til did not shy away from philosophy, even as he confronted it. Due to his extensive interaction and borrowing of philosophical terminology, he was often accused of following and endorsing those very schools he opposed. For example, he has been labeled by his critics as Kantian,65 an idealist,66 and a follower of Kierkegaard.67 This at least shows that he truly engaged philosophically with differing views, even to the point of being accused of following them.

In discussing the rise of postmodernism and its impact on the field of hermeneutics, D. A. Carson considers various Christian apologetic responses. He mentions Van Til as coming out of a form of the fideist school, which he associates with Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and more generally, with all forms of reformed foundationalism. He cites the classroom experience of John Cooper’s presuppositionalist attack on modernism as evidence of the practical futility of such an approach in a postmodern world. In short, Cooper’s impassioned focus on presuppositions is met by an unimpressed Paul Ricoeur, who merely asks Cooper to validate his own presuppositions.68 Carson goes on to say that in light of the unique challenges of postmodernism, standard apologetic approaches (e.g., evidentialism and presuppositionalism) “simply do not touch the committed deconstructionist.”69

What is ironic about Carson’s dismissal of the usefulness of Van Til’s approach is that he proceeds to articulate a number of reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of postmodernity which evoke certain Van Tillian emphases. For instance, he applauds postmodernity’s concern with modernism’s disregard for the finitude of man and the noetic effects of sin which distort data and make the data fit into our self-serving grids.70 Carson observes that both Christians and non-Christians are under the influence of their own interpretive communities.71 In addition, in the face of the new hermeneutic and deconstructionism, he insists that true knowledge of the meaning of the text and intent of the author is possible, even if exhaustive knowledge is not.72 Later, he highlights how often deconstructionists “insist on either absolute knowledge or complete relativism.”73 Van Til repeatedly made reference to this very point. He emphasized the limits of human knowledge in terms of the Creator-creature distinction.74 Without such limits, man either seeks to know everything or claims to know nothing. In the end, Carson wants to assume God’s existence from a Christian worldview and to “explore how God’s existence affects our understanding of understanding.”75 In doing so, he argues that from a Christian view of finitude there are valid insights to be appreciated from both modernity and postmodernity, yet is careful not to succumb to the worldview of either one.76 These points explicitly fall in line with Van Til’s primary concerns in apologetics.

There is another striking parallel between Carson’s emphases and that of Van Til regarding the doctrine of God. Even in his evaluation of Descartes’ epistemological influence in hermeneutics, Carson underscores that the Cartesian disjunction between subject and object stems from not taking God into account. A view which includes an omniscient God from the start would understand that from God’s view, “all human beings are ‘objects,’ and all their true knowing is but a subset of his knowing.”77 Elsewhere, he affirms the essential relationship between biblical theology and systematic theology and the fact that everyone assumes a systematic theology (a doctrine of God in particular) as they begin to employ any method of theology or use of critical tools in the process. All of this affects, among other things, what data is permitted and on what basis it is permitted, which is also tied to the issue of authority.78 In discussing the bible’s plot-line and the importance of interpreting Scripture according to a redemptive-historical framework, he highlights particular attributes of God—consciously following John Frame’s emphases:79 the Creator-creature distinction,80 God as absolute personality,81 and the Trinity, showing God to be inherently personal.82 The fundamental “I-thou” relationship is found in God himself.83 Citing Colin Gunton, he argues for pairing the ontological “otherness” of God to his “relationality.” God is both other than creation and in crucial relation to it at the same time.84 Granted, there is much overlap here between these emphases, but they are mentioned with a view to combating religious pluralism.

Three important observations can be made about Carson’s treatment. First, he brings the doctrine of God into an interpretive discussion, involving redemptive history and its contemporary hermeneutic relevance. Second, like Van Til, he argues that approaching Scripture depends on who God is.85 Third, his emphases happen to be very similar to those of Van Til,86 who also was interacting with and combating unbelieving philosophy and inconsistent methodology, albeit in the realm of apologetics. Perhaps, Carson may have some use for Van Til after all.

More recently, Kenton Sparks has brought Van Til’s name into his discussion concerning the relationship between hermeneutics and epistemology. He argues that there have been essentially two modern responses to postmodernism among evangelicals: presuppositionalism and the propositional approach.87 In each case, there is an epistemic optimism which outstrips both the pessimism of antirealism and the optimism of practical realism. “Practical realism,” which Sparks seems to endorse, is characterized by a postmodern awareness (e.g., value of tradition and limits of human knowledge) yet also by a guarded optimism.88 With regard to Presuppositionalism, especially of the Van Tillian variety, Sparks particularly objects to the notion that “the only healthy way to interpret anything is via a special hermeneutic that presupposes the truth of Christian belief.”89 He argues that epistemologically, presuppositionalists are “strong Cartesian foundationalists” in that they start with basic beliefs necessary to reach truth, which are supernatural gifts only available to Christians.90 In the end, he sees Van Til’s ideas as endorsing a view of interpretation in which God miraculously gives Christians success and that only they are able to provide the right interpretation.91

Though much could be said in response to Sparks’ accusations, I will restrict my comments to the following. Again, we have a mixture of misunderstanding and later endorsement of ideas which mirror Van Til’s own. As for misunderstanding his ideas, it will suffice to say that Sparks has completely ignored the basis for the epistemological ideas he cites—namely, Van Til’s two-level ontology (i.e., Creator-creature distinction). This is an integral aspect of his thought which cannot be missed. It is directly related to the idea of the need for comprehensive knowledge in order to have true partial knowledge. Without this grounding, Sparks understands Van Til as setting up an unstable rule by which man must decide between pure rationalism and pure irrationalism (i.e., either man knows all, or he knows nothing in reality). Ironically, this is Van Til’s persistent critique of all non-Christian epistemology, certainly not something he himself endorsed. In a footnote to the accusation of Cartesian foundationalism mentioned above, he faults Van Til for what he sees as an inconsistency in claiming that we must think God’s thoughts after himself, but that we must also think analogically.92 Sparks argues that these two are mutually exclusive ideas—either God tells us everything in order to think God’s thoughts after him or we think analogically, which means we approximate them but do not really think them.93 However, one need not look any further than the immediate context of the very passage that he cites (in favor of driving a wedge between true and analogical knowledge) for correction. Van Til states that:

The system that Christians seek to obtain may, by contrast, be said to be analogical. By this is meant that God is the original and that man is the derivative. God has absolute self-contained system within himself. What comes to pass in history happens in accord with that system or plan by which he orders the universe. But man, as God’s creature, cannot have a replica of that system of God. He cannot have a reproduction of that system. He must, to be sure, think God’s thoughts after him; but this means that he must, in seeking to form his own system, constantly be subject to the authority of God’s system to the extent that this is revealed to him.94 . . . If one does not make the human knowledge wholly dependent upon the original self-knowledge and consequent revelation of God to man, then man will have to seek knowledge within himself as the final reference point. Then he will have to seek an exhaustive understanding of reality. Then he will have to hold that if he cannot attain to such an exhaustive understanding of reality, he has no true knowledge at all. Either man must then know everything or he knows nothing. This is the dilemma that confronts every form of non-Christian epistemology.95

Sparks makes a glaring omission here. It is God alone who has comprehensive knowledge of creation—rooted in his exhaustive self-knowledge.96 This same God reveals truth to man in part, alleviating any instability in terms of man’s finite capacities. As for his contention that Van Til’s presuppositionalism leads to affirming that only Christians are able to provide the right interpretation, there seems to be an oversimplified straw man present. Van Til explicitly recognizes that “followers of the self-authenticating Christ always disclaim infallible interpretation.”97 Rather, only the self-authenticating Christ has the infallible interpretation as God. As for his comments citing a disregard in Van Til for what he calls general hermeneutics (i.e., interpretive practice, Christian or not),98 he displays a very superficial understanding of Van Til’s nuanced view of the unbeliever’s knowledge of God, general revelation, and common grace.99 Space will not permit an extensive treatment here but, in short, unbelievers cannot help knowing truth about God, being in the image of God and living in God’s world, and can arrive at truth, even if ultimately inconsistent with their own unbelieving commitments.

Not unlike Carson, Sparks ends up mirroring Van Til’s emphases later in his discussion. There are two particular examples in which this is seen. First, he argues that the fall narrative underscores the Creator-creature distinction. The Creator alone knows all and the creature does not. The serpent essentially tempted Adam and Eve to subvert this distinction, which has important implications for epistemology and hermeneutics.100 Indeed, the fall narrative functions significantly in Van Til’s works, as he sees this as the origin of all unbelieving epistemology, especially in light of the Creator-creature distinction.101 However, as Sparks nuances certain implications of the fall for epistemology, he also diverges from Van Til at certain key points.102 However, he at least sees the need to consider these issues in relation to epistemology and hence, interpretation. Second, he emphasizes that man, being in the image of God, has the ability to succeed as an interpreter. This seems to mirror Van Til’s notion of analogy, though again, not without its divergences.103 However, Sparks’ rightful concern for man’s ability to have interpretive success is plagued by confusing finitude with sin and rooting epistemology in the reliability and probability of man to get things right, even if imperfectly so. While Sparks exhibits obvious misconceptions regarding Van Til’s epistemology, he does show concern for issues he sees as having an important relation to hermeneutics, which mirror Van Til’s own.

Our brief survey of Thiselton, Carson, and Sparks’ interactions with Van Til has ironically highlighted his relevance for contemporary hermeneutics rather than providing reasons for his dismissal. Rather than succeeding in downplaying his relevance, each has actually opened the door for a further investigation into it.

There are others, however, who have seen the positive relevance of Van Til for hermeneutics and have explicitly mentioned him in their work. Rather than proceeding in a chronological fashion, we will begin with those who give indirect, passing attention and then progress to those who give more direct attention.

D. Clair Davis, in an essay on inerrancy and Westminster Calvinism, argues that Van Til brought a helpful shift in apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary, from focusing merely on detailed refutation of liberalism to a focus on the integrity of a Christian methodology. This is due to Van Til’s self-conscious aligning of method with theology—specifically, God as Creator.104 While no theological model can exhaust the revelation of the triune God, our model and method should seek to approximate God’s system set forth in Scripture. He specifically cites John Frame, Vern Poythress, Edmund Clowney, and Richard Gaffin as deriving from Van Til’s theological emphases and methodology, and expanding their application beyond his own scope, including hermeneutics. For example, Gaffin delves into Berkouwer’s criticism of Van Til’s lack of exegesis by providing explicit exegetical support for the latter’s emphases in epistemology, which have significant implications for interpretation.105 This coincides with the fact that while Princeton and Westminster’s focus was on the doctrine of Scripture, the current focus has become biblical hermeneutics. He suggests that Van Til would have welcomed this shift and applied his distinctive approach accordingly.106

Vanhoozer, a key contributor to the current hermeneutical discussion, mentions Van Til briefly in an essay on the interplay between theology and hermeneutics in interpreting not only the Bible, but culture.107 He apparently commends Van Til for stressing that “created reality does not exist as brute, uninterpreted fact . . . it is already meaningful because it is interpreted by God.”108 Hence, the task of the human interpreter is to “think God’s thoughts after him.”109 After such an endorsement, it is surprising that he makes no further mention of Van Til. This is even more peculiar as he proceeds to discuss such topics as presuppositions and conflicting worldviews, even concluding his discussion with the observation that “culture is the fruit of a theology or worldview.”110 Whatever the reasons for not giving Van Til a more prominent place in the dialogue,111 Vanhoozer does employ a few important ideas in Van Til’s thought in service of the interplay between theology and hermeneutics.112

Richard Pratt mentions Van Til when discussing the personal dimension of interpretation. Elsewhere, he more explicitly endorses Van Til’s approach to apologetics,113 but here, in this context, he is very brief.114 However, what he speaks of is significant. Earlier he had argued that sanctification and interpretation are interdependent.115 In the midst of that discussion, Pratt says that we must “‘think God’s thoughts after Him’ if we are to interpret properly.”116 In other words, sanctification involves not only our behavior and emotions, but our thinking as well.117 His direct mention of Van Til expands on this earlier reference in the form of a quotation summarizing the point that our whole being (mind, emotions, and will) must be in submission to God in a manner of consistency found in God himself.118 Man’s interpretation of Scripture involves applying it to our whole existence. This holistic thrust is in keeping with contemporary hermeneutical concern for both the horizon of the text and of the interpreter as it relates to meaning.

Michael Horton discusses the legacy of Van Til’s apologetic in terms of the present context of postmodernism. He highlights Van Til’s all-encompassing vision which governs our view of reality (ontology) and our access to it (epistemology).119 He applauds Van Til’s emphasis on a covenantal epistemology which shows that the deep problems of apologetics “are not final intellectual, but ethical.”120 Horton sees these points to be especially relevant to a contemporary situation where rationalism and empiricism have crumbled. Postmodernity has now adopted the myth of neutrality as a by-word and assumed the stance of truly coming to grips with horizons, language games, and paradigms. One will recognize these terms as regular verbiage in contemporary hermeneutics. In Horton’s opinion, Van Til’s approach is uniquely equipped to deal more adequately with such issues and to confront the ethical rebellion lurking behind unbiblical notions of them.121

More directly, albeit much more briefly, William Edgar introduces the second edition of Van Til’s Christian Apologetics with the call for not only providing more detailed applications of Van Til’s pioneering work, but also to apply his thought to other fields besides apologetics. In particular, he believes more work must be done in the area of philosophy in order to engage contemporary issues. He specifically asks, “How does [Van Til’s] approach work its way into discussion . . . with hermeneutical philosophies?”122

In a critical discussion of Van Til’s concept of analogy, James Emery White raises the question of how one is supposed to “determine the correct analogical correspondence in light of the subjective interpretation of the text?”123 He claims that particular weaknesses in Van Til’s ideas, such as a lack of clarity in knowing how and when our interpretation coincides with God’s and a general neglect of the hermeneutical problem of subjective interpretation, contribute to endorsing an infallible hermeneutic for the regenerate (similar to Sparks). Again, there seems to be some confusion present throughout his argument, evidenced by the fact that White at one point associates Van Til with Gordon Clark124 (an outspoken opponent of Van Til’s epistemology), and at other points cites and endorses accusations of fideism125 and Kantianism.126 Regardless of these particular misconceptions, what is interesting for our purposes is that all of this leads White to conclude: “Put simply, Van Til leaves no room in his concept of truth for the serious hermeneutical issues his system generates.”127 Even if White ultimately disagrees with Van Til’s system and his ability to provide adequate answers for the issues raised by it, there remains at least the acknowledgment of its relevance for hermeneutics.

J. I. Packer, in an essay for Van Til’s festschrift, speaks of the inherent relations between biblical authority, inerrancy, and hermeneutics. He observes that “it appears also from the fact that every hermeneutic implies a theology . . . where a false hermeneutic operates the Bible will not in fact have authority, whatever is claimed to the contrary.”128 This observation clearly parallels Van Til’s own insistence upon apologetic method assuming either the truth or the falsity of Christian theism as its starting point.129 More specifically, “every bit of exegesis of Scripture already involves a view of the nature of Scripture.”130 Packer laments the tendency of latter-day evangelical separation of interpretive principles and the conditions and means of understanding.131 Again there is a similar concern in Van Til’s emphasis on deeper philosophical presuppositions and preconditions related to knowledge and method.

Krabbendam comes to many of the same conclusions Van Til does in his work on the subject.132 He also locates the new hermeneutic within the larger hermeneutical stream running from Schleiermacher, Heidegger, Gadamer, and theologians, such as Bultmann and Barth. It is Krabbendam’s “transcendental appraisal of the New Hermeneutic” which particularly resonates with Van Til’s own critique. He sees the fundamental failure of the new hermeneutic, and modern hermeneutics in general, in an assumed Kantian dualism which provides its basic framework.133 This nature-freedom dialectic of Kant is expressed in terms of the subject-object relation (nature) and a transcendence of that relationship (freedom). There exists a fundamental opposition between the two realms, while at the same time a presupposing of one another. There is a necessary subject-object relationship, yet that relationship must necessarily be transcended in order for true hermeneutical understanding to be achieved.134 The new hermeneutic’s failure comes into focus amidst the backdrop of such dialecticism. It is not interested in traditional rules or techniques of interpretation because such things are merely carried out in the realm of nature. Epistemologically, it seeks understanding in the non-objectifiable realm of freedom. Yet no matter how much they try to achieve such understanding via the so-called language event, objectifying assertions remain inescapable. True understanding remains a perpetual mirage. It allows higher critical methods to have final authority in the nature realm regarding Scripture and assumes that the language of the Bible is “metaphysically deficient,” failing to transcend objectification (i.e., the language of Scripture is inadequate and incapable of expressing its own subject matter.) Seeking to bridge the gap between objectifying and non-objectifying understanding, the new hermeneutic only succeeds in further objectification.135 Krabbendam insists that it is this assumed and unquestioned dialectic which must be confronted in order to expose its true nature—rebellion against the God of Scripture.136 Specifically, this presupposed dialectic is symptomatic of fallen man in general, who seeks to interpret creation from an autonomous vantage point—one not in submission to Scripture but rather one which suppresses it.

It is important to note how Krabbendam brings Van Til’s own critique of the new hermeneutic into view, while endorsing the scope of its application beyond it. First, he seeks to confront a presupposed framework of metaphysics and epistemology underlying the more salient features. Second, he seeks to expose the unstable mix of rationalistic and irrationalistic elements of the dialectic which undermine its own claims and goals. Third, he identifies the new hermeneutic with the ethical rebellion of the would-be autonomous man against the God of Scripture. He and Van Til both understand the search for the transcendence of the subject-object relation as a sinfully evasive move.137 Fourth, he argues that the dialectic underlying the new hermeneutic is merely symptomatic of fallen man’s attempt to conceive of reality and knowledge apart from Scripture. Hence, the critique leveled at the new hermeneutic by Van Til, it is argued, is fit for biblically evaluating other hermeneutical approaches and philosophies.

Bahnsen has identified a search for epistemological certainty among twentieth-century philosophers.138 He surveys three key figures representing the schools of both pragmatism and linguistic analysis: Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Austin. The latter two are particularly notable because of their association with contemporary hermeneutics. Wittgenstein’s concept of language games and Austin’s speech-act theory have become common parlance in the field. None of the three is ultimately able to escape skepticism regarding certainty, because, according to Bahnsen, they never started with the only presuppositions fit for the task.139 After noting the necessity of addressing epistemological problems, justification, objectivity, and the need for a self-attesting worldview which will ground certainty, he turns to Van Til for clarity.140 The key issue boils down to the relation of the human mind to the divine mind and with respect to how the human mind attempts to interpret reality.141 Perhaps more pointed is the question: “Which mind, man or God’s, is to be taken as original and epistemologically ultimate?”142 Christian epistemology, he argues, is “revelationally transcendental in character.”143 Bahnsen asserts that modern philosophy is encumbered by a phenomenalism wherein all methods of interpretation have become anchored in the mind of man as an autonomous thinker, who seeks to impose order on an ultimately chaotic, irrational reality.144 What of Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Austin? In spite of helpful emphases in terms of epistemological awareness, they too are entangled in the dialectical tensions between rationalism and irrationalism, leading to ultimate skepticism.145 Clearly, Bahnsen sees the relevance of Van Til’s thought for broader issues which necessarily affect hermeneutics.

In a different, but relevant context, Beale brings up Van Til in his interaction with Peter Enns concerning his book, Inspiration and Incarnation. Beale asks whether we should allow extra-biblical ancient Near Eastern texts to dictate the genre of Genesis or let it speak for itself. Beale opts for the latter, for only then can we rightly seek to understand its relation to extra-biblical texts. He criticizes Enns’ use of these texts as a lens through which to understand the Old Testament, as well as his endorsement of Second Temple Jewish hermeneutics as a lens through which to understand the hermeneutics of the New Testament authors.146 Ironically, Enns claims to be coming from a “reformed, specifically presuppositional, theological, and epistemological starting point.”147 Beale acknowledges his own indebtedness to Van Til and argues that Enns has got it all backwards. Van Til would first start with Scripture and judge all things by Scripture.148 He would seek to understand the self-interpretation of Scripture first and then judge all ancient Near Eastern texts and Second Temple Jewish methods accordingly. What is intriguing is that Van Til is considered relevant to a hermeneutical discussion of which he never directly wrote about.149

Somewhat perplexing, however, is Beale’s mention of Van Til in another, yet related hermeneutical context. This time he is dealing with postmodern questions regarding the New Testament use of the Old Testament. Beale seeks to explain a biblical epistemology in which “we can sufficiently, but not exhaustively, understand the meaning of the biblical authors’ writings.”150 Specifically, he is responding to Moyise’s view that what is important is not whether the New Testament author respected the Old Testament context, but how the Old Testament context interacts with the New Testament context, sometimes creating new understandings which can redefine and distort the original context by placing it in a new one.151 Contrary to Moyise’s subjectivist hermeneutic, Beale favors N. T. Wright’s “critical realism,”152 which seeks to avoid the extremes of objectivism and subjectivism.153 Beale seems to adopt an epistemology which is essentially based on probability and a horizontal frame of reference, rather than one consistently in relation to God.154 Yet, this is clearly something that he wants to avoid, as is evident later, when he grounds his epistemology and meaning in the transcendent God of Scripture.155 He then suggests that Wright’s epistemology of “presuppositional verification” as being very close to that of Kuyper, Van Til, and Gordon Clark, as well as the common sense hermeneutical validation of E. D. Hirsch.156 The key observation to be made at this point is twofold. First, Beale lumps Van Til in with some strange bedfellows—namely, Wright, Clark, and Hirsch.157 This will become more apparent later, but there seems to be some over-generalization and a neglect of epistemological differences among these individuals, especially in relation to Van Til. Second, Beale has rightly underscored the need for a distinctively Christian epistemology in order to clarify and properly evaluate a key issue in contemporary hermeneutics (i.e., New Testament use of the Old Testament). In doing so, he brings Van Til into consideration, yet in a way which begs for more elaboration. Moreover, he has recognized that the stability of meaning can only be found in an omniscient, sovereign, and transcendent God. This implies that not only do we need a distinctively Christian epistemology for hermeneutics, but a Christian ontology as well.

McCartney and Clayton have also cited Van Til favorably in their work on biblical interpretation.158 Much of their general approach implicitly resonates well with many of Van Til’s particular emphases. There is a clear emphasis on the doctrine of God and its relevance for interpretation. For instance, they see God’s comprehensive knowledge, among other things, as the ultimate solution to many of the common postmodern objections against absolute truth. Our knowledge is limited and partial in relation to this comprehensive knowledge, yet grounded in it.159 God provides the basis for interpretation which is both truly objective and subjective. God’s horizon comprehends all horizons in the interpretive process.160 They also emphasize both God’s personal nature (in terms of the ontological Trinity) and his ultimate authority in determining meaning.161 They clearly root the goal and method of hermeneutics in God. He must point us to the goal of interpretation primarily in terms of the Bible’s own interpretation of itself, from which method naturally flows. This involves having sensitivity to both systematic and biblical theology.162 Since methods are determined by the hermeneutical goal, there is no neutrality in interpretation,163 not only with respect to the presuppositions we bring to the text, but also their relation to God as the determiner of the goal.

However, they explicitly make reference to Van Til when discussing the foundations of understanding. Unbelievers, in seeking to make an absolute judgment concerning truth yet denying the Christian system of truth found in Scripture, must essentially put themselves in the place of God as omniscient.164 They argue that human reason can only function effectively as a tool to comprehend language and other created things if it is conceived of according to the Creator-creature distinction. This is also rooted in how Scripture speaks of man’s constitution and the created world around him (Rom 1:19–21).165 When discussing the relationship between general and special revelation as it relates to interpretation, they argue that facts only have meaning in relation to other facts. Hence, there are no brute facts (i.e., no fact exists apart from the meaning the Creator has given to it). “No fact or predication about reality can be known, let alone stated, without a framework of understanding.”166 Similarly, when discussing the underlying issue in using Scripture in evangelism, they bring up the deeper issue of epistemology. Any use of Scripture involves applying it to particular situations. This is a part of interpretation or seeking its modern meaning. They stress that we must acknowledge God as the self-existent, original, and complete fact which makes sense of all other created facts. God is the starting point for understanding and argumentation.167 Though rather esoteric at first glance, these points are brought up in such practical contexts as the relationship between general and special revelation in interpretation and use of Scripture in evangelism.

Moisés Silva, in two outstanding essays concerning issues related to contemporary hermeneutics, cites Van Til in support of a number of significant points. First, in evaluating the debate over whether Scripture is essentially clear or obscure (and its effect on hermeneutical method) in the history of interpretation, Silva asserts that we must bring any hermeneutical approach “under the searching light of Scripture itself,” whether evangelical or not. No matter how scientific methods or tools appear, none are completely neutral with respect to faith commitment.168 He says this in the immediate context of the discussing the role of scholarship related to the historical gap between the time and culture of the biblical writers and that of the contemporary reader. Indeed, the bulk of the history of biblical interpretation could be described as an attempt to bridge this gap in terms of meaning.169 Silva explicitly mentions his influences here—namely, Kuyper and Van Til, both of whom insisted on the differing starting points of believing and unbelieving science.170 Though both types can appear to have the same general character, they actually move in different directions based on their assumed starting point.171 However one seeks to traverse the historical gap in biblical interpretation, it must be done in submission to Scripture, as it is being traversed.

In another essay, Silva argues that in order to apply linguistic principles to biblical hermeneutics, one must not only ask what the Bible says about language in general (e.g., its relation to creation, sin, and redemption), but also must submit to its authority.172 In other words, we need a meaningful framework shaped by God’s revelation in order to evaluate linguistic theories and methods appropriately.173 He cites both Kuyper and Van Til in support of this point, even quoting the latter with respect to facts being ultimately defined in the context or system in which they are found, either Christian or non-Christian. Both systems claim all the facts.174 Silva helpfully reminds us that a distinctively Christian hermeneutic should be in submission to Scripture even as it seeks to interpret it. A distinctively Christian hermeneutic should not rely on notions of ontology and epistemology in general, but rather on how they are defined in Scripture.

In another essay, Silva addresses the often maligned and fractured relationship between theology and exegesis.175 He stresses the close, mutually informing relationship between biblical interpretation and systematic theology. His appreciation for Calvin’s hermeneutics includes an awareness of common grace, which enabled him to draw from other branches of secular learning, such as philology and literary analysis, and put them to use in service of interpretation and theology.176 He specifically cites how the Dutch tradition helpfully worked out the implications of Calvin’s notions of common grace, epistemology, and sin. He mentions Van Til’s relevance for biblical hermeneutics in three ways. First, his emphasis on presuppositions and the denial of neutrality has obvious value in light of contemporary concerns. Second, Van Til stressed that man, far from being a detached neutral observer, actually suppresses the truth in unrighteousness (Rom 1:18–23) and that the fallen condition finds its characteristic expression in seeking to subvert the Creator-creature distinction. Third, unbelievers make true intellectual progress only on “borrowed capital,” taking advantage of the very truths which contradict their own unbelieving presuppositions.177

In light of these realities, Silva argues that “it is not feasible to separate biblical interpretation from theology . . . systematics should influence our exegesis.”178 Later he says plainly, “my theological system should tell me how to exegete.”179 There are three important implications stemming from these conclusions. First, the very nature of systematic theology is that of contextualization. In other words, theology involves seeking to formulate the teaching of Scripture in ways that apply that teaching to our present context, categories, and concerns.180 Hermeneutically, theology involves traversing the gap between what a text meant and what it means. Second, the evangelical presupposition concerning the unity of Scripture requires that the whole Bible be the ultimate context for any one part. This, of course, is based on the conviction that the whole of Scripture comes from one divine author. Lastly, whether explicitly stated or not, all interpret the Bible with theological presuppositions. Better to recognize and evaluate them in light of Scripture than to proceed in a naïve fashion, blind to the exegetical assumptions involved in the process.181

So we see that in Silva’s hermeneutical considerations, Van Til’s influence can be detected across a number of important issues, mirroring Van Til’s own use of systematic theology as the basis for his apologetic method and his primary critique of other rival methods.182 First, presuppositions are not only to be acknowledged and recognized, they are to be evaluated and used properly—according to Scripture. Also, we need biblical categories for understanding unbiblical presuppositions in relation to the doctrines of sin and common grace. Secondly, he stresses that whatever hermeneutical method is used to bridge the historical gap between the text and the interpreter, it must be evaluated in terms of its starting point (i.e., presuppositions related to ontological, epistemological, and ethical questions).183 Thirdly, whatever hermeneutical concepts we are dealing with, they must be defined according to the Christian system of truth. Lastly, systematic theology not only has significant influence on exegesis (whether one admits it or not), but it also should influence it.

Graeme Goldsworthy reiterates many of Silva’s observations and extends the application of Van Til’s ideas in the direction of biblical theology.184 In doing so, he explicitly makes the connection between the fields of apologetics and hermeneutics in terms of presuppositions and starting points.185 He rightly points out that the varying definitions of hermeneutics that scholars have offered over the years carry with them differing theological stances and presuppositions, which are not neutral in nature.186 Moreover, these assumptions regarding the key elements in communication (i.e., sender, message, receiver)187 “either directly or indirectly deal with the question of God.”188 Who God is affects one’s conception of the sender, the nature of the message, and the nature of the receiver—every important aspect of communication involved in interpretation. The Bible itself provides not only the proper presuppositions required for a full-orbed worldview, but it also supplies its own hermeneutical principles. He recognizes the challenge of maintaining evangelical presuppositions amidst potentially conflicting ones found in modern philosophical hermeneutics.189

What are the basic evangelical presuppositions that Goldsworthy suggests are integral to a biblical hermeneutic? They are essentially theological. They are best summarized by four of the Reformation solas: grace alone, Christ alone, Scripture alone, and faith alone.190 What is even more significant, however, is that these four “really take their essential characteristics from God as Trinity.” None can exist without the others. They are what they are “only because God is the kind of God he is.” Goldsworthy particularly highlights the nature of God in terms of the ontological Trinity.191 He summarizes that the basic presupposition which affects the way we think of every fact available to us “is thus an ontological one concerning the being of God that establishes the ontology of the universe and every creature in it.”192 This resonates with Van Til’s own emphasis on the doctrine of God as the basic presupposition in developing and evaluating apologetic method.193 In sum, “basic Christian doctrine, then, becomes the presupposed basis for the evangelical interpretation of Scripture.”194 Granted, there is a hermeneutical spiral involved in which presupposed doctrine influences interpretation and interpretation refines doctrine. Scripture, however, as God’s word, is the ultimate authority in this dialogue. Presupposing doctrine, argues Goldsworthy, necessarily involves the redemptive-historical character of that doctrine in interpretation. Indeed, this is the main thrust of his book—biblical theology is particularly suited, as a hermeneutical model, to fit the worldview of Christian theism.195 At the same time, there are what he calls “ground rules” for communication established by God, consisting of a biblical ontology and epistemology. There is an ontological priority of God properly expressed in the Creator-creature distinction and as Trinity. This means that we cannot simply set this priority aside and ignore it while engaging in interpretation. Epistemologically, who God is and who we are in relation to him brings both objectivity and subjectivity together in harmony—as opposed to one trumping the other as seen in forms of modern and postmodern hermeneutics. In sum, Goldsworthy has brought in Van Til’s ideas in service of formulating a distinctively Christian hermeneutical model.

Vern Poythress has probably brought Van Til’s thought to its widest and most creative application in the field of hermeneutics. He does this in at least four main ways. First, he acknowledges the value of Van Til’s general presuppositional approach for hermeneutics. In particular, Poythress has highlighted the insights of Thomas Kuhn in the history and philosophy of science196 which has helpfully drawn attention to the role of presuppositions and lack of neutrality, paralleling Van Til’s own insights in apologetics.197 Kuhn claimed that progress and change in knowledge comes not through mere piecemeal addition, but primarily through the use of frameworks, composed of basic assumptions, standards, and values.198 These insights, if biblically defined, are of particular relevance in evaluating hermeneutical methodologies, such as the historical-critical method,199 forms of literary criticism,200 and Speech Act theory.201 However, he also points out that the primary subject matter is different between science (creation) and biblical interpretation (Creator). In the case of biblical interpretation, due to God’s infinity and the nature of his relation to creation, no one analogy, theory, or model could ever define or capture him.202 This idea of capturing God in a theoretical framework involves reducing God to the limits of creation, thereby confusing the Creator-creature distinction.

In discussing different types of biblical theology and its relationship to exegesis and systematic theology, he argues that, rather than hindering, all three disciplines enrich one another. He mentions that Van Til and recent philosophical hermeneutics have recognized that “‘circularities’ are inevitable for finite human beings.” For example, exegesis necessarily involves making assumptions about the nature of reality and the presence or absence of God in the Bible. If presuppositions are inevitable, the question becomes, where are they taken from, from systematic theology or secular philosophy? Here, Poythress expresses a distinctly Van Tillian concept of antithesis. The only alternative to systematic theology influencing exegesis is the “corrupting influence of hermeneutical assumptions rooted in human rebellion against God and desire for human autonomy.”203

Besides presuppositions, other related Van Tillian ideas appear in various interpretive contexts. Poythress brings up his idea of brute facts to argue that no event or reality as a whole exists prior to and independent from any perspective, knowledge, or interpretation of it. All reality and events are ultimately meaningful to God prior to creation and hence, our knowledge is dependent on this backdrop of divine knowledge.204 Interestingly, this comes up in the context of a hermeneutical discussion of the fourfold Gospel account of the person and work of Christ. In another related context, the idea that there could be such a thing as mere events of history “without God’s word commanding them and interpreting them” is a counterfeit illusion, imposing our meaning upon that which is assumed to have no previous meaning.205 Historical investigation cannot avoid prior commitments about the nature of reality and meaning.206 The question becomes, which god or metanarrative is assumed?

Discussing God’s relationship to language, he mentions that unbelievers actually depend on God in order to rebel against him.207 He sees Van Til’s ideas of antithesis and common grace as helpful in making sense of the effects of sin on language and communication. The former refers to allegiances between believers and unbelievers, which manifests itself in ultimately different worldviews. The latter refers primarily to the fact that unbelievers are not as bad as they could be—holding onto fragments of truth, though inconsistently so (at least according to their unbelieving assumptions).208 Both ideas are used by Satan to endorse counterfeits of truth, having formal similarity yet meaning something very different. These counterfeits are rooted in and aided by a faulty view of the Creator-creature distinction, expressed in terms of a false transcendence (God is unknowable), false immanence (God identified with creation), or an unstable combination of the two. Modernism tends toward a false immanence, whereas postmodernism tends toward a false transcendence, though both feed off one another and display an unstable mixture of both.209

In addressing key tenets of postmodern deconstructionism, he cites Van Til in opposition to Derrida, who infamously asserted that, concerning meaning, “There is nothing outside the text.”210 Though not absolutely denying the existence of things outside a text in principle, deconstructionists emphasize that all we have are processed and assimilated human constructions. All we have access to with regard to God are such constructions. However, from a biblical worldview, meaning is not ultimately generated by man, but by God. God, as Creator, defines reality and there is no meaning that doesn’t come from God—“no existence that does not depend on his signifying word . . . we never get outside God’s meanings.”211 Here, Poythress explicitly employs Van Til’s emphasis on all facts and meanings of those facts being derived from being in relation to God and his all-encompassing plan. Indeed, there are no brute facts, but only that which exists in the “text” of God’s plan.212 Ironically, deconstructionism does have some affinity with Van Til’s transcendental apologetic. Both are interested in critically examining assumptions. However, deconstructionism seeks to undermine a text through exposing assumptions made concerning background issues of language and thought. These background assumptions, it is argued, are of an unfathomable, universal nature, of which man cannot have comprehensive knowledge.213 Hence, these assumptions undermine explicit assertions made in the text. Van Til, to the contrary, would argue that the grounding of all so-called unfathomable knowledge is the comprehensive knowledge that God has of his creation, in relation to his own comprehensive self-knowledge. Texts are only undermined insofar as the author (or reader), through the text, assumes an autonomous epistemological stance, independent of God.

Second, he endorses his own brand of perspectivalism, which he consciously derives from Van Til, Frame, and Kenneth Pike.214 That said, we will focus primarily on his more conscious use of Van Til.

Poythress argues for the triune character of meaning, relying on both Van Til’s formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity and his concept of analogy (based on the Creator-creature distinction, with human knowledge as derivative, dependent, and genuine).215 Similarly, he emphasizes that the nature of God affects how we know him and his revelation.216 Moreover, Poythress, like Van Til, speaks of the nature of God and Scripture in similar terms. One may view the meaning of Scripture as tri-perspectival, analogous to aspects of the Trinity. He suggests a triad of attributes of God which reflect the diversity, relational communion, and deity of each person as a perspective on the entire Godhead.217 They can be seen as corresponding to certain attributes of Scripture with regard to meaning: instantiational (particular text), associational (connections or relations with other texts), and classificational (stable meaning). While each person of the Trinity has all three of these attributes, each is particularly associated with an attribute: the Father with classificational, the Son with instantational, and the Spirit with associational.218 In sum, when seeking the meaning of a text of Scripture, it is important to appreciate the Trinitarian qualities of it as the word of the triune God.

Poythress goes on to argue that various non-Christian philosophies are guilty of exalting one particular perspective at the expense of others. In terms of ontology, he observes that the realist-nominalist categories have suffered from an unbiblical exaltation of unity (tendency of realism) and diversity (tendency of nominalism), which are actually equally ultimate in the doctrine of the Trinity. Furthermore, he argues for other philosophical tendencies: rationalism exalts the classificational aspect, empiricism exalts the instantational aspect, and subjectivism exalts the associational aspect.219 Each is ultimately an assault on the triune nature of God. Van Til’s notion of the non-Christian rationalistic and irrationalistic tendencies is used to expose ontological assumptions present in unbelieving philosophy which subvert the Creator-creature distinction.220 He sums up his argument for Trinitarian logic by admitting and embracing its circularity, in accordance with Van Til.221 He uses Trinitarian logic in order to argue for it. This is something unavoidable in light of the ultimate authority and ontological status of the triune God. There is no possibility of neutral reasoning in this respect.222 Van Til’s ontological emphases are used to evaluate various philosophies relevant to hermeneutics.

Another relevant way in which Poythress applies his Van Tillian-influenced Trinitarian ontology to hermeneutics is through its relation to another triad, concerning verbal communication.223 In redemption, the persons of the Trinity perform particular roles analogous to roles seen in God’s verbal communication: the Father as author, the Son as text, and the Spirit closely associated with the reader. The practical effect is that the ultimate archetype behind all human communication, in terms of its key categories (author, text, and reader), is the Trinitarian being of God. This accounts for seeing an ultimate unity and diversity concerning all three. Consequently, we must avoid Trinitarian heresies present in certain conceptions of the communication triad. For example, Unitarianism would evidence itself in collapsing author, text, and reader into one meaning, thereby stripping away the essential complexity of human communication. Polytheism, on the other hand, would evidence itself in multiplying meanings related to each aspect of the triad, thereby driving a wedge between each, resulting in at least three separate, potentially contradictory, meanings.224

Third, Poythress uses Van Til’s ideas in articulating the fullness of meaning found in biblical interpretation. Seeking to do justice to the divine meaning of Scripture, he considers the relationship between the God and the human authors in terms of the incarnational analogy. Just as in the Chalcedonian definition regarding the two natures of Christ, the human and the divine must not be identified or separated in terms of meaning. Ultimately, meaning is what God intended through the various human authors to their intended hearers.225 However we conceive of this complex process, we must keep the Creator-creature distinction intact when considering the roles of the human and divine author in the interpretation of Scripture. For example, the divine message cannot be trimmed down to the limits of human reason.226 God’s speech is, at the same time, propositional, personal, and perspectival.227 It is rooted in God’s triune nature and knowledge.

Since the fullness of meaning is rooted in God, it follows that the meaning of Scripture, whether looked at narrowly or canonically, is infinite in its fullness.228 Unless this fact is recognized, there is a tendency toward reductionism, especially if comprehensive precision is sought in such areas as historical understanding,229 language, or philosophical theology.230 As we are confronted with the divine author at every point in interpreting the Bible, we must avoid the false ideal of exhaustive comprehension of meaning, either in the human interpreter or human author.231 Only in this way will we preserve the Creator-creature distinction. It is important to recall the necessity of perspectives as Poythress sees it. They are necessary because no single human model or viewpoint can exhaust or capture God’s intended meaning through Scripture, since it is rooted in his infinite self-knowledge. Multiple perspectives are needed to appreciate its fullness. Hermeneutical techniques do not exhaust this meaning. God is not a “prisoner of mechanism,” nor can he be reduced to mechanical calculation.232 After all, even the most apparently sterile scientific study is not mere technique, but involves many vital assumptions.233 After surveying such modern theories of meaning as symbolic logic, structural linguistics, and translation theory, he concludes that reductionism is present wherever scientific rigor (undergirded by unbiblical presuppositions) is enforced.234 If human language and communication are intelligible only against the backdrop of intra-Trinitarian communication, then “the category of mystery accordingly belongs to meaning and to hermeneutical reflections on meaning,” and reductionistic approaches must be critically evaluated.235

Lastly, Poythress discusses hermeneutics in terms of God’s Lordship and Christ’s redemption. The Enlightenment desire for neutral, self-sufficient interpretation is impossible in understanding the Bible’s message (or anything else for that matter). God is sovereignly and personally present in all interpretive endeavors. Consequently, our thoughts in these matters are ethically related to God, under his authority.236 “We ought to have God as the standard in judging all rules in interpretation.” Without his standard, our interpretation is unintelligible.237 Moreover, his communication to us is inescapable, as it is expressed through general and special revelation, a point Van Til also emphasized.238 In short, our interpretation of the Bible must be a re-interpretation of God’s interpretation, according to his standard of that interpretation.

A key characteristic of non-Christian hermeneutics is a denial of God as the stable source and standard of all aspects of the communication process, which not only contributes to interpretive difficulties and alienations, but also opens the door for hermeneutical idolatry.239 Without God behind the communication process as the authority, sovereignly in control, and present in all, there is no way to hold its vital components together.240 Whatever approach is taken, there is an inevitable deification of creation, where one aspect of the communication process is emphasized in order to ground the whole thing.241 By leaving God out of the equation, this grounding is done merely on a human level. The end result is reductionism, in which one aspect of the process (e.g., interpreter) is deified as the autonomous ground of meaning, trumping the others. Yet, “each must fail because none can exist without the others.”242 By ignoring God’s role in the interpretive process, there is an inevitable blurring of the Creator-creature distinction. However, by acknowledging God’s lordship over interpretation, one can avoid this tendency. The various pitfalls associated with each component in terms of success in communicating truth can only be established on the bedrock of the Trinitarian communication of God, who is infinite.243 Poythress concludes: “God’s Lordship is the necessary presupposition not only of the interpretation of the Bible but interpretation of all human communication.”244

Emphasizing the redemption of interpretation, Poythress argues that Christ alone is the savior of the author, discourse, audience, and the hermeneutical circle. From a biblical worldview, interpretation cannot be separated from redemptive history. The effects of sin must be recognized and its solution taken seriously, even in the realm of hermeneutics. Poythress sums up the situation well:

Just as there is no metaphysical interpretive standpoint free of the Lordship of God, and just as no moment in interpretation escapes his exhaustive mastery, so no human standpoint is free of the conflict of sin and redemption, and no moment in interpretation escapes the penetrating influence of our relation to Christ’s life, death, and resurrection. There is no neutrality. There is no “objectivity” even, in the sense of which Enlightenment rationalism dreams. The only ultimate objectivity is also an exhaustively personal subjectivity, namely the eternal objective fact of intra-Trinitarian communion in truth, power, and personal fellowship.245

For both Van Til and Poythress, these theological realities necessarily direct hermeneutics.

I will close this survey of Van Til’s influence on those explicitly using his ideas in hermeneutics with Royce G. Gruenler. Though neither as extensive nor as innovative in his application as Poythress, he nonetheless provides a fitting conclusion to our discussion. In his response to Krabbendam’s article on the new hermeneutic, he affirms Krabbendam’s assessment and proceeds to apply what he calls “Van Til’s presuppositional hermeneutic” to Gadamer and representatives of the new hermeneutic.246 In short, there is nothing new about the new hermeneutic. He describes in broad strokes what this Van Tillian hermeneutic entails. First, we do not impose a set of dogmatic assumptions upon brute or unknowable facts, following Kant. Rather, God has already pre-interpreted and created the facts and their relation to his redemptive plan in Christ. “Common grace and special grace find their union in him.”247 He affirms Van Til’s assessment of the new hermeneutic, noting the value in his presuppositional approach, exposing the underlying assumptions being made by Fuchs and Ebeling. Various forms of human autonomy are detected and exposed as non-Christian. There is an “axe to grind”248 among non-Christian hermeneutics in which hidden agendas stack the deck in favor of certain interpretive outcomes. Only an explicitly Christian hermeneutic is sufficient for this task. Any attempt to separate one’s Christian faith from a purely descriptive, historical interpretation will fail to do justice to the content of Scripture. Gruenler explains:

This is precisely Van Til’s point and the awesome challenge of his hermeneutic. Only in humble acceptance of God’s own special interpretation of history in Jesus Christ can one properly use the tools of historical research . . . the search for the real meaning of facts in the created world of nature and history can only be achieved by the aid of God’s own “canonical” interpretation of those facts.249

God’s self-disclosure in Jesus Christ and the inscripturated word “is his own interpretation of the deep grammar of nature, history, and of human existence.”250 It is paramount to evaluate hermeneutical method on the level of presuppositions regarding these matters, getting them out in the open, in order to evaluate them from a Christian worldview.

Elsewhere, Gruenler calls this Van Tillian hermeneutic, “Biblicial Realism.”251 He makes it clear that interpretation cannot be isolated from how one broadly interprets the world.252 Macro-level concerns press in at every point. Ultimately, this involves God and his pre-interpretation of the world. This pre-interpretation is shared among the persons of the Trinity.253 As he puts it, “It is my conviction that hermeneutics is first of all the enterprise of God . . . truth-bearing ideas are always underwritten by the reality of God.”254 Not only has Gruenler brought Van Til and his ideas into the hermeneutical discussion, he has also identified Van Til’s approach as a hermeneutic—one that has great value in effectively evaluating and diagnosing hermeneutical methodologies.

Conclusion

Because of Van Til’s controversial reputation in some circles, he has often been dismissed without sufficient consideration. Therefore, it was necessary, albeit at some length, to demonstrate his relevance for contemporary hermeneutics for those who have tended to dismiss him, and for those who have used his ideas in the field. For the most part, Van Til has been relegated to a mere footnote in the contemporary discussion. In light of the above survey and evaluation, perhaps he should be allowed to have a more prominent voice. If so, what is his place in the current discussion? In order to establish the place where his voice can be heard most clearly and helpfully, we need to survey the current field. It is to this that we now turn.

1. Tertullian, Prescription against Heretics 7.

2. Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 83–109.

3. E. R. Geehan, ed., Jerusalem and Athens.

4. Van Til, New Hermeneutic. An example of a more indirect treatment can be found in his evaluation of Jewish interpretation of Christ and the Old Testament (Christ and the Jews).

5. E.g., Thiselton, Two Horizons; Vanhoozer, Is There?

6. Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 82–88.

7. Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 204–5; Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 6.

8. Van Til, “My Credo,” 21.

9. Van Til, Doctrine of Scripture, 131.

10. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 13.

11. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 128. “Christianity not only has its own methodology, but also that only its methodology gives meaning to life” (Case for Calvinism, 106).

12. I.e., a broader philosophical description of what constitutes understanding versus merely focusing on particular interpretive rules.

13. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 30; Christian Epistemology, 118.

14. Van Til, Christ and Jews, 4.

15. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 55. He insightfully points out that, in the fall narrative, Satan, in effect, said that Eve should decide the question, “How do we know?” without asking the question, “What do we know?” (Defense of Faith, 57).

16. I.e., God is both absolute and personal.

17. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 34 (emphasis mine).

18. Van Til, Christianity and Idealism, 85.

19. Van Til generally regards a “fact” in two important, but differing, senses. First, in a positive sense, referring to created, revelatory facts pre-interpreted by God—which combines both the universal and particular—making them ultimately intelligible. Second, in a negative sense, referring to what he called “brute facts”—uninterpreted by God, man, or both—making them unintelligible (Van Til, Christian-Theistic Evidences, 54–58; Christian Epistemology, 1–10, 118; Systematic Theology, 37, 40; Defense of Faith, 140–41, 167; Theory of Knowledge, 34–37; Frame, Van Til, 77–78, 180–83, 272–75, 308, 313, 314). In this particular case, he is referring to “facts” in the positive sense.

20. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 32 (emphasis mine).

21. Van Til, Christianity and Idealism, 9, 127.

22. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 67.

23. Van Til, Is God Dead?, 39, 41 (emphasis mine); Evolution and Christ, 32, 38, 44. By “predication,” he simply means making an assertion (attaching a predicate to a subject).

24. Bahnsen, “Socrates or Christ, 237 (emphasis his).

25. Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 44; Van Til, Psychology of Religion, 145, 150.

26. Van Til, “My Credo,” 9.

27. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 117.

28. Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 19.

29. Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 167 (emphasis mine), 221.

30. Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 12.

31. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 123.

32. I.e., completely self-defined, self-sufficient, and self-interpretive; independent of creation (Van Til, Reformed Pastor, 74, emphasis mine).

33. Van Til, “Introduction,” 22–23 (emphasis mine).

34. Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 266, 269 (emphasis mine); 266–77; Paul at Athens.

35. Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 264, 269.

36. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 227.

37. Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 265–67. Elsewhere, he states that “only on the basis of a world in which every fact testifies of God can there be a Word of God that testifies of itself as interpreting every other fact” (Systematic Theology, 179).

38. Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 104–5; Great Debate, 33; Systematic Theology, 60; Christian Epistemology, 123; Scripture, 40; “Introduction,” 34–35.

39. Though, in many places, Van Til follows his mentor, Geerhardus Vos in affirming the presence and necessity of special (verbal) revelation prior to the fall (Vos, Biblical Theology, 27–40; Van Til, Common Grace, 69; Systematic Theology, 126; Theory of Knowledge, 30; Reformed Pastor, 69, 71; Jue, “Theologia Natural,” 168–70).

40. Van Til, Reformed Pastor, 98 (emphasis mine). Elsewhere, in a sermon on “Christ and Scripture,” he argues that Christ placed “himself before the Jews as the one through whom their Scriptures alone received their meaning” (Van Til, God of Hope, 8).

41. Discussing pre-redemptive special revelation, Van Til makes the same point that “history cannot be seen for what it is at any stage, except when viewed in relation to its final end” (Systematic Theology, 126).

42. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 240.

43. Geehan, Jerusalem, 243; Christ and the Jews, 35.

44. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 218; Van Til, “Christian Scholar,” 172; Systematic Theology, 225. Van Til, discussing verbal inspiration, also makes mention of the Spirit’s necessary and authoritative role in giving the correct interpretation of the facts of redemption. He also asserts this point in opposition to Roman Catholic interpretation which he sees as seeking an infallible interpretation in the human interpreter rather than in Scripture itself (Systematic Theology, 233, 250).

45. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 219;Psychology, 148–49.

46. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 176

47. Van Til, Doctrine of Scripture, 24, 27, 67; Defense of Faith, 113–14.

48. Tipton, “Triune Personal God,” 141; Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 78, 96, 102; Theory of Knowledge, 207; “Introduction,” 28.

49. Van Til, “Covenant Theology,” 306; Christian Epistemology, 98, 100; Common Grace, 69–70.

50. This is a characteristic Van Til uses to depict the ethical antithesis between believing and unbelieving thought (e.g., Defense of Faith, 257–60; Apologetics, 62–63; Systematic Theology, 161, 189, 274).

51. E.g., Vanhoozer, Is There?, 81, 367–78, 383, 436–37.

52. Van Til, Reformed Pastor, 75.

53. Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 69. He speaks of a similar tendency in Western philosophy (e.g., Spinoza) which he labels as “monological” (versus man inherently in dialogue with his Creator) (Christ and Jews, 38).

54. E.g., Osborne, Hermeneutical Spiral, 480.

55. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 5.

56. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 3, 9, 47; Thiselton, “Philosophical Categories,” 87–100.

57. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 10, 47.

58. Frame, Van Til, 21. One clear example of this is found in Van Til’s unpublished essay, “Evil and Theodicy,” in which he explicitly borrows Hegelian terminology (overcoming “through negation of the negation to the affirmation”) in order to argue for both election and reprobation as means to God’s glorification ( Bristley, “A Guide.”)

59. Van Til, Christianity and Idealism, 15-16; Defense of Faith, 65; Oliphint, “Van Til’s Methodology,” 27–33.

60. Van Til, Christ and Jews, 36.

61. Van Til, Christian Epistemology, xiv-xv.

62. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 17.

63. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 55-56.

64. Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 57.

65. Anderson, Benjamin B. Warfield, 46, 48; Daane, Theology of Grace.

66. Buswell, “Fountainhead,” 48; DeBoer, “New Apologetic,” 3; DeBoer, “Van Til’s Apologetics,” 7–12; Pinnock, “Philosophy of Christian Evidences,” 423; Knudsen, “Crosscurrents,” 308–10.

67. Evans, Faith Beyond Reason, 103.

68. Carson, Gagging of God, 95–96; Cooper, “Reformed Apologetics,” 108–20. Carson does recognize that Cooper’s expression of presuppositionalism might not satisfy some presuppositionalists.

69. Carson, Gagging of God, 96.

70. Carson, Gagging of God, 98; Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 129; Systematic Theology, 56. Carson calls for a proper corrective to the dispassionate and impersonal approach of modernity to “truth” (Gagging of God, 101–2). This mirrors Van Til’s own concern (Van Til, “Covenant Theology,” 306; Scripture, 24, 27, 67; Common Grace, 69–70; Christian Epistemology, 98, 100; Defense of Faith, 113–14).

71. Carson, Gagging of God, 126–27; Van Til, Why I Believe.

72. Carson, Gagging of God, 102–3, 121; Van Til, Systematic Theology, 65–66, 268–70.

73. Carson, Gagging of God, 107 (emphasis his).

74. E.g., Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 47–51.

75. Carson, Gagging of God, 130.

76. Carson, Gagging of God, 132.

77. Carson, Gagging of God, 59.

78. Carson, “Unity and Diversity,” 77–79, 91.

79. Carson, Gagging of God, 194; Frame, Apologetics, 34–50.

80. Carson, Gagging of God, 194, 201, 202, 204, 223, 229.

81. Carson, Gagging of God, 223–24.

82. Elsewhere, he argues that God is not merely an impersonal “ground of being” (Carson, Collected Writing, 19, 21).

83. Carson, Gagging of God, 226–28.

84. Carson, Gagging of God, 229.

85. Carson, Collected Writings, 22.

86. Frame, Van Til, 51–88.

87. Curiously, he says in passing that both are inspired by the common sense realism of Thomas Reid, who, he argues, was more nuanced in his thought than representatives of either of these approaches (Sparks, God’s Words, 44). However, Sparks provides no evidence in support of such a claim (especially with regard to Van Til). In fact, Reid’s influence appears in varying degree, consistently or inconsistently, in two apologetic approaches which Van Til argued explicitly against, namely Old Princeton and that of Joseph Butler (Frame, Van Til, 134n7, 273; Hunt, “Bavinck,” 330–31; Van Til, Systematic Theology, 162).

88. Sparks, God’s Word, 44–47.

89. Sparks, God’s Word, 45.

90. Sparks, God’s Word, 45.

91. Sparks, God’s Word, 46.

92. Basically, Van Til’s notion of “analogy” emphasized the ontological and epistemological differences between God and man, based on the Creator-creature distinction.

93. Sparks, God’s Word, 45n55 (citing Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 16).

94. Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 16 (emphasis his).

95. Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 17 (emphasis his).

96. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 371–75.

97. Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 145.

98. This is Sparks’ definition.

99. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 190–99; Common Grace, 5; Systematic Theology, 117–89; Bahnsen, “Crucial Concept,” 1–31; Van Til’s Apologetic, 442–60. For example, using a helpful and creative illustration, Van Til refers to the unbeliever’s faculties functioning like a “buzz saw”—which may work efficiently but in the wrong direction, making faulty use of his created equipment (Van Til, Defense of Faith, 97, 105).

100. Sparks, God’s Word, 49.

101. E.g., Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 47–49; Christian Epistemology, 20–23; Defense of Faith, 36–37; Christian Apologetics, 33–34, 42–43, 79, 154–55.

102. Sparks, God’s Word, 49–50. For instance, Sparks exaggerates what Adam and Eve did not know and seems to confuse finitude with sin. The latter confusion is expressed in saying that, “only an infinite being—God himself—is able to perceive reality without distortion . . . our epistemological success is limited by finitude” (God’s Word, 50). This raises questions concerning what is epistemological “success” for finite man and whether man’s thinking is inherently distorted due to his finitude.

103. Sparks, God’s Word, 50–51. This seems to contradict his earlier dismissal of Van Til’s concept of analogy (God’s Word, 45n55).

104. Davis, “Inerrancy,” 44.

105. Gaffin, “Epistemological Reflections,” 103–24; Berkouwer, “Authority of Scripture,” 197–204.

106. Davis, “Inerrancy,” 45–46.

107. Vanhoozer, First Theology, 309–36.

108. Vanhoozer, First Theology, 322.

109. Vanhoozer, Frist Theology, 322.

110. Vanhoozer, First Theology, 326.

111. The only other mention of Van Til appears in another essay entitled “The Trials of Truth” on Christian epistemology in the face of postmodernism. Vanhoozer cites an article by John Cooper, who reminds us of the contributions of twentieth-century Dutch-Calvinists, including Van Til. In particular, he mentions their attack on the alleged neutrality and autonomy of man’s reason (Vanhoozer, First Theology, 343n16). Vanhoozer uses this to support his notion of “expository epistemology” (i.e., the need to uncover one’s ultimate presuppositions).

112. Another idea congruent with Van Til’s thought is Vanhoozer’s treatment of the questions of God, Scripture, and hermeneutics as one problem. Each is part of the “hermeneutical circle” in which our understanding of God informs hermeneutics and our hermeneutics informs our understanding of God (First Theology, 9–10; Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 1–13).

113. Pratt, Every Thought Captive.

114. This is not to say that Van Til’s ideas are not in the general backdrop throughout his work on hermeneutics (Pratt, He Gave Us, 1, 66–67). For example, he expresses appreciation for Van Til’s assessment of the influence of Kant in the history of western philosophy, citing The New Hermeneutic in the very context of discussing his definition of “hermeneutics” (Pratt, He Gave Us, 1, 409n1).

115. Pratt, He Gave Us, 43–52.

116. Pratt, He Gave Us, 47.

117. Van Til emphasized this very point, citing Charles Hodge in support (Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 94–97; Hodge, Systematic Theology, 2:99–101, 244; 3:16, 35–36).

118. Pratt, He Gave Us, 395; Van Til, Systematic Theology, 387.

119. Horton, “Consistently Reformed,” 144.

120. Horton, “Consistently Reformed,” 145.

121. Horton, “Consistently Reformed,” 148.

122. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 14–15 (emphasis mine).

123. White, What is Truth?, 59.

124. E.g., he confuses Van Til with Clark’s notion that all truth is propositional and must be deduced from the Bible in order for it to be knowable (White, What is?, 60, 169; Clark, “Bible as Truth,” 158, 167; Trinity, 85).

125. White, What is?, 51–58. For a discussion of how Van Til repudiated fideism, see Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 72–78.

126. White, What is?, 44.

127. White, What is?, 59 (emphasis mine).

128. Packer, “Biblical Authority,” 141.

129. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 129.

130. Geehan, Jerusalem, 204.

131. Packer, “A Response,” 565.

132. Krabbendam, “New Hermeneutic,” 535–58.

133. Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 22–23.

134. Krabbendam, “New Hermeneutic,” 549.

135. Krabbendam, “New Hermeneutic,” 546, 551–52.

136. Krabbendam, “New Hermeneutic,” 553, 555.

137. Krabbendam, “New Hermeneutic,” 554–55; Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 101–9, 116–17, 207–8.

138. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 241–43.

139. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 243–84.

140. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 285.

141. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 287.

142. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 289; Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 15, 107, 133.

143. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 291 (emphasis his).

144. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 291; Van Til, Defense of Faith, 148.

145. Bahnsen, “Pragmatism,” 292; Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 50; Reformed Pastor, 89.

146. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 77–78.

147. Enns, “Response,” 315n6.

148. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 78n45.

149. However, Van Til did write about Philo Judaeus’ hermeneutical method and treatment of the Old Testament, which would fall in the latter part of the Second Temple period (Christ and Jews, 3–22).

150. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 224.

151. Contra Moyise, Beale sees these two questions as inherently related (Erosion of Inerrancy, 225).

152. Wright, New Testament, 31–144. For a helpful, balanced critique of Wright, see: Moritz, “Critical but Real,” 172–95.

153. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 253.

154. E.g., Wright, New Testament, 34, 42, 45–46. Interestingly, shortly after this endorsement, Beale again highlights the Van Tillian ideas that some knowledge can be known, even if not exhaustively or perfectly understood, and that some presuppositions are good and necessary (Erosion of Inerrancy, 255). However, he fails to ground these statements in something more stable than at least the appearance of mere common sense pragmatism mediated through a moderate form of hermeneutical syncretism.

155. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 257, 259.

156. Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 254–55.

157. Beale acknowledges his primary influences to be: Hirsch, Vanhoozer, and Wright (Erosion of Inerrancy, 260).

158. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader.

159. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 12, 30, 34, 36.

160. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 300–1.

161. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 14, 30, 34, 35, 37–38, 301.

162. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 61–63.

163. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 68.

164. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 7–8; Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 14–15.

165. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 8.

166. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader, 53–54; Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 6.

167. Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 12–13.

168. Silva, “Has the Church?,” 70.

169. Silva, “Has the Church?,” 69–70.

170. Silva, “Has the Church?,” 70n20.

171. Van Til typically articulates this in terms of ultimacy. Either man is ultimate in his interpretation or God is ultimate (e.g., Theory of Knowledge, 22).

172. Silva, “God, Language,” 204.

173. Silva, “God, Language,” 204.

174. Silva, “God, Language,” 204n1; Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 36–37.

175. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 251–69.

176. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 254–55.

177. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 257.

178. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 259–60 (emphasis mine); Poythress, “Presuppositions and Harmonization,” 508–9; Vanhoozer, Is There?, 455.

179. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 261. Silva makes the perceptive point, contrary to the objection that such a method is indefensibly anachronistic, that the very use of modern English to explain the biblical text requires the use of subsequent formal expressions. Hence, contemporary theological explanation of the bible’s message demands contemporary theological categories (“Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 262).

180. Frame, Doctrine, 276.

181. Silva, “Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” 261–63. Here, Silva again cites Van Til as one who, before Bultmann and Kuhn, emphasized the role of pre-understanding and questioned “neutrality” in scientific method, exposing the role of presuppositions.

182. E.g., Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 17–54; Defense of Faith, 27–44.

183. Van Til, Theistic-Ethics, 1–37.

184. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics.

185. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 42. He cites Van Til and Thiselton as particularly significant figures in these respective fields.

186. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 21–25, 43.

187 These correspond to the common hermeneutical categories of author, text, and reader.

188. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 43 (emphasis mine), 44, 47.

189. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 22.

190. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 46–50.

191. Goldsworthy, “Ontological,” 161–62; Hermeneutics, 258–72.

192. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 50–51.

193. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 59, 124, 197, 283, 367n51.

194. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 53; Van Til, Defense of Faith, 27.

195. Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 68.

196. Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions.

197. Poythress, “Science and Hermeneutics,” 503–5, 528–9; Symphonic Theology, 84, 122.

198. Poythress, “Science and Hermeneutics,” 473, 478–79.

199. Poythress, “Science and Hermeneutics,” 438, 441–42, 465–68.

200. Poythress, “Philosophical Roots,” 165–71; “Structuralism,” 221–37; Conn, “Historical Prologue,” 22–23.

201. Poythress, “Canon and Speech,” 337–54.

202. Poythress, “Science and Hermeneutics,” 500; Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 145.

203. Poythress, “Kinds,” 134.

204. Poythress, Symphonic Theology, 49; Van Til, Theistic Evidences, 40–65.

205. Poythress, In the Beginning, 239.

206. In context, Poythress mentions postmodernism, modernism, and “critical realism.” Each, he argues, to one degree or another exhibits “autonomous criticism” of which there is no “autonomous escape.”

207. Poythress, In the Beginning, 79–80. This is an example of Van Til’s notion of “borrowed” or “stolen” capitol (Van Til, Systematic Theology, 152–53; Case for Calvinism, 147–48).

208. Poythress, In the Beginning, 114–15.

209. Poythress, In the Beginning, 320–25; Frame, Knowledge of God, 14–18.

210. Poythress, In the Beginning, 371; Derrida, Of Grammatology, 158.

211. Poythress, In the Beginning, 372.

212. Poythress, “Christ,” 312; Van Til, Defense of Faith, 59–69; Christian Epistemology, 12–18; 34–37.

213. Poythress, In the Beginning, 374.

214. Frame, Knowledge of God; Christian Life; Pike, Linguistic Concepts.

215. Poythress, “Reforming Ontology,” 187–219; Redeeming Science, 25–26; God-Centered, 16–20, 38–43, 52–58, 63–76.

216. Poythress, “Why?,” 96–98.

217. Here, Poythress and Frame rely on Van Til’s previous formulation of his own latent perspectivalism with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity (Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 29n4; Frame, Van Til, 119–23, 170–72).

218. Poythress, “Reforming Ontology,” 191–93, 197; God-Centered Interpretation, 72–74.

219. Poythress, “Reforming Ontology,” 198–200. Similarly, Torres has seen a multiperspectival approach as a useful tool in order to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of postmodernism (Torres, “Perspectives,” 123–36).

220. Poythress, “Reforming Ontology,” 215–17.

221. E.g., Van Til, Defense of Faith, 123.

222. Poythress, “Reforming Ontology,” 218.

223. Poythress appreciates the Trinitarian nature and function of each triad while, at the same time, acknowledging that no one triad captures the Trinity, nor his Trinitarian word. Rather, like his view of perspectives, multiple triads are needed in order to appreciate the inherent complexities involved.

224. Poythress, “Why?,” 97–98.

225. Poythress, “Divine Meaning,” 241–56.

226. Poythress, “Divine Meaning,” 256.

227. Poythress, “Truth and Fullness,” 212; “Divine Meaning,” 252–54.

228. Poythress “Presence of God,” 87–103; “Divine Meaning,” 241–79; God-Centered, 20–25, 32–36, 43–47, 75–76; Symphonic Theology, 16–17, 45–51.

229. Poythress invokes Van Til’s notion that one must have complete comprehension in order to begin to reason with one piece intelligibly. In this case, the piece is an historical event (“Presence of God,” 98).

230. Poythress, “Truth and Fullness,” 223–24, 227; Symphonic Theology, 55–91

231. Poythress, “Divine Meaning,” 241, 243–47, 256; Symphonic Theology, 85.

232. Poythress, God-Centered, 89.

233. Poythress, God-Centered, 89, 94. At this point, he cites Van Til’s Theistic Evidences, along with others, such as, Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, and Kuhn’s influential work.

234. Poythress, “Truth and Fullness,” 213–27.

235. Poythress, “Why?” 97–98.

236. Poythress explicitly states that both he and Frame are indebted to Van Til with regard to these points, citing six of his works in particular (Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 29).

237. Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 30.

238. Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 32; Van Til, Systematic Theology, 117–22.

239. Poythress, “Christ,” 312.

240. In this portion of his article, he employs Frame’s epistemological triad (control, authority, and presence), summarizing God’s Lordship (Frame, Knowledge of God, 109–22).

241. Poythress highlights three general movements in his discussion: rationalism, empiricism, and subjectivism (“God’s Lordship,” 37–39).

242. Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 37.

243. Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 43–58.

244. Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 63.

245. Poythress, “Christ,” 321.

246. Gruenler, “A Response,” 575–76.

247. Gruenler, “A Response,” 576.

248. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 257, 302; Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 442.

249. Gruenler, “A Response,” 587.

250. Gruenler, “A Response,” 588.

251. Gruenler, Meaning and Understanding, 169–73.

252. Gruenler, Meaning and Understanding, xiii–xiv.

253. Gruenler, Inexhaustible God.

254. Gruenler, Meaning and Understanding, xvi.