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Introduction

In order to understand the appropriate intersections between Van Til’s thought and contemporary hermeneutics, it is necessary to get an initial lay of the land. What are the issues and gaps in the hermeneutical literature which Van Til can most appropriately speak to? Admittedly, this is a daunting task. The prospect of trying to engage in a large-scale analysis of even one aspect of the contemporary landscape, due to the complexity and diversity involved, according to Craig Bartholomew, is “like trying to do analysis with a club, where one requires a scalpel.”255 Presuming to provide a detailed analysis of contemporary hermeneutics (1960 to present)256 would be largely reductionistic.257 Hence, our aim and scope will be tailored according to particular criteria. First, any mention of key figures and movements will be presented according to scholarly consensus regarding their thought and distinctive contributions. Subtle differences and variations among interpreters of such figures will only be noted if relevant to the discussion.258 Second, the primary focus will be on contemporary hermeneutics according to the degree of its influence on biblical hermeneutics. Third, the survey will be conducted with an eye toward Van Til’s emphases in order to make appropriate connections. In this chapter, we will highlight particular trajectories concerning the shifting nature of how hermeneutics has come to be defined.

Defining “Hermeneutics”

One general trend present in the literature is a shift in how hermeneutics has come to be defined. It must be said from the start that the terminology used and distinctions made by various scholars present a unique challenge. For example, more ancient writers tended to treat exegesis and hermeneutics as overlapping concepts.259 Some treat interpretation and hermeneutics interchangeably,260 while others distinguish between exegesis, interpretation, and hermeneutics.261 Thiselton prefers to lump exegesis and interpretation together as interchangeable and sees hermeneutics as a deeper-level discipline.262 Rather than getting lost in these various distinctions, the following discussion will concentrate on concept-level considerations in order to avoid confusion.

Earlier definitions generally reveal a narrower conception in terms of their scope and aim. For example, Berkhof, though more nuanced than others exhibiting this earlier notion, states that “hermeneutics is the science that teaches us the principles, laws, and methods on interpretation.”263 Similarly, Ramm defines it as a science and an art—the former because it is guided by systematic rules and the latter because those rules are applied with a certain skill (not mechanically).264 The same focus on hermeneutics as a set of rules for interpretation is still endorsed among many contemporary evangelicals, although for perhaps different reasons. For instance, Thomas, self-consciously relying upon two older works,265 argues for hermeneutics as a set of principles which are to be used in exegesis. He does so in opposition to what he sees as confusion in evangelical hermeneutics, due to the adoption of newer and different principles which unnecessarily expand its scope.266 Porter and Stovell suggest that one could divide the literature on biblical interpretation into two main categories—those which give step-by-step instruction and tools for interpretation and those which introduce a variety of methods, usually involving a diachronic look at the history of interpretive method.267 In sum, the general consensus is that earlier evangelical treatments of hermeneutics at least emphasized methodology and rules by which a proper interpretation of a text could be obtained.268

These earlier definitions do not necessarily ignore larger questions related to the interpretive endeavor, but they often do not explicitly state their presuppositions. These presuppositions function to determine what questions and what issues are considered relevant to the interpretive task. Many of these assumptions revolve around two key questions: Where is meaning found? What is the goal of biblical interpretation?269 These questions indeed involve a host of other important questions as well. For instance, what authority determines where meaning is found and the goal of interpretation? Earlier works on biblical interpretation tended to assume certain categories and distinctions to one degree or another. Such issues as the subject-object distinction between the reader and the text,270 meaning found in the original author’s intent, the goal of allowing the author to speak through the text, and readers inductively allowing the meaning of a text to emerge were often assumed rather than discussed.

In some cases, these older treatments proceeded on certain modernist assumptions and goals.271 This of course does not mean that in older works a modernistic agenda was pursued. Rather, certain criteria were assumed and seen to be consistent with a Christian approach. The question is whether consistency is present and to what degree. Perhaps most indicative of this type of thinking are those with an especially strong polemical thrust to their work, who sought to guard against certain pitfalls in interpretation. Two examples will suffice. In The History of Interpretation, Farrar argues that the history of biblical interpretation, from its rabbinic roots onward, is largely a sad affair, often darkening the true meaning of Scripture rather than elucidating it.272 He reserves his highest praise for aspects of the grammatical-historical and, especially, the historical-critical method of the Enlightenment.273 It is here that interpretation reaches its zenith and comes into its own, where scientific and historical precision trump diluted eisegesis. Farrar’s emphasis is clearly horizontal—the level of human history and scientific methodology. Overall, he prefers Enlightenment methods, yet endorses Christ’s interpretation of the OT.274 However, are these two approaches compatible?

More recently, Thomas has argued for so-called “traditional” hermeneutics (i.e., focused on propositional truth) in opposition to what he sees as postmodern subjectivism.275 In particular, he faults various contemporary scholars for redefining hermeneutics to include such elements as theological presuppositions and modern meaning. To the contrary, we must set aside any pre-understanding of doctrine until the exegetical task is finished. He goes on to cite works on hermeneutics prior to the 1970s where he sees the traditional quest for objectivity in interpretation—a quest similar to his own. Like Ramm, he is against allowing subjective considerations to become part of the interpretation process.276 With Terry, he is opposed to any pre-conceived hypothesis, whether it is correct or not. This would include one’s own dogmatic conceptions, whether or not they are seen as an essential part of divine revelation.277 He claims that Terry’s only assumption was that he was dealing with an inspired book.278 Concerning objectivity, it seems as though Thomas equates objective certainty with knowability.279 Believers have a “divinely-enabled objectivity” via the Holy Spirit.280 According to Thomas, saying that neutral objectivity is nonexistent (i.e., acknowledging understanding to be subjective and partial) is to affirm that God is non-objective.281 Westphal argues that this type of hermeneutical objectivism (which he sees running through the work of Betti, Habermas, and Hirsch) seeks an absolute in reaction to any notion of relative which borders on forgetting the difference between Creator and creature.282 Throughout Thomas’ discussion, there is an emphasis on detached objectivity and precision, especially as it relates to the historical side of hermeneutics, for there to be true understanding in interpretation.283 Moreover, one might add that even amidst such a supposedly detached approach, assumptions about the morality of knowledge are unavoidable. In such an enlightenment-like pursuit, doubt is considered a virtue and credulity a vice.284 Hence, neutrality is undermined. Granted, both Terry and Thomas are on the more extreme end of the spectrum. They more self-consciously exhibit certain modernist notions and values present in some older work in the field.

Another highly influential work in evangelical hermeneutics is E. D. Hirsch’s Validity in Interpretation.285 Hirsch was a secular literary-critic286 who argued for the existence of objective meaning in literary works. Perhaps most significant and influential is his distinction between meaning and significance and its effect on the nature of meaning and relevance for the contemporary reader.287 For our present purposes, it is important to point out two influential aspects of Hirsch’s work. First, his stated goal is to achieve validity in interpretation, which he defined as probable consensus regarding the intent of the author. This is opposed to the notion of certainty.288 Second, his work has a strong polemical thrust, seeing anything less than an unchanging meaning found in the author’s intent alone as necessarily relativistic. He particularly takes Gadamer to task for confusing the original meaning (intended by the author) and modern meaning of a text.289 Hirsch’s main focus is rooting validity in the intent of the human author and finding objective meaning with definite boundaries, yet through a process of probability and consensus, not certainty. Lundin sees a certain irony in how evangelicals have embraced Hirsch’s work, with its modernist premises. “In trying to counter the rationalism and subjectivism that threaten their faith and its sacred texts, Christian scholars turn for aid to the very source of the ideas and practices they so strenuously oppose.”290 This at least raises questions concerning the compatibility of Hirsch’s views with a consistent, Christian hermeneutic.

How has the emphasis in defining hermeneutics shifted in more recent years? The general trend has been a movement toward a more all-encompassing definition rather than focusing merely on rules and practical methodology. To Gadamer, hermeneutics is not a method for understanding but an exploration of the conditions under which understanding takes place.291 Understanding always involves interpretation.292 Earlier evangelical treatments have a perceived lack of sophistication in light of this more recent shift. Noll observes that:

Evangelicalism . . . has not regularly promoted sophisticated hermeneutics. While many elaborate systems are at hand for extracting meaning from the biblical text, few are available for understanding the interpretive constraints brought to the text, or more specifically the cultural presuppositions which often hide under the guise of commonsensical interpretive techniques.293

Accordingly, many have adopted an expanded definition reflective of current philosophical questions. Soulen suggests that the older definition (prior to what he calls the “modern” period) became unworkable in light of the erosion of certain theological premises.294 He goes on to say that:

In its modern form, hermeneutics seeks not merely to describe rules for appropriate interpretation but more basically to provide a general theory of human understanding that can support continued claims for the contemporary meaningfulness and possible truth of biblical (and other ancient) texts.295

Some evangelical scholars have also followed suit, though not all would go as far as Soulen. Thiselton sees the root of this expanded definition to be “the recognition that historical conditioning is two-sided.” The text and the interpreter both stand in an historical context and tradition and are so conditioned by that standing.296 Following Gadamer, he concludes that the nature of the hermeneutical problem is shaped by this dual conditioning so that “for understanding to take place, two sets of variables must be brought into relation with each other.”297 Ultimately, this requires a fusion of two horizons, wherein “the interpreter’s own horizon is re-shaped and enlarged.”298 For this to take place there must be an awareness of larger philosophical issues involved. J. B. Torrance, in his preface to Thiselton’s seminal work, The Two Horizons, suggests that “we cannot raise the question of interpretation without raising questions about the nature of knowledge, the use of language, and the scientific and ontological presuppositions operative in the mind of the exegete.”299

It may be noted at this point in our discussion that certain labels put on the various stages of development in the history of interpretation must be given an honest assessment in order to avoid caricature. This can be seen in relation to the shift in defining hermeneutics. In some treatments, using the pre-modern (or pre-critical),300 modern, and postmodern schema, the pre-modern phase is almost invariably dismissed for lacking the sophistication of later phases. This criticism differs from that of Noll’s cited above in that Noll is exposing the refusal to acknowledge complexity, while here there is a refusal to acknowledge at least an implicit awareness of complexity in pre-modern hermeneutics. Upon closer examination, this dismissal is unfounded. Richard Muller has objected to the term pre-critical as a label for pre-Enlightenment hermeneutics due to the fact that medieval and Reformation commentators were readily aware of and actually addressed issues of philology and context. The real issue is a difference over critical presuppositions, not critical method.301 Zimmerman has helpfully provided a corrective to such a tendency.302 Perhaps most helpful is his point that pre-modern theologians not only had worldview awareness (in terms of epistemology, ontology, and ethics), but also saw hermeneutics as involving the interpreter.303 In fact, Zimmerman contends that the arrival of a more universal scope in hermeneutics is actually “a return to interpretation as worldview thinking that pre-Enlightenment theology already possessed to a great measure.”304 Space will not permit a detailed analysis of his argument in support of these points. However, it is a helpful reminder that in the midst of a shifting definition of hermeneutics, recent emphases are not necessarily new ideas.

In sum, hermeneutics has generally shifted from an emphasis on techniques and principles of interpretation to seeking to provide a general theory of understanding. The implications of the latter necessarily go beyond merely interpreting texts, but touch upon all areas of human awareness.305 This widened scope has simultaneously brought about both rationalistic and irrationalistic tendencies among scholars who seek to address the Pandora’s box of complexity. This shift raises an important question: how can one offer a general theory of understanding while still exercising an appropriate humility which takes into account human limitations?

Reasons for the Shift?

Dissatisfaction with Objectivity and Neutrality

So, what accounts for this shift in defining hermeneutics? Surely, the answer to this question is complex and involves a multitude of factors. We will briefly mention some identifiable, interrelated trends that at least contributed to it. It is possible to conceive of these particular factors as perspectives on the overall trend. These will include ones which have both indirect and direct bearing on biblical interpretation.

First, growing dissatisfaction with the overall pursuit of a detached objectivity and neutrality in interpretation has led to a consideration of a wider range of factors, including presuppositions. Unacknowledged presuppositions are actually more dangerous than those expressly stated. For example, in what Bartholomew calls the “classic liberal move”—one sets up a fictitious objectivity obscuring philosophical presuppositions under the veil of neutrality which in turn disallows any presuppositions (at least from opponents).306 Consequently, such presuppositions lie outside the sphere of critique and are assumed to be necessarily true. The focus on rules of interpretation was not in and of itself incorrect, but incomplete. A growing philosophical awareness in hermeneutics may be traced back, at least more systematically, to the work of Schleiermacher (notwithstanding Zimmerman’s observations stated above), who argued that even rules of exegesis presupposed an answer to the question of how any understanding was possible to begin with.307 Moreover, an explanation of a text using “tools” already involves a selection of those tools, which is in itself an interpretive task of understanding prior to working with textual data.308 In fact, Gadamer criticized Helmholtz and Dilthey for not recognizing that scientific method itself is a tradition of sorts—a case of modernity invoking tradition in order to free us from tradition.309 The inevitability of presuppositions was captured bluntly by Bultmann, who said, “There cannot be any such thing as presuppositionless exegesis.”310 Poythress argues that this point would be made with greater clarity if certain distinctions were made. For example, the necessity of a reference point outside the system of analysis used in addition to reference points within a system. We must not merely ask, “Which analysis is valid?” but “Which analysis is useful for what purposes? . . . according to what standards?”311 Such considerations help to expose the hermeneutical situation as inherently presuppositional.

Rather than being considered a hindrance to interpretation, many have argued that pre-understanding and presuppositions must be embraced in order for understanding to be possible. Gadamer expressed dissatisfaction with the Enlightenment ideals of a perfected, comprehensive, and certain knowledge which is somehow detached from prejudice or tradition.312 He goes to great lengths to establish that “to stand within a tradition does not limit the freedom of knowledge but makes it possible.”313 Gadamer was opposed to what he saw as futile attempts to root understanding in empathy through an imaginative identification with an historical author (e.g., Schleiermacher and Dilthey), or to somehow neutralize prejudice (e.g., Husserl) in order to achieve understanding.314 Rather, understanding involves using our prejudice positively.315 Along the same lines, one could also ask the question, what pre-understanding is necessary to understand a given text?316 Polanyi contends that “all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge.”317 By tacit, he means that which is indemonstrable and cannot explicitly be stated. Rather, it is based on one’s conception of the nature of things.318 Scientific measurements are always tacitly personal and theory-laden.319 Coming from a different angle, Voelz argues that a purely objective reading is not only impossible, it is undesirable, due to the fact that an interpreter should understand a text in light of the expectations of the author and the assumptions of the text.320 In other words, if the goal is to understand the intent of the author and text, then there should be an awareness of the presuppositional intent as well. To summarize, presuppositions should be acknowledged to avoid clandestine bias and as an unavoidable necessity in order for understanding to take place. It is not that presuppositions are a necessary evil to be overcome, but are actually required. All of this raises an important question helpfully highlighted by Gadamer: what are the pre-conditions of true understanding in hermeneutics?

Historical Awareness

Another aspect of the interpretive endeavor which undermines an emphasis on objectivity and neutrality is the contextual nature of interpretation. There has been growing appreciation for the historical-situated-ness of both the author or text and the reader in which man’s relationship to history and the world is not as a user, but as a participant.321 Porter and Robinson claim that “a study of hermeneutics, like ourselves, belongs to history—to understand means to be historical.”322 In earlier treatments, the historical situation of the original author(s) and text received much of the attention, yet to the neglect of other historical aspects. Indeed, one characteristic tendency of modernity is a general uneasiness concerning history and tradition.323 As one writer put it, modernity’s approach has been “not so much out of the past, indeed scarcely against the past, but detached from it.”324 In other words, it sought to study historical objects of the past from a place outside history. Much contemporary literature, however, is focused on the historical-bound reader and the question of how understanding can take place between the author or text and reader, both being limited by their historical vantage points. “The modern interpreter, no less than the text, stands in a given historical context and tradition.”325 “There is no privileged access to a work of literature, no access that stands outside history and outside one’s own horizon of understanding.”326 Any notion of a timeless author, text, or reader is considered utterly naïve, labeled by one as a “view from nowhere.”327 Contrary to being a barrier to understanding, it is argued that one’s historical horizon provides the necessary pre-understanding to interpret an historical text.328

In light of these concerns, Gadamer’s aforementioned fusion of horizons has become highly influential. In order to move toward a proper fusion, one must first engage in a distancing in order to do justice to the historical context of the endeavor. One must take into account the particularity of a text before seeking to fuse with its horizon. However, this distancing and fusing does not take place through detachment from the text, but in dialogue with it.329 Akin to the issue of presuppositions, ignorance of historical distance is tantamount to ignoring pre-understanding.330 In Gadamer’s terminology, “temporal distance” (Zeitenabstand) is not an obstacle to be overcome, but rather helps “the interpreter to distinguish between fruitful and unfruitful pre-judgments.”331 Another important concept for Gadamer is “effective-history” (Wirkungsgeschichte), from which the interpreter cannot escape. By this, he means “the actual operation of history on the process of understanding itself.”332 He explains that “understanding is not to be thought of so much as one’s subjectivity, but as the placing of oneself within the process of tradition, in which past and present are constantly fused.”333 However one may answer the question of how to distinguish between the meaning of a text and the meaning of a text as the reader understands it, he or she cannot do so without reference to tradition and historical conditionedness.334 The historical nature of the key components in interpretation necessarily expands the definition of hermeneutics.

As influential as Gadamer’s idea of the fusion of two horizons has been in some evangelical circles, it has not been without criticism. Bartholomew, while commending Thiselton’s shift to focus more upon broader philosophical awareness,335 provides a helpful corrective to his endorsement of the two horizons concept. Namely, a third horizon must be addressed—the horizon of God and the world as his creation.336 Similarly, McCartney and Clayton assert that:

God’s horizon is totally comprehensive of all horizons, which is not to say that all possible meanings of texts are God’s meanings, but that the determinate meaning of any text is exhaustively known by him. Further, God is not mutable or bound by time, and so the meaning which he understands of a text is unchanging.337

This ultimate horizon, biblically conceived, would necessarily inform how the other two are to be understood not only in terms of what they are, but also how they are in relation to one another. The implications of God and his role in the process are far-reaching. Unfortunately, this aspect does not receive the attention it deserves in Thiselton’s work. He grants the possible model of Wolterstorff concerning divine discourse, but says that this is a different subject from hermeneutics. He suggests that the role of the divine author is primarily an issue of how God inspires Scripture. Besides affirming the incarnational mystery between the divine and human and avoiding the analogous errors of Docetism and Arianism, there is not much else to glean from such consideration.338 However, it would seem unnecessarily dismissive and reductionistic to relegate God’s role (or horizon) in hermeneutics to acknowledging inspiration and the incarnational analogy. Do not even these acknowledgements have implications for hermeneutics? The nature of Scripture as inspired affects how we interpret it. Considerations of God’s voice and intent in relation to the horizon of the human author and reader are integral to a proper biblical hermeneutic, not merely supplementary material to consider apart from the main interpretive endeavor. As Zimmerman points out, “the real question is whether philosophical hermeneutics can offer the radical exteriority necessary to lift the self beyond its own horizon.”339 This radical exteriority refers to that which transcends the two horizons and grounds their very intelligibility and evaluation. For all its awareness of historical complexity, there is an authority gap in seeking to distinguish between good and bad prejudice and ultimately between good and bad interpretation via a fusion of the two horizons.340 As such, the dialogue with the past neither ends nor reaches a state of comprehension, failing to provide a leg to stand on in terms of evaluating divergent interpretations or fusions.

From What it Meant to What it Means

A third factor contributing to the shift concerns the relationship between what a text meant and what it means to the contemporary reader. Erickson says:

We are dealing here with what I have chosen to call the problem of getting from there to here: how to move from the message of the Bible in the time it was given to its message for today. In many ways, I think the issue of contemporizing the biblical message is possibly the single most important issue facing evangelical hermeneutics today.341

Similarly, Vanhoozer observes that the problem that has dominated scholars’ attention in modern biblical studies is “how to overcome the cultural and historical distance that separates present-day readers from the original situation of the authors.”342 Osborne suggests that “the problem of interpretation begins and ends with the presence of the reader.”343 Childs argues that one key issue arising from such consideration is whether the bible can be anything more than an expression of a time-conditioned culture—whether any ancient text, for that matter, can have determinate meaning for the present.344

These comments from biblical scholars mirror concerns among those in philosophical hermeneutics. Both have come to appreciate the relationship in terms of a dialogue between the past and present, between author/text and reader—using the concept of the hermeneutical circle or spiral. This two-way interaction is preferred over the predominant one-way emphasis of earlier Enlightenment interpretation. Gadamer stresses openness as being essential in the I-thou relationship present in this dialogue.345 In fact, he sums up this major thread in his body of work by stating, “It is the Other who breaks into my ego-centeredness and gives me something to understand. This . . . motif has guided me from the beginning.”346 The interpreter must take caution and be willing to listen to the author/text (other) in the dialogue, without the goal of either horizon winning.347 For Gadamer, tradition is one main bridge which spans the historical gap,348 facilitating the fusion of horizons. One implication of this is that meaning is a fluid and ever-evolving entity, as readers from subsequent historical contexts dialogue with the text. Hence, Palmer argues that “meaning is not an objective, eternal idea but something that arises in relationship.”349 Moreover, meaning always transcends the intent of the original author.350 Consequently, Gadamer can say “the artist who creates something is not the ideal interpreter of it.”351 Meaning cannot be reduced down to merely authorial intent or merely seeking to reproduce that intent in one’s interpretation.352 However, most evangelicals, even if sympathetic to Gadamer’s notion of dialogue, have shied away from certain postmodern conclusions based on it. To be fair, even Gadamer and many who follow him still claim to hold onto a form of hermeneutical stability and deny mere relativism.353 Yet, the question remains, how?

For others, these assertions are unacceptable, as they provide a slippery slope toward rank relativism. According to Hirsch, unchanging meaning is to be isolated within the original author’s intent, while significance is what is in relation to the reader(s) and spans the historical gap.354 It is not the meaning of a text which actually spans the gap, but rather the significance of that meaning. As Hirsch construes it, the hermeneutical problem ultimately does not include the need to span historical distance, but rather is the search for the verbal meaning intended by the author.355 Hirsch provides an antithetical alternative to Gadamer’s view of application (what Hirsch calls significance). According to Gadamer, our understanding of a text is tied to the questions we bring to it, which are never identical to those of the original author. Understanding a text entails seeing how it applies to the situation and questions of the reader. Understanding always involves application.356

It would seem that the dilemma facing contemporary evangelical hermeneutics is a choice between two conflicting alternatives. First, in light of the complexity of historical distance and its relation to meaning highlighted in philosophical hermeneutics, evangelicals can follow Gadamer. But in order to do so, important questions must be addressed. For example, how should we conceive of the meaning of a text going beyond its author biblically, as opposed to meaning in general? Moreover, can interpretation be biblically conceived of as including both the element of production and reproduction? If meaning and application are not to be separated, how should we conceive of the relationship between original and modern meaning?

Second, in light of the dangers of relativism implied by Gadamer, evangelicals can follow the way of Hirsch. Yet again, one must address important questions. How should we define objective meaning and where is it ultimately grounded? How do we access it accurately if separated from it by historical distance? Moreover, in the case of biblical interpretation, can one understand the meaning of a text if one does not know how to apply it? Does not application presuppose meaning and vice-versa?357 More importantly, do the nature of the Bible and its own interpretation of itself match either of the two alternative paths with regard to these issues?

Where is Meaning to be Found?

Fourth, as Vanhoozer points out, there has been an identifiable shift in focus regarding where meaning is to be found in interpretation. He describes the shift in terms of the “three ages of criticism.” This threefold division parallels the threefold division found in philosophy—metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.358 Although Vanhoozer treats these as separate chronological periods (at least in terms of pedagogical expediency), we prefer to treat them as emphases to avoid overgeneralization and to acknowledge the presence of each at various points throughout the history of the church.359 First, meaning is sought in the intent of the author (either human or divine). Second, meaning is sought in the text. Third, meaning is sought in the reader. Incidentally, there has also been debate regarding which of the three predominately functions to bridge the historical gap mentioned above.360 In terms of our focus on contemporary hermeneutics, the latter two have received the most attention. However, all three can be generally detected among the key figures present in the discussion. For example, Hirsch emphasizes the human author;361 Ricoeur seeks meaning in the text; and Gadamer focuses on the reader (and the reader’s dialogue with the author/text).362 It must be noted that neither Gadamer nor Ricoeur deny that an author exists or has relevance, but they do affirm that meaning escapes the limits of the author and that the author cannot provide a determinate object.363 This shift in emphasis has clearly widened the scope in defining hermeneutics to include more nuanced consideration of both, the text and the reader.

It is important to note that for each one of these emphases, deeper questions need to be raised. For instance, what is an author or an intention? The same question could be asked concerning a text and so on. The point is that even the most basic components of written communication, which are often taken for granted, involve deeper presuppositions concerning metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Indeed, the question of where meaning is to be found is ultimately a theological question, as it relates to the meaning of life and humanity.364 How one answers these questions depends on what is assumed about the nature of reality, how that reality is known or cannot be known, and whether one has a responsibility in how they understand that reality. In each case, we are confronted with the question of whether there is meaning beyond the human author, text, and human reader. Is there prior meaning to be found and understood in a text or is it dependent upon the reader to create or supply meaning?

Vanhoozer has argued that the particular character of this shift in focus is evident in what he calls the “aesthetic turn.” This turn is rooted in Kant’s fundamental dualism between the realms of freedom and nature, but more explicitly emerging in the twentieth century.365 Various movements have been identified with this shift, most notably: New Criticism, structuralism, and post-structuralism. Even Heidegger’s own shift between his earlier and later work, it has been argued,366 exhibits a microcosm of this turn.367 In biblical hermeneutics, the turn can be detected in some forms of Narrative Theology and literary criticism.368 In short, a text is seen as essentially cut off from its author in terms of meaning and historical context.369 This spirit of aestheticism includes “the idea that the realm of art is autonomous and self-sufficient, not susceptible to non-aesthetic standards, rules, or criteria.”370 The practical effect is the concept of an autonomous text, which takes on a meaning of its own, apart from its author.371 However, the shift does not stop with an autonomous text, but has spawned the concept of an autonomous reader. This is seen most clearly in certain forms of reader-response hermeneutics.372 It may be noted that postmodern deconstructionism aims to overthrow meanings rather than to create new ones. However, one may argue that such an agenda assumes a meaning from which it seeks to corroborate through attempts to show how a text undermines possible meanings attached to it.

Vanhoozer’s survey of these shifts highlights the morality and goal of contemporary hermeneutics. Rather than mere neutral, changing interests, he argues that these shifts comprise a series of evasive ‘undoings,’ which are postmodern reactions to modernity’s faith in objective reason and morality. First, there is the undoing of the author. This is tied to a suspicion of metaphysics, often exhibited in various forms of non-realism. Characteristic of this undoing is the denial “that language corresponds to some non-linguistic presence.”373 For example, for Saussure and Derrida,374 there is no thing signified, only signs pointing to other signs.375 Hence, meaning is not signified by linguistic signs in texts,376 because there is nothing ultimately outside texts (or at least anything able to be known intelligibly).377 This introduces a gap between authorial intent and verbal meaning in which intentionality is not prior to systems of language nor even ascertainable by the intender.378 Perhaps most significant for our purposes is that to whatever degree there is an undoing of the role of the author, authority is undone.379 Even in Gadamer, there is a recognition that the birth of the reader is not the death of the author—only the death of an absolute author.380 This is an especially pertinent point. The very nature of the Bible and its subject matter testifies to its own authority to speak to the contemporary reader as the very word of God, with absolute authority.