Читать книгу Outlines of Educational Doctrine - Johann Friedrich Herbart - Страница 5

Table of Contents

8. The term virtue expresses the whole purpose of education. Virtue is the idea of inner freedom which has developed into an abiding actuality in an individual. Whence, as inner freedom is a relation between insight and volition, a double task is at once set before the teacher. It becomes his business to make actual each of these factors separately, in order that later a permanent relationship may result.

Insight is conceived as the perception of what is right or wrong. This perception is founded on the spontaneous, or intuitive, feeling that arises in the mind when certain elementary will-relations are presented to the intelligence. The unperverted mind has a natural antipathy to strife, malevolence, injustice, selfishness; it has a corresponding approval of harmony, good-will, justice, benevolence. These feelings arise, naturally, only when the appropriate ideas are present. Insight, therefore, is a state of feeling or disposition arising from knowledge, or ideas.

When volition has come into permanent accord with educated insight, virtue has been attained. Conscience approves every virtuous act; it disapproves every deviation from virtue. Inner freedom, therefore, is marked by approving conscience; lack of it, by accusing conscience. The development of virtuous character is not so easy, however, as might appear from these simple statements, for virtue has a shifting, not to say a developing character. Elementary as the fundamental ethical ideas may be when presented in the home or in the kindergarten, they are not elementary when met with in modern civilization. At times virtue has been of a military character, as in Sparta and Rome; at other times it has been ecclesiastical, as in the Middle Ages. At the present time, in addition to all that it has ever been from a purely Christian character, it is civil, social, industrial. Virtue in a modern city has a content quite different from that in a pioneer mining camp. Furthermore, virtue is uneven in its development. The race has, for instance, been trained long and hard to respect unprotected property, so that we may fairly say such respect has become instinctive; yet when unprotected property comes into new relations to the individual, as in the case of borrowed books, we may find only a rudimentary conscience. What scholar is not a sufferer from this form of unripe virtue?

9. But even here at the outset we need to bear in mind the identity of morality with the effort put forth to realize the permanent actuality of the harmony between insight and volition. To induce the pupil to make this effort is a difficult achievement; at all events, it becomes possible only when the twofold training mentioned above is well under way. It is easy enough, by a study of the example of others, to cultivate theoretical acumen; the moral application to the pupil himself, however, can be made, with hope of success, only in so far as his inclinations and habits have taken a direction in keeping with his insight. If such is not the case, there is danger lest the pupil, after all, knowingly subordinate his correct theoretical judgment to mere prudence. It is thus that evil in the strict sense originates.

It is helpful to give the pupil abundant opportunity to pass judgment upon the moral quality of actions not his own. The best opportunities are at first the most impersonal ones, for where the child himself is immediately concerned, the quality of his judgment may be impaired by intense personal feelings, such as fear of blame or punishment. Literature furnishes the earliest and most copious examples; later, history may be helpful, though there is great danger of taking partial or mistaken views as to the moral quality of historical deeds. A selection of literature is an artistic whole. All the relations can be easily perceived, but any given historical event is likely to be a small section of a whole too vast for the youthful mind to comprehend. It is for this reason that caution is needed when passing judgment upon historical facts.

To encourage the child to pass judgment in these impersonal cases is to sharpen his natural perceptions of right and wrong, and to influence his disposition favorably. One who has been led to condemn cruelty to animals in this way is likely to be more thoughtful himself, and less disposed wantonly to inflict pain. But every resource of authority and persuasion, as well as appeal to sensibility and conscience, must be employed to make virtuous action habitual, and to prevent the generation of evil.

10. Of the remaining practical or ethical concepts, the idea of perfection points to health of body and mind; it implies a high regard for both, and their systematic cultivation.

Perfection here means completeness of efficiency, rather than acquisition of holiness. An efficient will is strong, vigorous, decided; it is self-consistent in the pursuit of leading purposes, not vacillating or incoherent. Still, the idea of moral perfection is not a remote one, for, in order to be thoroughly efficient, a will must be in substantial accord with the ethical order of a rational society. All its deviations from established law and custom will be for their improvement, not for the destruction of what is good in them.

11. The idea of good-will counsels the educator to ward off temptation to ill-will as long as such temptation might prove dangerous. It is essential, on the other hand, to imbue the pupil with a feeling of respect for good-will.

Good-will is one of the three concrete virtues lying at the basis of social order. It is both passive, as in laissez faire attitudes of mind, and active as in thoroughgoing civic, business, and social coöperation. School training must seek to impress the mind with respect for the active rather than the passive type of good-will. So, too, must it ward off the dangers both of passive and active ill-will, as manifested, in covetousness, malice, malevolence, envy, treachery, stinginess, cruelty, hard-heartedness. How these ends may be attained, will be considered later.

12. The idea of justice demands that the pupil abstain from contention. It demands, furthermore, reflection on strife, so that respect for justice may strike deep root.

No idea appeals more strongly to the unperverted youthful mind than that of justice or fair play; even the gentlest natures become indignant at manifestations of injustice. The basis of the idea is, in the thought of our author, our natural displeasure in contention over that which, in the nature of the case, only one person can have. Primarily, it concerns property rights, but secondarily it may extend to other relations in which two or more wills are at issue. Justice in the acquisition, possession, and disposition of wealth is the theme of the greater part of every judicial system. The idea of justice is the second of the three concrete moral virtues necessary for civilized society.

13. The idea of equity is especially involved in cases where the pupil has merited punishment as requital for the intentional infliction of pain. Here the degree of punishment must be carefully ascertained and acknowledged as just.

Note.—This kind of punishment should not be confounded with educative punishment—so called, i.e., punishment through natural consequences.

The third concrete moral idea is that of equity, or requital. It arises when existing will-relations are altered either for good or bad. The natural demand is that the requital shall be adequate to the deed. Lack of requital for good deeds we call ingratitude, one of the most hateful of human failings. In savagery and barbarism private vengeance is the normal method of requiting injuries. Remnants of this system still exist in the duel, and in the fierce vendettas of some sparsely settled regions. Civilization demands that requital for evil deeds shall be remanded to the executors of established law. Only in this way is society saved from destructive broils. In this respect, as in so many others, the school is the miniature of the institutional world. The teacher is, to a considerable extent, lawgiver, judge, and executive. Not a small part of his moral influence upon his pupils depends upon the justice of his requitals for violated law. Good-will, justice or rights, and requital are the three fundamental concrete moral ideas upon which sound character, both individual and national, is based. The remaining two are that of inner freedom and that of efficiency. Though formal in character, i.e., devoid of positive content, they are equally important with the more concrete conceptions.

14. Where a number of pupils are assembled there arises, naturally, on a small scale, a system of laws and rewards. This system, and the demands which in the world at large spring from the same ideas, must be brought into accord.

The school is a miniature world, to be regulated by the same system of moral ideas as that which obtains in society. Compare 182, 310.

15. The concept of an administrative system has great significance for pedagogics, since every pupil, whatever his rank or social status, must be trained for coöperation in the social whole to fit him for usefulness. This requirement may assume very many different forms.

16. Of the system of civilization only the aspect of general culture, not that of special training, must be emphasized at this point.

Note.—The principles of practical philosophy which have just been briefly indicated are at the same time the starting-points of ethical insight for the pupils. If the resolve to direct the will accordingly be added, and if the pupil obeys this resolve, such obedience constitutes morality. Quite distinct from this is the obedience yielded, be the motive fear or affection, to the person of the teacher, so long as that higher obedience is not securely established.

17. For the business of education, the idea of perfection, while it does not rise into excessive prominence, stands out above all others on account of its uninterrupted application. The teacher discovers in the as yet undeveloped human being a force which requires his incessant attention to intensify, to direct, and to concentrate.

Note.—The maxim perfice te is neither so universal as Wolff asserted, as though it were the sole fundamental principle of ethics, nor so objectionable as Kant represents it to be. Perfection, quantitatively regarded (Vollkommenheit—the state of having come to fulness), is the first urgent task wherever man shows himself lower, smaller, weaker, more narrowly limited, than he might be. Growth, in every sense of the word, is the natural destiny of the child, and the primary condition of whatever else of worth may be expected of him in later life. The principle perfice te was deprived of its true meaning by the attempt to define by it the whole of virtue—a blunder, since no single practical idea ever exhausts the contents of that term. Quite different is the import of the next remark, which applies solely to the practice of pedagogy.

18. The constant presence of the idea of perfection easily introduces a false feature into moral education in the strict sense. The pupil may get an erroneous impression as to the relative importance of the lessons, practice, and performance demanded of him, and so be betrayed into the belief that he is essentially perfect when these demands are satisfied.

19. For this reason alone, if others were wanting, it is necessary to combine moral education proper, which in everyday life lays stress continually on correct self-determination, with religious training. The notion that something really worthy has been achieved needs to be tempered by humility. Conversely, religious education has need of the moral also to forestall cant and hypocrisy, which are only too apt to appear where morality has not already secured a firm foothold through earnest self-questioning and self-criticism with a view to improvement. Finally, inasmuch as moral training must be put off until after insight and right habits have been acquired, religious education, too, should not be begun too early; nor should it be needlessly delayed.

It is well known what obstacles confront the American teacher who desires to give a religious basis to moral character. For a full discussion of the subject viewed from numerous standpoints, the reader is referred to “Principles of Religious Education,” Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1900. This book is a series of lectures by prominent school men and others.