Читать книгу Campfire and Battlefield - John Clark Ridpath - Страница 17

THE ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA—FORTIFICATIONS ON THE POTOMAC—POPULAR DEMAND FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS—CONFEDERATES FORTIFY MANASSAS JUNCTION—THEIR LINE OF DEFENCE AT BULL RUN—McDOWELL'S DEPARTURE FOR BULL RUN—A CHANGE OF PLAN—FIGHTING AT BLACKBURN'S FORD—DETOUR FROM CENTREVILLE AND FLANK ATTACK FROM SUDLEY FORD—UNION SUCCESS IN THE MORNING—DISASTROUS BATTLE OF THE AFTERNOON—LOSS OF THE BATTERIES—A REAR ATTACK—DISORDER AND RETREAT—RESULTS OF THE BATTLE.

The first serious collision of the opposing armies occurred at Bull Run, in Virginia, on July 18 and 21, 1861. It was a battle between raw troops on both sides, and at a later period in the war a few well-led veterans might have turned it at almost any time into a victory for the losers and a defeat for those who won it. It developed the strength and weakness of the men, the commanders, and the organization of the army. It opened the eyes of the North to what was before them in this conflict, and it gave pause to military operations for a better preparation. Up to Bull Run, the war might have been terminated by a single great battle. After it, the struggle was certain to be a long one.

FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE.

Up to May 24th, the Union troops had been kept strictly on the Washington side of the Potomac. On that date, Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield sent three columns of troops across the river into Virginia, to drive back the Confederate pickets which were within sight of the capital. From Washington to Alexandria, a few miles down the river, a line of fortifications was established, which, with the approaches to Washington from Maryland in Union control, seemed to assure the safety of the city.

Troops from all the loyal States had continued to arrive at Washington. The ninety thousand men who had responded to the first call of the President had enlisted for three months. While these troops predominated in the service it was not the expectation of General Scott to undertake any serious operations. He proposed to utilize these for the defence of Washington; the garrisoning of Fortress Monroe, with possibly the recovery of the Norfolk Navy Yard; the reinforcement of Patterson at Harper's Ferry and of McClellan in the Shenandoah; and the control of the border States. When the half million of three-years men called out in May and July should be equipped with the half billion of dollars voted by Congress, and instructed and drilled during a summer encampment, larger military operations were to ensue; but not before.

But after the mishap to Butler's men at Big Bethel, and the ambushing of a troop train at Vienna, near Washington, there was a public demand for some kind of vigorous action which should retrieve the national honor, tarnished and unavenged since Sumter, and should justify the military establishment, which to the non-military mind seemed already enormous. Brigadiers and gold lace and regiments playing "high jinks" in their camps convenient to the attractions of Washington became a by-word, and "On to Richmond!" became the cry of those who wanted to see some fighting, now there was an army, and wanted to see secession rebuked and rebellion nipped in the bud. Under the stimulus of this public demand, which, however erroneous from a military point of view, could not be ignored, a forward movement was decided on.

The Confederate forces were established on what was known as the "Alexandria line," with its base at Manassas Junction, about thirty miles east of Alexandria. Early in June, General Beauregard, still wearing the laurels of his Sumter victory, was sent in person to command, relieving the Confederate General Bonham. Manassas Junction stood on a high plateau, dropping off toward the east into the valley of the little stream called Bull Run, running from northwest to southeast some three miles distant. The Confederates had begun to intrench and fortify this elevated position; but Beauregard's quick and educated military judgment at once decided that a better defence could be made by moving his line forward to Bull Run, where the stream afforded a natural barrier, except at certain fords, where his men could be posted more effectively. Here he established himself, the right of his line being at Union Mills Ford, nearly due east from Manassas, and his left just above Stone Bridge, by which Bull Run is crossed on the Warrenton Turnpike leading from Centreville to Gainesville. His commanders (after Johnston's arrival), from left to right, were: Ewell, supported by Holmes; Jones and Longstreet, supported by Early; Bonham, supported by Jackson; Cocke, supported by Bee, each guarding a ford; and, at Stone Bridge, Evans. The Bull Run line of defence requiring a larger force, Beauregard was liberally reinforced from Richmond, so that his army numbered nearly twenty-two thousand men and twenty-nine guns, before he was joined by Johnston with about eight thousand men and twenty-eight guns.

Against this force advanced General McDowell, who had succeeded Mansfield in command of operations south of the Potomac, with something less than twenty-nine thousand men and forty-nine guns. With his army under the commanders already named, he was ready and started from Washington on July 16th, within a week of the date he had planned, notwithstanding the slow operations of the Government's military machinery, rusted by long disuse and not as yet in smooth working order. The departure of his column was a strange spectacle. The novelty of warfare and the general impression that the war was to be ended with one grand, brilliant stroke—an impression largely derived from the confidence at headquarters that the expedition would be successful—turned the march into a sort of festive picnic. Citizens accompanied the column on foot; Congressmen, newspaper correspondents, sightseers, went along in carriages. There was a tremendous turnout of non-combatants, eager to see the finishing stroke to the rebellion. These were destined to share in the general rout that followed and to come pouring back into the security of Washington, all mixed in with the disorganized and flying troops. One member of Congress, John A. Logan, of Illinois, a veteran of the Mexican War, followed the army from the House of Representatives, armed with a musket, and began as a civilian a participation in the four years' fighting that brought him high rank, great honor, and a distinguished reputation.

UNITED STATES MILITARY RAILROAD, BULL RUN.

GENERAL AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE.	GENERAL LOUIS BLENKER.

On July 18th the army arrived in front of the enemy at Bull Run. An army of seasoned campaigners, accustomed to self-denial, would have done better, for they would not have stopped along the way to pick blackberries and change stale water for fresh in their canteens at every wayside well and spring. The plan agreed upon by Generals Scott and McDowell had been for an attempt to turn the enemy's right from the south; and to conceal his purpose McDowell ordered an advance, directly along the Warrenton Turnpike, on Centreville, as though that were to be his point of attack. But Washington was full of Confederate spies, and Beauregard was well informed as to what to expect. Tyler, whose division led the way, found Centreville evacuated and the enemy strongly posted along Bull Run, as he could see from his elevated position at Centreville, looking across the Bull Run valley with Manassas looming up beyond. It was McDowell's intention that Tyler should limit himself to making the feint on Centreville, without bringing on any engagement, while diverging to the left behind him the main army attacked Beauregard's right. But neither Tyler nor his men were as yet schooled to find an enemy flying before their advance and not yearn to be after them for a fight. Discovering the position of the enemy across the stream at Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords, he brought up some field pieces and sent forward his skirmishers; and as the enemy continued to retire before his successive increase of both troops and artillery, he presently found that the reconnoissance he had been ordered to make had assumed the proportions of a small engagement with the brigades of Bonham, Longstreet, and Early, which he drove back in confusion, with a loss of about sixty men on each side.

After this engagement, McDowell abandoned his attack from the south in favor of a flank attack from the north, where the roads were better. His army was now concentrated at Centreville, whither the commanders had been attracted by the sound of the engagement at Blackburn's Ford, and there he divulged to his commanders the new plan of attack. Richardson's brigade was continued at Blackburn's Ford to keep up the appearance of an attack in front, and the next two days, Friday and Saturday, July 19th and 20th, were occupied in looking for an undefended crossing of Bull Run north of the Confederate line, in resting the men, and provisioning them from the supply trains, which were slow in reaching the rendezvous at Centreville.

ON THE ROAD TO BULL RUN.

The engineers reported late on Saturday, the 20th, a practicable crossing of the stream at Sudley Ford, accessible by a detour of five or six miles around a bend of Bull Run turning sharply from the west. McDowell determined to send Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions to make this flank movement over a route which took them north, then west, and brought them upon the enemy's left, as they crossed Bull Run at Sudley Ford and moved due south by the Sudley Road toward Manassas. Meanwhile Tyler was ordered to proceed from Centreville to the Stone Bridge at Bull Run, there to feign attack until he heard Hunter and Heintzelman engaged, when he would cross and join their attack on the Confederate left, or push on to Gainesville, west of Bull Run, and head off Johnston, who McDowell was certain was coming from Winchester, with or without "Patterson on his heels," as General Scott had promised.

But during McDowell's enforced two days of inactivity at Centreville there had been portentous happenings within the Confederate lines. Johnston had already left Winchester on the 18th; one detachment of his army had joined Beauregard on the morning of the 20th; Johnston in person arrived at noon with a second detachment, and the remainder of his force arrived on the 21st in time to take part in the battle, the brunt of which was borne by Johnston's army, which McDowell had hoped not to meet at all! Johnston, as the ranking officer, assumed command, and he and Beauregard turned their attention to defending themselves against the attack now initiated by McDowell.

Hunter and Heintzelman, whose brigades were commanded by Cols. Andrew Porter, Ambrose E. Burnside, W. B. Franklin, Orlando B. Willcox, and Oliver O. Howard, reached Sudley Ford after an unexpectedly long march, and crossed it unopposed about nine in the morning. Tyler, who had been expected to hold the Confederate Evans at Stone Bridge by a sharp attack, betrayed the incidental character of his demonstration by the feebleness of his operations; and Evans, suspecting from this an attack from some other direction, was soon rendered certain of it by the clouds of dust which he saw toward the north. Immediately, of his own motion and in the absence of orders from his superiors, he informed his neighboring commander, Cocke, of his intention, and leaving only a few companies to deceive Tyler at Stone Bridge, he turned his command to the rear and marched it to a strong position on Young's Branch, where he faced the enemy approaching from his left. This action has commended itself to military critics as the finest tactical movement of the entire battle. Evans was even momentarily successful in repulsing the troops of Burnside's brigade, which he pursued for a short distance. At the outset, General Hunter was severely wounded. Porter came to Burnside's support, and Bee and Bartow, of Johnston's army, aligned their brigades with that of Evans. There was sharp fighting for two hours; but the arrival of fresh supports for Burnside and Porter, including Sykes' regiment of regulars and the regular batteries of Griffin and Ricketts, and the extension of the Union line by Heintzelman's division beyond the Sudley Road, proved too much for the Confederates, who retreated downhill out of the Young's Branch valley before a Union charge down the Sudley Road. But they had checked the advance long enough for Johnston to order a general movement to strengthen the new line of defence which was then formed on a hill half a mile south of Young's Branch, under the direction of Jackson, who with his own brigade of Johnston's army met and rallied the retreating Confederates. It was right here that Stonewall Jackson acquired his sobriquet. To encourage his own men to stop and rally, Bee called out to them: "Look at Jackson's brigade! It stands there like a stone wall." And Jackson never was called by his own name again, but only "Stonewall." Tyler did send Keyes' and W. T. Sherman's brigades across Bull Run by the ford above Stone Bridge in time to join in the pursuit, Sherman pushing toward Hunter and Keyes remaining near Bull Run; but Schenck's brigade he did not send across at all.

As a result of the morning's fighting the whole Union line was pushed forward past the Warrenton Turnpike, extending from Keyes' position on Bull Run to where Porter and Willcox were posted, west of the Sudley Road. The Union troops felt not only that they had the advantage, but that they had won the battle; and this confidence, added to the fact that they were weary with marching and fighting, prepared them ill to meet the really serious work of the day, which was still before them.

INTERIOR OF CONFEDERATE FORTIFICATION.

Johnston and Beauregard came up in person to superintend the dispositions for defence. The line was formed on the edge of a semicircular piece of woods, with the concave side toward the Union advance, on an elevation some distance south of the first position. The Confederate artillery commanded both the Warrenton Turnpike and the Sudley Road (the latter passing through the woods), and the plateau between them was subject to a cross fire. Across this plateau the Union advance had to be made, and it was made under great disadvantages. His effective fighting force reduced by casualties, by the retirement of Burnside's brigade after a hard morning's fighting, and by the separation from the main army of Keyes' brigade, which made an ineffectual attempt to cross Young's Branch and get at the enemy's right, McDowell was no longer superior in numbers, as in the morning. His weary men had not only to fight, but to advance on an enemy in position—to advance over open ground on an enemy concealed in the woods, invisible even while their sharpshooters picked off his gunners at their batteries. The formation of the ground gave him no comprehensive view of the whole field, except such as he got by going to the top of the Henry house, opposite the Confederate centre; nor could his subordinate commanders see what the others were doing, and there was a good deal of independence of action among the Union troops throughout the remainder of the day.

For his afternoon attack on the new Confederate position McDowell had under his immediate control the brigades of Andrew Porter, Franklin, Willcox, and Sherman, with Howard in reserve, back of the Warrenton Turnpike. These commands were not available up to their full strength, for they included a good many regiments and companies that had lost their organization. From their sheltered positions along the sunken turnpike and the valley of Young's Branch he brought them forward for an attack on the centre and left of the enemy. With splendid courage they advanced over the open ground and made a succession of determined assaults, which carried a portion of the position attacked. About the middle of the afternoon the regular batteries of Captains Griffin and Ricketts were brought forward to a position near the Henry house. But though their effectiveness from this point was greatly increased, so also was their danger; and after long and courageous fighting by both infantry and artillery, it was the conflict that surged about these guns that finally gave the victory to the Confederates.

STONE HOUSE, WARRENTON TURNPIKE, BULL RUN.

THE NEW HENRY HOUSE, BULL RUN. Showing the Union monument of the first battle.

Two regiments had been detailed to support the batteries, but the inexperience of these regiments was such that they were of little service. The batteries had scarcely taken up their advanced position when the gunners began to drop one by one under the fire of sharpshooters concealed in the woods before them. Sticking pluckily to their work, the artillerymen did effective firing, but presently the temptation to secure guns so inefficiently protected by supporting infantry proved strong enough to bring Confederate regiments out from the cover of the woods; and keeping out of the line of fire, they stole nearer and nearer to the batteries. A Confederate cavalry charge scattered one of the supporting regiments, and a volley from a Confederate regiment, that had gotten up to within seventy yards, sent the other off in confused retreat. So close an approach had been permitted by Captain Griffin under the mistaken impression, communicated to him by the chief of artillery, that the troops approaching so steadily were his own supports. He realized his error too late; and when a volley of musketry had taken off nearly every one of his gunners, had killed Lieutenant Ramsay, and seriously wounded Captain Ricketts, the Confederates rushed in and captured the guns.

STAND OF THE UNION TROOPS AT THE HENRY HOUSE.

Then ensued a series of captures and recaptures of these same guns, first by one side and then by the other. At the same time there was a general fight all along the line of battle, which did not dislodge the Confederates while it wore out the Union troops. They lacked both the experience and the discipline necessary to keep them together after a repulse. The men lost track of their companies, regiments, brigades, officers, in the confusion, and little by little the army became disorganized, and that at a time when there was still remaining among them both strength and courage enough to have won after all. It has been said that at one time there were twelve thousand individual soldiers wandering about the field of battle who did not know "where they belonged." The strong individuality of the early recruits of the war was in a measure accountable for this. They had not as yet become machines, as good soldiers must be. "They were not soldiers," said one officer, "but citizens—independent sovereigns—in uniform." It was impossible, of course, to get strong, concerted action out of such a mass-meeting of individual patriots; and the constant disintegration of regiments and brigades gradually reduced the effectiveness of McDowell's army.

Meanwhile the Confederate reinforcements from the lower fords were arriving. The remainder of Johnston's army from Winchester had already arrived; and though the Union army did not know that they had been fighting the biggest half of Johnston's army all day, they realized that they were dealing with Johnston now. During the fight of the day the Union right wing had faced around almost to the east, and the combined attack of the new Johnston brigades and Early's reinforcements from the fords was delivered almost squarely on the rear of its right flank.

A blow so strong and from such an unexpected quarter had a serious effect on the troops that received it. But not as yet was the conviction of defeat general in the Union army. The contest had been waged with such varying results in different parts of the field, one side successful here, another there, and again and again the local advantage turning the other way under some bold movement of an individual command, that neither army realized the full significance of what had happened. The Unionists had begun the afternoon's work under the impression that the victory was already theirs and that they had only to push on and secure the fruits of it. In some parts of the field their successes were such that it seemed as though the Confederate line was breaking. Many of the Confederates had the same idea of it, and Jefferson Davis, coming up from Manassas on his way from Richmond, full of anxiety for the result, found the roads almost impassable by reason of crowds of Confederates escaping to the rear. His heart sank within him. "Battles are not won," he remarked, "where two or three unhurt men are seen leading away one that is wounded." But he continued on, only to find that the field from which his men were retreating had been already won, and that McDowell's army were in full retreat.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, C. S. A.	BRIGADIER-GENERAL BARNARD E. BEE, C. S. A.

RUINS OF THE HENRY HOUSE.

McDowell himself did not know how the retreat had begun. He had not ordered it, for he inferred from the lull in the fighting that his enemy was giving way. But it had dawned on the men, first that their victory was in doubt, then that the Confederates had a fighting chance, and finally that the battle was lost; and by a sort of common consent they began to make their way to the rear in retreat. A curious thing happened which dashed McDowell's hope of making a stand at Stone Bridge. Although the Warrenton Turnpike was open, and Stone Bridge had been freed from the obstructing abattis of trees, offering a straight road from the battlefield to the rendezvous at Centreville, the troops all withdrew from the field by the same directions from which they had approached it in the morning. And so, while the brigades near the Stone Bridge and the ford above it crossed directly over Bull Run, the commands which had made the long detour in the morning made the same detour in retreat, adding many miles to the route they had to travel to reach Centreville.

McDowell accepted the situation, and made careful dispositions to protect the rear of his retreating army. Stuart's pursuing cavalry found a steady line of defence which they could not break. The rearmost brigades were in such good order that the Confederate infantry dared not strike them. The way over the Stone Bridge was well covered by the reserves east of Bull Run, under Blenker. But now occurred an incident that greatly retarded the orderly retreat and broke it into confusion.

There had been some fighting during the day between the reserves left east of Bull Run and Confederate troops who sallied out from the lower fords. As a result of this a Confederate battery had been posted on an elevation commanding the Warrenton Turnpike where it crossed Cub Run, a little stream between Bull Run and Centreville, on a suspension bridge. When the retreating brigades which had made the long detour from Sudley Ford reached this bridge they were met with a shower of fire from this battery. Finally, the horses attached to a wagon were killed, and the wagon was overturned right on the bridge, completely obstructing it. The remainder of the wagon train was reduced to ruin, and the thirteen guns which had been brought safely out of the battle were captured. A panic ensued. Horses were cut from wagons, even from ambulances bearing wounded men, and ridden off. Even while McDowell and his officers were deliberating as to the expediency of making a stand at Centreville, the disorganized men took the decision into their own hands and made a bee-line for Washington.

Portions of the army, however, maintained their organization, and partly successful attempts were made to stop the flight. The Confederates had but little cavalry, and were in no condition to pursue. There was a black-horse regiment from Louisiana that undertook it, but came upon the New York Fire Zouaves, and in a bloody fight lost heavily. The retreat was well conducted; but this was due largely to the fact that the Confederates were too exhausted and too fearful to continue the pursuit. It is not to be denied that on both sides, in the battle of Bull Run, there was displayed much bravery, and not a little skill. Never before, perhaps, was such fighting done by comparatively raw and inexperienced men.

It was a motley crowd that thronged the highway to the capital. Intermixed were soldiers and civilians, privates and members of Congress, worn-out volunteers and panic-stricken non-combatants, "red-legged-devil" Zouaves, gray-coated Westerners, and regular army blue-coats. They pressed right on, fearing the pursuit which, unaccountably, did not follow. Some of the men since morning had marched twenty-five miles, from Centreville and back, and that night they marched twenty miles more to Washington.

All the next day the defeated army straggled into Washington city—bedraggled, foot-sore, wounded, hungry, wet through with the drizzling rain, exhausted. The citizens turned out to receive and succor them, and the city became a vast soup-house and hospital. On the streets, in the shelter of house-areas, under stoops, men dropped down and slept.

FORT LINCOLN, WASHINGTON, D. C.