Читать книгу The Member And The Radical - John Galt - Страница 15

CHAPTER NINE

My first session in Parliament was a time of bustle; as much, however, owing to my being still a novice in the business, as to the concerns in which I took an interest: but I gradually quieted down into more method; and, as practice makes perfect, before the session was concluded, I began to know, in a measure, what I was about, and could see that some change of a molesting kind was impending over us.

The French revolution had done a deal of damage to all those establishments which time and law had taken so much pains to construct; but nothing which it caused was so detrimental to the stability of things, as the introduction of that evil notion among mankind, that the people were the judges of the posts and perquisites about Government; for although it is very true that the means of paying for these things is drawn from the nation at large, it is not very clear that there is any class of the people competent to judge of the whole subject. It is surely consistent with nature that governments should be made out of the first people for rank, talent, and property, in the kingdom, and that they should have allowances and privileges, under regulation, suitable to their high stations. Now, how can the lower orders and the commonalty be judges of what is a fit recompense for persons of the degree alluded to? Operatives would think a very small salary a great deal, as compared with their earnings; and, no doubt, the higher orders are equally unjust when they attempt to value the remuneration of labour. The democratical, for example, think state salaries always exorbitant, and the aristocratical never think wages low enough: out of this controversy between them has arisen many of those troubles which eyes that are not yet opened will be closed by old age and death before they are ended; for it is now no longer possible to prevent the world from conceiving itself qualified to judge of what a nation should pay to its servants. Every man, now-a-days, thinks he has a right to tell what the nation shall pay, and yet conceits that no one has a right to interfere with him. Surely it is not consistent with common sense, that the nobility, who talk so much about the corruption of places and pensions, should be the judges of the recompense that is due for the services of men of high degree; and yet it is this which is the cause of our vexations. No doubt, it is very wrong that any class, faction, or party, in the state, should monopolise the patronage of the whole state: but there is a wide difference between that, which some say renders reform needful, and that pretence to regulate the emoluments and salaries of the state by the public voice. Salaries are great or small relative to their duties and stations. The chiefs of the state must keep up an equality of station with those of the highest rank in the kingdom; and those of every degree under them must maintain a like equality with the class of persons that their public duties require them to act and associate with: it is therefore, in my opinion, a most heterodox way of thinking, to imagine that the private property of individuals of high rank is to remain untouched, and yet that the officers of state, who must necessarily be their associates and companions, shall be reduced to comparative poverty. I am the more particular in explaining my view on this subject, because, in common with other honourable members, I have felt, as will be in due time shewn, very serious annoyance from the new-fangled doctrines of the Utilitarians. And here, before I proceed with my narrative, I may as well observe, that there is, in my opinion, a great fallacy about this new-light doctrine of utility, as something distinct from happiness. I consider, and it has been so considered from the beginning of the world, that the object of all utility is happiness; but every man’s happiness does not lie in the same circumstances, and therefore there can be no universal method of producing happiness by utility. No doubt it is useful to get public affairs administered as cheaply as possible; but if the chiefs of the state must be the companions of the high and rich, you will never get men of talent to fill these offices, without exposing them to the hazard of committing high crimes and misdemeanours, to procure indirectly the wherewithal to keep up their equality.

Having thus stated my ideas upon the rightfulness of regulating salaries of public officers by the way of living among those with whom their public duties require them to associate, it will be seen that I have, in always voting with the ministers against the reduction of salaries, only acted on the soundest principles; for even in the matter of sinecures, I have adhered with constancy to my principles. Sinecures ought not to be considered as salaries for doing nothing, but as salaries set apart nominally for the use of those dependants of influential people whom it is necessary to conciliate to the Government. All governments must have various means of conciliating various men: there must be titles and degrees for those whom such baubles please; there must be enterprises and commands for those who delight in adventures; and there must be sinecures and pensions for the sordid. It is as much to be lamented that such humours are entailed upon our common nature, as it is to be mourned that it is liable to so many various diseases; but it is an ignorant mistake of the nature of man to think the world is to be ruled by one class of motives.

Such were the reflections which occupied my mind during the recess of Parliament after my first session. I was thankful that my fortune enabled me to be independent, and that I had no natural turn for the diplomatics of politics; but I learned, from conversing with politicians, something of the state at which society was arrived, and saw the necessity of having clear ideas regarding those matters in which I was most interested; for my object in going into Parliament was to help my kith and kin by a judicious assistance to Government, and it was of great importance that the assistance should be given on a conscientious principle. Accordingly, by these reflections I was persuaded, that, from the state of the times and public opinion, no member of the House should, without the clearest views as well as convincing reasons, consent to the creation of new places, nor, be it observed also, to the abolition of old places; and this led me to a very manifest conclusion.

It appeared, when I came to think of it, that the great cause which stirred men to be in opposition to Government was to provide for their friends and dependants, and that that was the secret reason why the Opposition found such fault with existing institutions and places, and why they put forth new plans of national improvement, which they pledged themselves, if ever they got into office, to carry into effect. Time has verified this notion. Under the pretext of instituting better official and judicature arrangements, new ones have been introduced by the Opposition when they came into power, which enabled them to provide for their friends and dependants; but they were obliged to indemnify those who enjoyed the old offices. Whether the change was an improvement or not, I would not undertake to maintain; but the alteration was very conducive to the acquisition of a new stock of patronage. With very little individual suffering, the change necessarily superseded and set aside those who did the work under the old system; but as there would have been gross injustice in turning adrift the old servants, they were provided for by an indemnification, and the new servants had all the new places to themselves over and above: in time, as the old servants died off, the evil was remedied.