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Of other Relations

§ 1. BESIDES the before-mentioned occasions of Time, Place, and Causality of comparing, or referring Things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

First, The first I shall name, is some one simple Idea; which being capable of Parts or Degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the Subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple Idea, v. g. Whiter, Sweeter, Equal, More, etc. These Relations depending on the Equality and Excess of the same simple Idea, in several Subjects, may be called, if one will, Proportional […].

§ 2. Secondly, Another occasion of comparing Things together, or considering one thing, so as to include in that Consideration some other thing, is the Circumstances of their origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the Relations, depending thereon, as lasting as the Subjects to which they belong; […] and these I call natural [346]Relations: Wherein we may observe, that Mankind have fitted their Notions and Words to the use of common Life, and not to the truth and extent of Things. For ’tis certain, that in reality, the Relation is the same, betwixt the Begetter, and the Begotten, in the several Races of other Animals, as well as Men: But yet ’tis seldom said, This Bull is the Grandfather of such a Calf; or that two Pigeons are Cousin-Germains. […]

§ 3. Thirdly, Sometimes the foundation of considering Things, with reference to one another, is some act, whereby any one comes by a Moral Right, Power, or Obligation to do some thing. Thus a General is one, that hath power to command an Army; and an Army under a General, is a Collection of armed Men, obliged to obey one Man. A Citizen, or a Burgher, is one who has a Right to certain Privileges in this or that place. All this sort depending upon Men’s Wills, or Agreement in Society, I call Instituted, or Voluntary; and may be distinguished from the natural, in that they are most, if not all of them, some way or other alterable, and separable from the Persons, to whom they have sometimes belonged, though neither of the Substances, so related, be destroy’d. […]

§ 4. Fourthly, There is another sort of Relation, which is the Conformity, or Disagreement, Men’s voluntary Actions have to a Rule, to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of: which, I think, may be called Moral Relation; as being that, which denominates our Moral Actions, and deserves well to be examined […].

[348]§ 5. Good and Evil, as hath been shewn, […] are nothing but Pleasure or Pain, or that which occasions, or procures Pleasure or Pain to us. Morally Good and Evil then, is only the Conformity or Disagreement of our voluntary Actions to some Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us, from the Will and Power of the Law-maker; which Good and Evil, Pleasure or Pain, attending our observance, or breach of the Law, by the Decree of the Law-maker, is that we call Reward and Punishment.

§ 6. Of these Moral Rules, or Laws, to which Men generally refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their Actions, there seem to me to be three sorts, with their three different Enforcements, or Rewards and Punishments. For since it would be utterly in vain, to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man, without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil, to determine his Will, we must, where-ever we suppose a Law, suppose also some Reward or Punishment annexed to that Law. […] This, if I mistake not, is the true nature of all Law, properly so called.

§ 7. The Laws that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Rectitude, or Obliquity, seem to me to be these three. 1. The Divine Law. 2. The Civil Law. 3. The Law of Opinion or Reputation, if I may so call it. By the Relation they bear to the first of these, Men judge whether their Actions are Sins, or Duties; by the second, whether they be Criminal, [350]or Innocent; and by the third, whether they be Vertues or Vices.

§ 8. First, The Divine Law, whereby I mean, that Law which God has set to the actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the light of Nature, or the voice of Revelation. […] he has Power to enforce it by Rewards and Punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another Life […]. This is the only true touchstone of moral Rectitude; and by comparing them to this Law, it is, that Men judge of the most considerable Moral Good or Evil of their Actions; that is, whether as Duties, or Sins, they are like to procure them happiness, or misery, from the hands of the ALMIGHTY.

§ 9. Secondly, The Civil Law, the Rule set by the Commonwealth, to the Actions of those, who belong to it, is another Rule, to which Men refer their Actions, to judge whether they be criminal, or no. […]

§ 10. Thirdly, The Law of Opinion or Reputation. Vertue and Vice are Names pretended, and supposed every where to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong: And as far as they really are so applied, they so far are co-incident with the divine Law above-mentioned. But yet, whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these Names, Vertue and Vice, in the particular instances of their application, through the several Nations and Societies of Men in the World, are constantly [352]attributed only to such actions, as in each Country and Society are in reputation or discredit. […] though Men uniting into politick Societies, have resigned up to the publick the disposing of all their Force, so that they cannot employ it against any Fellow-Citizen, any farther than the Law of the Country directs; yet they retain still the power of Thinking well or ill; approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst, and converse with: And by this approbation and dislike they establish amongst themselves, what they will call Vertue and Vice.

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§ 15. To conceive rightly of Moral Actions, we must take notice of them, under this two-fold Consideration. First, As they are in themselves each made up of such a Collection of simple Ideas. Thus Drunkenness, or Lying, signify such or such a Collection of simple Ideas, which I call mixed Modes: and in this Sense, they are as much positive absolute Ideas, as the drinking of a Horse, or speaking of a Parrot. Secondly, Our Actions are considered, as Good, Bad, or Indifferent; and in this respect, they are Relative, it being their Conformity to, or Disagreement with some Rule, that makes them to be regular or irregular, Good or Bad: and so, as far as they are compared with a Rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under Relation. […]

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