Читать книгу An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe - John Locke - Страница 8

No innate Principles in the Mind

§ 1. It is an established Opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the Understanding certain innate Principles; some primary Notions (Κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι), Characters, as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and brings into the World with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced Readers of the falseness of this Supposition, if I should only shew (as I hope I shall in the following Parts of this Discourse) how Men, barely by the Use of their natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the help of any innate Impressions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any such Original Notions or Principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the Ideas of Colours innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from external Objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several Truths, to the Impressions of Nature, and innate Characters, when we may observe in our selves Faculties, fit to attain as easy and certain Knowledge of them, as if they were Originally imprinted on the Mind.

But because a Man is not permitted without Censure to follow his own Thoughts in the search of Truth, when they lead [26]him ever so little out of the common Road: I shall set down the Reasons, that made me doubt of the Truth of that Opinion […].

§ 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain Principles both Speculative and Practical (for they speak of both) universally agreed upon by all Mankind: which therefore they argue, must needs be the constant Impressions, which the Souls of Men receive in their first Beings, and which they bring into the World with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent Faculties.

§ 3. This Argument, drawn from Universal Consent, has this Misfortune in it, That if it were true in matter of Fact, that there were certain Truths, wherein all Mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shewn, how Men may come to that Universal Agreement, in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done.

§ 4. But, which is worse, this Argument of Universal Consent, which is made use of, to prove innate Principles, seems to me a Demonstration that there are none such: Because there are none to which all Mankind give an Universal Assent. I shall begin with the Speculative, and instance in those magnified Principles of Demonstration, Whatsoever is, is; and ’Tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, which of all others I think have the most allow’d Title to innate. These have so setled a Reputation of Maxims universally received, that ’twill, no doubt, be thought strange, if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, That these Propositions are [28]so far from having an universal Assent, that there are a great Part of Mankind, to whom they are not so much as known.

§ 5. For, first ’tis evident, that all Children, and Ideots, have not the least Apprehension or Thought of them: and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal Assent, which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate Truths: it seeming to me near a Contradiction, to say, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify any thing, being nothing else, but the making certain Truths to be perceived. For to imprint any thing on the Mind without the Mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore Children and Ideots have Souls, have Minds, with those Impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these Truths, which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such Impressions. For if they are not Notions naturally imprinted, How can they be innate? And if they are Notions imprinted, How can they be unknown? To say a Notion is imprinted on the Mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this Impression nothing. No Proposition can be said to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may; then, by the same Reason, all Propositions that are true, and the Mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the Mind, and to be imprinted: Since if any one can be said to be in [30]the Mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the Mind is of all Truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus Truths may be imprinted on the Mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know: for a Man may live long, and die at last in Ignorance of many Truths, which his Mind was capable of knowing, and that with Certainty. So that if the Capacity of knowing be the natural Impression contended for, all the Truths a Man ever comes to know, will, by this Account, be, every one of them, innate; and this great Point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those, who deny innate Principles. For no Body, I think, ever denied, that the Mind was capable of knowing several Truths. The Capacity, they say, is innate, the Knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate Maxims? If Truths can be imprinted on the Understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be, between any Truths the Mind is capable of knowing in respect of their Original: They must all be innate, or all adventitious: In vain shall a Man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate Notions in the Understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of Truths) mean such Truths to be in the Understanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these Words (to be in the Understanding) have any Propriety, they signify to be understood. So that, to be in the Understanding, and, not to be understood; to be in the Mind, and, never to be perceived, is all [32]one, as to say, any thing is, and is not, in the Mind or Understanding. If therefore these two Propositions, Whatsoever is, is; and, It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, are by Nature imprinted, Children cannot be ignorant of them: Infants, and all that have Souls must necessarily have them in their Understandings, know the Truth of them, and assent to it.

§ 6. To avoid this, ’tis usually answered, that all Men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of Reason, and this is enough to prove them innate […].

§ 7. […] to apply this Answer with any tolerable Sence to our present Purpose, it must signify one of these two things; either, That as soon as Men come to the use of Reason, these supposed native Inscriptions come to be known, and observed by them: Or else, that the Use and Exercise of Men’s Reason assists them in the Discovery of these Principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

§ 8. If they mean that by the Use of Reason Men may discover these Principles; and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; their way of arguing will stand thus, (viz.) That, whatever Truths Reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the Mind; since that universal Assent, which is made the Mark of them, amounts to no more but this; That by the use of Reason, we are [34]capable to come to a certain Knowledge of, and assent to them; and by this Means there will be no difference between the Maxims of the Mathematicians, and Theorems they deduce from them: All must be equally allow’d innate, they being all Discoveries made by the use of Reason, and Truths that a rational Creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his Thoughts rightly that Way.

§ 9. But how can these Men think the Use of Reason necessary to discover Principles that are supposed innate, when Reason (if we may believe them) is nothing else, but the Faculty of deducing unknown Truths from Principles or Propositions, that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have need of Reason to discover, unless as I have said, we will have all the certain Truths, that Reason ever teaches us, to be innate. […]

§ 10. ’Twill here perhaps be said, That Mathematical Demonstrations, and other Truths, that are not innate, are not assented to, as soon as propos’d, wherein they are distinguish’d from these Maxims, and other innate Truths. I shall have occasion to speak of Assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, That these Maxims, and Mathematical Demonstrations are in this different; That the one has need of Reason using of Proofs, to make them out, and to gain our Assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, That [36]it lays open the Weakness of this Subterfuge, which requires the Use of Reason for the Discovery of these general Truths: Since it must be confessed, that in their Discovery there is no Use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this Answer, will not be forward to affirm, That the Knowledge of this Maxim, That it is impossible for same thing to be, and not to be, is a deduction of our Reason. […]

[…]

§ 12. If by knowing and assenting to them, when we come to the use of Reason be meant, that this is the time, when they come to be taken notice of by the Mind; and that as soon as Children come to the use of Reason, they come also to know and assent to these Maxims; this also is false, and frivolous. First, It is false. Because it is evident, these Maxims are not in the Mind so early as the use of Reason: and therefore the coming to the use of Reason is falsly assigned, as the time of their Discovery. How many instances of the use of Reason may we observe in Children, a long time before they have any Knowledge of this Maxim, That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be? and a great part of illiterate People, and Savages, pass many Years, even of their rational Age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general Propositions. […]

[…]

§ 14. But, Secondly, were it true, that the precise time of their being known, and assented to, were, when Men come to the Use of Reason; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous, as the Supposition of it self is [38]false. For by what kind of Logick will it appear, that any Notion is Originally by Nature imprinted in the Mind in its first Constitution, because it comes first to be observed, and assented to, when a Faculty of the Mind, which has quite a distinct Province, begins to exert it self? […] I agree then with these Men of innate Principles, that there is no Knowledge of these general and self-evident Maxims in the Mind, till it comes to the Exercise of Reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of Reason, is the precise time when they are first taken notice of; and, if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate. […]

§ 15. The Senses at first let in particular Ideas, and furnish the yet empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the Memory, and Names got to them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by Degrees learns the use of general Names. In this manner the Mind comes to be furnish’d with Ideas and Language, the Materials about which to exercise its discursive Faculty: And the use of Reason becomes daily more visible, as these Materials, that give it Employment, increase. But though the having of general Ideas, and the use of general Words and Reason usually grow together; yet, I see not, how this any way proves them innate. The Knowledge of some Truths, I confess, is very early in the Mind; but in a way that shews them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about Ideas, not innate, but acquired: It being [40]about those first, which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants have earliest to do, and which make the most frequent Impressions on their Senses. In Ideas thus got, the Mind discovers, That some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of Memory; as soon as it is able, to retain and perceive distinct Ideas. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of Words; or comes to that, which we commonly call the use of Reason. For a Child knows as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the Ideas of Sweet and Bitter (i. e. That Sweet is not Bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) That Worm-wood and Sugar-plumbs, are not the same thing.

[…]

§ 17. This Evasion therefore of general Assent, when Men come to the use of Reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those supposed-innate, and other Truths, that are afterwards acquired and learnt, Men have endeavoured to secure an universal Assent to those they call Maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to, as soon as proposed, and the Terms they are propos’d in, understood […]

§ 18. In Answer to this, I demand whether ready assent, given to a Proposition upon first hearing, and understanding the Terms, be a certain mark of an innate Principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a Proof of them: If it be said, that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such Propositions to be innate, which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully [42]stored with innate Principles. For upon the same ground (viz.) of Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, That Men would have those Maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several Propositions about Numbers, to be innate: And thus, That One and Two are equal to Three, That Two and Two are equal to Four, and a multitude of other the like Propositions in Numbers, that every Body assents to, at first hearing, and understanding the Terms, must have a place amongst these innate Axioms. Nor is this the Prerogative of Numbers alone, and Propositions made about several of them: But even natural Philosophy, and all the other Sciences afford Propositions, which are sure to meet with Assent, as soon as they are understood. That two Bodies cannot be in the same place, is a Truth, that no Body any more sticks at, than at this Maxim, That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; That White is not Black, That a Square is not a Circle, That Yellowness is not Sweetness: These, and a Million of such other Propositions, as many at least, as we have distinct Ideas, every Man in his Wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the Names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If then these Men will be true to their own Rule, and have Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, to be a mark of innate, they must allow, not only as many innate Propositions, as Men have distinct Ideas; but as many as Men can make Propositions, wherein different Ideas are denied one of another. Since every Proposition, wherein one different Idea is denied of another, will as certainly find [44]Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, as this general one, It is impossible for the same to be, and not to be; or that which is the Foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the two, The same is not different: By which Account, they will have Legions of innate Propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other. But since no Proposition can be innate, unless the Ideas, about which it is, be innate, This will be, to suppose all our Ideas of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Figures, etc. innate; than which there cannot be any thing more opposite to Reason and Experience. Universal and ready assent, upon hearing and understanding the Terms, is (I grant) a mark of self-evidence: but self-evidence, depending not on innate Impressions, but on something else (as we shall shew hereafter) belongs to several Propositions, which no Body was yet so extravagant, as to pretend to be innate.

§ 19. Nor let it be said, That those more particular self-evident Propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as, That One and Two are equal to Three; That Green is not Red, etc. are received as the Consequences of those more universal Propositions, which are look’d on as innate Principles: since any one, who will but take the Pains to observe what passes in the Understanding, will certainly find, That these, and the like less general Propositions, are certainly known and firmly assented to, by those, who are utterly ignorant of those more general Maxims; and so, being earlier in the Mind than those (as they are called) first Principles, cannot owe to them the Assent, wherewith they are received at first hearing.

[…]

[46]§ 21. But we have not yet done with assenting to Propositions at first hearing and understanding their Terms; ’tis fit we first take notice, That this, instead of being a mark, that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary: Since it supposes, that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these Principles, till they are propos’d to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these Truths, till he hears them from others. For if they were innate, What need they be propos’d, in order to gaining assent; when, by being in the Understanding, by a natural and original Impression (if there were any such) they could not but be known before? […]

§ 22. If it be said, The understanding hath an implicit Knowledge of these Principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing, (as they must, who will say, That they are in the Understanding before they are known) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a Principle imprinted on the Understanding Implicitly; unless it be this, That the Mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such Propositions. […]

§ 23. There is I fear this farther weakness in the foregoing Argument, which would perswade us, That therefore those Maxims are to be thought innate, which Men admit at first hearing, because they assent to Propositions, which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any Argument or Demonstration, but a bare Explication or Understanding of the Terms. Under which, there seems to me to lie this fallacy; That Men are supposed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing de [48]novo; when in truth, they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For first it is evident, that they have learned the Terms and their Signification: neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired Knowledge in the case: The Ideas themselves, about which the Proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their Names, but got afterwards. So, that in all Propositions that are assented to, at first hearing; the Terms of the Proposition, their standing for such Ideas, and the Ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is remaining in such Propositions, that is innate. […]

§ 24. To conclude this Argument of universal Consent, I agree with these Defenders of innate Principles, That if they are innate, they must needs have universal assent. For that a Truth should be innate, and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by these Men’s own Confession, they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to, by those who understand not the Terms, nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard, nor thought of those Propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of Mankind. But were the Number far less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby shew these Propositions not to be innate, if Children alone were ignorant of them.

[50][…]

§ 28. […] Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground, to think these two famed speculative Maxims innate: since they are not universally assented to; and the assent they so generally find, is no other, than what several Propositions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them: And since the assent that is given them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural Inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Discourse. And if these first Principles of Knowledge and Science, are found not to be innate, no other speculative Maxims can (I suppose) with better Right pretend to be so.