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MUSLIM POPULATIONS TODAY

Is Islam the fastest growing religion in the world? Where are the largest concentrations of Muslim populations?

Among global religious communities, Islam does seem to show the fastest rate of growth, with Christianity running a close second. In total numbers, Christians still appear to outnumber the approximately 1.6 billion Muslims by perhaps five hundred million. The largest concentrations of Muslims by geographical region are in South Asia, with around a third of the world’s total in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. Combining all the Muslims in the Middle East and Africa adds more than another third. And the populations of Indonesia, the nation with the largest number of Muslims, combined with those of the rest of East, Central, and Southeast Asia comprise roughly the final third.

Where do Muslims live today? What are their estimated numbers?

Islam is now a truly global religious tradition. Approximately 1.6 billion Muslims live worldwide, on every continent and in most countries. In very general terms, about a third of the total live in the Middle East and North Africa. Several major ethno-linguistic groups are represented there, including Arabs, Turks, Persians, and Berbers. Many people associate Islam with Arabs even though they are now a relatively small minority of the global population. Another third live in central and southern Asia, including the southern republics of the former Soviet Union, Western China, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Pakistan is the most important modern example of a nation-state established as a Muslim land. Another third are in sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, and in smaller concentrations in several dozen other countries. Indonesia boasts the single largest national population of Muslims, approaching two hundred million. At over a hundred million, India is home to the world’s largest minority Muslim population. Estimates as to American Muslims vary considerably, from three to eight million. It may also be helpful to think in terms of religio-cultural spheres, defined by key language groups, in which Islam has been a particularly important influence. The Arabicate sphere, for example, includes all those areas in which Arabic has been the dominant vehicle of Islamic expression, namely, the central Middle East, north Africa, and east Africa. The Persianate sphere consists of Iran, Afghanistan, and all of southern Asia. Within the Malayo-Polynesian sphere are Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Central Asia, including western China, and present-day Turkey and the Balkans comprise the Turkic sphere. Last but not least is the sub-Saharan sphere, in which Nigeria and other west African nations are most significant.

Followers of Islam are now present all over the world, numbering about 1.6 billion people as of 2014. This map indicates the percentage of people in each country who are Muslims.

In which countries do the largest majority Muslim populations live today?

Principal nations with majority Muslim populations include virtually all of the Middle Eastern and North African countries, plus a couple of sub-Saharan African states, such as Nigeria; Pakistan and Bangladesh; Malaysia and Indonesia; and the five Central Asian republics formerly belonging to the Soviet Union (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). Dozens of other nations include significant minority populations, with India’s over one hundred million Muslims at the head of the list. Another important minority Muslim population that Westerners rarely hear about is that of the People’s Republic of China.

Are most Muslims Arabs?

This is a widespread misperception. Arabs, the largest remaining population of Semitic ancestry, account for only about a fifth of the global Muslim population—a total roughly equivalent to the combined populations of Pakistan and Bangladesh alone. And within the Middle East, there are several other major ethnicities and language families. The two largest of these are Turks and Iranians—neither in any direct way related to Semitic peoples, and both using languages unrelated originally either to each other or to Arabic. In addition, significant sub-groups of Middle Eastern Muslims among Turkic peoples are, for example, Turkmen; and among Iranian peoples there are large numbers of Kurds as well as several major tribal groups living in present-day Iran.

What are some other major ethnic and cultural groups of Muslims in the World today?

Across North Africa one finds also Muslims who are ethnic Berbers and in sub-Saharan Africa dozens of tribal groups such as the Tuareg, Hausa, and Fulani. People of Indic background are by far the largest single group, if one considers a large number of ethnic subgroups together, totaling almost a third of the global Muslim population. Turkic descent accounts for the lineage of most of the citizens of Turkey as well as those of the former Soviet Central Asian republics and a region once called Eastern Turkestan that now makes up a large area of Western China—totaling about one-fifth. The people of both Iran and Afghanistan are largely of Indo-Aryan descent and are more closely related ethnically to the people of the Indian subcontinent than they are to their Arab or Turkic neighbors.

Tuareg Muslims, such as these men from Desert Timbuktu in Mali, are one of the many different ethnic and cultural groups that make up the Muslim community worldwide.

What are the most important languages in major Muslim populations?

As suggested in earlier questions about the “culture spheres,” Muslims speak and write in dozens of major language groups. Arabic remains the chief Islamic language not only because so many Muslims speak it (over three hundred million), but because it is the language of the Quran and is thus associated with Islam’s sacred origins. Multiple languages and dialects—Turkic, Indic (such as Urdu, Sindhi, and Gujarati) and Indo-European (such as Persian), Malayo-Polynesian, and African tongues—remain important spoken and literary languages and essential tools for careful study of Islam.

Do all Muslims belong to the same large religious group?

Asked whether they think of the global community of Islam as composed of various factions, most Muslims are likely to respond that all Muslims belong to the same universal umma (UM-mah, global community) or brother- and sisterhood of faith, and that any talk of sub-groups or sects is beside the point. All believe in the oneness of God, the prophetship of Muhammad, divine revelation in the Quran, the existence of angels, the ultimate accountability of all persons, and the Five Pillars—in short, all the fundamental items of belief and practice described earlier. But there are in fact various sub-communities within the larger umma, each with its unique histories and contributions to the larger history of Islam. Minority communities of Muslims have often had to contend with the same problems that have beset minorities always and everywhere, regardless of the composition of the majority in which they find themselves.

RADICAL POLITICALLY ACTIVIST AND RELIGIOUSLY IDEALIST FACTIONS

What are politically radical activists and religiously idealist factions?

In this context, “radical” refers to highly mission-oriented groups whose members subscribe to a hard-core exclusivist ideology and tend to be willing to use harsh or even “extremist” tactics to achieve their goals. The term “politically activist” describes an ideology focused on establishing and enforcing a comprehensive system of governance and social control. And, as the chapter on “Essential Beliefs” below will explain further, the phrase “religiously idealist” refers to factions whose interpretation of Muslim history calls for the systematic restoration of what they believe to be Prophetic “ideal”—to recreate as nearly as possible the overall environment they claim characterized the lifetime of Muhammad during the Medinan years (622–632).

What sort of Muslims are the “Taliban”?

A group originally of Pakistani and Afghan nationalities, mostly of Pashtun ethnicity, emerged during the 1980s during Afghanistan’s struggle to fend off the Soviet Union’s military invasion. Among the mujahideen (freedom fighters) engaged prominently in the struggle were a faction who called themselves taliban (a Persian plural meaning “seekers, students”). Most members of the faction consider a reclusive figure named Mullah Umar their foundational figure, but his role in the group’s ongoing activities remains little understood. Taliban social policies are notoriously oppressive toward women especially, as manifest in their refusal to allow girls to be formally educated and public corporal punishment for women who violate their antiquated dress code. They seek to impose their own harsh interpretation of Sharia penal sanctions, including such barbaric practices as stoning for adultery and amputation of hands for theft.

What is the Muslim Brotherhood?

Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), generally acknowledged as the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (1927), was a well-educated man from a religiously conservative Egyptian family who believed that Muslims should be more active in promoting the broader societal implications of the Islamic faith. His theoretical works on “politicizing” Islam have been widely influential in the growth of a wide variety of contemporary activist Muslim organizations especially in the Middle East and North Africa. Politically activist organizations related to the Brotherhood include, for example, Hamas. Though the Brotherhood began and developed largely in Egypt, it has gained a political footing in other Middle East nations by running for office and having members elected to national assemblies. In countries such as Jordan, independent branches of the Brotherhood have arisen. More recently, the Brotherhood has exerted considerable influence in the aftermath of early 2011 “revolutionary” events that resulted in the ouster of long-time dictator Husni Mubarak. Al-Banna himself did not advocate violent means, and his contemporary disciples generally strive to bring about their goal of integrating society under religious values—acknowledging religious pluralism and rights of non-Muslims— through political activism and reform. Some other organizations indirectly influenced by Brotherhood values have, however, embraced the use of violence as necessary for overthrowing non-Islamic rule. This includes such groups as al-Qaeda and its spinoffs, the Taliban, and a host of Islamic “jihadist” organizations based in various states from North Africa through the Middle East and into Central and South Asia.

Protestors against the Muslim Brotherhood march in Cairo, Egypt, in 2013. The Brotherhood originated in Egypt.

Who are the Salafi Muslims and how influential are they?

Muslim religious scholars began using the term salaf over a millennium ago to refer to pious ancestors in faith. The term comes from an Arabic root meaning “to precede” and was for many years a general designation for early Muslims whose religious commitment made them exemplars for subsequent generations. About a century ago, prominent reformers Muhammad Abduh and Jalal ad-Din al-Afghani used the name Salafiya for their movement aimed at renewal of traditional values. More recently, the term has returned to more common usage in reference to a religio-cultural style or loosely organized school of thought that represents a decidedly “idealistic” interpretation of history. For contemporary Salafis, the concept of “reform” really means a return to, or recovery and renewal of, the values and practices they associate with the age of the Prophet and the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs (i.e., up to 661).

What is the current impact of the Salafis?

Salafi groups are reasserting their influence in many different political and cultural contexts, from the central Arab Middle East especially, but also well beyond. In places such as Egypt they have reinforced their influence by alliances with such politically organized and connected groups as the Muslim Brotherhood. Unfortunately, some Salafi groups have become increasingly prone to violent means in enforcing their more radical social and ethical norms. They are as hostile toward other self-described Muslims whom they declare destined for eternal damnation because they are guilty of all manner of “innovation” and heresy (that is, not truly Muslims at all), as they are to non-Muslims.

Who are the Wahhabi?

During the mid-late eighteenth century, a preacher and religious scholar named Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792, wah-HAAB) mounted an attack on what he regarded as un-Islamic elements among Muslims of the Arabian Peninsula. He targeted Sufi groups in particular and called for the destruction of shrines dedicated to holy personages and often associated with Sufi organizations. He influenced Ibn Saud, “founder” of the Saudi dynasty, who in turn adopted the nascent Wahhabi ideology.

Among the more interesting features of the Wahhabi approach to religion and theology is its insistence on the principle of the scholar’s responsibility for “independent investigation” (ijtihad, ij-ti-HAAD) and commensurate rejection of “unquestioning acceptance of tradition” (taqlid, tahk-LEED)—that is, simply swallowing whole what one has been told. Another is that Wahhabism claims as its theological forebear the redoubtable Ibn Taymiya—a brilliant, creative medieval thinker whose legacy has unfortunately been tarnished by uncritical (and unfair) association with more extreme forms of Wahhabi and Salafi elements.

Saudi public policy remains broadly influenced by the Wahhabi ideology, including an accelerated campaign to destroy historical sites (such as cemeteries and structures believed to date to Muhammad’s time) judged to foster inappropriate devotion and distract from “pure monotheism.” Wahhabi influence also characterizes the kingdom’s practice of funding projects elsewhere that adhere to Wahhabi standards of piety—such as replacing ornately decorated classic mosque architecture in regions such as war-ravaged Bosnia with much simpler, less colorful structures.

What kinds of organizations call themselves Ansar?

The Arabic term ansar (ahn-SAAR) means “helpers” and takes its broader religious meaning from a segment of the early Muslim community in Medina (after the Hijra) who earned the name from their deliberate support and assistance for the Prophet in engaging various factions in Medina. Various organizations have adopted the term in their formal titles, beginning more recently in the nineteenth-century Mahdist movement in the Sudan. There the Ansar continued to function well into the twentieth century even after Sudan’s independence in 1955. They were influential among tribal groups in Darfur (a large western region of the Sudan), and they supported the ongoing struggle against the central government in Khartoum. Still other groups far from Sudan have adopted the name more recently, as in one Ansar ash-Sharia (Partisans of Revealed Law), which rose as a faction in the post-Kaddafi Libyan revolution, and another based in Yemen. Both are extremist Salafi groups bent on eradicating “un-Islamic” beliefs and practices by violent means if necessary.

What are the factions called Hamas and Hizb Allah (Hezbollah)?

Hamas is an acronym for an Arabic expression meaning “Islamic Resistance Movement” (harakat al-muqawamat al-is-lamiyya). Originating, and still based, in the Palestinian region of Gaza, Hamas was in effect an activist offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Not satisfied with the Brotherhood’s relative passivity during the 1987 Palestinian intifada (in-ti-FAA-da, uprising), Hamas mobilized for the express purpose of resisting Israeli occupation. It continues to refuse to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist as a state and advocates engaging with Israel through military means. Hezbollah, the “Party of God,” is in itself a generic title for a variety of factions in various regions that adopt the name to distinguish themselves from enemies of Muslim community labeled as “Parties of Satan” (Hizb ash-Saytan). Political parties by this name exist, for example, in Iran, Libya, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. But by far the most publicized in recent events is the Lebanese Hezbollah, which arose to prominence during Lebanon’s protracted civil war, and especially during the years after the suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in 1983. Whereas membership in Hamas is largely (if not exclusively) Sunni, Hezbollah’s religious affiliation is Twelver Shi’i, with direct connections to Twelver Shi’i Iran. As such, the organization espouses the “political theology” of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, according to which true “Islamic” governance centers on the “rule of the [Islamic] jurisprudent”—vested, in this instance, in the Ayatollah Khomeini and his current successor, Ali Khamenei.

A Hezbollah flag is draped on a wall behind a praying Lebanese woman sitting next to the grave of her family, victims of an Israeli bombardment.

Are there any other analogous “parties” or “factions” active today? Are they all politically oriented? Do any espouse explicit use of violent means of protest or political engagement?

There are in fact dozens of such organizations in the Middle East alone, and many more across the globe in nations and regions with predominantly Muslim populations. Various organizations dedicated to “reformist” movements, from Morocco to Indonesia, go by a variety of monikers: front (jabha, JAB-ha), progress/revival/reawakening (nahda, NAH-da), renewal (tajdid, taj-DEED) mission/proselytization (dawa, DA-wa), revolution (thawr), assembly or group or association (jamaat, ja-MAA-at, jamiyyat, jam-EE-yat), struggle (jihad—including “inward” as well as “outward”), and union (ittihad, it-tee-HAAD), to name only the more common designations. By far the majority of these organizations reject violent means except in genuine instances of self-defense, and the “platforms” of most are largely if not exclusively oriented to engagement in the political arena. That is not to say their engagement both individually and corporately does not include religious concerns and agendas—any more than one might encounter, for example, in contemporary American politics.

ISLAM AND VIOLENCE

One often hears the term “holy war” associated with certain groups who call themselves Muslims. Are their motives genuinely religious and are such groups representative of Muslims in general?

Muslims and non-Muslims alike have unfortunately been using the term “holy war” for generations. The expression is an inappropriate rendering of the Arabic term jihad (ji-HAAD), whose root meaning is “striving” or “struggle.” What Muslims mean when they use the term to describe external military and political activities is something like “religiously justifiable struggle against injustice and oppression.” In other words, in its classical meaning the term jihad is roughly analogous to Christian “just war theory.” Most of the time the call for a jihad is 90 percent rhetoric, involving little or no serious reflection on what the tradition in its considerable depth and sophistication stipulates about criteria and conditions for waging a “just war.” Political and economic considerations invariably intrude.

While the word jihad means “struggle” or “striving” toward a spiritual goal, the use of the word by radical Islamists has equated it with “Holy War.”

Why is the expression “holy war” such a hot-button term?

Many non-Muslims express misgivings about what appears to be the Islamic idea of “holy war.” They are often frankly afraid because they have formed the opinion that Islam is a violent religion. Many people have unfortunately and most unfairly come to expect that behind every episode of hostage-taking or large-scale terrorism there lurks a band of swarthy, bloodthirsty Arab or Iranian Muslims. Every time journalists use the term “jihad,” either as part of a faction’s name, or to describe the “holy war” a Muslim leader has allegedly called for, millions of listeners or readers have their worst fears confirmed. “There they go again!” one hears people say too often, citing such examples as Khomeini’s death sentence on writer Salman Rushdie and Saddam Husayn’s attempts during the Gulf War to galvanize Islamic support for a jihad against all infidels defiling sacred Arabian soil. In short, “holy war” is a term too often tossed around loosely, and questions in several chapters here will address specific aspects of the term and its implications.

Does Islamic tradition insist on specific limits to the use of violent means?

Questions abound concerning the conditions for religious sanctioning of violent means, which Islamic tradition shares with more than one other major religious tradition. There is no doubt that it is an important issue about which understanding several complex aspects is important. First, Muslims regard Muhammad as model; second, the actual aspirations of many millions of Muslims are for a life of peace; third, conditions governing authentic jihad are numerous and demanding; and finally, Americans and Europeans must try to appreciate the pain that the western domination of the Middle East and other parts of the world over the past century has caused in populations across the globe.

What is Muhammad’s role in Muslim views about using violence?

Muhammad stands out as the prime exemplar of the ideal mode of fostering peaceful relations among interest groups and communities that are defined by overlapping or otherwise conflicting claims. The story of the Prophet’s replacing the Black Stone in the Kaba suggests, along with other traditional accounts, that Muhammad developed a public reputation very early as a trustworthy person and an effective negotiator. When envoys came south from Yathrib (later Medina) to offer Muhammad and the Muslim community a new home, part of what they wanted in return was that Muhammad act as arbitrator in various factional disputes then troubling their city. Tradition cites prominently Muhammad’s diplomacy in forging treaties and alliances. It emphasizes especially Muhammad’s preference for peaceful means and the centrality Muhammad accorded to the reconciliation of hearts.

Author Salman Rushdie was targeted for assassination because of his 1988 novel, The Satanic Verses, which many Muslims felt insulted the Prophet. Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, issued a fatwa in 1989 to have Rushdie killed. The fatwa has since been rescinded.

Why is Muhammad’s role in the unfolding of early Islamic history often portrayed so negatively in “western cultures”?

It is exceedingly difficult to see through the veil of dark images that has shrouded the picture of Muhammad in the thinking of many non-Muslims over the centuries. When non-Muslims read, for example, of Muhammad’s decision to resort to fight the Jewish tribes of Medina, they are shocked. Unfortunate events like these seem to blind one to anything positive in the early history of Islam, and non-Muslims rarely (if ever) get the Muslim side of the story. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Muhammad remains for Muslims the paragon of gentleness and concern for the needs of people. One always needs to look for the truth somewhere in between the ideal of utter perfection most communities see in their foundational figures and the jaundiced view taken by people who for many reasons prefer to cling to negative assessments of “others.”

Why is mutual understanding so hard to come by when it comes to such matters?

Part of the problem here is that there is sometimes a thin line between justifiable revolution and unlawful, treasonable action. How many colonial American preachers encouraged their congregations to support the “American revolution”? Whether in Northern Ireland or the Middle East, organizations like the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and Hamas have arisen to combat what they perceive as tyranny. Many of their members no doubt think of themselves as devout and sincerely religious. And many Irish-American Catholics and Arab-American Muslims who support these and other such causes financially no doubt regard their choice as highly ethical. But such support necessarily involves a terribly serious form of denial. It requires that one assert that no one on the “other side” is innocent, or at the very least, that it is sometimes acceptable to shed innocent blood to achieve a greater good.

Does the media accurately portray the notion that many Muslims, with support from clerics, are involved in terrorist activities?

Suppose a non-Christian living outside of the United States had heard that most Americans identify their country as a Judeo-Christian nation. Suppose that the only reports about Christians were of sectarian violence emanating from Northern Ireland. Would the conclusion be that Christians prefer violence? If IRA bombings and murders alone did not persuade people of that, suppose there were credible reports that some Irish Catholic priests regularly gave their blessings to such activities. Suppose further that reports from that quarter were reinforced by occasional news of “Christian” bombings and assassinations at abortion clinics in the United States. And suppose that there were accounts of how racist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Aryan Nation regularly cloaked their social views in biblical and other ostensibly religious teaching, and that organizations like them actively recruited with a message of hatred. Would that be enough to form an opinion that Christianity and violence somehow go together? Virtually everywhere, people have appealed to religion to justify actions and policies that most persons of good will would condemn as incompatible with their religious beliefs. Just because people claim to belong to a particular religious tradition does not mean that they fairly represent that tradition. It merely means that unscrupulous people can sometimes twist and manipulate religion for evil purposes.

How many different kinds of activist or extremist (i.e., violence-promoting) “jihadis” are there?

It is important to distinguish between two large categories of “jihadist” ideologies. For example, the “nationalist” type pursues strategy, objectives, and tactics limited in scope to a given political setting or nation-state. The Sunni organization based in Gaza and known as Hamas, for example, is focused sharply on the Palestinian cause; the Shi’ite and Iran-backed Hezbollah is centered in Lebanon and aims at what it regards as liberation from and destruction of the state of Israel; and the Taliban, with bases mostly in Pakistan currently, are intent on establishing Afghanistan as a Muslim state.

What about jihadism on a larger scale?

Some groups of “transnational” jihadis, such as al-Qaeda and related organizations, declare war on a more remote foe, typically identified as “the West”—especially the United States, with attention to its allies, Europe and Israel, as well as the non-Islamic governments of their own home countries. Transnational jihadists rally around what they claim are historical and ongoing Western-inspired offenses against, and systematic oppression of, Islam and Muslims. Just as the Iranian revolutionary ideologues have consistently condemned the United States as the Great Satan, transnational jihadis cast their struggle as a cosmic engagement between good and evil so intractable that only the most extreme forms of outward violence will affect any change. Anything short of constant warfare against this global enemy is collaboration and cowardice and refusal to engage in the struggle to reform Islam from the inner corruption that tempts Muslims to prefer comfort to warfare. Some preachers continue to invite martyrs for the cause, promising eternal rewards and support for their surviving families. Arguing that otherwise forbidden suicide is in this case “self-selected martyrdom,” they engage in contorted exegesis of the Quran for the purpose of giving the highest justification to all-out warfare. Though the vast majority of Muslim religious scholars abhor their ideological distortions, the extremists call for the indiscriminate slaughter of whoever happens to be in the path of their cause.

What motivates some highly influential religious scholars to adopt such radical ideologies when the vast majority do not go to such extremes?

Recent social science research suggests that neither, say, poverty nor the views of their own teachers are to blame here, as many might suppose. Much more important are broader sociological factors, especially lack of support in their academic background and educational networks. People trained in religious studies who lack the “connections” needed to secure stable and respectable jobs as local imams or faculty members in major state institutions are most likely to drift toward the fringe. One reason is that established governments typically limit the spread of extremist groups by controlling the ideologies taught in those state-controlled institutions. The research shows that while only 2–3 percent of scholars whose networks helped them get the “good” jobs were ever inclined toward radical ideologies, over 50 percent of those who lacked influential “connections” and could not land state positions became radicalized. These individuals, disaffected and willing to engage in questionable interpretations of the tradition in order to get followers from outside the “system,” are the teachers largely responsible for disseminating violent jihadist rationale.

Why was Ayatollah Khomeini so influential? Did he preach primarily military conflict with “the West”?

Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (1902–1989) is certainly best known for his strident invectives against the “West,” and especially against the United States. He was an accomplished orator and prolific writer and is widely regarded as the principle architect of the Iranian Revolution. Khomeini made his first public political declaration in the early 1940s, and he remained consistent in his views till his death. As for his views on jihad, Khomeini speaks of the traditional understanding of jihad or “struggle in the way of God” according to both its outward and inward aspects. The Greater Jihad, inner personal purification, is an absolute prerequisite for any outward attempts to establish justice and counter aggression. Without first establishing an interior conviction of this world’s worthlessness in comparison to the ultimate worth of the next world, the Lesser Jihad remains just another way of serving this-worldly concerns. It is worth noting that Iraq, not Iran, was the aggressor in the nearly decade-long Iran-Iraq war, in which Saddam Husayn employed chemical weapons.

The Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (1902–1989) was the architect of the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

Are the twenty-first-century uprisings in predominantly Muslim lands across North Africa, through the Central Middle East, and into West and South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan) directly and uniquely a result of the religious tradition of Islam?

In many instances what outsiders see Muslims doing in other parts of the world is not very different from what outsiders would do in an instant if they were in Muslims’ shoes. A primary difference, though, is that outsiders regard their own motives as political or economic while assuming that Muslims (outsiders seem unshakably convinced) are motivated by religion. The Afghan rebels have called their struggle against Russian military occupation a jihad, identifying themselves as mujahidin. Indeed the law of jihad does allow for military response to an invasion of one’s territorial sovereignty. Numerous groups of Muslims who use the word “jihad” in their names genuinely believe their actions are justifiable and done precisely in defense, for they consider foreign presence in their part of the world invasive and unwelcome. What is most important to note here is this: on balance, Islamic tradition simply does not encourage, let alone recommend unreservedly, violent solutions to human problems.

Most Americans seem to be convinced that Muslim armies spread Islam largely by executing non-Muslims who refused to convert—is this accurate?

Quite the contrary. Early Muslim armies had established various forms of Islamic government from Spain to what is now Northern India by about one hundred years after Muhammad’s death in 632. Over the next thousand years and more, when power changed hands across those lands and wherever Muslim regimes had been established subsequently, the new authorities battled against Muslim rulers and supporters of their regimes. Transfers of power from one dynasty have rarely (if ever) been orderly and peaceful, and it was mostly Muslims who suffered the consequences. Even accounting for a percentage of non-Muslims dying in Muslim invasions and subsequent periods of overt persecutions, the scores of times over twelve hundered years that Muslim dynasties and regimes supplanted other Muslim political entities would likely have accounted for significantly larger numbers of Muslim casualties than non-Muslim.

Did the Muslims pretty much invent “suicide bombing”?

This is not accurate. Here is some perspective on the unpleasant reality of suicide bombing: A careful study investigated the first forty-one such incidents taking place in the contemporary Middle East. The bombings occurred in Lebanon between 1982 and 1986. Researchers positively identified thirty-eight of the perpetrators and followed up with inquiries into their backgrounds, express motivations, and religious or ideological affiliations. Twenty-eight were avowedly secularist, communist, or members of leftist Arab organizations. Three were Christian, including a young woman who was a primary school teacher. Only seven of the thirty-eight were known to have espoused a distinctly Islamic religious ideology. It is also important that the first suicide bombings in recent times occurred not in the Middle East, but in Sri Lanka, and were perpetrated by members of the revolution Tamil Tigers, who were almost entirely of Hindu religious background.

A widespread belief is that in recent conflicts, non-Muslims have been the principal target of jihadi Muslims? Is this based on factual information?

In more recent times, Muslim extremists have killed far more Muslims than non-Muslims and continue to do so. Whether in the nearly ten-year Iran-Iraq war, in which an estimated half million or more died in hostilities, or through multiple counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the Sudan’s attempted genocide of the Muslim (but ethnically “non-Arab”) inhabitants of Darfur, or jihadi attempts to establish bases of operation in nations like Mali, or in the bloodbaths attending the revolt against Syrian president Bashar as-Asad, their victims have been almost entirely other Muslims. Even taking into consideration recent violence against Middle Eastern Christians, internal strife associated with the “Arab Spring,” from North Africa to Egypt to Syria, is further evidence of the predominance of Muslim-on-Muslim violence. And in spite of the Prophet’s injunctions against harming fellow believers, these factions have waved off any concern by arguing that their targets have forfeited the right to be called “true” Muslims because of alleged collaboration with the enemy or because they have clearly forsaken the true spirit of Muhammad.

ISLAM AND THE MESSAGE OF PEACE

If there are indeed “moderate” Muslims out there somewhere, why do they not loudly denounce any and all Muslim associations with violence?

As a matter of fact, and a seldom reported record, Muslim leaders have been denouncing and attempting to counteract claims of Islamic legitimacy by countless agitators for violence and supporters of groups like al-Qaeda since immediately after 9/11. Just as the data from international European police reporting have received virtually no press coverage, neither have the outcries of major Muslim groups and individual religious scholars throughout the past ten years simply have not been considered newsworthy because, some would argue, they do not support the dominant narrative about Islam and Muslims. For every fatwa calling for the destruction of “Zionists and Crusaders” (as in Usama bin Ladin’s infamous 1998 declaration), there have been scores (perhaps even hundreds) of counter-fatwas.

Are there any examples of significant immediate Muslim denunciations of those events?

Perhaps more surprising for the vehemence of his denunciation was Shaykh Muham-mad Husayn Fadlallah, spiritual leader of Lebanon’s “islamist/jihadist” Shi’ite organization known as the Party of God (Hizb Allah). Saying that he was “horrified” by these “barbaric and un-Islamic” attacks, the shaykh condemned the misguided notion that any such act can be considered a form of laudable martyrdom. No suicide will be rewarded hereafter, because it is a crime; and no action that disregards the limitations placed on genuine jihad (as the 9/11 events did) is ever acceptable. Furthermore, he insisted that such acts in no way serve their intended purpose, and in fact work against the cause of Palestinians in particular and Muslims in general. “It is a horrible massacre on every level with no positive results for the basic causes of Islam.” Fervent believers in Islam, the shaykh insisted, must adhere to the tradition’s humane values; and though his own organization is opposed to the U.S. government and its policies, it does not blame the American people and cannot countenance the kind of action done on 9/11 for the purpose of retaliating against people who are not at fault for their administration’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, there remains the vexing matter of Hezbollah’s ongoing involvement in Middle Eastern violence.

Are there any distinctively Islamic approaches to the matter of international peace?

The vast majority of Muslims long for a world at peace. They sincerely believe that Islamic values seek to promote the possibility of such a world. Their tradition, they believe, stands not only for the absence of war, but for that positive state of safety, security, and freedom from anxiety that uniquely results from the condition of grateful surrender to God in faith (islam, iman). Those who get their entire picture of Muslims from media coverage of current events need to understand that they are getting a very limited perspective. Any Malaysian or Pakistani television viewer who relied on that medium to convey a sense of American values might very well develop a similarly truncated picture of Americans.

Have there been any modern and/or contemporary Muslim “pacifists”?

Quite a few, actually. Unfortunately news of violence-prone extremists invariably keeps such highly positive and idealistic organizations out of the news. Among earlier modern pacifist Muslim movements, Khuda Khidmatgar’s organization of one hundred thousand Muslim Pathans, led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, espoused a non-violent program of civil resistance and social reform under the British Raj during the twentieth century. In addition, numerous individual Muslim pacifists have contributed notably to non-violent activism. An Azhar-trained Syrian scholar named Jawdat Said is a good example. As early as the 1950s he condemned violence-prone organizations and movements as shortsighted and ultimately self-destructive. His public commitment inspired his sons to refuse compulsory service in the Syrian army, and they paid for their courage by being denied the right to graduate from the University of Damascus. Other prominent individuals who have spoken out in favor of Islamic non-violence include Iranian Ayatollah Mohammad ash-Shirazi, Saudi doctor Khalis Jalabi, Iraqi writer Khalid Kishtainy, and Indian scholar Asghar Ali Engineer. Most have preferred the more active term “civic jihad” to the passive-sounding “non-violence.”

Did any prominent Muslims denounce the atrocities of 9/11/2001 immediately after those events occurred?

Yes, there were many such denunciations, though the American press made virtually no mention of them. Two statements issued within forty-eight hours of the tragic events stand out especially, precisely because they were by individuals whose public positions might make many Americans think they would be prime examples of the last Muslims one might expect to make such statements. The first was from Shaykh Muhammad Sayyid al-Tantawi, the rector of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the premier academic institution of traditional Sunni Islamic teaching. Shaykh Tantawi, a conservative cleric by any measure, delivered a weekly sermon in Cairo to an audience of thousands, insisting that God would punish all who attack innocent people. Such attacks, he argued, display only cowardice and stupidity and will result in their perpetrators facing a harsh judgment in the next life.

What about larger-scale, so-called “peace movements” that are more recent?

Again there have been more than a few such contemporary movements. Three stand out and exemplify their presence in various parts of the world. One takes its inspiration from twentieth-century Kurdish/Turkish thinker Said Nursi. His monumental Quran commentary the Treatise (or Epistle) of Light (Risale-i Nur) is the key text for the movement’s nine million followers now spread across the globe. Another arises from the thought of contemporary Turkish scholar Fethullah Gülen and focuses on developing intercultural connections especially through engagement in education. Members of the organization tend to be highly educated professionals, including physicians, lawyers, and engineers, as well as academics spread across a broad range of disciplines. Another important movement is called the Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN), whose presence impacts more than eighteen Asian nations through a host of social projects. None of these movements identifies itself explicitly with terms such as “peace-oriented,” “non-violent,” or “pacifist.” By calling themselves “Islamic” they intend to communicate an inherent concern and even active drive toward the peace that that name implies for the vast majority of Muslims. Among the more striking features of these developments are their truly international scope and diversity and the overwhelmingly positive impulse that has given rise to them.

Bawa Muhaiyaddeen was a Sufi shaykh from Sri Lanka who preached peace among Muslims and non-Muslims.

Are there any examples of contemporary Sufi views of war and violence?

A Sri Lankan Sufi named Bawa Muhaiyaddeen (d. 1986), who lived much of his adult life in the United States, is known for his efforts to teach peace to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. His writing establishes a thoroughly positive and irenic tone, facing head on that most intractable of problems, the fate of Jerusalem. After a lengthy and eyeopening chronology of the city’s changing fortunes over the centuries, the author appeals to world leaders to struggle against factionalism and enmity. Bawa bases his pacifist spirituality on the grounds of the rights of all to justice, on faith and the virtues of patience and trust in God, and on God as source of all peace. His treatment of Jihad in general likewise focuses entirely on the inward dimension, the “Greater Struggle” of self-conquest fought with the weapons of patience, gratitude, trust, and praise. In his writings, Bawa makes an idealistic distinction between the wars Muhammad fought and those that modern states wage against one another: the former served the spread of truth, the latter only promote mindless bloodshed. He treats the nasty business of outward warfare by referring to the strictures with which Islamic tradition has sought to limit the practice of justifiable conflict. He emphasizes how the Prophet prayed while others did battle, how he counseled lenience toward captives, and restraint.

What does Bawa Muhaiyaddeen think Islam’s positive role should be?

In Bawa Muhaiyaddeen’s strikingly non-triumphalistic view, Islam’s task is to unify humanity in an inclusivist fashion. He thus considers virtually all scriptures as divine Word (including the Hindu Puranas and Zoroastrian Avesta). People must seek to view the world as God sees it rather than from partisan perspectives. He stands thus at the opposite end of the spectrum from, say, Sayyid Qutb and other recent “radicals,” who have had enough of patience and long-suffering. But Bawa’s efforts to build a community of peace-seekers near Philadelphia provides a wonderful example of one contemporary Muslim spirituality and will offer every reader much to ponder.

RELIGION AND POLITICS

Where, in general, do religion and political power come together?

Virtually every religious tradition has had to come to terms with its relationship to civil authority and power. As often as not, the relationship varies at least slightly from one political setting to another. Even in the United States many traditions have shifted their positions historically. Even the standard and seemingly straightforward principle of “separation of church and state” has been reinterpreted in various ways, with prominent religious figures seeking and winning national elected office as high as the U.S. Senate. The situation has historically been still more complex where political rulers have declared one religious tradition the “state creed.” That has often meant hard times for members of faith communities that have not enjoyed official patronage and protection. Popular perception nowadays tends to label Islam as the tradition most likely to take political shape, as though no other has ever done so. But ample data from the history of religion suggests that questions the relationship of temporal to spiritual power have arisen for virtually every major tradition at some time or other.

Are there characteristically Muslim views about the convergence of religion and political power?

Muslims often describe their tradition as a “total way of life,” a comprehensive approach that goes far beyond mere ritual observance or showing up at the mosque once a week. Some believe that such an all-encompassing teaching must ultimately be expressed in political terms, referring to early Muslim community life under the Prophet’s leadership in Medina as the ideal. Throughout history Muslims have experimented with various models for balancing or integrating religious and civil authority. Some have worked well enough, allowing for freedom of religious practice and expression among members of religious minorities under Muslim rule. In fact, the historical record suggests that Muslims have been at least as successful as any other group at administering religiously sponsored regimes fairly and evenhandedly. Muslims in various parts of the world today continue to believe that an Islamic government represents the best hope of justice in a troubled world. But in a world where religious pluralism is increasingly evident, dividing humankind along religious lines seems a less than desirable option. The challenge now, as in the past, is to live by the Quranic dictum “There is no compulsion in religion.”

Is it ever really useful to label conflicts as “religious wars”?

Wars are very seldom fought for purely religious reasons. Communities of faith often develop side-by-side in relative harmony. When problems arise, they are almost always initially political, economic, and social. Then, often enough, those who wish to keep the pot boiling invoke age-old religious differences as though they were the cause of every conflict. They remind their constituents that if they really want to be loyal, they will not rest until some ancient slight to the faith has been set right. Underneath it all is the awareness that wanting to destroy a people’s will requires attacking the most powerful symbols of their identity, some of which are bound to be religious. So, for example, in Bosnia during the 1990s, a major thrust of Serb policy was to obliterate as completely as possible all visible signs of Muslim presence, destroying especially ancient mosques and libraries and leaving paved parking lots in their place. Numerous contemporary examples of significant conflict in predominantly Muslim lands feature Muslim-on-Muslim violence, even if the aggressors “dress up” their rhetoric to gather “religious” sympathy by insisting that the people they kill are in fact not “true” Muslims at all.

If Muslims all believe that Islam is not “just a religion” but a “total way of life,” doesn’t that imply perfect consonance of religious and civil/political spheres?

Americans often criticize Islam as inherently flawed because it allegedly refuses to distinguish between religious and civil spheres. On the contrary, there have historically been at least as many Islamically related regimes with separate administrative structures to deal with religious affairs as those that made no policy distinction between religious and civil spheres. This view also conveniently ignores centuries of European and American history. The critique might have some credibility except that those who voice it most loudly are the very people who increasingly insist that their own religious convictions are a legitimate standard of political action. A fine example of the melding of religious and civil spheres in America is the rhetoric of more than a few recent State of the Union addresses, in which a president hints that because of divine guidance, America is virtually infallible. But there are, and always have been, other far more spectacular examples of political ideology cloaked in the garb of religion.

How can one sum up the various models of administration and governance in Islamic history?

At various times in Islamic history different models of leadership have predominated. By far the single most important has been that of the caliphate. In that model, the successor to the Prophet, the caliph, has ideally served as both political and spiritual leader, Commander of the Army and of the Faithful. After its beginning in Medina and reestablishment for some eighty-nine years in Damascus, Baghdad was the caliphate’s center for some five centuries; but the caliphate’s authority did not go uncontested. Several rival caliphates laid claims, most notably in Cordoba and Cairo (under an Ismaili Shi’i dynasty called the Fatimids). In the mid-tenth century the caliphate suffered a severe abridgment when a Turkic dynasty overcame Baghdad and vested the caliph’s temporal power in a new parallel institution called the sultanate. After the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258, various dynasties made largely symbolic attempts to prop up or otherwise revive the moribund institution. Nowadays the caliphate is a memory, though some still dream of its resurgence.

Why do religious beliefs so often seem to be associated with intolerance?

Human beings dislike shades of gray. They prefer to convince themselves that they can keep truth and falsehood neatly separated. There is “us” and there is “them,” and they know who has the truth. Stereotyping and demonizing are natural next steps. Not only are “they” wrong religiously, they are somehow not quite up to most people’s standards of humanity and thus are to be pitied if not simply dismissed as irrelevant. Intolerance of religious diversity is a serious historical evil, a force that can easily be exploited by people of ill intent. And yet it costs so little to approach the massive fact of religious pluralism with an open mind.

Have there been other movements based on other models?

Claimants to leadership of the imamate type arose from time to time. Mahdist movements (Sunni groups that focus on the return of a divinely “guided” person called the Mahdi) have been attempted with varying degrees of success until modern times. One abortive attempt at such a movement occurred as recently as 1979, around the beginning of the Iranian revolution and the storming of the American embassy in Tehran. At that time Sunni and Shi’i Muslims alike were observing the beginning of the fourteenth Islamic century. In Tehran Twelver Shi’ites relived the suffering of Husayn against the evil tyrant in their struggle against the evil Shah and the United States in regular observances that mark the beginning of every year, but take on renewed importance at the turn of a century. In Mecca a small Mahdist group, recalling the tradition that with each new century God would raise up for Islam a “renewer,” took over the sanctuary of the Kaba and proclaimed a short-lived new age and paid with their lives for daring to violate the holy place.

There’s been much talk concerning the fear of Islamic “invasion” of the West. Is the Muslim goal to restore the caliphate?

A small minority of extremists cherish the notion of a restored caliphate. But such a scenario presupposes several conditions that one looks for in vain in the history of Is-lamic political regimes. First, the caliphate of nostalgia is supposed to have been a truly global centralized rule in which the “commander of the faithful” exacted the fealty of Muslims everywhere. In fact, at no time during the history of the caliphate did it extend across the full expanse of territories in which Islam would eventually become a dominant presence or majority faith community. At its broadest extent, the caliphate, by any account a vast project, stretched from Spain to Northwest India. However, it never became established firmly in Iberia, and within half a century after the Abbasid dynasty had founded its new capital of Baghdad in 762, the fabric of the caliphate began to unravel from the edges. By the early ninth century, restive provinces broke off as practically independent amirates; by the mid-tenth century, a Shi’i faction had become the power behind the throne in Baghdad; a century later, the Seljuk Turks had virtually neutered the caliphate by establishing the sultanate as the de facto parallel institution with all the real power.

Were there “rival caliphates” elsewhere in Islamdom?

By the tenth and eleventh centuries, rival caliphates were well established in Spain and Egypt. In other words, the political map of Islamdom quickly took on the look of a crazy quilt, and the notion of a resurrected global Muslim rule is in reality a dream that has never come true as the people who fantasize about it might imagine. By the time the Ottoman dynasty incorporated the great middle swath of what had been the Byzantine Empire, even that great power included only part of North Africa and went no further east than Iraq. In addition, the kind of caliphate whose resurrection radical/puritanic/extremist groups envision, is not the extended dominion represented for several generations by the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. They look back instead to the pristine days of the Prophet and his four immediate successors in Medina, the Rightly Guided caliphs. They typically regard the subsequent dynastic regimes with their pretensions to royalty as betrayals of the Prophetic age. The problem here is that the Rightly Guided caliphs ruled a much reduced realm even at its greatest extent.

What other factors militate against a revived caliphate?

The idea of the caliphate presupposes the seamless integration—indeed, the simple identity of political and religious institutions. The historical reality is that the majority of the many political regimes under Islamic auspices across the globe over the course of more than a millennium actually represent a wide variety of blends and interrelationships of political and religious institutions. Take early modern Iran, for example. In 1500, Shi’i Islam was proclaimed the “state” creed by the ascendant Safavid dynasty. For most of the subsequent five hundred years, the royal and religious establishments each remained distinct. Religious officialdom played the role of a loyal opposition for the most part, and at no time did religious scholars mount a serious campaign to exercise actual political rule. Not until the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 did Khomeini’s radical reinterpretation of Iranian Shi’i traditions of political theology call for direct religious establishment control over political institutions.

Have rulers in states/regions with predominantly Muslim populations engaged or expressed overtly religious values to galvanize popular support?

No ruler wants to risk loss of authority by undercutting the religious legitimation upon which rule depends. But powerful religious figures and movements have often tugged at the allegiance of Muslims in many cultures, thus increasing the likelihood of divided loyalties among a ruler’s subjects. Efforts to use such forces to advantage have often materialized in royal support for the institutions that serve the followers of charismatic religious leaders. From Morocco to Indonesia, enormous sums of money have gone into the endowment, building or renovation, and general financial support of holy places associated with holy persons. Some tomb-shrines have become the centers of entire towns. Those of Mulay Idris I (d. c. 793) on Mount Serhun near Fez, Morocco, and of Mulay Idris II (d. 828) in Fez are two such focal points. For centuries Moroccan governments have paid official attention to the maintenance of these holy sites, for devotion to these two Friends of God and descendants of Muhammad runs too deep among the people to ignore.

Given recent upheavals across the Arab Middle East and North Africa, especially the resurgence of al-Qaeda and related groups, what are the chances that those striving to resurrect the caliphate will threaten global stability and overrun the “Islamic World”?

Here, as always, historical perspective is essential. First, of the scores of proclaimed caliphates that various groups have announced over the past five hundred years, virtually none have attained greater than regional success and/or remained significantly influential for more than a generation or two. Second, in more recent memory and back as far as 1980, a group such as the Taliban proudly conferred on their leader, Mulla Omar, the name “Commander of the Faithful,” a primary historical title of the caliph. No matter how loudly they shout their assumed prerogatives, the Taliban will likely remain a threat to regional stability in South Asia and not far beyond. Third, even though groups such as the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Syria” (ISIL/S) boldly advertise their establishment of a “caliphate” for which they claim sovereignty from the Mediterranean to Iran (with designs well beyond that, presumably), their recent alarming successes depend heavily on political and social factors that can still be reversed.

While “ISIL” might (like earlier temporarily successful attempts to reestablish a caliphate) manage to consolidate some territory and advertise its success in attempts to recruit young fighters, there are hundreds of millions of Muslims from Morocco to Malaysia who want nothing to do with such a development and who are horrified at ISIL’s ideology and savagery. Finally, many major Muslim religious and legal scholars from the most respected and prestigious Islamic institutions have issued unmistakable denunciations of these extremists, their pretensions, and their methods as contrary to Islamic law’s restrictions on the conduct of war and in no way representing Islam’s deepest values. ISIL, they insist, has no right to use the term “Islamic” in its title.

Are there other examples of rulers promoting religious values by promoting popular devotion and “shrines”?

Further to the east is an instructive example of a different sort of shrine associated with the legitimation of an Islamic ruling dynasty, the Timurid (referring to “descendants Timur Lang, aka Tamerlane). In Iran and central Asia, rulers funded architectural projects as part of their programs of charitable works that would demonstrate their own genuine Islamic values. But this was not purely for show and often represents deep religious commitment on the part of these princely patrons. Ruling class figures were often genuinely attached to the teachings and legacy of venerable spiritual teachers. Timur Lang, for example, was so taken with the spirit of the already long-deceased Shaykh Ahmad Yasawi (d. 1166) that he undertook a major architectural project to honor the shaykh. In 1397 he built a glorious new tomb at the site of the original grave. Timur became personally involved in the project, even to stipulating the central dome’s height of 126 feet. Highly visible near an oasis along a pilgrimage and caravan road, this splendid work was a statement of Timur’s devotion as well as a monument to the shaykh.

Is such “devotion” not really a cover for political motives—more akin to currying favor among the wider population of believers?

Political motives do not necessarily rule out genuine devotion, though they may indeed cast a shadow of doubt on the sincerity of a ruler’s claim of religious motivation. Many Ottoman Sultans well into modern times engaged in the renovation of shrines and tombs, with credible evidence of authentic piety. In fact, even during times when rulers have felt the need to officially suppress overt veneration of Friends of God and force devotees to go underground, those very authorities themselves may have continued to be devotees. For example, Jalal ad-Din Rumi’s (d. 1273) tomb in Konya was originally built under a Saljuqid ruler, a predecessor dynasty to the Ottomans. But under Sulayman’s rule, the tomb, already a popular place of pilgrimage for generations, was renovated and the facilities expanded. Now Rumi’s final resting place provides a stunningly ironic example of the enormous power of such holy places.

Has this dynamic ever worked in reverse, with rulers trying to undermine popular devotion to a major religious figure?

When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (d. 1938) officially proclaimed the secular Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923, he suppressed the Sufi orders because they represented too great a potential force for disruption in his experiment in governing a Muslim nation. Members of the Mevlevi tariqa were officially disbanded and no longer allowed to gather publicly. But the Turkish Ministry of Culture continues to subsidize Rumi’s tomb as a “museum,” and pilgrims continue to visit it as a shrine. A striking tribute to the enduring spirit of Rumi (and indirectly of scores of other holy persons) appears on a 5,000 Turkish lire currency note in use until inflation rendered it virtually worthless: one side depicts a sternly serious Ataturk in profile; the other, a benignly smiling Rumi next to the fluted green dome beneath which three dervishes whirl. On balance, political rulers throughout history and in many cultural and religious contexts have run a broad gamut of modes of expressing, cultivating, and, of course, manipulating religious beliefs for their own purposes.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (d. 1938) founded the secular Turkish Republic after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi ruled Iran from 1941 until the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The Pahlavi shahs were considered by many Muslims to have been heavily influenced by the West and Russia.

Has Iran always been ruled by radical Shi’ite “clerics” like Khomeini and his successor, Khamenei?

Iran has been “officially” a Shi’i nation since around 1501—a relatively small portion of the Persian people’s very long history, dating back as far as 2800 B.C.E. In the early sixteenth century, a Turkic dynasty with Sufi background, called the Safavids, came to power and declared Twelver Shi’ism the “state creed.” For some 480 years, the religious establishment of scholars and specialists in Sharia functioned as a kind of loyal opposition in relation to the royal authorities. The Safavids were sandwiched between the two other “gunpowder empires”—the Ottomans and the Mughals, both Sunni dynasties. They engaged militarily with the Ottomans over several centuries, and some argue that by distracting the Ottomans in contests over territory the Safavids may well have prevented the Turks from conquering more of Europe. The Safavid dynasty weakened toward the end of the seventeenth century and suffered from an Afghan inter-regnum after a Pashtun invasion in 1722. After several decades of political instability, Iran was again stabilized by another Turkic dynasty, the Qajar, in 1794. From their new capital in Tehran, the Qajars ruled until overthrown by the Pahlavi family, an indigenous and short-lived Iranian dynasty.

How did Iran undergo such radical change after the mid-twentieth century?

Under the two Pahlavi shahs, Iran’s foreign relations were marked by increasing influence by outsiders, especially Russia, Britain, and the United States. One notorious example of foreign interference was the CIA overthrow of Musaddiq’s interruption in Pahlavi rule in 1953—an event that still colors Iran views of “the West.” In 1963, an ayatollah named Ruhollah Khomeini spearheaded a popular attempt to overthrow the second Pahlavi shah and was exiled to Iraq. An inveterate firebrand, Khomeini continued to annoy Iraq’s Baath rulers until Saddam Hussein banished him to France in the early 1970s, where he continued to agitate for the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. His Iranian Revolution succeeded in early 1979. The timing was powerfully symbolic, marking the very start of the Islamic lunar year 1400, and redolent of the ancient tradition that God would raise up a “renewer” at the outset of every (Islamic) century. Khomeini implemented what was a totally new political theology for modern Iran, centered as it was on the “Oversight of Religious Lawgiver,” and seeking to foster a rare example of contemporary theocratic regime.

The destruction of the sixteenth-century Bridge of Mostar in 1993 by Croatian forces was a symbol of major divisions between Serbs and Croats.

What, if any, is the religious connection with the late-twentieth-century strife among Muslims and Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia?

Islam began to develop a significant presence in the Balkans with the Ottoman conquest of 1463. Christianity had already been deeply rooted among the Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs for many centuries. Conversion to Islam, while generally not coerced by the Ottomans, was definitely associated with foreign domination. Although the Croats and Serbs have by no means always been peaceful neighbors, there have been periods of still greater hostility between the Christians, who consider themselves the inheritors of the land, and the Muslims, who are often regarded as invaders. For many non-Muslim Bosnians, all things even remotely identifiable as Turkish represent the remnants of a historic scourge whose vestiges they would like to eliminate. Bosnian Serbs, with the urging of the government of Serbia in Belgrade, have been engaged in the systematic eradication of virtually every visible reminder of the Ottoman presence that they associate with Islam. Scores of historic mosques, libraries, bridges, and other architectural treasures have been destroyed, all in an attempt to eradicate the identity of the Muslim people of Bosnia.

What has all the talk about “ethnic” cleansing got to do with religion?

The peoples of the Balkans are generally of Western Slavic stock, so the term “ethnic cleansing” is an inaccurate description of recent events in the republics of the former Yugoslavia. All of the inhabitants of the region given the national designation of Bosnia (comprised of an eastern section called Bosnia and a western called Hercegovina) speak a Slavic language often called Serbo-Croatian. While there are some differences in the ways Bosnian Croats, Serbs, and Muslims speak, the differences are analogous to those that distinguish British English from American English. Recent events in the Balkans have resulted largely from political decisions that have sought to aggravate divisions among people of various religious communities who had been learning to live together peacefully. As such, the religious distinctions are decidedly secondary, but a handy tool for demagogues whose success depends on their ability to promote divisiveness and hatred.

What is one example of a Christian power declaring war on Muslims for religious reasons?

In 1989, on the six hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic launched his campaign for a Greater Serbia with a blood-curdling speech on the site of that historic conflict. He spoke of how Prince Lazar, who had died a glorious martyr’s death defending his homeland against the Turks in 1389, was a Christ-figure and the Muslims were the Christ-killers. Milosevic then hinted that he was the new Prince Lazar whose mission was to reverse the score, and he soon launched a savage onslaught against the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina, tearing apart a society in which Croatian Catholics, Serbian Orthodox, and Bosnian Muslims had lived in peace for many years. Even now, few careful observers of the Balkan conflict would identify religion as the true instigating factor, let alone claim that Christianity is inherently and irredeemably violent.

CONCERNS OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MUSLIMS

Is there an “Islamic economics”?

Beginning with the Quran, Islamic tradition has had specific concerns about economic transactions in relation to economic justice. Muhammad himself had been a businessman, working with the caravan trade owned by his first wife, Khadija. As in so many other matters, Muslims find an exemplar in the Medinan society of the Prophet’s day. One issue the Quran addresses at least indirectly is that of considering money as “product” rather than as a simple means of exchange. In effect the Quran regards money as a measure of goods and services, not itself a basis for making more money.

Given the realities of contemporary economic life, can “Islamic economics” actually be workable these days?

Global banking and market systems are built on the concept that one can make money by loaning or investing it, without at the same time producing anything else. So how do Muslims manage? Many, of course, have simply been going along with the “system.” But there has been increasing interest in new attempts to devise creative ways to make money work according to the principle that all parties to financial transactions—not just the borrower—must share equally in the risk as well as the profits. In other words, the focus of all parties is on the success of the project being funded rather than on the financial transaction. In addition, investors must screen their options carefully; the final criterion is not the promise of highest returns, but the certainty that the eventual product will be compatible with Islamic religious values (e.g., no stock in companies that produce weapons, alcohol, or pornography, or have gaming concerns). In that same spirit, Islamic banking provides for interest-free loans to the truly needy.

A Muslim woman shops at a vegetable stand in Delhi, India. Muslim values concerning economics are much less adversarial than in many Western cultures; the customer is considered a partner, not merely a consumer to be used.

What is the ultimate goal of Islamic values regarding economics?

Muslims engaged in implementing traditional Islamic values in today’s global marketplace face a major challenge, but the goal is to ensure social equity and keep the profit-motive subordinate to a higher principle. This is Islam’s major contribution to the evolution of “business ethics” in our time. Less adversarial than the financial arrangements most people have become accustomed to, the emphasis in Islamic banking is on cooperation, so that the customer is primarily a partner. Attempts to define “Islamic economics” as a discipline began in India during the 1930s and 1940s, not long before the creation of Pakistan.

A detail from a stained-glass window at the Saint-Julien cathedral in Sarthe, France, shows Adam and Eve's temptation in the Garden of Eden. Muslims and Christians share this and other stories from their holy books.

Where does this perspective fit on the spectrum of modern economic systems?

In theory, Islamic economics stands somewhere between capitalist free enterprise and socialist control: it seeks to maintain market forces, but within the limits of broad social consciousness. But there is as yet nothing like consensus on a coherent theory among Muslim economists. The Quran, for example, forbids riba (ree-BAA), a term generally understood to mean “taking interest,” but economists do not agree precisely with what that means for today. In practice, developments are largely limited to the field of banking. The first modern Islamic bank was established in Dubai in 1975, but over the past twenty years or so, the experiment has grown dramatically. Magazines pitched to Muslims now include increasingly numerous ads for businesses that invite participation from people looking for sound investment opportunities that are also religiously acceptable (halal, ha-LAAL).

Are there Islamic websites?

Since the Internet has become such a handy way to communicate and advertise, naturally Muslims are finding ways to use it to good advantage. A cursory flip through the pages of almost any popular magazine published for a Muslim readership turns up dozens of interesting items. As expected, publishers and bookstores specializing in Islamic materials are among the most numerous advertisers. A close second are vendors of miscellaneous supplies of interest to Muslims, including clothing and jewelry with religious calligraphy; devotional materials such as prayer rugs, pictures of Mecca, and wall plaques with Quranic calligraphy; educational tools such as a “Pilgrimage to Mecca” board game; recorded versions of Quran recitation; and a growing array of software items to aid in the traditional religious sciences. Next come ads for special services such as arrangement of travel for pilgrimage, both the Hajj and the Umra (minor pilgrimage outside the formal season of Hajj) to Saudi Arabia, and programs in Islamic Studies at Islamic colleges. Muslim social service agencies seeking to raise funds for the care of orphans and the indigent are increasingly visible on the Internet as well. A type of advertising that seems to be generating increasing interest in this category of special services for Muslims consists of listings of financial options and banking and investment services that take into account the ethical concerns of those who believe Muslims ought to avoid the established institutions of mainstream capitalism if at all possible.

Are there any Quranic teachings that relate to contemporary understandings of the material world?

Beginning with the Quran, important Islamic texts and thinkers have addressed themselves to environmental issues. Take this text from the Quran for example: “Do they not see how each thing God has created, down to the very least, most humbly prostrates itself to God as its shadow revolves from the right and the left? To God all in heaven and on earth prostrates itself; from beasts to angels none withholds haughtily. In reverent fear of their transcendent Lord they do what they are bidden” (Quran 16:48–50). Unlike the Bible, the Quran contains no integrated narrative of creation, suggests that God would surely need no rest after his “work,” and hints that a “day” might actually be a very long time. In both sources Adam is the first human being, but the Quran’s descriptions of the material vary from dust to semen to water to a clot of blood. Though the Quran’s Adam also knows the names of all creatures, the emphasis is on God’s knowledge rather than Adam’s. In the Quranic stories, human beings are not created in God’s image, for that would compromise the divine transcendence.

A view of the Old City of Jerusalem, Israel. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre is at the top, right. Jerusalem is considered a holy city by Christians, Jews, and Muslims alike.

How do the Bible and Quran differ with respect to the creation myth?

In general the Quran seems to place greater emphasis on God’s sovereignty and power than does the biblical account. Whereas the Bible describes creation as a single original action, the Quran suggests that God is involved in creation as an ongoing activity, reasserting His creative prerogative with the emergence of each new living being. In the Bible, God seems to commission the first people unreservedly to take charge of the earth. Islamic tradition also regards the creation as given to humans to use, but God seems to hesitate a bit in turning the operation over to Adam and Eve. God offered to Heaven, Earth, and the Mountains the “trust” of watching over creation. They declined out of fear, so God offered the Trust to humankind. Adam accepted, unjust and foolish as he was—and ungrateful in addition. When God informed his angels he was preparing to entrust creation to Adam as his representative (literally, caliph, vice regent), they warned the Creator that human beings would surely act wickedly. God assured the angels that the risk was worth taking. God reckoned it was a gamble worth taking for He had called forth from Adam’s loins and assembled all of his yet unborn descendants and asked them, “Am I not your Lord?” They had responded as one and without hesitation, “Yes, we are witnesses to that!” (Quran 33:72, 2:30, 7:10, 172).

Can Muslims and Christians come together on matters of environmental stewardship?

Any discussion of religious attitudes toward the care and keeping of the planet is bound to run head-on into the unpleasant fact that virtually no major religious community can boast a very impressive record in implementing its stated values. Unfortunately, greed quickly swamps lofty but fragile ideals in its wake. However unrealistic it may seem to speak of a tradition’s ideals without taking a hard look at how human beings have actually behaved, ideals do need to be restated. Muslims and Christians as communities need to get serious about understanding their own traditions’ mandates about environmental concerns. Then there may be more solid ground on which to discuss shared responsibilities about confronting the global tendency to sacrifice the earth on the altar of the great god Profit.

ISLAM AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

What is the role of “sacred place/space” in contemporary international affairs, especially in the Middle East?

Islamic tradition has expressed the most expansive sense of sacred place and has retained the strongest sense of traditional orientation to a sacred center. To the Arabian cities of Mecca and Medina come pilgrims from all over the world to commemorate the central events in the prophetic missions of Abraham and Muhammad. When religionists decry the presence of non-Muslim military personnel on Arabian soil, they raise the unacceptable, if rather unlikely, prospect of an infidel invasion of the Holy Cities. To the Iraqi towns of Najaf and Karbala, Shi’ite pilgrims have come over the centuries to commemorate the deaths of Ali and his martyr-son Husayn. It was in part to liberate these two holy sites from Saddam Hussein that Khomeini persisted in the war with Iraq. Somewhere in Iraq even now, some Shi’ite mullah is surely exhorting his people to defend these sanctuaries of the martyrs from defilement by outsiders.

Western Wall of the Jewish Temple, popularly known as the “Wailing Wall” because of its association with annual lamentation of the fast observed on the Ninth of Av over the destruction of the Temple. The lower courses of masonry are from King Herod’s time, identifiable as Herodian by the trimmed outer margin of each stone. (Photo courtesy David Oughton).

Why is the holy city of Jerusalem such a bone of contention in Middle Eastern politics?

Each of the three Abrahamic faiths revolves around a sacred story, a distinctive interpretation of history. At the center of every sacred story is at least one sacred place, which in turn carves out of the cosmos a space held to be inviolable and safe for believers, a sanctuary. For Jews, Jerusalem clearly focuses that sense of sacred place, and within Jerusalem it is the Western Wall (or Wailing Wall) that symbolizes Jewish identity above all. Here one can see and touch all that remains of the Solomonic and Herodian temples. Here one can lament the destruction of both temples and long for the raising of a new one. Unfortunately, time has made the situation agonizingly complex for Jews. The merest mention of rebuilding the temple evokes cries of outrage from the Muslim community, for on top of the temple mount there now stand the seventh-century shrine called the Dome of the Rock and the early eighth-century al-Aqsa mosque.

What do Muslims think is especially important and “Islamic” about Jerusalem?

For Muslims the place recalls the importance of Abraham and Solomon as prophets and adds a new layer of sacrality in the belief that this place was a way station in Muhammad’s chief mystical experience, the Night Journey and Ascension. The Muslim holy places on the temple mount also bear an important historic relationship to Christianity. Inscriptions on the Dome of the Rock, as well as the Dome’s axial relationship to the al-Aqsa’s basilical hall (which, it appears, was laid out to parallel and outdo that of the Sepulcher with its dome and basilical hall), clearly suggest a statement of Muslim superiority over Christianity. Muslims count as their own, in addition, the mosque of the Ascension (of Jesus) on the Mount of Olives and the Mosque of Hebron that enshrines the cave of Machpelah, the tomb of Abraham and the patriarchs. Located as it is in an Arab town, the latter has been an important symbol for Palestinians.

What Middle Eastern sites are especially important to Christians?

For most Christians, the principal holy sites in the Middle East are of course the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, as well as several places in Nazareth. Perhaps no single place speaks more eloquently of the diversity of Christianity in the Middle East than the Holy Sepulcher. With its multiple side chapels representing various Christian communities, competing liturgical celebrations, and the olfactory dissonance that results from multiple flavors of incense, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher offers a virtual smorgasbord of the Christian tradition. It has been and remains an important symbol of Christian presence in Jerusalem. Christians have not always enjoyed free exercise of their rights in the Middle East, and access to the Sepulcher remains one symbolic anchor in their sense of identity. As a sacred city, Jerusalem is the single most important place in the Middle East. For Muslims, the Dome is a symbol of victory; for Jews, the Wall a symbol of loss; for Christians, the Sepulcher a symbol of victory through loss.

Is there a succinct summary to the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Years ago a Palestinian uttered this story: Once upon a time, a camel and a scorpion happened upon each other on the banks of a river. As the camel prepared to swim across, the scorpion approached and asked for a ride. When the camel refused for fear the scorpion would take advantage of his kindness and sting him to death, the scorpion explained how foolish that would be, for then they would both die. The camel agreed and began to ferry his passenger across. Halfway over the scorpion stung the camel. With his last gasp the dromedary asked, “Why on earth did you sentence us both to death?” Said the scorpion as the two went under, “Welcome to the Middle East!” The Palestinian asked, “Who is the camel and who is the scorpion?”

A German ship, part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force, docks at Istanbul. While one can’t say that the West is unified against the East, many people often do see conflicts with Muslims under such generalized terms.