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“Swift and Effective Retribution”

Qaddafi’s Claim over the Gulf of Sidra

In 1970 the Libyan Arab Republic demanded and received a substantially higher price for the crude oil it sold to foreign petroleum companies, becoming the first oil-producing country in the world to do so. Over the next five years Libya’s annual oil earnings jumped from $1.35 billion to $6 billion, and with this huge revenue windfall Colonel Qaddafi procured foreign military equipment—mostly from the Soviet Union—at a rate that soon outpaced his country’s security needs and the ability of his armed forces to operate it efficiently. The CIA ascribed Qaddafi’s extravagant arms purchases to megalomania. According to the agency the Libyan leader believed that his huge arsenal, the country’s considerable oil earnings, and his revolutionary ideology would make him the leader of the Arab struggle against Zionism and Western influence in the region. Between 1970 and 1985 Qaddafi spent more than $20 billion on Soviet-made armaments, making Libya one of the largest customers of Soviet military hardware and technical assistance in the world.¹

By the mid-1980s Qaddafi’s country of 3.6 million people possessed one of the best-equipped armed forces in the Middle East. The Libyan military boasted 2,800 tanks (including top-of-the-line, Soviet-built T-72s), 2,300 armored vehicles, 535 combat aircraft (including sophisticated French-built Mirages and high-performance, Soviet-built MiG-23s and MiG-25s), 6 Soviet-built Foxtrot diesel-electric submarines, 65 surface combatants (most of which were capable of firing deadly antiship cruise missiles), and one of the most modern air defense networks in the world. In reality, however, Libya’s military strength was considerably more formidable on paper than in fact. Hundreds of battle tanks and combat aircraft remained packed in their shipping crates, and a general lack of technical expertise and operational know-how hampered the effectiveness of the regular military, which numbered seventy-three thousand men in 1985. The Libyans relied heavily on advisers and technicians from the Soviet bloc for the installation, maintenance, and operation of the modern equipment in their large arsenal. In the early 1980s approximately twenty-five hundred Soviet military advisers served in Libya. Furthermore, it was widely reported that pilots from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Syria, Pakistan, and North Korea as well as some Palestinian groups flew missions for the Libyan Arab Air Force (LAAF) because the quantity of available operational aircraft exceeded the number of qualified Libyan pilots. The normal ratio, by comparison, was two pilots per aircraft.²

The Nixon administration was concerned about the accumulation of French-and Soviet-made arms on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean and, in 1972, commenced aerial reconnaissance to monitor Libya’s importation of military equipment. U.S. flight operations were conducted well outside Libyan airspace. Nevertheless, on 21 March 1973 two Libyan Mirage fighters attacked a U.S. Air Force RC-130 reconnaissance plane that was operating more than eighty miles off the coast of Libya. Fortunately the unarmed plane was not hit. Not surprisingly, Qaddafi ignored the protest note sent from Washington.

In retaliation for President Nixon’s decision to resupply Israel during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and in an attempt to make aerial surveillance of his country more difficult, Qaddafi made a fateful announcement on 11 October 1973.³ He said that the entire Gulf of Sidra is “located within the territory of the Libyan Arab Republic . . . extending north offshore to latitude 32 degrees and 30 minutes, constitutes an integral part of the territory of the Libyan Arab Republic[,] and is under its complete sovereignty.”⁴ By proclaiming the huge gulf to be Libyan internal waters Qaddafi blatantly repudiated several longstanding international conventions. To support Libya’s claim he advanced his own interpretation of international law. First he argued that the Gulf of Sidra was a bay, although its 250-mile-wide opening far exceeded the 24-mile-wide maximum size allowed to enclose internal waters by Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Second he stated that Libya’s claim over the Gulf of Sidra was historic, but W. Hays Parks, an authority on international law, explained that “such a claim must be long-standing, open, and notorious—with effective and continuous exercise of authority by the claimant—and one to which other states acquiesce.” Qaddafi’s declaration of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra dated from 1973, hardly a longstanding claim. Furthermore, by the mid-1980s only two countries—the post-Numayri regime in Sudan and Burkina Faso—had recognized Qaddafi’s claim.⁵

Principal Libyan military installations, mid-1980s

Libya: A Country Study, ed. Helen C. Metz, 1989

On 11 February 1974 the U.S. Department of State issued a démarche that called Libya’s claim of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra “unacceptable as a violation of international law.” The note made a further declaration: “The United States Government views the Libyan action as an attempt to appropriate a large area of the high seas by unilateral action, thereby encroaching upon the long-established principle of freedom of the seas. . . . The United States Government reserves its rights and the rights of its nationals in the area of the Gulf of Sidra affected by the action of the Government of Libya.”⁶ Similar protests were issued by the Soviet Union and several other nations.⁷

The United States and other maritime powers enjoyed a long history of operating in the international waters of the Gulf of Sidra and were understandably concerned about Qaddafi’s assertion of sovereignty over the gulf for two important reasons. First, the gulf forms a large indentation—120 miles at its deepest—in the North African coastline and is therefore a convenient location for naval forces to conduct surface and air exercises free of commercial fishing zones and away from the busy shipping lanes and air routes of the central Mediterranean. Acquiescence to Libyan sovereignty would have severely complicated and restricted training opportunities for the U.S. Sixth Fleet and other navies operating in the Mediterranean. Second, if left unchallenged Qaddafi’s claim would have encouraged other nations to advance their own unreasonable claims of extended territorial seas, creating, in the words of Parks, “the danger of international maritime anarchy.” At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held from 1973 to 1982, the U.S. delegation fought vigorously to maintain maximum operational mobility for its naval forces worldwide. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea extended territorial sea limits from three to twelve nautical miles but also reaffirmed important sections of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone including the definition of what constitutes a bay. The convention denied any recognition whatsoever of Libya’s claim over the Gulf of Sidra.⁸ Although the United States did not sign the 1982 convention, it accepted the convention’s twelve-mile limit for denoting territorial waters.⁹

President Carter’s Libya Policy

On three occasions between 1973 and 1979 the United States challenged Qaddafi’s illegal claim of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra by conducting routine naval exercises in the disputed waters. In late 1979 Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, and Adm. Thomas B. Hayward, the chief of naval operations, proposed a large-scale freedom of navigation (FON) exercise designed to assert U.S. rights in the gulf and underscore Qaddafi’s inability to back up his claim with military force. Carter’s Libya policy, however, was influenced by his desire to maintain economic relations, avoid military confrontation, and prevent closer cooperation between Tripoli and Moscow. Carter rejected the FON plan out of a concern that a bold challenge to Qaddafi might provoke a military incident, endanger Americans living and working in Libya, or embarrass Arab and other Muslim leaders who were trying to negotiate the release of American hostages being held since 4 November 1979 by radical Iranian students at the U.S. embassy in Tehran.¹⁰

Despite Carter’s cautious policy toward Libya, relations between Washington and Tripoli rapidly deteriorated. On 2 December 1979 a large mob gathered outside the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, demonstrating against the United States and shouting pro-Iranian slogans. Before long the crowd overran, sacked, and burned the embassy while a single Libyan policeman looked on. The Carter administration immediately lodged a stern protest with the Libyan government. The United States demanded that Libya admit responsibility for the attack and destruction of the embassy, since it had not provided adequate protection for the facility. The Libyans responded with expressions of regret for the incident but denied any responsibility. After the Carter administration threatened to suspend operation of the U.S. mission in Tripoli the Libyan government agreed to compensate the United States for the damages. In April and May 1980 the Carter administration expelled six Libyan diplomats because they were engaged in a “campaign of intimidation” against Libyan exiles living in the United States. In May the administration finally closed the American diplomatic mission in Tripoli.¹¹

On 16 September two Libyan MiG-23 Floggers allegedly fired missiles at an unarmed U.S. Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance plane flying in international airspace. The American plane escaped unharmed. Since the evidence surrounding the incident was not conclusive, the Carter administration neither acknowledged the suspected attack nor sent a formal protest to Tripoli. Five days later another confrontation took place when eight Libyan fighters flown by Syrian pilots attempted to intercept an RC-135 operating two hundred miles off the Libyan coast. This time, however, the electronic surveillance plane was accompanied by a trio of F-14 Tomcat fighters from the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67). The Tomcats immediately challenged the aggressors, who wisely broke off the engagement and returned to base. Once again the administration did not publicly acknowledge the incident. Carter did not want to escalate tensions between the United States and Libya during his reelection campaign.¹²

On 22 October the Libyan people’s bureau in Washington purchased advertising space in the Washington Post and reprinted a letter from “Brother Leader” Qaddafi to Carter and his Republican opponent in the election, former California governor Ronald Reagan. Qaddafi claimed that “several aggressive measures have been taken by America against Libya, as represented in . . . the taking of very hostile political and media attitudes.” He stressed that an armed conflict between the United States and the Arabs could “only be avoided if America stops the military steps it has taken which threaten the independence of the Arab homeland.” He warned that if the United States persisted in its aggressive policies toward the Arab nation, the Arabs would be entitled to exercise the right of self-defense to protect their homeland. Finally, in regard to his own country, Qaddafi demanded that the United States stop its “surveillance planes from spying across Libyan borders.”¹³ In light of the recent Libyan attack on U.S. aircraft and the nearly identical one in 1973, administration officials were convinced that Qaddafi was prepared to use force to defend his airspace and obstruct American intelligence-gathering activities.

In the fall of 1980 the Pentagon again proposed a FON exercise for the Gulf of Sidra, but Carter could not risk another crisis in the Middle East. He was fighting for reelection and his attention was consumed by the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He ordered the Sixth Fleet to operate north of 32° 30’, and by doing so he granted implicit recognition to Qaddafi’s claim over the Gulf of Sidra.¹⁴

The Election of 1980

In the November election Ronald Reagan won the presidency in a landslide, capturing forty-four states and 51 percent of the popular vote. Jimmy Carter won only six states and the District of Columbia and 41 percent of the popular vote. A master of modern media politics and a champion of the conservative values of Middle America, Reagan campaigned against big government. He advocated lower taxes, fewer regulations, and less interference by government in business and everyday life. Radiating an unwavering faith in the abilities of the American people and in the potential of the free enterprise system, Reagan preached that all Americans could achieve unprecedented prosperity if only government would “get off their backs.” In the area of foreign affairs he called for a stronger national defense, the restoration of U.S. prestige around the world, and a tougher stance toward the Soviet Union (which he decried as an unrelenting enemy of American values and a threat to world peace). He also spoke out on the problem of international terrorism: “We must take a stand against terrorism in the world and combat it with firmness, for it is a most cowardly and savage violation of peace.”¹⁵

Carter suffered one of the worst electoral defeats by an incumbent president in U.S. history. Many Americans viewed the magnitude of the loss as a repudiation of his leadership. Others, including Carter himself, believed that the landslide was more an indication of the nation’s frustration over a set of circumstances that no president could have handled to the satisfaction of the public. In the latter half of his term these circumstances included rising gasoline prices, double-digit inflation, high unemployment, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and, most frustrating of all, the long captivity of the American hostages in Tehran. As a final insult to Carter and his presidency, the Iranian government did not release the hostages until moments after Reagan took the oath of office on 20 January 1981.

Reagan Grapples with the Terrorism Issue

President Reagan wasted no time making good on his promises to increase defense spending by huge amounts, to develop a tougher policy toward the Soviet Union, and to combat international terrorism. Since fighting terrorism would certainly involve Libya, that country was briefly discussed at the first meeting of the National Security Council on 21 January 1981. The new president and his chief advisers considered Qaddafi a genuine threat to American interests in the Middle East and Africa and were determined to thwart his efforts to destabilize friendly governments in the region. According to political scientist Lisa Anderson, the Libyan dictator “was selected for special attention by the United States as the symbol of all the United States finds repugnant in international affairs—support for international terrorism, opposition to a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and support for a diminished U.S. role in the world.”¹⁶

Five days later, on 26 January, Reagan and his top national security advisers—Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, National Security Adviser Richard V. Allen, FBI Director William H. Webster, and CIA Director William J. Casey—gathered to discuss state-sponsored and state-supported terrorism. This deadly phenomenon continued to claim more innocent victims with each passing year. Since 1968 when the CIA began compiling statistics on terrorism, the year just completed was in fact the bloodiest one on record. Particularly alarming was the rate at which Americans were becoming vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In 1980 nearly 40 percent of all terrorist incidents involved American citizens or property. Of the 278 attacks on U.S. citizens, ten people were murdered and ninety-four injured.

Reagan and his advisers regarded international terrorism as an issue of vital national importance, and combating it became one of the new administration’s highest foreign policy priorities. They reviewed the federal government’s programs and resources devoted to countering terrorism. They evaluated everything, from the secret antiterrorist Delta Force to the various interagency working groups and task forces responsible for carrying out U.S. policy on terrorism. They concluded that more had to be done, but they quickly realized that before they could develop new policies for confronting terrorism, they had to learn as much as possible about the nature of the enemy. They determined that greater emphasis had to be placed on the collection of intelligence on the terrorist threat. Casey immediately ordered all CIA stations to elevate terrorism on their list of intelligence collection priorities, known as the “essential elements of intelligence” in the intelligence trade. At some stations, especially those in Europe and the Middle East, collecting intelligence on terrorism became the number one priority.¹⁷

The next day, 27 January, at a ceremony held on the White House lawn Reagan welcomed home the Americans who were held captive in Iran for 444 days. Reagan was intensely concerned about the well-being of the former hostages, and his anger over their captivity had not yet subsided. Furthermore, the American people were overjoyed that the hostages were returned safe and sound, but they were still angry and frustrated that Iran had been able to humiliate the United States virtually without consequence. Speaking before the former hostages and their families and with the world as his audience, Reagan proclaimed that the time had come to retaliate against terrorism.¹⁸ He proclaimed: “Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution. We hear that we live in an era of limits to our power. Well, let it be understood that there are limits to our patience.”¹⁹

Reagan’s rhetorical bombshell took some of his closest advisers and several career officials by surprise. Kenneth Adelman, a former member of Reagan’s transition team and at the time working at the State Department, had drafted the phrase “swift and effective retribution.” Adelman had traveled with former President Carter to West Germany to greet the former hostages on their journey home from Iran and learned firsthand how badly the Iranians had treated their captives. When Adelman briefed Reagan on their condition the president became “very disturbed” by what he heard. The hostages had been treated far worse than anyone suspected. Following his meeting with Reagan, Adelman composed the powerful phrase, believing it was appropriate for the moment. He had no doubt that Reagan would follow through on the tough statement.

Reagan’s declaration effectively committed his administration to a war against international terrorism even before it had developed a strategy or even knew with certainty what it was confronting.²⁰ Nevertheless, Haig became the first administration official to take up the call to arms against terrorism. At his first news conference as secretary of state, held one day after Reagan’s remarkable statement, the former chief of staff in the Nixon White House and former NATO supreme commander asserted that “international terrorism will take the place of human rights [in] our concern, because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights.”²¹ In an attempt to clarify his remark Haig explained that the campaign against terrorism by the Reagan administration would have the same priority that the battle for human rights had held in the Carter administration. Nevertheless, Haig refused to speculate about actions the administration might take following a future terrorist incident. He stated that Reagan’s pledge of “swift and effective retribution” was “consciously ambiguous.”²²

Haig also expressed his belief that the Soviet Union played a significant role in international terrorism. He claimed that the Soviets were actively “training, funding, and equipping” terrorists, and he accused them of “conscious policies . . . which foster, support, and expand this activity which is hemorrhaging in many respects throughout the world today.”²³ Haig was convinced that Moscow controlled a vast terrorist network and used the terror weapon to undermine Western interests. His view was buttressed by the writings of American journalist Claire Sterling. In her book The Terror Network Sterling claimed that an existing international syndicate of disparate terrorist organizations helped one another and obtained support from “not altogether disinterested outsiders,” most significantly the Soviet Union and its allies. The outside assistance included training, weapons, funding, diplomatic cover, and logistical support. Although Sterling did not agree with Haig’s belief that the Soviet Union directed the day-to-day operations of terrorist groups, she emphasized that the Soviets were quite eager to benefit from the actions of the terrorist groups they supported. Sterling labeled it “terror by proxy.”²⁴

Ronald I. Spiers, the chief of the State Department’s intelligence branch, informed Haig privately that current intelligence did not support his public statements. Unconvinced, Haig requested from William Casey a formal intelligence report—a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)—to analyze the role of the Soviet Union in international terrorism. Since terrorism was not a topic routinely covered by NIEs, Casey ordered the Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) to draft a special NIE (SNIE) on Moscow’s involvement in terrorism. Although Casey’s gut instincts told him that Haig’s thinking was correct, Casey believed that the best way to prove Haig’s point was through good analysis of the available intelligence.²⁵ While the SNIE was being written Casey held a meeting with Sterling, who lambasted the CIA for not thoroughly investigating the Soviet role in international terrorism. Casey came away from the meeting impressed by the strength and passion of her arguments. “God damn it. . . . I’ve got this woman who’s written a pretty persuasive book faulting us,” he fumed. “Just because nobody heard a tree fall in the forest doesn’t mean it didn’t fall.”²⁶

The first draft of the SNIE did not support Haig’s perception of the Soviet role. It concluded that the Soviets did not organize or direct terrorist activity and argued that the Soviets did not approve of it. The estimate made a careful distinction between the actions of national liberation movements and other insurgent groups that were supported by Moscow versus the activities of terrorist organizations that were not. The SOVA analysts also stressed that no conclusive evidence of Soviet or Eastern European involvement in international terrorism existed. In late March Casey reviewed the draft and stated that he was “greatly disappointed” with its conclusions and “he would not be willing to put his name on it.” He accused SOVA of trying to prove Soviet involvement in terrorism beyond a shadow of a doubt and relying too heavily on Moscow’s own pronouncements on terrorism. Rather than ask SOVA to rethink its conclusions, Casey directed the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to prepare a new draft analysis. Casey favored the DIA’s version which, in contrast to the SOVA analysis, stated that current intelligence reporting supported the existence of terrorist training camps in Eastern Europe. Over the next few weeks a senior CIA analyst supervised the preparation of a compromise draft analysis, which SOVA and DIA accepted with few reservations.²⁷ In May the SNIE, titled Soviet Support for International Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence, was signed by Casey and forwarded to Haig and other senior administration officials.²⁸

The estimate contained a number of key judgments and conclusions:

the Soviet Union was deeply involved in the support of revolutionary violence for the purpose of “weakening unfriendly societies, destabilizing hostile regimes, and advancing Soviet interests”;

the Soviets were ambivalent about the use of terrorist tactics in the performance of revolutionary violence, but they were deeply concerned that terrorist violence would promote or harm their interests in specific situations;

strong evidence existed that the Soviets directly or indirectly supported several national insurgencies and liberation movements that used terrorism in their programs of revolutionary violence;

evidence of Soviet support for nihilistic terrorist organizations—groups whose only purpose was to attack symbols of the status quo—was weak and contradictory since some members of nihilistic groups were trained and supported by Soviet friends and allies while the Soviets occasionally characterized nihilistic terrorism as “criminal”;

some revolutionary organizations supported by the Soviets accepted a degree of control and direction from Moscow, while others did not;

the Soviets provided extensive military and paramilitary training to members of revolutionary organizations in camps located in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and the Middle East, and they supplied weapons and other forms of assistance to a wide spectrum of revolutionary groups around the world;

the Soviets backed many countries or organizations that in turn supported the terrorist activities of revolutionary groups, including Libya, South Yemen, Palestinian groups, Eastern bloc nations, and Cuba;

Moscow accepted the support that its allies and friends gave to revolutionary groups because these actions either advanced its interests or were “the price to be paid” for maintaining and strengthening its influence with its friends and allies; and

the Soviet Union’s policy of supporting various forms of revolutionary violence was likely to continue because it enhanced Soviet interests at minimal cost and with little damage to Soviet prestige.²⁹

The SNIE made it clear that the Soviets were responsible to a significant degree for the phenomenon of modern international terrorism. The Soviets became involved in the deadly movement after Israel’s stunning victory in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. After the war the Palestinians had concluded that conventional Arab military forces could not defeat Israel and decided to mount a protracted guerrilla war against Israel just as the Vietcong guerrillas were doing against the United States in South Vietnam. This change in Palestinian strategy coincided with Moscow’s determination to play a more prominent role in the affairs of the Middle East. The Palestinians believed that effective use of terrorism would demonstrate their national strength and would prompt Israel to respond with repressive measures that would turn international public opinion against them and encourage many Palestinians living in exile to join the armed struggle against Zionism. The Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe developed the Palestinian insurgent movement into an effective fighting force and, in the process, trained several guerrillas in the complex workings of international terrorism.

In the late 1960s Soviet, Czech, and East German instructors trained a large number of PLO commandos in camps located in Czechoslovakia. The Palestinians then established their own training facilities in several countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa. By the early 1970s the Palestinians were training not only their own guerrillas but also members of several nihilist terrorist groups such as the West German Baader-Meinhoff Gang, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Japanese Red Army. In return the PLO received political and logistical support from several nihilist groups in Europe. By 1970 the Soviets had very little direct involvement in terrorist training yet, according to Reagan’s deputy CIA director Adm. Bobby Inman, little doubt remained that the Soviets were “the grandparents” of modern international terrorism. “They built the original training camps and gave the PLO the capability to train their own,” Inman said.³⁰

The impact of the new Palestinian strategy was felt immediately. In the eighteen months following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War the Israeli government reported more than twelve hundred terrorist attacks within the country’s borders. Furthermore, radical factions of the PLO, such as the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), refused to limit their guerrilla war to Israel. The PFLP vowed to attack Zionism and its supporters anywhere in the world.

Two essential conclusions can be drawn about Moscow’s involvement in international terrorism. First, although the Soviets were deeply engaged in supporting acts of revolutionary violence, their support was largely opportunistic. They hoped to advance their interests simply by creating trouble for their opponents. There was no centralized program for terrorism in Moscow but, if a revolutionary group sought assistance, the Soviets rarely turned it down. Second, international terrorism became self-sustaining largely through the efforts of the Soviet Union. Moscow conducted the initial terrorist training in the late 1960s and, by the end of the decade, its graduates were operating their own camps and carrying out their own terrorist operations. Therefore, since terrorism was operating independently of the Soviet Union, being able to persuade Moscow to disavow support for revolutionary or terrorist groups would not end the problem of terrorism. The SNIE did not support Haig’s view that the Soviet Union controlled day-to-day terrorist operations. The Soviets supported terrorism when the opportunity presented itself, but they did not call the shots.³¹

A decade later, after the collapse of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe, the former communist governments disclosed the true nature of the terror network. The Eastern Europeans, most notably East Germany, provided extensive support to several nihilist groups and freelance terrorist organizations. For example, the East German intelligence service, the Stasi, supplied the West Germany–based Red Army Faction with weapons, false documents, training, and funds. The East Germans also allowed Palestinian terrorists to use their country as an operating base and provided sanctuary to the notorious freelance terrorist Carlos. Hungary gave safe harbor to Carlos, Czechoslovakia operated a major terrorist training program, and Yugoslavia served as a major base of operations for the Palestinians. Sterling’s controversial hypothesis about a functioning terrorist network supported by interested outsiders, such as the Soviet Union, and Casey’s belief that the Soviet Union and its allies were extensively involved in international terrorism were both vindicated.³²

The Reagan Administration Develops a Libya Policy

For senior policymakers in the State Department, the CIA, and the NSC there was no better target for Reagan’s advocacy of “swift and effective retribution” against terrorism than Qaddafi’s Libya. In a 1981 research paper titled Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, the CIA identified Libya as “the most prominent state sponsor of and participant in international terrorism.”³³ Whereas Admiral Inman referred to the Soviets as the “grandparents” of international terrorism, Claire Sterling labeled Qaddafi as “the Daddy Warbucks of terrorism.”³⁴ Haig pointed out that Qaddafi’s oil revenue was “almost exclusively diverted to the purchase of armaments, the training of international terrorists, and the conduct of direct intervention in neighboring states of Northern Africa.”³⁵ The CIA reported that Libya’s support for terrorism included “financing for terrorist operations, weapons procurement and supply, the use of training camps and Libyan advisers for guerrilla training, and the use of Libyan diplomatic facilities abroad as support bases for terrorist operations.”³⁶

The Reagan administration immediately began crafting a systematic, comprehensive, and multifaceted strategy aimed at exerting extraordinary pressure on the Qaddafi regime. The strategy would consist of covert operations, diplomatic actions, economic sanctions, and demonstrations of military power.³⁷ According to one official the plan would, as a minimum, “make life uncomfortable” for the Libyan dictator, whom many Reagan appointees erroneously perceived as a Soviet surrogate bent on spreading mischief throughout the Middle East and Africa.³⁸ Administration officials hoped that an aggressive Libya policy would damage Qaddafi’s reputation as an Arab leader, isolate him diplomatically, dissuade him from new foreign adventures, and deprive him of international support in the event of a confrontation with the United States or one of its allies in the Middle East, namely Egypt. They wanted to weaken Qaddafi’s domestic authority and increase the likelihood that he would be removed from power. They sought the support of U.S. allies in Europe but were determined to carry out their plan with or without the help of the Europeans, who did not share their view of Qaddafi as a crazed terrorist and international menace.³⁹

This dramatic change in U.S. policy toward Libya did not occur overnight. For a number of departments and agencies of the U.S. government—particularly the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA—producing a complicated strategy required several months of intense discussion and negotiation.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, some of the components of the strategy were ready for implementation within a few months.

Planning covert operations against Libya began immediately. During his first week at the CIA Casey reviewed an SNIE titled Libya: Aims and Vulnerabilities. The secret study, which the Carter administration initiated following the attempted assassination in October 1980 of an exiled Libyan dissident living in Colorado, was completed only a few days before Casey took office. It contained a number of conclusions that piqued the director’s interest in taking direct action against Qaddafi.⁴¹ First, after his recent success in Chad, Qaddafi was likely to undertake other foreign ventures that would challenge U.S. and Western interests in the Middle East and Africa.⁴² Second, the number of recent coup attempts suggested that Qaddafi’s grip on power might be loosening. Unfortunately, the exile and internal opposition to Qaddafi was fragmented, disorganized, and largely ineffective. The activities of Libyan exile groups consisted mainly of publishing anti-Qaddafi materials and smuggling them into the country. To enhance the opposition’s chances of effectively challenging the Qaddafi regime the CIA had to play a more direct, hands-on role. Merely supplying funds and arms would not be enough.⁴³ Third, although Qaddafi was not a Soviet pawn, his relationship with the Soviet Union was “based on common short-term interests rather than on a shared world view.” The Libyans purchased Soviet military equipment in huge quantities and the Soviets benefited from the hard currency generated by the arms sales—estimated at $1 billion per year—as well as from Qaddafi’s anti-Western policies.⁴⁴ Fourth, Qaddafi had ordered his armed forces to attack any U.S. ship or aircraft entering the Gulf of Sidra, which made the chance of an incident occurring between U.S. and Libyan forces extremely high.⁴⁵ Finally, Qaddafi was to a large extent a “traditional Arab street politician” who derived his political legitimacy from his charisma and the public’s perception of his invincibility. If the aura of Qaddafi’s personality could be irreparably damaged then his inept domestic and foreign policies might overtake him and prove to be his undoing.⁴⁶ Consequently, some of Qaddafi’s regional opponents, most notably President Sadat of Egypt and President Numayri of Sudan, focused “their resources on quietly bleeding Qaddafi at his most vulnerable point—his overextension in Chad and the danger this [posed] for him at home.”⁴⁷

The strategy of undermining Qaddafi’s domestic base by striking at him in Chad appealed to Haig and Casey. The two officials directed their staffs to develop a coordinated policy to provide covert aid to the Chadian rebel Hissene Habré, whom the CIA described as the “quintessential desert warrior.” Haig and Casey believed that a Libyan defeat in Chad would foment widespread disaffection within the officer corps of the Libyan armed forces, while heavy Libyan casualties would generate great unrest among Libyan rank and file. The two advocated a covert initiative that would, in effect, “bloody Qaddafi’s nose” and “increase the flow of pine boxes back to Libya.” Reagan approved a formal intelligence order or “finding” that authorized the CIA to conduct a covert operation in support of Habré’s efforts to wrest control of the Chadian government from Goukouni Oueddei and remove Libyan influence from the country. The operation provided Habré with money, weapons, technical support, and political assistance.⁴⁸

It was presumed that thwarting Qaddafi in Chad also would send a very strong signal to the Soviet Union. Since the 1970s the Soviets had established client states in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola virtually unopposed by U.S. administrations in the years following the Vietnam War. Haig emphasized that the Reagan administration’s position regarding Soviet involvement in the Third World was decidedly different. “Our signal to the Soviets had to be a plain warning that their time of unrestricted adventuring in the Third World was over,” he asserted, “and that America’s capacity to tolerate the mischief of Moscow’s proxies, Cuba and Libya, had been exceeded.” The fact that Qaddafi did not act on behalf of the Soviet Union and therefore could not be considered a Soviet proxy was not important to Haig.⁴⁹ Libya and the Soviet Union enjoyed a close relationship by virtue of a few common interests, and that relationship caused some administration officials (such as the secretary of state himself as well as the hard-liners within his department) to regard Libya as a client of the Soviet Union.

Reagan signed another intelligence finding that directed the CIA to provide “nonlethal” aid and training to anti-Qaddafi groups. This aid operation was to proceed cautiously and deliberately first by recruiting reliable agents from the exile Libyan community and then by taking on the arduous task of developing viable opposition groups based outside the country. If the second step achieved a measurable degree of success the administration would then consider drafting a new finding that would support a plan to go forward with an anti-Qaddafi propaganda program and paramilitary operations.

In 1979 Dr. Muhammad Yusuf al-Muqaryaf, a senior Libyan bureaucrat and diplomat, defected to Egypt where he immediately denounced Qaddafi as a corrupt, brutal, and profligate dictator. In October 1981 Muqaryaf founded the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), a group financed primarily by the CIA and Saudi Arabia. Based in Sudan, the NFSL set up a radio station that broadcasted news and opposition propaganda into Libya, and recruited other prominent exiles to join the anti-Qaddafi movement. Muqaryaf dedicated himself to abolishing the Qaddafi regime, through violence, if necessary. Casey did not expect the exiles to be powerful enough to overthrow Qaddafi, but he supported them as an inexpensive, low-risk means of making trouble for the Libyan dictator and as a new source of intelligence on developments inside Libya.⁵⁰

In the summer of 1981 the covert operation in Chad got underway. After the CIA’s deputy director for operations, Max Hugel, briefed the House Intelligence Committee on the operation, a number of committee members questioned the wording of the finding, which was vague enough that it could be interpreted as justification for directly challenging Qaddafi’s hold on power. Concerned committee members sent a classified letter to Reagan in which they strongly protested the operation. The media soon caught wind of the letter and reported that several members of the Intelligence Committee were objecting to a CIA covert operation taking place in an unnamed African country. In a half-page article Newsweek described the operation as “a large-scale, multiphase and costly scheme to overthrow the Libyan regime of Col. Muammar Qaddafi.” The article then reported that “the CIA’s goal . . . was Qaddafi’s ‘ultimate’ removal from power. To members of the House Intelligence Committee who reviewed the plan, that phrase seemed to imply Qaddafi’s assassination.”⁵¹ A scheme to assassinate Qaddafi, however, would be in direct violation of Executive Order 12333, signed by Reagan in 1981. According to the order, “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”⁵²

Casey was furious about the leaks and subsequent news reports. The CIA’s Directorate for Operations had carefully designed a covert support operation for Chad, a country in which the agency believed it had a reasonable chance of success and where U.S. allies France, Egypt, and Sudan were already involved. Reports of a plan to topple the Qaddafi regime undoubtedly would make the Libyan dictator more cautious and vigilant just as the CIA was trying to strike at him indirectly through Chad. In response to the Newsweek story the White House issued a statement that denied the contents of the article but acknowledged that some members of the House Intelligence Committee had written a letter to Reagan protesting an unspecified operation. Newsweek reporters then sought clarifying information about the operation from their source, who happened be a member of the committee. Soon afterward Congressman Clement J. Zablocki—Democrat of Wisconsin, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and a member of the House Intelligence Committee—admitted to House staff personnel that he had been the source of the Newsweek story. Congressman Edward P. Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, rebuked Zablocki for the leak and informed him of his misunderstanding of the facts, but Boland did not pursue disciplinary action against his colleague.⁵³

The next component of Reagan’s Libya strategy to take shape was the calculated use of military power. One month into his presidency Reagan approved an assertive, comprehensive FON program that was designed to defend U.S. national interests against the unreasonable maritime claims of more than forty nations, including Qaddafi’s Libya. Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), particularly Admiral Hayward, urged Reagan to authorize a FON exercise for the Gulf of Sidra. Carter had blocked the most recent proposals for an exercise in the gulf, but Weinberger and Hayward did not want to follow the former president’s policy of avoiding the disputed body of water. Conducting maneuvers in the gulf, they argued, would demonstrate U.S. determination to exercise its rights and would undermine Qaddafi’s credibility since there was nothing he could do to prevent the Sixth Fleet from operating there. Reagan sided with the top officials at the Pentagon.

In the late spring of 1981 at a meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG)—a gathering of the president’s most senior advisers and chaired by the president himself—Reagan directed the Pentagon to plan a major Sixth Fleet exercise that would challenge Qaddafi’s claim over the Gulf of Sidra. The exercise was tentatively planned for late summer. It would boldly yet peacefully assert U.S. rights in international waters and airspace and would demonstrate to America’s friends and adversaries in the Middle East the United States’ commitment to peace and stability in the region. The Pentagon spearheaded the planning of the exercise, but other departments and agencies were involved in the process owing to the sensitive nature of it. One day before the start of the exercise Newsweek reported that the Reagan administration “will test Qaddafi’s reactions—and those of his allies in Moscow—by staging war games inside the gulf.” According to the magazine the maneuvers would serve as the administration’s “first direct challenge to the Libyan strongman.”⁵⁴ (Details of the FON exercise and its surprising outcome are presented later in this chapter.)

Regarding the diplomatic components of the new Libya strategy, the administration pursued several initiatives. First it appealed to U.S. allies in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East to join the United States in condemning and isolating Libya. Several European governments advised the administration not to confront Qaddafi publicly because such an approach might strengthen him at home and enhance his stature throughout the Third World. On the other hand, President Sadat, who once described Qaddafi as “a lunatic,” encouraged American efforts to pressure the Libyan leader. Second, the administration pledged diplomatic support and significant increases in military assistance to several of Libya’s neighbors in North Africa, namely Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, strong evidence emerged that Qaddafi’s liquidation campaign against Libyan exiles had reached the United States, which had a profound effect on diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya.

In October 1980 Faisal Zagallai, a graduate student at Colorado State University and one of the leaders of the Libyan exile dissident community, was grievously wounded when he was shot twice in the head by an assailant using a .22 caliber pistol. Incredibly, the Jamahiriyya Arab News Agency (JANA), the official information bureau of the Libyan government, announced that the attack had been carried out by one of Libya’s revolutionary committees. The FBI traced the gun to a former U.S. Army Green Beret, Eugene Tafoya, who had been recruited by the Libyan government and was serving as a Libyan agent. When Tafoya was arrested on 22 April 1981 investigators found in his possession an address book containing the names of other Libyan exiles living in the United States. The publicity over Tafoya’s arrest supported the Reagan administration’s efforts to paint Qaddafi as an international outlaw and practitioner of state-sponsored terrorism. The arrest also led to the first public action taken by the administration against the Libyan government.⁵⁶

On 6 May 1981 Haig ordered the closure of the Libyan people’s bureau in Washington and gave the twenty-seven Libyan diplomats posted there five days to leave the United States.⁵⁷ The official State Department announcement cited “a wide range of Libyan provocations and misconduct, including support for international terrorism.” The statement also noted that the United States was disturbed by “a general pattern of unacceptable conduct” by the Libyan government, which “is contrary to internationally accepted standards of diplomatic behavior.” The State Department also warned U.S. citizens not to travel to Libya and advised all Americans living there to leave.⁵⁸ The closure of the people’s bureau was Reagan’s first signal to Qaddafi that more serious consequences were to follow if he did not curtail his involvement in international terrorism.⁵⁹

One month later the Reagan administration took another step to isolate Qaddafi. On 2 June Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, announced that the United States would support all African states that opposed Libyan intervention in their countries. “The administration . . . is deeply concerned about Libyan interventionism in Africa and in particular the presence of Libyan troops in Chad,” Crocker stated. The administration announced huge increases in military assistance to Qaddafi’s neighbors in Africa and the Middle East: Egypt received $900 million in aid; Sudan, $100 million; Tunisia, $140 million; Morocco, $100 million; Somalia, $95 million; and Oman, $1 billion (for improvements to bases used by U.S. forces).⁶⁰

Arguably the most important component of Reagan’s Libya strategy was economic sanctions, since they could have the most immediate and profound impact on the Qaddafi regime. Nevertheless, concerns about the U.S. oil industry, about American citizens in Libya, and about the degree of allied cooperation greatly influenced the development of a package of economic sanctions against Libya. In early 1981 Libya was the third largest supplier of oil to the United States, with Libyan oil making up 10 percent of the total U.S. supply. As long as the United States purchased $7 billion of Libyan oil each year and upwards of two thousand American workers and their families provided Qaddafi with a ready pool of potential hostages, the administration was hampered in its ability to construct a tough, comprehensive strategy toward Libya. The United States continued to buy oil from Qaddafi because Libyan light crude was especially attractive on the American market. Its low sulfur content was well suited for producing gasoline with fewer pollutants. Most refineries along the East Coast of the United States specialized in processing Libyan light crude, which meant that an embargo on Libyan oil could cause an economic slowdown in that region of the country. Even if the United States did ban Libyan oil, the Libyan economy probably would not suffer because new customers in Europe would make up the difference.

Before it could implement a stringent economic policy toward Libya the Reagan administration had to make several tough decisions. It would have to cut off the importation of Libyan oil, shouldering the economic consequences of that action, and it would have to order all Americans out of Libya. At the same time the United States would seek the cooperation of its European allies. With their support the sanctions would have had a greater chance of success. The Europeans, however, were not ready to take drastic economic steps against Libya. They were more concerned with protecting their economic interests in Libya than with confronting Qaddafi over the issue of terrorism. A number of European countries, particularly Italy, France, and Germany, were dependent on Libyan oil, and several European companies benefited greatly from Libya’s multibillion dollar development programs. The Europeans argued that until American rhetoric toward Qaddafi was matched by concrete actions, they would be unwilling to risk their economic relationship with Libya for what they considered a symbolic expression of disapproval of Libya’s involvement in international terrorism. Furthermore, several European governments had their doubts about the effectiveness of economic sanctions, citing the failure of past British sanctions against Rhodesia and U.S.-led sanctions against the Soviet Union, Poland, Iran, and Nicaragua. Ultimately the decision to ban Libyan oil was not made for another year and only then when it was prompted by a series of extraordinary events: a dogfight between U.S. and Libyan aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra, the murder of Anwar as-Sadat by Muslim extremists, and reports of a Libyan plot to assassinate Reagan.

Fundamental policy decisions regarding the Libya strategy were made by political appointees and approved by Reagan. In the ensuing policy discussions several career diplomats, intelligence officers, and Pentagon officials objected to many of the steps advocated by the appointees. Briefly stated, the political appointees were more hard-line in their approach toward Libya and in their desire to take assertive, immediate, and, if necessary, unilateral actions to contain and embarrass Qaddafi and undermine his authority in the country. At a minimum they wanted to respond publicly to his support for terrorism and his efforts to destabilize friendly governments in the Middle East and Africa. On the other hand, the career bureaucrats believed that Qaddafi was not as big a threat as the administration was portraying him. They worried that confronting Qaddafi in public might turn him into an Arab hero standing up to the United States. The careerists also emphasized that the Europeans did not regard Qaddafi as an international outlaw and that a poorly crafted Libya policy might undermine America’s fragile standing among moderate Arab leaders. They argued that the best way to handle Qaddafi was to ignore him, that is, not give him attention for his actions.

In the long run the careerists won most of the battles over the details of the Libya strategy. The individual components of the strategy were designed to produce a noticeable effect on Libya, but they were limited in scope. Each component was meant to heap considerable pressure on Qaddafi and induce a change in his behavior regarding terrorism, but none would directly assail his regime. Furthermore, many of the elements were to be carried out only after careful consultation with America’s allies in Europe and the Middle East. On the other hand, although the political appointees compromised on specific details of the strategy, they nevertheless achieved their objective of altering U.S. policy toward Qaddafi. Henceforth the Reagan administration regarded Qaddafi as an enemy of the United States.⁶¹

Planning the Gulf of Sidra Operation

At the Pentagon the planning for the FON exercise in the Gulf of Sidra made steady progress. Ostensibly the purpose of the exercise was to demonstrate the right of the United States to navigate the international waters of the Gulf of Sidra and to train Sixth Fleet ships and aircrews in the employment of modern guided missiles. The real intent, however, was to make a powerful impression on Qaddafi with a tremendous demonstration of U.S. military power.

In light of Libya’s track record of attacking U.S. aircraft in international airspace, Pentagon officials were gravely concerned about the risks associated with a major naval exercise inside the gulf. Coincidentally, the exercise was the first test of a new set of naval rules of engagement (ROE), formally titled the Worldwide Peacetime Rules of Engagement for Sea Borne Forces. The new ROE were the product of a thorough review of the existing ROE as ordered by Admiral Hayward in 1979.⁶² Navy regulations already gave on-scene commanders the authority “to counter either the use of force or an immediate threat of the use of force” with military action.⁶³ The new ROE were appropriately nicknamed the “Reagan ROE” in military circles.⁶⁴ They described in uncomplicated language the circumstances under which a commander could take appropriate action without approval from higher authority to defend his ships, aircraft, and personnel against an opposing force committing a hostile act, demonstrating an imminent use of force, or exhibiting a continuing threat to use force.⁶⁵

While the Pentagon was finalizing the exercise plan a multiagency national security working group was studying Qaddafi’s likely reaction to a large-scale naval exercise in Libyan-claimed waters. The participants concluded that the chance of Libyan reaction was low for a number of reasons. First, Qaddafi understood that ordering a major attack on the battle force would be tantamount to sending his air force and navy on a suicide mission. Second, the Soviets would not come to Qaddafi’s assistance in defending a territorial claim that they did not recognize.⁶⁶ Earlier in the year, during a conversation with Haig, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, made it clear that “Libya was an American problem.”⁶⁷ Administration officials quickly determined that the Soviets did not think Qaddafi was worth the risk of fomenting a major confrontation with the United States. Finally, it was presumed that Libya would not harm Americans living in the country because of their crucial role in Libya’s oil industry. In July the NSC reviewed the exercise plan and recommended its approval. The plan was forwarded to Reagan, who on 1 August gave the Pentagon the official go-ahead.⁶⁸

The exercise plan contained several operational contingencies for dealing with escalating levels of Libyan aggression. Aside from action taken in self-defense, any military response under this program of graduated measures required Reagan’s approval. Although the new ROE gave a great deal of discretion to the on-scene commander, a number of senior Pentagon officers accustomed to seeking permission first and shooting later still sought assurance from the White House that the new ROE were genuine.

At a cabinet meeting in early August Reagan received a thorough briefing on the details of the FON exercise, which carried the innocuous name Open Ocean Missile Exercise (OOMEX). Each year the Navy conducted several OOMEXs to maintain the efficiency of missile-firing ships and fighter squadrons. This particular missile exercise was to be performed in conjunction with the high-profile naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra, and it incorporated the new ROE. According to the ROE the carrier-based fighters were to intercept all approaching aircraft and escort them until they were clear of the exercise area, opening fire only if fired upon first (a significant change from the ROE that had been in effect during the Carter administration). Under former rules American pilots were required to request permission from the task force commander before firing back. Furthermore, according to the old ROE a pilot had to hold fire if the enemy pilot disengaged and returned to his base.⁶⁹ At the meeting Reagan made it absolutely clear that his naval forces had the authority to take appropriate action to protect themselves. “Any time we send an American anywhere in the world where he or she can be shot at, they have the right to shoot back,” he said. Enemy fighters would no longer get free shots at American aircraft. When asked by a cabinet officer how far a U.S. pilot could go in pursuit of Libyan planes that had fired on him, Reagan responded: “All the way into the hangar.”⁷⁰ The individuals present at the briefing were satisfied that the new ROE were genuine and that Reagan would support any member of his armed forces who exercised self-defense against an adversary committing or threatening to commit a hostile act.

As a further precaution the JCS ordered Rear Adm. James E. Service—a veteran attack pilot who served concurrently as commander of Carrier Group Two, as commander of Battle Force Sixth Fleet (also known as Task Force 60), and as the officer in tactical command (OTC) of the upcoming exercise—to Washington for discussions on the operational details of the exercise and the circumstances under which his task force, particularly his aircrews, could engage a hostile military force. On 12 and 14 August the U.S. government issued a notice to airmen and mariners that announced that live missile firings would be conducted in a 3,200-square-mile hexagonal area of the Mediterranean on 18 and 19 August. The exercise area included a section of the disputed waters south of 32° 30’.⁷¹

Not surprisingly, the Libyan government protested the planned exercise, calling it a violation of Libya’s territorial waters and airspace. In addition, one Libyan official accused the United States of coordinating the movement of the Sixth Fleet with Egyptian military forces that were conducting maneuvers near the Egyptian-Libyan frontier.⁷² Newsweek, in the issue that arrived at newsstands on 17 August, substantiated this accusation when it reported that “Washington officials are . . . eager to see how Qaddafi will react to what they insist is a coincidence: Egyptian troops will conduct maneuvers along the Libyan border at the same time.” Two days before OOMEX started Egypt canceled its plans for a military exercise near the Libyan border, fearing that if its maneuvers took place at the same time as the Sixth Fleet exercise Qaddafi might conclude that he was under a two-pronged attack and respond irrationally.⁷³

The Open Ocean Missile Exercise

For the two-day surface and air exercise Rear Admiral Service commanded a large battle force consisting of the carriers Nimitz (CVN 68) and Forrestal (CV 59); Carrier Air Wings (CVW) 8 and 17 based on the Nimitz and the Forrestal, respectively; and thirteen escort and support ships.⁷⁴ The planned highlight of OOMEX was the destruction of target drones by Sparrow and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles fired from fighter aircraft and Standard surface-to-air missiles launched by the nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers Texas (CGN 39) and Mississippi (CGN 40). In addition to carrying out the missile exercise and the FON operation Admiral Service was fully prepared to intercept and escort all Libyan aircraft and naval vessels that approached the exercise area and, if necessary, to perform armed defense of the battle force.

With his carriers in position north of 32° 30’ Service commenced OOMEX in the early hours of 18 August. Several F-14 Tomcats from the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Nimitz and F-4J Phantom IIs from the Forrestal catapulted into the morning sky and established a barrier of seven combat air patrol (CAP) stations between Libya and the battle force. The two Tomcat squadrons based on the Nimitz were the “Black Aces” of Fighter Squadron (VF) 41 and the “Jolly Rogers” of VF-84. The “Bedevilers” of VF-74 and the “Fighting Silver Eagles” of Marine Fighter-Attack Squadron (VMFA) 115 flew Phantoms off the Forrestal Pairs of F-14s filled four stations; pairs of F-4Js filled the other three. One Tomcat CAP station was located below 32° 30’. All of the U.S. aircraft operated in the Tripoli Flight Information Region (FIR), a Libyan-claimed air defense zone that extended out well into the central Mediterranean. The northern boundary of the zone was the 34th parallel. Within the FIR all aircraft were required to identify themselves to Libyan air traffic controllers.

At daybreak the guided missile destroyer William V. Pratt (DDG 44) and the destroyer Caron (DD 970) steamed south of 32° 30’ and operated in the Gulf of Sidra for the next thirty-four hours.⁷⁵ For the duration of the exercise Qaddafi was in Aden conducting an official visit to South Yemen. According to U.S. intelligence Qaddafi had left Tripoli before the start of the exercise and had arrived in the capital of South Yemen earlier than planned. While in Aden he signed a treaty of cooperation with Ethiopia and South Yemen, effectively uniting three of the most radical states in the Middle East and Africa. A CIA analysis of the pact found that the tripartite alliance significantly increased the threat to U.S. interests in northeast Africa. According to the analysts a quick look at a map of the region showed U.S. allies Egypt and Sudan caught between Libya on the west and Ethiopia and South Yemen on the east. According to the terms of the treaty Qaddafi pledged hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military assistance to his partners, and the three countries agreed to maintain a reserve military force of five thousand Libyan, five thousand Yemeni, and fifty thousand Ethiopian troops.

In Qaddafi’s absence his lieutenants reacted swiftly to the American flight operations taking place in the Tripoli FIR and the northern section of the Gulf of Sidra.⁷⁶ On the first day of the exercise an assortment of aircraft from the Libyan Arab Air Force—consisting of French-built Mirage F-1s and Mirage F-5Ds, and Soviet-made MiG-23 Flogger Es and MiG-25 Foxbat As—took off from bases along the Libyan coast and flew as close as possible to the American battle force. The F-14 and F-4J crews performed thirty-five intercepts of seventy Libyan aircraft operating in pairs. Several of the intercepts evolved into “hassles,” which is fighter pilot jargon for simulated dogfights. Most LAAF pilots turned back before entering the exercise zone, but on three occasions Libyan MiGs entered the restricted area and each time forced the fleet to suspend its missile-firing exercise. Navy fighters closely escorted each intruder until well clear of the exercise area.⁷⁷

Most of the aviators in the battle force were too young to have flown combat missions in Vietnam, but the first day of OOMEX provided U.S. fighter crews with an excellent opportunity to practice combat maneuvering against a potential adversary flying Soviet- or French-built aircraft. The Americans noted that in general the Mirage pilots were more proficient at evasive maneuvering than the MiG pilots and were more difficult to intercept and hold in formation. Some Navy airmen speculated that the difference might have been due to the quality of the training provided by the French compared to that supplied by the Soviets.⁷⁸

ABC News correspondent John K. Cooley was in Tripoli during the Sixth Fleet exercise. On the evening of 18 August he observed Libyan television announcers whip up the residents of Tripoli into a terrified frenzy with reports that the CIA was planning to overthrow or kill Qaddafi, that the American battle fleet was sailing toward Libya, that Egypt and Sudan were preparing to attack Libya with American support, and that the Libyan armed forces had been placed on high alert.⁷⁹ All of this, of course, was unknown to the aviators in the battle force who were preparing for another full day of flight operations over the Gulf of Sidra. The second day of OOMEX promised to be just as exciting as the first.

The Gulf of Sidra Incident

At 0545 local time on 19 August, the Nimitz and the Forrestal ordered their crews to flight quarters. By 0600 the ordnance men had armed the planes, and the aircrews had completed their mission briefings and were manning their aircraft. There was a gentle breeze that morning, and the forecast called for a deep blue sky that would provide clear visibility for several miles. The Nimitz and the Forrestal launched six F-14 Tomcats and four F-4J Phantoms, respectively. The ten fighters were to fill five CAP stations by first light. Tomcats from VF-41 were to occupy the three southern stations, while four Phantoms of VF-74 were to fill the remaining two. Both carriers launched antisubmarine aircraft to guard against the Libyan fleet of Soviet-built diesel submarines and attack aircraft for armed surveillance of Libyan surface vessels. This latter assignment was known as surface combat air patrol (SUCAP) and carried the code name “birddog.” An unarmed E-2C Hawkeye from Carrier Airborne Early-Warning Squadron (VAW) 124 based on the Nimitz took station in the northern portion of the exercise area, out of the reach of Libyan fighters. Its mission was to provide long-range surveillance and fighter control for the battle force. Finally, the carriers launched KA-6D tankers to extend the on-station time of the CAP aircraft.

The Black Aces of VF-41 flew the most capable fighter plane in the world. The Tomcat’s AN / AWG-9 radar could detect targets nearly two hundred miles away, and the aircraft’s weapons control system could track twenty-four targets and simultaneously engage six with AIM-54C Phoenix missiles. During OOMEX the F-14s were armed with short-range AIM-9L Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles, medium-range AIM-7F Sparrow semi-active radar-guided missiles, and long-range Phoenix active radar-guided missiles. The Tomcats were also equipped with an M-61A1 Vulcan 20mm Gatling gun for close-in dog-fighting. The Bedevilers of VF-74 were armed with Sidewinders and Sparrows. The Navy version of the F-4 Phantom was not equipped with a gun system.⁸⁰

A pair of Tomcats with radio call signs “Fast Eagle 102” and “Fast Eagle 107” was scheduled to fill the southernmost CAP station. Comdr. Henry M. “Hank” Kleeman, the commanding officer of VF-41, flew the lead F-14 fighter, Fast Eagle 102, and his wingman Lt. Lawrence M. “Music” Muczynski piloted Fast Eagle 107. Lt. David J. Venlet and Lt. (jg) James P. “Amos” Anderson served as the radar intercept officers (RIOs) in Fast Eagles 102 and 107, respectively. Muczynski later admitted that he would not have been disappointed had the sortie been completely uneventful. On the previous day, 18 August, he had seen plenty of action performing a pair of intercepts, one of which was against a powerful MiG-25. Once airborne Fast Eagles 102 and 107 topped off their fuel tanks then headed south to their CAP station at the southern end of the patrol area. While en route to their station they monitored on their radios a hassle that was taking place to the west between two Libyan MiG-25s and two VF-41 Tomcats. The Libyans eventually broke off and returned to base. Meanwhile, a pair of birddog A-7E Corsair II aircraft kept watch over a Soviet-built Osa-class missile patrol boat that had moved into the exercise area. Minutes later two Bedevilers swung south to intercept a pair of MiG-23 Flogger Es, which were heading north toward the battle force. The Tomcats arrived on station at sunrise and commenced a racetrack patrol pattern, cruising at twenty thousand feet at three hundred knots. The aircraft timed their patterns so that one plane was always pointed toward the Libyan coast while the other flew its northern leg.⁸¹

At approximately 0715, while the two Phantoms from VF-74 were escorting the two MiGs, Kleeman began what he thought was his last turn toward the coast before breaking off to refuel from an airborne tanker and returning to the carrier. Suddenly Venlet detected an air contact on his radarscope due south at eighty miles. It was proceeding north from the Libyan air base at Ghurdabiyah on the south shore of the Gulf of Sidra. The E-2C detected the contact at the same time and tracked its northward progress. Venlet immediately noticed the contact climb to twenty thousand feet and increase its speed to 550 knots. It was heading right for Fast Eagle 102. Venlet reported the contact to the E-2C and to the battle force antiair warfare commander (AAWC) stationed on the Nimitz. The AAWC, a senior officer in the battle force, had the authority to initiate defensive measures to protect the force from a hostile air threat. Venlet received no reply, however, because the radio circuit was busy with reports from the F-4Js escorting the MiG-23s.⁸²

Muczynski and Anderson in Fast Eagle 107 also held the presumed-to-be-Libyan contact on their radarscope. Muczynski abandoned the racetrack pattern and swung his Tomcat into a combat formation known as a “loose deuce.” This maneuver placed him four thousand feet above Kleeman and two miles off and slightly ahead of his skipper’s right wing. The loose deuce, an aggressive and flexible formation, allows each fighter to protect the other and enables either plane—depending on who spots the enemy first—to initiate an attack. The attacker becomes the “engaged” fighter, while the other plane—the “free” fighter—climbs to a higher altitude to take advantage of the situation set up by the engaged fighter. More than likely the free fighter takes the first shot. The crews of Fast Eagles 102 and 107 had spent countless hours practicing this maneuver and they believed it was a great example of a good offense being the best defense. Kleeman banked twenty degrees to the right, starting a gradual turn that put him on the tail of the “bogey” (unidentified air contact), but the aircraft altered course and continued to close in on him. The VF-41 skipper altered course further to the right, but the Libyan plane, guided by ground control intercept (GCI) radar, again changed course to maintain an intercept on Fast Eagle 102. Unable to loop in from behind, Kleeman and Muczynski increased speed to 550 knots and proceeded directly toward the Libyan plane with Fast Eagle 102 flying at an altitude of eighteen thousand feet. They prepared to execute a demanding but effective combat maneuver known as an “eyeball-shooter intercept.” Kleeman, acting as the “eyeball,” steered directly for the contact while Muczynski, the “shooter,” jockeyed into a position from which he could aim a Sidewinder at the tailpipe of the Libyan aircraft.⁸³ Still anticipating a routine intercept, Muczynski told Anderson to get his camera ready. They had taken pictures of Libyan pilots on the first day of the exercise and Muczynski believed that “there was no reason to expect anything different from the day before.”⁸⁴

With a relative closing rate of eleven hundred knots (eighteen miles per minute), it was only a matter of seconds before the American aviators saw the Libyan aircraft. Kleeman spotted the contact when it was approximately eight miles away. What had been a single blip on the AN / AWG-9 radar repeater was actually a pair of Libyan planes flying less than five hundred feet apart in a tight formation known as a “welded wing” (in which the lead pilot performs the aerial combat while the wingman protects the leader). At a range of two to three miles the skipper identified the aircraft as Soviet-built Su-22 Fitter Js (single-seat, single-engine ground attack planes).⁸⁵

The Su-22 was no match for the F-14 in combat maneuvering ability and firepower. The Fitter was considerably slower than the Tomcat and unable to turn as tightly. It was armed with two internal 30mm cannons and a pair of AA-2 Atoll heat-seeking, air-to-air missiles. Unlike the all-aspect homing capability of the Sidewinder, the Atoll could not be employed with any probability of success unless it was aimed directly at an opposing jet’s exhaust pipe. Ignoring the disproportionate odds in his favor, Kleeman carefully initiated an offset intercept of his unsophisticated foes.⁸⁶

As Kleeman closed in on the pair of Fitters, Muczynski executed a hard left turn that placed him behind the Libyans. The rigorous maneuver pounded Muczynski’s and Anderson’s bodies with a force seven times that of gravity. At approximately 0718 Kleeman initiated a 150-degree turn to the left that would put him in an escorting position alongside the lead Fitter.⁸⁷ At the instant the lead Libyan was one thousand feet in front of and five hundred feet below Kleeman, the Libyan radioed to his wingman: “I’m preparing to fire.” A fraction of a second later he called out: “I’ve fired!”⁸⁸ Kleeman immediately noticed the area under the Fitter’s left wing erupt in smoke and fire. Shockingly, the Libyan pilot fired an Atoll missile at the tail of Kleeman’s F-14. Simultaneously Kleeman and Muczynski shouted that the Libyan had launched a missile, and the two pilots banked hard to the left to avoid the heat-seeking missile, which passed safely under the tail of Fast Eagle 102. It flew unguided until it ran out of fuel. Kleeman managed to send an urgent report to the Nimitz, notifying the carrier that a pair of Libyan Fitters had attacked the Black Aces. In accord with the Reagan ROE, Kleeman and Muczynski took immediate action to defend themselves. Without hesitation they performed a crossover maneuver.⁸⁹ Kleeman told Muczynski, “You go for the guy that shot at us. I’m going for the wingman.” Muczynski replied, “Roger that.”⁹⁰ Since the Libyans had fired once already, Kleeman figured they might try it again. Then he thought, “The only acceptable course of action was to shoot at them.”⁹¹

The moment the lead Fitter pilot carried out his desperate attack, the Libyan pilots broke their tight formation and headed in different directions. The leader executed a climbing left-hand turn then turned right toward the north. The wingman turned east in the direction of the morning sun. Satisfied that Muczynski was pursuing the lead Fitter, Kleeman settled in one-half mile behind the Libyan wingman but held off firing a Sidewinder lest the missile home in on the blazing solar disk instead of on the Fitter’s tailpipe.⁹² Kleeman knew he was not ready to fire. “I realized that that was not a good position to shoot,” he recalled. “I waited about ten seconds until he cleared the sun, [and then] fired my missile. . . . There was no chance that I wasn’t going to pull the trigger. It did go through my mind that it was likely to cause a ruckus, but I had no choice.”⁹³ The AIM-9L streaked across the bright Mediterranean sky and slammed into the aircraft’s tailpipe section. Kleeman recalled that “the missile . . . struck him in his tailpipe area causing him to lose control of the airplane, and he ejected within about five seconds.” Kleeman observed the pilot descend in his parachute.⁹⁴

Meanwhile, Muczynski streaked to a firing position one thousand yards behind the lead Fitter. He had to throttle back and apply his speed brakes to keep from flying past him. Muczynski hesitated for an instant before firing, debating in his own mind whether or not it was necessary to take out an adversary who was headed away from the action and no longer a threat to either Kleeman or himself. In his headset speaker he heard his skipper shout: “Shoot! Shoot! Shoot!”⁹⁵ The Libyan made a couple of futile attempts to shake off Fast Eagle 107, but Muczynski fired a Sidewinder just as the Fitter initiated a hard bank to the right. The missile struck the Libyan aircraft in the tailpipe and the massive explosion a fraction of a second later severed the tail section and engine from the rest of the fuselage. Muczynski maneuvered immediately to avoid the cloud of debris produced by the disintegrating Fitter.⁹⁶ “If you fly through this stuff, and it goes through your engine, you’re finished,” he recalled. “I said, ‘My God, I’ve just shot myself down!’ I just took the stick and buried it in my lap. I pulled straight up over the top, doing a seven-G pull-up.”⁹⁷ Muczynski saw the pilot eject but never saw a parachute, which may have deployed automatically at a lower altitude.

Approximately three minutes after first detecting the Fitters the engagement was over. The air battle occurred approximately sixty miles off the coast of Libya and lasted barely a minute.⁹⁸ At approximately 0719 Fast Eagle 102 and Fast Eagle 107 joined up and headed back to the Nimitz, watching each other’s “six” to ensure that no Libyan MiGs crept up behind them. While en route Kleeman reported the result of the engagement to the carrier: two Fitters shot down, both pilots ejected, one parachute observed. Muczynski remembered the understated reply from the carrier. “The admiral wants to talk to you, when you get back,” responded the voice on the radio.⁹⁹

Muczynski activated the autopilot in his Tomcat and let it fly the plane back to the vicinity of the carrier, all the while attempting to settle himself down. “We were so pumped up . . . I literally was shaking uncontrollably,” he said.¹⁰⁰ Muczynski landed on his first try, trapping the number three wire. Kleeman was also excited. Rated the best pilot in the squadron at carrier landings, Kleeman took two “practice bolters” before landing on his third approach. After landing safely the four aviators were given an exhilarating heroes’ welcome by a jubilant crowd of officers and sailors who instantly swarmed onto the flight deck.

The Libyans supposedly recovered their two hapless pilots, and later that day two fliers were presented alive and well on Libyan television. Meanwhile, the LAAF continued to probe the defensive perimeter of the battle force. A total of forty-five intercepts, including the two kills, were performed during the two-day exercise. Admiral Service concluded OOMEX on the afternoon of 19 August and withdrew the two-carrier battle force from the exercise area.

On 24 August, while anchored in Naples, Italy, the Nimitz provided the venue for a press conference attended by more than one hundred reporters representing news agencies from around the world.¹⁰¹ Kleeman and the other Black Aces described the short air battle in great detail and answered several questions about the incident. They left little doubt that their actions were justified. Admiral Service and Vice Adm. William H. Rowden, commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, praised and supported the actions of the Black Aces. “The aircrews correctly reacted in self-defense,” remarked Rowden, a surface warfare officer who had embarked in the Forrestal for the exercise. “They did not require or ask [for] any specific authorization from Admiral Service or anyone else. . . . Our pilots went out and they performed a duty, and they performed it perfectly. They performed as they had been trained and disciplined to do.” Service added: “We had the superior airplane, superior pilots, and our weapons systems are . . . better.”¹⁰²

Several of Kleeman and Muczynski’s fellow aviators were certain that the Libyan lead pilot must have fired by mistake, because his chances for success were overwhelmingly against him. Muczynski, however, thought the attack was deliberate. His opinion was validated when the crew of an electronic surveillance plane informed him that they monitored voice traffic between the Fitters and their ground controller. They overheard the lead pilot report that he fired a missile at one of the American fighters; he mentioned nothing about making a mistake.¹⁰³

The Libyans may have selected low-performance Fitters for the attack to enhance the element of surprise. Their plan may have been to lull the American pilots into dropping their guard, fire a quick shot, and then run like hell for home. If they were counting on the Americans not to respond quickly with force they were dead wrong. Under the Reagan ROE there were no more free shots at Americans.

“You Fight Like You Train”

In the brilliant sunlit skies over the Gulf of Sidra, American fighter crews successfully acquitted themselves in their first aerial combat since the Vietnam War. The seeds for the unexpected victory had been planted during the latter years of the Vietnam War, when the U.S. Navy made a concerted effort to improve the combat performance of its fighter crews. During the Korean War, Navy and Air Force fighter pilots had enjoyed a kill ratio of thirteen to one against Communist pilots. During the first half of America’s involvement in Vietnam the kill ratio against enemy fighters fell to one loss for every two victories. By 1969 the ratio was approximately one for one. Particularly discouraging was the combat record of the high performance, four million dollar F-4 Phantom II. In combat against the one million dollar MiG-21 Fishbed, the Phantom won fewer engagements than its less sophisticated foe. Beginning in early 1968 a team of experienced naval aviators and technical experts studied the performance of Navy fighters in Vietnam. Capt. Frank Ault, former skipper of the USS Coral Sea (CVA-43) who had served a combat tour in the Tonkin Gulf off North Vietnam, led the team. After nine months of analysis the Ault Report found no single reason for the Navy’s mediocre air combat record, but instead it identified several problems that seriously degraded combat performance. Among those problems were faulty missile performance, an emphasis on long-range intercept tactics, and insufficient training in basic fighter tactics. U.S. fighter crews flew extremely powerful aircraft but their overreliance on radar and air-to-air missiles diminished their basic dogfighting skills. They could not outmaneuver the MiG pilots and, arguably worse, they did not understand the physics of a successful air-to-air missile engagement. Learning to use missiles effectively was especially important to the Navy since their version of the F-4 was armed only with missiles. The Ault Report contained 242 recommendations for improving the Navy’s fighter weapon systems, the most important of which was basic training in air combat maneuvering (ACM).

To its credit the Navy took assertive action to revamp fighter combat training during the Vietnam War, while the Air Force did not. In late 1968 the Navy began pulling together the staff and curriculum for what became the Navy Fighter Weapon School, better known as “Top Gun.” Based at Miramar Naval Air Station near San Diego, the school graduated its first class of “Fighter Ph.D.s” in March 1969. After Top Gun graduates and fleet crews trained by Top Gun alumni began arriving in Vietnam in 1972, the Navy kill ratio soared to slightly over twelve-and-a-half enemy planes shot down for each Navy loss. With its overwhelming air victory in Vietnam the Navy fighter community learned an important lesson: the skill of the crew is just as important as the technology built into the aircraft. The crew deserved a capable fighter system and they had to be thoroughly trained in the latest dogfighting techniques.

The Top Gun motto—“You fight like you train”—was evident over the Gulf of Sidra on the morning of 19 August 1981. The Black Aces epitomized the aggressive tactics taught at Top Gun, particularly the use of the “loose deuce” formation. Kleeman and Muczynski immediately took command of the action and relentlessly prosecuted the engagement until their foes were destroyed. From the moment they catapulted off the deck of the Nimitz they regarded their sortie over the Gulf of Sidra as a potential combat mission. Top Gun had trained them well; they were prepared to defend themselves.¹⁰⁴

Later that year Muczynski and Anderson participated in a seminar on fighter tactics at the annual Tailhook Reunion in Las Vegas. Needless to say, their discussion about the recent air battle was the highlight of the convention of carrier-based Navy and Marine Corps aviators. The two airmen were modest about their unexpected notoriety, stating that any aircrew in the wing could have engaged the Fitters and would have achieved the same outcome. They endorsed rigorous training in air combat maneuvering for fleet fighter crews and emphasized that continuous training had been instrumental in their recent success.¹⁰⁵

American Reaction to the Gulf of Sidra Incident

The aerial victory over the Gulf of Sidra generated an avalanche of media attention and produced an outburst of national pride. Newspapers throughout the country carried photographs of the four aviators, and Americans from all walks of life cheered the outcome of the sixty-second dogfight. Countless fast food restaurants and car washes decorated their outdoor signs with messages that read “USA-2, Libya-o” or “Navy-2, Libya-o.” After years of frustration the United States had scored a resounding victory over an international rogue.¹⁰⁶

Despite the public euphoria, the reaction of the Reagan administration to the shoot down was positive but restrained. The State Department issued the following statement: “The U.S. Government is protesting, through diplomatic channels, this unprovoked attack which occurred in international airspace approximately sixty nautical miles from the nearest land.” At a Pentagon press briefing Caspar Weinberger regretted “that the Libyans took this action and brought about these consequences.” He commended the skill and professionalism of the aircrews and emphasized that they followed the ROE governing this type of situation and were not required to seek higher approval for their actions.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci sought to bring immediate closure to the incident. As he put it, “We filed our protests; our ships are moving out of the area; the exercise is over; and we consider the incident closed.”¹⁰⁸

Following up its earlier statement the State Department sent a formal note of protest to the Libyan government. It stated that Libyan aircraft had carried out an “unprovoked attack against American naval aircraft operating in international airspace.” The Belgian government, which handled U.S. interests in Libya in the absence of diplomatic relations between Washington and Tripoli, informed the United States that the Libyan government refused to accept the note.¹⁰⁹

On 20 August Reagan took time from his vacation at Rancho del Cielo, his ranch near Santa Barbara, to visit the aircraft carrier USS Constellation (CV-64) while it was stationed off the coast of California.¹¹⁰ Although the visit had been arranged long before the Gulf of Sidra incident, the timing was remarkable. Using the carrier’s public address system from the navigation bridge Reagan praised the crew of the Constellation, although his words could have applied to every American man and woman in uniform: “This ship represents a powerful force in an uncertain world, and we all sleep a little better at night knowing that you’re on duty. Everything we as Americans hold dear is safer because of what all of you are doing.”

During an impromptu press conference on the navigation bridge Reagan commented on the significance of the incident of the previous day. “Libya .. . created an artificial line, claiming waters that are actually international waters,” he said. “We decided it was time to recognize what are the international waters and behave accordingly. . . . We responded as we will respond . . . when any of our forces are attacked. They’re going to defend themselves.” Reagan then left the navigation bridge and went down to the flight deck to observe a demonstration of naval striking power. Sitting in an armchair under a bright sunny sky, he watched F-14s scream by at near supersonic speed and felt the concussions of live bombs dropped into the dark blue water by A-6E Intruders.

After lunch Reagan addressed the Constellation’s crew assembled in the hangar deck. He again praised them and sent a stern message to the enemies of freedom: “You all make me very proud to be able to say I’m the commander in chief of all of you. The demonstration of firepower and efficiency by the air wing was . . . impressive to the enemies of freedom in the world. And we had an example of that just night before last on the carrier Nimitz. . . . You are ensuring peace just by doing what you’re doing, because any potential enemy has to see the price of aggression is . . . more than he might want to pay, and that’s the greatest service that can be performed.”¹¹¹ The crew burst out in cheers several times during his brief remarks.

Perhaps the most significant development following the air battle was the absence of second-guessing of the actions of the fighter crews by administration officials. If there were any doubts that the aircrews had acted properly, Reagan put those doubts to rest. He fully supported their split-second decision and reiterated his complete confidence in the talent and judgment of his armed forces. His “hands-off” approach to military operations attained its first success.

In his autobiography, An American Life, Reagan reflected on the message that the United States delivered to Qaddafi courtesy of the Sixth Fleet: “We weren’t going to let him claim squatters’ rights over a huge area of the Mediterranean in defiance of international law. I also wanted to send a message to others in the world that there was a new management team in the White House, and that the United States wasn’t going to hesitate any longer to act when its legitimate interests were at stake.”¹¹²

While Reagan Slept

Immediately after the shootdown a flash message was sent from the Nimitz to the headquarters of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe located in London, then forwarded to the headquarters of the European Command in Stuttgart, West Germany, and finally sent to the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon. It took less than six minutes for the message to travel from the Nimitz up the chain of command to the Pentagon command center. Lt. Gen. Philip J. Gast, USAF, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was on duty in the command center, immediately notified Weinberger and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David Jones, USAF. Weinberger called National Security Adviser Richard V. Allen, who a few minutes later notified Counselor to the President Edwin Meese III. Both Allen and Meese were with Reagan at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles. Weinberger’s call to Allen came in around 2300 Pacific Daylight Time. By that time Reagan had gone to bed. Meese decided to wait for a complete report on the incident from Weinberger before waking Reagan. Five hours later Meese and Allen had enough information. Shortly before 0430 the two aides woke Reagan and informed him of the incident. Reagan asked about the condition of the American aviators, he stated that he regretted the Libyan action, and he expressed his approval of the fleet’s response. Satisfied that the situation was in good hands he went back to sleep.¹¹³

In the wake of the sixty-second air battle with Libya some journalists tried to stir up controversy when they learned that Reagan’s staff had waited nearly five and a half hours before waking him and informing him of the dogfight. Reagan reacted to the “scandal” with his characteristic good humor: “There was no decision to be made or they would have . . . awakened me. . . . If our planes were shot down, yes, they’d wake me up right away; if the other fellow’s [planes] were shot down, why wake me up?”¹¹⁴ Besides, he quipped, “4:30 in the morning, California time, is as early as I want to be awakened.”¹¹⁵

Libyan and International Reaction

The Libyans reacted to the incident with disinformation and venomous rhetoric. The Jamahiriyya Arab News Agency reported that the LAAF had combated eight F-14s and shot down one. A few thousand demonstrators took to the streets of Tripoli and Benghazi to shout anti-American slogans, but they seemed to be chanting from rote and lacked conviction.¹¹⁶ At a rally in Aden Qaddafi charged that the United States threatened peace by “persisting in its provocations and terror.”¹¹⁷ A few days later in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, Qaddafi accused the United States of “wanton provocation, an act of international terrorism, brigandage and brinksmanship.”¹¹⁸ He called on the Arab world to “declare a state of mobilization to face imperialist-Zionist and reactionary challenges,” and he boasted that his country was “ready to defend the Gulf of Sidra even if it means a third world war.”¹¹⁹ “We are ready to die for the Gulf of Sidra,” Qaddafi told a crowd celebrating the twelfth anniversary of the Libyan revolution. “We will make the Gulf of Sidra into a new Red Sea with our blood.”¹²⁰

The PLO and a number of radical Arab states such as Syria, South Yemen, and Algeria denounced the United States and expressed support for Libya. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, whom Qaddafi condemned for being too moderate in the struggle against Israel, called the incident “the beginning of a new phase in the conspiracy against Libya and the Arab nation.”¹²¹ In an illusory showing of Arab unity, several moderate Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia and Tunisia and the controlled media in their countries charged the United States with aggression against a fellow Arab nation.¹²² The secretary general of the League of Arab States, Chadli Klibi of Tunisia, called the air battle “a violation of the peace and security” of the entire Arab world and stated that the incident “can only increase tension in the Middle East.”¹²³ Privately many moderate Arab leaders praised the American action. After Reagan briefed Sadat on the upcoming exercise during the latter’s visit to Washington in early August, the Egyptian leader exclaimed, “Magnificent!”¹²⁴ Sadat was undoubtedly delighted by the results of the air battle over the Gulf of Sidra.

Moscow offered perfunctory condemnation of the incident,¹²⁵ declaring that the Sixth Fleet’s “piratical action had caused a storm of indignation around the world.”¹²⁶ The planners in Washington had been right in their prediction: the Soviets did not come to the assistance of Qaddafi. The incident demonstrated the paradox of Moscow’s relationship with Libya. The Soviets were willing to demonstrate a degree of support for an Arab leader who shared many of their interests, especially in the Middle East, and who purchased huge quantities of their weapons, but they could not champion many of Qaddafi’s extreme policies and declarations. The Soviets took no further action on behalf of Qaddafi because they did not support his claim to the Gulf of Sidra.

Among America’s allies only Israel lent unabashed support to the United States. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin called the U.S. action “an act of self-defense—just like our raids on the Iraqi nuclear plant and on the PLO headquarters in Beirut.”¹²⁷ In Western Europe the reaction to the incident was mixed. Governments and the press generally supported the United States for acting in self-defense in international waters but expressed some concern that the United States may have provoked the incident. One unlikely source welcomed the American show of force. In an editorial the left-leaning French newspaper Le Monde stated: “Restoring the power of the United States . . . is above all a question of showing that the country will not hesitate to act whenever it is challenged. The hesitations and the scruples of a Jimmy Carter thus are relegated to the antique shop.” The Spanish newspaper Dario 16, however, best expressed the conflicting feelings held by many Europeans: “While Carter’s excessive weakness was a threat to Western stability, the whole world now feels insecure after Reagan’s show of force.”¹²⁸

The prospect of Libyan retribution against American citizens and interests in Libya was relieved one day after the incident when senior officials from the Libyan ministries of oil and heavy industry met with executives of the American oil companies operating in Libya. The Libyans assured the Americans that Libya would not retaliate against the United States by nationalizing the American oil companies, by placing an embargo on the sale of oil to the United States, or by harming the Americans living and working in Libya.¹²⁹ Furthermore, a Libyan diplomat in Paris stated that Libya had no intention of mistreating the Americans living and working in Libya because Libyans “differentiate between governments and peoples,” and because the Americans have “a role to play in the Libyan economy.”¹³⁰ In the aftermath of the incident the American expatriate community maintained an atmosphere of guarded calm, and oil field operations continued without interruption. Meanwhile Reagan, who was deeply concerned about the safety of the Americans living in Libya, sent a message to Qaddafi through diplomatic back channels. He warned Qaddafi “that any acts of terrorism directed against Americans would be considered acts of war, and we would respond accordingly.”¹³¹

Qaddafi Plots Revenge

By most measures the air battle in the Gulf of Sidra was a minor military victory, but in a number of ways it was an enormous psychological and diplomatic triumph for Ronald Reagan. First, Qaddafi had been outmatched militarily. The U.S. Navy demonstrated that it was a powerful and effective force, one that Qaddafi was helpless to stop. Second, Qaddafi was intimidated. Western business executives and European diplomats reported that the Libyan government was obsessed with the threat of attack by the United States. Third, the incident demonstrated to Moscow and its clients that the United States was willing to use force to protect its vital interests around the globe. Finally, the battle reassured moderate governments in the Middle East and Africa that radical regimes were vulnerable and assumed an enormous risk if they challenged the United States. In his memoir Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, Caspar Weinberger commented on the political consequences of the recent action: “We had demonstrated not only a greatly increased American resolve, but also a greatly increased American capability for dealing with the enemy quickly and decisively. That alone did more to reassure our allies than any budget amounts we committed to spend, or any amount of rhetoric, no matter how well delivered.”¹³²

On 22 August Qaddafi was in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, conferring with the country’s Marxist ruler, Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam. Present at the meeting was a senior Ethiopian official allegedly on the bankroll of the CIA. The agency rated him as a “generally reliable” to “excellent” source of information. At the meeting Qaddafi declared that he was going to have Reagan assassinated. The informant forwarded this information to his local CIA handlers and added that Mengistu believed Qaddafi was serious. The report was forwarded to Washington with the recommendation that Qaddafi’s statement be taken seriously.

Shortly afterward the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted a telephone call from Addis Ababa to Tripoli in which Qaddafi repeated his vow to avenge the Gulf of Sidra debacle by assassinating Reagan. The CIA mentioned both reports in Reagan’s daily intelligence brief. Although most administration officials lost interest in the reports after one week, William Casey remained keenly interested in the matter and directed the intelligence community to keep him informed of any new information concerning Qaddafi’s threat to kill Reagan.¹³³

The Assassination of Sadat and the Bright Star Exercise

On 6 October President Anwar as-Sadat of Egypt was brutally murdered by Muslim extremists as he viewed a military parade celebrating the eighth anniversary of Egypt’s crossing of the Suez Canal during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In a speech delivered only hours after the assassination Qaddafi applauded the killing and remarked that “the sound of the bullets that resounded firmly and courageously in the face of as-Sadat this morning was in fact saying this is the punishment of those who betray the Arab nation.”¹³⁴

Although no evidence that linked Libya to the crime could be uncovered, the United States took immediate action to assure regional allies and increase pressure on Qaddafi.¹³⁵ First, on 8 October Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 14. The secret directive, titled “Security Considerations in Egypt and Sudan,” directed the secretaries of state and defense to “undertake an immediate examination of steps to be taken to strengthen the position of Egypt and Sudan.” The directive mandated increased military cooperation with both countries, and it envisioned that the enhanced cooperation would take the form of large increases in military aid, more visible demonstrations of military support, and promises to safeguard Egypt and Sudan. Additionally, it authorized the expansion of Bright Star ’81, the large multinational exercise scheduled to take place in November in several locations throughout North Africa and the Middle East. The Reagan administration hoped that Bright Star would demonstrate a potent U.S. military commitment to the Middle East and North Africa and counter the influence of the radical tripartite alliance of Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen; that it would deter attacks on the new government in Egypt and other friendly governments in the region; and that it would assure regional allies that the United States would come rapidly to their aid during a crisis.¹³⁶

Second, in mid-October Reagan dispatched two U.S. Air Force E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Egypt. The planes arrived on 15 October and immediately began monitoring the airspace around Egypt. By deploying the two sophisticated planes the United States sought to project both a visible presence and a settling influence in the region following Sadat’s assassination. The deployment demonstrated support for the new Egyptian president, Husni Mubarak, and served as a warning to Qaddafi not to exploit the tenuous situation in Egypt.

Bright Star ’81 commenced on 9 November and continued for two weeks. During the exercise the United States demonstrated its ability to project power and operate military forces thousands of miles from their bases in the United States. A flight of B-52 Stratofortress bombers struck targets in Egypt’s Western Desert after a nonstop flight from their bases in North Dakota. In Egypt approximately four thousand U.S. troops took part in joint-maneuvers with the Egyptian army. In Sudan U.S. Special Forces instructed Sudanese forces in counterinsurgency tactics. In Somalia medical and engineering units conducted training exercises for their Somali hosts. In Oman a thousand Marines carried out an amphibious landing near that country’s border with South Yemen. By the time the exercise concluded on 24 November, the United States had demonstrated its commitment to regional allies, had blocked Libyan exploitation of the Sadat assassination, and had minimized the influence of the Libya–Ethiopia–South Yemen pact.¹³⁷

Sadat’s shocking death and its aftermath dominated the administration’s Middle East policy during most of October and November. The matter of Qaddafi’s threat to assassinate Reagan still remained, however, and by late fall the threat developed into a brief crisis.