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Preface

In the dead of night on 15 April 1986, U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers and U.S. Navy attack aircraft struck terrorist headquarters and support facilities in and near the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. President Ronald Reagan had ordered the operation—code named “El Dorado Canyon”—in retaliation for Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi’s involvement in a terrorist bombing in West Berlin that had claimed the life of one U.S. serviceman, mortally wounded a second, and injured several other Americans. The raid’s purpose was three-fold: to punish Qaddafi for the West Berlin attack, to disrupt Libyan terrorist operations by crippling the country’s terrorist infrastructure, and to dissuade Qaddafi from sponsoring or supporting further acts of terrorism. The American public overwhelmingly supported Reagan’s decision to use force against Qaddafi, though many believed that Reagan should have acted much sooner against the agents and sponsors of international terrorism.

When Ronald Reagan took office as the fortieth president of the United States on 20 January 1981, the country was under assault from the forces of international terrorism. American citizens were the primary targets of terrorist violence and, on the day Reagan began his presidency, fifty-two American hostages were freed after 444 days of captivity in Iran. The hostage crisis was a humiliating experience for the United States, and it played no small role in driving Reagan’s predecessor, Jimmy Carter, from office. A week later, at a public ceremony celebrating the homecoming of the hostages, Reagan pledged that his administration would respond to acts of terrorism with “swift and effective retribution.” Over the next five years terrorist aggression against Americans became increasingly violent, and after each incident Reagan stated that the responsible party would be held accountable for its deed. Yet he did not act. He did not avenge the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983, the destruction of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut six months later, the murder of off-duty Marine embassy guards in El Salvador in June 1985, the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 that same month, or the massacres of innocent travelers at the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985. With each new and more horrifying act of violence the American people felt more vulnerable, became increasingly angry and frustrated, and began to believe that Reagan’s war against terrorism consisted of powerful rhetoric but not much else. By early 1986 it seemed likely that Reagan’s presidency would fall victim to terrorism, just as Carter’s had years before. Then, in mid-April 1986, the president gave a convincing response to a specific terrorist incident by ordering Operation El Dorado Canyon.

Why did it take Reagan so long to retaliate? The likely answer is that it was much easier for him to promise military action than to carry it out. It was difficult to locate the perpetrators of a terrorist act. State sponsors, if their involvement could be established, were often immune from attack because of unique political or strategic circumstances. One of Reagan’s most important advisers was opposed to using military force except under strict criteria. At the same time America’s European allies were staunchly opposed to military action due to their own political and economic concerns.

Once Reagan committed his administration to a campaign against terrorism in January 1981, his policymakers trained their focus on Qaddafi’s radical regime in Tripoli. They did so for several practical reasons: Qaddafi was the most open advocate of international terrorism, many leaders in Africa and the Middle East reviled his regime, and Libya was the weakest militarily of the leading state supporters of terrorism (a list of states that included Syria and Iran).

America’s difficulties with Qaddafi did not begin with Reagan’s presidency. In 1973 Qaddafi declared the entire Gulf of Sidra an integral part of Libyan territory. His unlawful claim violated international conventions governing territorial waters and spurned the right of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and other navies serving in the Mediterranean to conduct naval exercises in international waters and airspace. Furthermore, during the 1970s Qaddafi became a leading practitioner of state-sponsored terrorism, which he considered a practical means of achieving his foreign policy objectives. He instigated acts of subversion against moderate governments in the Middle East and Africa, he aided “liberation” movements in countries all over the world, and he provided training, arms, and funding for a disparate collection of terrorist organizations. By the end of the decade the United States and other Western governments considered Qaddafi the world’s most notorious champion of terrorism.

The Reagan administration set out to develop a multifaceted strategy to challenge Qaddafi’s illegal claim over the Gulf of Sidra, to contain his subversive activities, and to confront his reprehensible involvement with terrorism. The strategy consisted of diplomatic and economic sanctions, covert operations, and demonstrations of military power. During the first five years of Reagan’s presidency certain elements of the strategy became stricter, bolder, and more assertive. In 1981 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) launched a covert operation in Chad designed to challenge indirectly Qaddafi’s hold on power. In 1985 the CIA planned to provide lethal aid to Libyan dissident groups in the hope that they would abolish the Qaddafi regime, and the National Security Council (NSC) actively encouraged an Egyptian attack on Libya. In 1982 Reagan ordered an embargo on imported Libyan oil and in 1986 he severed all economic ties between the two countries. During his first year in office Reagan directed the U.S. Sixth Fleet to conduct a large naval exercise near Libya; five years later he ordered the fleet to carry out a series of progressively larger and more complex demonstrations, which eventually culminated in major surface and air operations in the Gulf of Sidra.

The Sixth Fleet exercises vigorously challenged Libya’s claim over the Gulf of Sidra and forcefully demonstrated the will of the American people in the struggle against Libyan terrorism. In August 1981 and March 1986 Qaddafi attempted to strengthen his illegal claim to the gulf with military force. In each instance the fleet defended itself and answered Qaddafi’s challenge with a stern rebuke. To avenge his humiliating defeat in March 1986 Qaddafi ordered several terrorist operations against American citizens and interests overseas. In early April his agents carried out the deadly attack on La Belle discothèque in West Berlin.

Ironically, for about two years Reagan’s Libya strategy seemed to have a quieting effect on Qaddafi but, by 1984, the Libyan dictator was linked to several notorious acts of subversion, terrorism, and dangerous mischief. Reagan’s strategy had failed to induce Qaddafi to renounce terrorism and subversion largely because America’s European allies had given the policy little support and rejected certain portions of it outright. Reagan had sought the closure of all Libyan embassies and a total ban on the purchase of Libyan oil, but the Europeans for the most part were unwilling to take those steps. They feared Libyan reprisals and wanted to avoid any action that might threaten their lucrative commercial relationships with Libya. When U.S.-Libyan relations reached a crisis in early 1986, the United States found itself virtually alone in confronting Qaddafi. After the West Berlin bombing Reagan realized that other steps that fell short of military force—diplomatic measures, economic sanctions, and large naval demonstrations—had not produced a noticeable change in Qaddafi’s behavior. Knowing full well that few allies would support his decision, Reagan nevertheless proceeded with Operation El Dorado Canyon. Most of them later criticized his action.

Yet the air strike profoundly affected both Colonel Qaddafi and America’s allies. Qaddafi received the unambiguous message that he could no longer attack Americans with impunity. The allies, on the other hand, sought to forestall further U.S. military action by implementing stronger counterterrorism measures and pledging to cooperate more closely with the United States in the fight against international terrorism.

Several years have passed since American bombs fell on Libya, and the events leading up to Operation El Dorado Canyon and the raid itself have faded from public memory. By 1991 the air strike was eclipsed by several important foreign affairs developments, such as the Iran-Contra affair, a large U.S military commitment in the Persian Gulf during the later stages of the Iran-Iraq War, U.S.-Chinese relations following the massacre at Tiananmen Square, the collapse of Soviet communism, the U.S. invasion of Panama, and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Moreover, it is worth noting that two well-known biographies of Ronald Reagan—President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime by Lou Cannon, originally published in 1991, and Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan by Edmund Morris, published in 1999—each devote only a few paragraphs to the U.S.-Libyan showdown of the 1980s.

Nevertheless, the story of Operation El Dorado Canyon and the events and circumstances leading up to it deserve to be told. On a number of occasions the dispute between Reagan and Qaddafi dominated U.S. foreign policy and, during the first three and a half months of 1986, it was a full-fledged crisis. This book presents a political-military history of relations between the United States and Libya from the beginning of Reagan’s presidency through the aftermath of the air strike, including the development of Reagan administration policies regarding international terrorism and its most prominent advocate, Muammar al-Qaddafi, and the political and economic strategies, diplomatic initiatives, covert actions, and military operations aimed at the Qaddafi regime. During Reagan’s presidency hostilities erupted between U.S. and Libyan forces on four occasions. Therefore, considerable space here is devoted to operational planning, descriptions of military equipment and tactics, and a portrayal of the combat actions that took place.

In recounting the turbulent relationship between Reagan and Qaddafi I have emphasized a number of points. First, developing a comprehensive U.S. strategy toward Libya was a long and difficult process. Many policy decisions took months to achieve because of bureaucratic infighting, disagreements between senior officials, conflicting interpretations of intelligence, and the need to assuage allies’ concerns. Second, despite having a reputation among his critics as a “trigger-happy cowboy,” Reagan refrained from using force in response to Libyan terrorism until he could reliably attribute responsibility for a specific terrorist incident to the Qaddafi regime and until other measures had been given a reasonable chance to modify Qaddafi’s behavior. Third, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force planned and trained for operations against Libya with exceptional skill and precision—often facing short deadlines and working under intense political pressure—and carried them out with extraordinary heroism. Fourth, the Sixth Fleet played an indispensable role in the prolonged confrontation with Libya by demonstrating the advantages of using naval power to achieve and maintain foreign policy objectives without resorting to all-out war or the long-term deployment of military forces. Finally, the air strike of 15 April 1986 was a devastating political and psychological defeat for Qaddafi. It undercut his ability to carry out or support further acts of terrorism, and it convinced him that he could no longer harm Americans without paying a terrible price. After Operation El Dorado Canyon Qaddafi was haunted by the prospect that the next terrorist incident that bore his fingerprints could trigger another armed riposte from the United States. While he did not forswear the use of terrorism, he was forced to adjust his operational methods, which in turn significantly reduced his involvement in the deadly practice. Moreover, the effect of the air strike on Qaddafi, namely the effective employment of military force against his regime, was not lost on other practitioners and supporters of global terrorism.

Certain portions of this book reveal a particular bias of the author. As a retired naval officer I take great pride in describing the extraordinary professionalism and heroic actions of Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force servicemen who risked their lives in combat against Libyan air, naval, and air defense forces. I have the highest admiration of and deepest respect for the courage of our servicemen and, in the case of two airmen, their supreme sacrifice. On the other hand, I am not blind to the faults of the Reagan administration and the U.S. military, especially regarding policies that did not serve the interests of the American people and tactical decisions that placed American forces in exceptional danger.

The body of this work begins and ends with a look at Libya. Chapter one contains an overview of Libyan history, an account of Qaddafi’s rise to power, and a description of revolutionary Libya. Portions of chapter seven examine the impact of El Dorado Canyon on Libya’s leader and describe Qaddafi’s attempts to end his country’s isolation in the years immediately following the air strike. The epilogue recounts the Lockerbie incident, its lasting impact on U.S.-Libyan relations, and Qaddafi’s succeeding efforts to rejuvenate his prestige in Africa, the Middle East, and the West. The final pages of this work contain an assessment of the legacy of El Dorado Canyon, an overview of the terrible events of II September 2001 and President George W. Bush’s call for a global war to eradicate terrorism, and a glimpse at the prospects for U.S.-Libyan relations in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

Editorial Note: Concerning the transliteration of Arabic words into English, I followed the system practiced by the Middle East Journal, with the following exceptions: first, I assimilated the definite article “al-” when it precedes “sun” letters of the Arabic alphabet (for example, Anwar as-Sadat, not Anwar al-Sadat); second, to avoid confusion I retained the widely accepted spellings of well-known people and places (such as Gamal Abdul Nasser, not Jamal abd an-Nasir, and Tripoli, not Tarabulus); and third, to maintain consistency with regard to geographic names, I adopted the system used by the editor of Libya: A Country Study, an area studies handbook published by the U.S. government in 1989.

Another thought on this subject: There are literally hundreds of English renderings of the last name of the leader of Libya. Qaddafi, Qadhafi, Qadhdhafi, Gadhafi, Gaddafi, Gadaffi, and Kaddafi are some of the more common spellings. “Qaddafi” is used throughout the body of this work because it is less cumbersome than “Qadhdhafi,” which is the most accurate transliteration. The reader can gain some appreciation of the range of alternate spellings of the name Qaddafi by browsing through the titles of books, articles, and documents shown in the bibliography.