Читать книгу Metal that Will not Bend - Kally Forrest - Страница 26

News of the VW strike and the R2 living wage demand reverberated, falling on fertile ground in Mawu’s East Rand stronghold. The strike wave that followed, beginning in June 1980, was almost entirely spontaneous and illegal. The union stepped in to lend support where possible, and this encouraged further actions in what Hyman describes as ‘cumulative disorder’.⁴⁰ Short demonstration stoppages were the most common, their primary purpose being to call attention to the urgency of workers’ feeling of grievance. In such stoppages strikers are often willing to return to work to negotiate before employers make concessions.⁴¹ The tactic of ‘working to rule’ whereby workers protest by conforming to the letter of their job description was notably absent, however, which told a story in itself – there were no specified ‘rules’ to begin with.

Both Hyman and Tarrow⁴² assert the effectiveness of the wildcat strike because management has little opportunity to plan its response, in contrast to the formal notice given in an official dispute. Tarrow sees spontaneous action as the most authentic expression of worker power, but on the East Rand many such actions failed. Many workers, especially those demanding pay rises, returned to work without winning concessions, or were dismissed. Facing such risks, their actions may appear irrational. Hyman suggests, however, that even where workers know they cannot win, ‘the opportunity to release tensions accumulated in an oppressive work situation gives many apparently irrational walk-outs a convincing rationale’.⁴³ Providing workers are not sacked, even failed strikes have the effect of shifting the balance of power and shaping future dynamics in the workplace.

Workers on strike during the East Rand strike wave at Hendler and Hendler (The Star, 7 May 1982)

Workers at Rely Precision in Boksburg claimed that the strike wave spark originated in their factory in May 1980 when Mawu members spontaneously downed tools over the dismissal of a steel cutter accused of not being at his work station, despite his 15 years of service. Strikers refused to disperse until management gave them a hearing, and were assaulted by police, arrested and spent the night in jail. Represented by a union lawyer they ‘all appeared in the court the same morning … we foundry workers stood together in our boots and overalls, still dirty from the sand and dust of the foundry … some of us had the foundryman’s leather apron on. Others wore their safety glasses.’⁴⁴ The charge of participating in an illegal strike was later dropped.

The company refused to rehire the dismissed strikers, but Mawu would not let the matter die. It helped them to produce a play about their experiences that was performed across the East Rand. It also brought a case against the minister of police which resulted in compensation two years later. ‘The money helps, but the victory helps the metal workers’ struggle even more,’ said a union member. ‘Since then the SAP [South African Police] have not beaten us on the East Rand because they do not want to pay again.’⁴⁵ For management, it was a costly victory. Paul Stewart records that a year later the output of the scab labour hired from nearby townships was still below that of the fired migrants.⁴⁶

Tension was heightened by the mysterious ransacking of Fosatu’s offices in July 1981 (Wits archives)

Two other Mawu victories fuelled the climate of dissidence. At Vaal Metal Pressings and Hendler and Hendler, workers gave their majority support to Mawu in company referendums and Hendler began pay talks with shop stewards outside of the industrial council. Seifsa’s response was to issue guidelines urging members not to conduct referendums. A strike at the CWIU-organised Colgate in Benoni, where workers won the right to bargain outside the industrial council and which involved a product boycott, also served as a potent example.⁴⁷

Mawu’s Mayekiso believes that the trigger for wider dissidence was a pay strike at engineering firm Hall Longmore, where workers won 10c an hour more than the industrial council offer. ‘When … other factories heard about this, they also began demanding increases and this was the beginning of the wave of strikes … It started in Wadeville and spread to Benoni, Alrode and Isando.’⁴⁸ Soon afterwards, 2 000 workers at Salcast Smelter in Benoni struck in support of wage demands, followed by 1 500 workers at Hendler. Between July and November 1981, more than 50 strikes took place on the East Rand, involving 25 000 workers.⁴⁹

Many of the strikers were migrants living in East Rand Administration Board (ERAB) townships such as Tembisa, Vosloosrus and Katlehong. There was great excitement, especially in hostels, as workers everywhere on the East Rand told stories. One worker described the exhilaration: ‘Groups of people would gather at night and discuss the latest news. Each had a story to tell. Each worker was giving his own sermon, some angry, some laughing. Talk mixed excitedly with song. It was like the Zion churches. And all the strikers were Christian soldiers.’⁵⁰ Hostels became pillars of union strength, and the tension was heightened by the mysterious torching of Fosatu’s Benoni offices in July.⁵¹

Pay was the central grievance. Rising food prices and rentals, combined with falling real wages, formed the backdrop. Additional pressure for migrants, who made up 30 per cent of the East Rand workforce, was the devastating drought in rural South Africa and the more stringent application of the pass laws by ERAB.⁵² A further spark was the new metal industrial council agreement in July 1981, which set a minimum of R1.13 per hour. This was a 20 to 23 per cent increase on the previous year but was well below the inflation rate which, for black workers, stood at 30 per cent.⁵³ A worker poet on the East Rand sang this lament:

Benoni, Boksburg, Springs, Egoli,

we make you rich.

We hostel people make you rich.

You send us back home to die with empty

pockets,

empty dreams and dust in our lungs, chopped-off hands and your machines grinding in our brain.⁵⁴

The right of the industrial council to set wages for the industry went to the root of Mawu’s battle for power. By demanding increases above council rates, it was challenging the council’s right to set wages and the right of the white establishment to control African workers’ lives. Seifsa instructed metal companies to resist pay demands, and most strikers were forced back to work without increases. The hard-line employer association did however acknowledge that ‘it would have to become more responsive to the shop floor if it were to survive’.⁵⁵ It began urging companies to recognise unions which agreed to join the council, negotiating only grievance and disciplinary issues at the plant.

Management control was at issue in more than half the strikes, while job insecurity was a strong concern for contract workers. ‘Management prerogative’ over dismissals, retrenchments, conduct of foremen, shift changes and workloads featured prominently among demands, and in these areas many concessions were won. At Telephone Manufacturers of South Africa, for example, workers refused to work because they considered production demands too heavy, and management relaxed the schedule. At Mine Steel Products in Boksburg, a stoppage forced the reinstatement of workers dismissed after refusing to carry an unreasonably heavy load. At Scaw Metals, six workers dismissed for rejecting the closed shop were reinstated and allowed to join Mawu.⁵⁶

Some 25 of the metal strikes revolved around dismissals, often at the hands of racist and capricious white foremen, and in more than half strikers were reinstated.⁵⁷ At Scaw Metals, for example, black workers were fired after a fight sparked by racist abuse, but reinstated after a four-day strike. Management issued a warning to Seifsa employers that companies could ‘no longer get away with dismissing a black worker when he assaulted a foreman who called him “kaffir”’.⁵⁸ Some white workers in lower supervisory positions, threatened by black job mobility, became deeply unhappy as companies made concessions to militant co-workers and extreme right-wing groups on the East Rand emerged. On such matters as warnings and dismissals, Mawu shop stewards began to use grievance procedures to bypass immediate supervisors and undermine their control, and appealed directly to top management.⁵⁹

Sometimes, as at Boksburg Foundry, workers struck over the dismissal of union leaders, and at Vaal Metals, Boksburg Foundry and Nickel Chrome they successfully demanded the dismissal of worker representatives who were ‘bought off’ by management. Increasingly, managers tried to dampen the militancy by offering to promote workers’ leaders or send union representatives on company training.⁶⁰

Employers who hoped that the Christmas break would serve as a cooling-off period were disappointed. As the economy slid deeper into recession and job cuts became more common in 1982, the strike wave intensified. Wadeville, in particular, became a war zone, with strikes by 14 000 workers. Exclaimed Andrew Zulu, a Mawu shop steward and Fosatu vice president: ‘I never dreamt workers would show so much interest in union activity, because when I started people believed they would be arrested as we were involved in what they [government] called communism.’⁶¹

The 1982 strikes were more narrowly focused on wages, perhaps reflecting Mawu’s growing success in winning recognition in factories. Recognition agreements, and particularly their grievance and disciplinary codes, also seemed to give migrants the greater security and dignity they demanded.

The 1982 industrial council talks were again a spark to the tinder, but for a different reason. The deadlock between employers and white artisans delayed the implementation of the main agreement, so that black workers did not receive their annual increase at the usual time. By September at least 45 strikes had erupted,⁶² and 4 000 workers rejected the industrial council system at Mawu’s AGM.⁶³