Читать книгу The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues - Kan'ichi Asakawa - Страница 8

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Regarded, however, from a broader point of view, no one could predict a happy consequence of so ominous a beginning, as has been described, of the new Eastern situation. By her successful intervention, Russia had conferred upon China a signal favor, for which a reward was expected; but the reward, again, assumed such a form that it at the same time served as a new favor looking toward a fresh reward, so that the final resultant of the repeated process proved altogether out of proportion to the initial deed of patronage. The first step of this process was a 4 per cent. loan^[144] to China of 400,000,000 francs at 94⅛, and payable in thirty-six years, beginning with 1896. Not only were these liberal terms attended by no security, but also the interest was guaranteed by a special edict of the Czar.^[145] The loan was issued principally from Paris in July, 1895,^[146] and the income was intended to cover one half^[147] of China’s indemnity to Japan.^[148] In order to facilitate the transactions in connection with this loan, as well as to promote the commercial relations between Russia and Eastern Asia, the Russo-Chinese Bank was organized late in 1895. In August, 1896,^[149] the Chinese Government was induced to contribute 5,000,000 taels toward the capital of the Bank, which seem to have been paid out of the new loan.^[150] Later in the same year, Prince Ukhtomsky, president of the Bank, who had come to Peking with an immense number of costly presents to be distributed among the members of the Court, succeeded in securing the consent of the Chinese Government to the Statutes of the Bank, which were subsequently published on December 8.^[151] The privileges of the institution as enumerated in these Statutes included the receiving of tax returns, management of local finances, coining, payment of the interests of the public bonds, and construction of railways and telegraph lines in China, in so far as concessions should be made by her Government to the Bank. The latter now has more than thirty branches and agencies in East Asia, and this professedly private corporation has since proved to be a great instrument through which the Russian Government has obtained from China enormous concessions in Manchuria.

Before we examine the nature of these concessions, it is important to observe what took place between Russia and China through the official channels. On March 27, 1896, the Eastern world was startled to see the publication in the North China Daily News of a treaty of defensive alliance concluded earlier in the same year between Russia and China. The Japanese Government had already, on March 16, been assured by the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg that the treaty did not exist.^[152] It is not clear whether the denial referred to the particular treaty in question or to any treaty of alliance whatsoever. However that may be, the reported agreement^[153] was of the most serious character, as will be gathered from the following abstract. In recognition of the service rendered by Russia regarding the matter of the Liao-tung Peninsula and of the loan, the Chinese Emperor desired to conclude with Russia a treaty of alliance; and, consequently, it was agreed, in secrecy, that, if Russia should come in conflict with other Asiatic Powers, she should be allowed to make free use of any port or harbor on the Chinese coast, and, in case of urgent need, levy troops from among the Chinese people. If a protest should be made by other Powers, China should answer that she was powerless to resist Russian demands. If she should desire even to render active assistance to Russia against the common enemy, she might do so, but this point required further discussion. In view of the great disadvantages of the ice-bound naval harbors of Russia, China agreed to allow her in time of peace a free use of Port Arthur, or, if the other Powers should object, of Kiao-chau. If the latter should be found inadequate, Russia might choose any harbor on the coast of Kiang-su and Che-kiang. If, on the other hand, China should be at war with another Power, Russia should endeavor to effect a compromise between the belligerents, and, if the effort should fail, it should be the duty of Russia openly to assist China and thereby strengthen the alliance between the two Powers. In regard to Manchuria, Russian military officers should be free to travel along the eastern frontiers of the Sheng-king and Kirin Provinces and to navigate the Yalu and other rivers, the object being either to further trade or to patrol the frontiers. When the Siberian Railway was completed, a branch line might be constructed under the joint control of China and Russia, passing through the Provinces of Heilung and Kirin, and reaching Talien or some other place selected by Russia. In order to protect this line, Russia might possess near Talien-wan an island and the opposite shore, fortify them, and station there her squadron and military forces. If a war should arise between Russia and Japan concerning Korea, China should allow Russia to send her troops toward the Yalu, so as to enable them to attack the western boundary of Korea.

No matter whether any treaty of alliance had been signed between China and Russia early in 1896, significant events soon followed which gave rise to rumors of grave import. When it was resolved by China to send Wang Tsz-chun to St. Petersburg as special envoy to attend the coronation of the Czar, which was to take place in May of the same year, M. Cassini, Russian Minister at Peking, is said to have intimated that no one but Li Hung-chang was acceptable to Russia as the representative of the Chinese Emperor. Li’s pro-Russian proclivities had been well known, but he had up to this time been in disgrace for having concluded the treaty of Shimonoseki so unfavorable to China. He now regained his favor with the Court, and started on his mission to Russia, presumably taking with him the draft of the Russo-Chinese convention which M. Cassini had framed. The convention is reported to have been signed, to avoid suspicion of other Powers, not at St. Petersburg, but at Moscow, and, on the Russian side, not by M. Lobanoff, Foreign Minister, but by M. Witte, Minister of Finance. When, however, the agreement was referred to the Yamên at Peking for ratification, a large majority of the Chinese Ministers are said to have disapproved the terms of Li’s treaty, until the strenuous efforts of M. Cassini turned the tide and the convention was ratified by the Emperor on September 30, 1896. This is the celebrated “Cassini Convention.”^[154] Let us now examine the more important of its contents. The preamble explicitly referred, as also did the treaty of alliance already summarized, to the favors done to China by Russia at the close of the recent war. The body of the convention falls, in its substance, into two large divisions, namely, the Articles (1–6) relating to railway concessions in Manchuria, and those (8–11) in regard to the disposition of certain ports on the Chinese littoral. Russia was allowed to extend the Siberian Railway to Vladivostok across Manchuria via Aigun, Tsitsihar, Petuna, Kirin, and Kun-chun (Art. 1). As regards the projected Chinese railroad between Shan-hai-kwan and Mukden, if China should find it inconvenient to build it, Russia might furnish capital and construct the line, China reserving to herself the option of buying it after ten years of Russian management (Art. 2). Another Chinese line in contemplation between Shan-hai-kwan and Port Arthur and Talien-wan via Niu-chwang, and its appurtenances, should be built in accordance with the general railway regulations of Russia (Art. 4). The fifth Article was striking: All the railways built by Russia in the Chinese territory were to be protected by the local Chinese authorities, but in the more remote regions, where the necessary protection was not available, Russia was allowed, in order to afford a better protection to her railroad and property, to station special battalions of Russian infantry and cavalry. Regarding the ports, it was agreed that Russia might lease Kiao-chau for fifteen years for the use of her squadron, but, in order to avoid suspicion by other Powers, she should not immediately occupy the harbor or seize the points commanding it (Art. 9). In view of the strategic importance of Port Arthur and Talien-wan and their adjacent territories, China should in haste provide for their adequate defense and repair their fortification, and Russia should render all necessary aid for the protection of the two harbors, and should not allow any other Power to attack them; if, for urgent necessity, Russia should engage in a war, China should allow her, to enable her to attack the enemy and defend her own position with greater ease, temporarily to concentrate her military and naval forces in those harbors (Art. 10). So long, however, as Russia was not involved in hostilities, China should retain all rights in the control of Port Arthur and Talien-wan, and Russia should not interfere with them in any manner (Art. 11). In addition to these Articles, it was provided that, if China should desire to reorganize the entire army of Manchuria on the European basis, she should engage the services of Russian military instructors (Art. 8). In the matter of mining, Russian and Chinese subjects might, with the consent of local authorities, work all kinds of minerals in the Heilung and Kirin Provinces, and in the Long White Mountains (Art. 7).

COUNT CASSINI

Russian Minister at Washington, and formerly at Peking

Such are the contents, in brief, of the much debated “Cassini Convention,” the existence of which has been as often alleged as denied. The reported document may well be unauthentic, at any rate in several important particulars. Its main interest consists, however, not so much in the question of its literal authenticity, as in the important facts, (1) that the subsequent course of events is largely foreshadowed in its contents, and (2) that high Russian authorities have obtained, or at least claimed, certain privileges which cannot be found in all the other Russo-Chinese contracts that are known to us, but are in one way or another reflected in the present convention. The universal belief in the diplomatic world appears to be that, if the published text of the Cassini Convention is untrustworthy, some of its substance must have been contained in an agreement which Li Hung-chang signed in Russia in 1895, and in some later secret agreements. Nor is it impossible to substantiate this belief from evidence of undoubted authenticity. Thus M. Pavloff, the Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Peking, said, on October 8, 1897, to Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister, that “shortly after the return of Li Hung-chang from his mission to St. Petersburg, the Chinese Government had informed the Russian Minister that they had up intention of continuing the Northern line [beyond Shan-hai-kwan toward Kirin], but if at any time they did continue it, owing to the particularly friendly relations existing between the Russian and Chinese Governments, they would in the first instance address themselves to Russian engineers and employ, if necessary, Russian capital.”^[155] It will at once be observed that this closely corresponds to Article 3 of the Cassini Convention. On this ground, M. Pavloff considered it a “contravention of the agreement”^[156] on the part of the Chinese Government that the latter allowed British subjects, on June 7, 1898, to furnish capital and the chief engineer for the extension of the Northern line, and, repeatedly and in a manner highly irritating to the British and Chinese Governments, demanded the replacement of Mr. Kinder and his staff with Russian engineers.^[157] It was again in the same spirit that Russia succeeded in inducing England to insert in the additional clauses of the Anglo-Russian railway agreement of April 28, 1899, a statement to the effect that the Russians might extend the Manchurian Railway in a southwesterly direction through the region traversed by the Northern Chinese line built with British capital,^[158] Count Muravieff explaining that M. Witte attached importance to the insertion of this clause.^[159] Well he might, for no sooner was the Agreement concluded than Russia pressed China, though without success, for the concession for a railway reaching directly to Peking itself.^[160] Again, if the provision in the Cassini Convention that China should with all haste repair the fortification of Port Arthur, with the assistance of Russia, and, in case of necessity, turn it over to the use of the latter’s fleet (Art. 10), was false, it was not long before Count Muravieff could declare, in December, 1897, that an “offer” had been made by the Chinese Government to allow the Russian squadron to winter at the port.^[161] More significant still was M. Pavloff’s remark to Sir Claude MacDonald, that “he must tell him frankly that the Russian Government intended that the provinces of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come under the influence of any nation except Russia.”^[162] Sir Claude pointed out that Kirin, the probable terminus of the extension line, to which M. Pavloff had objected, was more than two hundred miles from the Russian frontier, but the Chargé had evidently marked out the entire Manchurian provinces as a Russian sphere of influence. It may be said that this claim even exceeded the Cassini Convention and verged to the less trustworthy treaty of alliance. The attention of the reader may, however, be called to a still more direct evidence than the veiled remarks of M. Pavloff. In the official statement accompanying the text of the Russo-Chinese Convention of April 8, 1902, which was published in the Official Messenger of April 12, occur the following words: “The Chinese Government, on their side, confirm all the obligations they have previously undertaken toward Russia, and particularly the provisions of the 1896 agreement, which must serve as a basis for the friendly relations of the neighboring Empires. By this defensive agreement, Russia undertook in 1896 to maintain the principle of the independence and integrity of China, who, on her side, gave Russia the right to construct a line through Manchuria, and to enjoy the material privileges which are directly connected with the above undertaking.”^[163] It is impossible to find any one contract concluded in 1896 which either might be considered a “defensive agreement” or contains the points enumerated in the quoted passage. The so-called Cassini Convention alone contains the provisions about the railway, as well as Articles 9 and 10, which may be said to “maintain the principle of the independence and integrity of China.”^[164] The coincidence becomes even more striking when we consider, together with the Convention, the reported treaty of defensive alliance of 1896, which may be regarded, if any, the preliminary plan of the Convention. It is also interesting to note that when Dr. George Morrison, the noted Peking correspondent of the Times, had an interview with Prince Ching on March 19, 1901, and directly referred to the supposed existence of a series of secret agreements between Russia and China, beginning with the one which Li Hung-chang negotiated during his mission in St. Petersburg, the Prince “assented without the slightest demur.”^[165] Finally, we are in possession of a vague statement made by Count Cassini himself, who, in 1904, referred to the treaty “giving to Russia railroad and other concessions in Manchuria,” which, said he, “I had the honor to negotiate [at Peking] in behalf of my Sovereign.”^[166] The agreement of September 8, 1896, to which we shall presently turn, “giving railway and other concessions in Manchuria,” was concluded between the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg and the Russo-Chinese Bank, and, unless Count Cassini negotiated it at Peking at the same time that the Chinese Minister did at the Russian capital, it may be inferred that the former, in his quoted statement, referred to a “Cassini Convention.” It is not at all impossible, however, that both he in China and Mr. Hu in Russia took part in the negotiations which resulted in the conclusion of the agreement of September 8, 1896.

Taking all these indications together, it seems almost safe to aver that at least two important items of concessions—namely, railway grants and the use of some ports for strategic purposes—must in some form have been secured by Russia after 1896, and before the actual lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan in 1898. It is needless to say that these two objects, railways and ports, possessed a political meaning of the greatest moment, the ports affording the Russian navy a commanding point on the Pacific coast, and the railways ultimately connecting that point with the army bases in Siberia and European Russia.

Of these two items, it was the railways that first emerged from the state of a preliminary to that of a final agreement between Russia and China. And it was here that the Russo-Chinese Bank played a great rôle for the Russian Government, for the Agreement of August 27 (September 8), 1896,^[167] providing for the construction by the Russians of a railway through Manchuria connecting the Trans-Baikal and South Ussuri lines of the Siberian railway system, was concluded between the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg and the Bank. The latter undertook to organize the Eastern Chinese^[168] Railway Company with its accounts separate from those of the Bank (Art. 1). It is instructive to note that it is stated in the preamble of this Agreement that the Chinese Government “intrusted”^[169] the Bank to undertake the construction of the line, and that the government agreed to contribute 5,000,000 taels toward the capital of the Company.^[170] The Russian troops should be transported by the railway without obstruction and at half-fare (Arts. 8 and 9). Upon the basis of this Agreement were promulgated by the Government of the Czar Statutes^[171] providing for the construction and operation of the railway. Nothing can better betray than these two documents, the Agreement and the Statutes, that the enterprise was only in a very limited sense an undertaking of a private company. In the first place, the capital of the Company was divided into share-capital and bond-capital, the former, not guaranteed by the Russian Government, being limited to only 5,000,000 rubles, while the latter, which was officially guaranteed, could be indefinitely expanded according to necessity.^[172] It in fact had already before the present war swollen to the enormous sum of over 270,000,000 rubles.^[173] In the second place, the operation of the railroad was placed upon the uniform basis of the Siberian system, and under the management of a board whose nominal president was a Chinese,^[174] but whose vice-president, who was to assume the actual direction, was under the supervision of the Minister of Finance.^[175] Finally, but not the least in importance, was the provision regarding the protection of the railway and its employees and the policing of the lands assigned to the road and its appurtenances. The former duty was to be performed by the Chinese Government, but the latter “was confined to police agents appointed by the Company. The Company shall for this purpose draw up and establish police regulations.”^[176] In these police agents, ostensibly to be employed by the Company, one may discern the origin of the famous “railway guards,” later called the “frontier guards,” whose existence has become an important problem since 1902 in connection with the Russian evacuation of Manchuria. It should also be noted that this provision concerning the police agents does not appear in the corresponding Article in the text of the Agreement between China and the Bank, upon which the Statutes were based, so that one is at a loss to know what was the conventional ground for this Russian law, unless, indeed, it was the so-called Cassini Convention, which was alleged to have provided for the organization of Russian infantry and cavalry battalions in order to protect Russian interests in the more remote parts of Manchuria.

It was agreed that the line should, after eighty years, come under the possession of the Chinese Government, which might also buy up the road and its appurtenances after thirty-six years.^[177] It is interesting to see that it also provided that during the eighty years of Russian management, all commodities carried between China and Russia by the railway should pay in China duties one third less than the ordinary import and export duties in that Empire,^[178] a provision hardly reconcilable with the open door principle, and explicitly contrary to the principles proposed by the United States to the Powers two years later.^[179]

The Eastern Chinese Railway Company was organized in February, 1897, and the first sod of the Manchuria Railway was cut with great ceremony on the eastern frontier of the Kirin Province on August 28, 1897.

To some this railway concession may have appeared at first to have been intended merely to reduce the time and expense of completing the eastern section of the Siberian Railway by allowing it to pass across Manchuria through a route shorter and easier than the one along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Such a belief was, however, soon dispelled, or rather, modified, by the acquisition by Russia of the lease of the greatest naval harbor in the Yellow Sea, and, simultaneously, of the right to join this naval basis by a new railway with the main Manchurian line, so as to make complete the connection between Port Arthur and the army centres in Siberia and Russia. The Russian lease of this port was, however, preceded by and modeled after the German lease of Kiao-chau, which should therefore receive our brief attention first.