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Bringing Counter Espionage and ISOS into the Field

In preparation for Operation TORCH, MI6

“provided a mobile SI(b) Unit to carry out covert counter-espionage operations and to be responsible for communicating ISOS information to the I(b) sections and supervising the exploitation of it”. [1]

There has been much written about the intelligence and deception battles fought in WW2 – Thaddeus Holt’s book “The Deceivers” is one example that provides an excellent description of these areas. So far, however, little has been said about Allied Counter-Espionage (CE) work done “in the field”.

The conception, creation, and exploitation of special military counter-espionage units, manned by MI6 and MI5 staff trained in CE work, and acting as a conduit for specialized ULTRA information to the military staffs at Army Group and Army level, can be credited to one man – Col Felix Cowgill. He was also the man who gave much practical impetus to the creation of the British-American intelligence “special relationship”, by ensuring the OSS Counter-Intelligence Branch was capable enough to demand an equal place with the British in European CI operations during WW2, and had a voice on intelligence and counter-intelligence which was heard at the highest political level in the USA. He developed MI6’s Section V from 1939 to the end of 1944 into a top CE organization, and helped train the elite of OSS/X-2 in the tradecraft of counter-espionage. His insistence on keeping tightly-held the secret of ISOS made him enemies within the British intelligence establishment and probably did prevent optimum usage of the material both in the UK and in the Middle East, but the risks to the whole Allied CE system if that secret were to be blown meant that he, as the ultimate controller of distribution, had to err on the side of caution always. Like Moses leading the people of Israel, he was not allowed to enter his promised land, being forced to stand aside at the last moment, with his promised reward snatched from him by back-stabbing colleagues.

The main aim in these chapters is to cover the Allied CE efforts in North Africa and Europe, but a good part of that work was intertwined with the Allies’ various deception organizations and their operations. We therefore also intend to give some description of these activities, in particular where they involve the participation of enemy agents controlled by the Allies.

The first chapters of this book will provide an outline of the organization and activities of Section V in the UK and in neutral counties, together with the organization and work of other Allied Counter-Espionage and deception agencies, so that the role of a military Counter-Espionage organization can be better explained. Thereafter the organization, development and actual casework of these specialized British formations and their OSS/X-2 counterpart, in North Africa, Italy and Western Europe will be covered in more detail. [2]

Counter Espionage, Signals Intelligence and Deception

During WW2, the British were able to defend their nation from invasion and mislead the enemy into overestimating the strength of Allied forces and misinterpreting Allied intentions when they conducted military operations. They did this through the use of deception, and they were aided in selling this deception by control of the enemy’s eyes on the ground – their agents; by misleading their eyes in the air – aerial reconnaissance – by physical measures such as deploying dummy equipment and structures; by producing false radio traffic; and by being able to check on the success of these measures through the interception and decryption of the enemy’s radio messages (ULTRA). Enemy agents in Britain and the British Empire were the responsibility of MI5, the domestic security agency, and abroad the intelligence agency responsible was SIS (also known as MI6, which is the term generally applied in this text to avoid confusion with US and Italian services with those initials).

In some areas like the Middle East these two agencies operated through separate organizations (i.e. SIME and the ISLD) which helped to provide cover and to supervise deception operations together through a Committee, coordinating with similar groups in other theatres and receiving direction from the London Controlling Section (LCS), which was set up in September 1941 to ensure all deception by the Allies was coordinated.

The work of Counter-Espionage abroad was the responsibility of Section V in MI6, and its role included the penetration and neutralization of hostile intelligence services using penetration agents, double agents and controlled enemy agents. Penetration agents were agents trained and tasked to be recruited by the enemy (as Kim Philby was, by the Soviets against the British MI6). Double agents were agents or officers of the hostile government, intelligence or security service who worked against their employers (such as Oleg Penkovsky, the Russian military officer who volunteered to work for MI6 and the CIA). Controlled Enemy Agents were usually enemy agents deployed behind Allied lines who were caught and turned, agreeing to work against their employers under strict Allied supervision and control (this was the case with a number of spies sent to the UK by the Abwehr, eg TATE, MUTT and JEFF). All three types of agent played a part in the work of Section V and its military counter-espionage units.

The X-2 Branch of the OSS was trained in CE work by both MI6(V) and by MI5. Therefore the definition they gave in their War Report is significant, in that it explains the basis for the wartime operations of MI6(V):

"The principal function of CE was to penetrate the enemy's or potential enemy's closely guarded undercover intelligence services in order to discover his intelligence aims. Knowing the enemy's aims, it was the further function of CE to neutralize his intelligence efforts or control or direct them to its own purposes......One of the principal methods by which this was accomplished was the manipulation of double agents." (War Report of the OSS, p196, prepared by the History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, War Department, Washington DC, 1949.)

Philby and his Recruitment to Section V

(While not intended as a history of Kim Philby, as the Head of the Iberian Desk, and later Deputy Head of Section V, he did have an important role in the Section’s wartime efforts, and the stories below give some indication of the close personal – indeed, almost incestuous - relationships that existed between personnel in MI5 and MI6, especially those involved in the use of ISOS and the running of double agents).

Col Felix Henry Cowgill, a former officer in the Indian police and an expert on penetration of the Comintern in that region, was recruited to join Section V in February 1939, becoming head of Section in January 1941 under Col Valentine Vivian, Deputy Chief of MI6. [3] Cowgill’s appointment in 1939 brought the staff level of the section to three, including Vivian and his secretary! In the prelude to war Vivian began to expand the section, before handing the section to Cowgill in January 1941. At that time much of the recruitment to British intelligence was done on the “Old Boy network”, using contacts, friends and relatives, and people who had attended the same school or university, but checks were – supposedly - done with MI5 on potential recruits. A number of recruits to the section were transferred from MI5, while others came from a Field Security Wing (Intelligence Corps) of the Territorial Army.

HAR “Kim” Philby (most famous for having been a Soviet agent within MI6 from 1940 to 1953) claimed that he put out feelers about employment in the British intelligence establishment through his journalist contacts in June 1940. He had just returned from Europe where he had been a war correspondent with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). He rapidly secured an interview with a Miss Marjorie Maxse, who recruited him for Section D of MI6, a department created to conduct sabotage and black propaganda. One of the first colleagues he met was Guy Burgess, a friend from Cambridge University, and a fellow Soviet spy, who had worked in the section since late 1938. [4] How much influence Burgess may have had in his recruitment is unknown, though he did claim credit for it. [5] Within a month of Philby’s recruitment, however, the Section was absorbed into SOE, and Burgess was fired.

It was reported that MI5 checks on Philby came back with “Nothing Recorded Against”, despite his prior association both with communism and the Anglo-German Fellowship. At the time of Kim Philby’s initial recruitment by MI6, the MI5 registry was possibly in a little disarray following its move to HM Prison at Wormwood Scrubs, but it did not suffer damage by bombing at Wormwood Scrubs until 24-25 September 1940. It is therefore unlikely that his card - if there was one - was unavailable for checking. [6] At the time of the recruitment of Guy Burgess to MI6 in late 1938, there can be no excuse for a failure to find his records.

Burgess had been an enthusiastic communist at Cambridge until his recruitment as a spy (under the false flag of the Comintern) in 1934, and he had thereafter, like Philby, been associated with the Anglo-German Fellowship and had visited Germany. His employment by MI6 is therefore surprising, unless there were either no vetting enquiry made to MI5, or else the results were disregarded or manipulated. From 1936 Burgess had been used as an agent in a private intelligence network, running messages between the British Prime Minister and French politicians – and copying them for British (and no doubt Soviet) intelligence. Perhaps this work, and his friendship with a senior MI6 officer, David Footman, gave him a back-door entry to MI6.

Burgess had been working for the BBC Talks Department, and had interviewed Footman as a published author. In December 1938 Burgess was recruited to Section D and began working in a semi-overt black propaganda organization, the Joint Broadcasting Committee (JBC). Burgess was therefore the first member of the soviet spy ring known as the Cambridge Five to penetrate the British secret services.

Philby was sent as an instructor to the Section D training school at Brickendonbury Hall, where he met Tommy Harris and his wife, who were employed as cooks (again, on the recommendation of Guy Burgess) [7]. Harris, when seeking to get Philby recruited to Section V, claimed that they had known each other in Spain. According to Chapman Pincher’s book, “Their Trade is Treachery”, he was named by a friend of Philby’s, Flora Solomon, “as having served as a courier during the Spanish Civil War for Philby” (to the Russians). Harris, the son of a wealthy art dealer, later held an open-house in Chesterfield Gardens in London, which became a hang-out for a group of “Young Turks” within the intelligence fraternity, known simply as “The Group”. Members of this group used their positions to help others get employment in the intelligence world.

Harris obtained a job with the MI5 Iberian section. Another acquaintance and soviet spy, Anthony Blunt, was employed from June 1940 as assistant to Guy Liddell, the head of B Division of MI5. Blunt recommended the recruitment of Harris, according to Christopher Andrew's History of MI5, "Defend the Realm" (Alfred A Knopf, 2009, p284). About July 1941 Harris suggested Philby as a possible recruit to Dick Brooman-White, his boss in MI5. Brooman-White, in turn, suggested him to Cowgill. [8] Philby became a member of Section V of MI6 in August 1941, with Brooman-White transferring to Section V’s Iberian Desk under Philby sometime in 1942.

Another version of his recruitment (given by Anthony Cave Brown) claims that Philby was hand-selected by Col Vivian from SOE [9] (Vivian had supposedly arranged his original employment in Section D of MI6, just prior to this being absorbed into SOE in July 1940). Ben MacInyre’s book “A Spy Among Friends” recorded that Vivian merely vouched for Philby on his initial recruitment with the words “I was asked about him, and said I knew his people.”

Vivian was aware of Philby’s communist links [See Footnote a] and questioned Philby’s father (very briefly!) at a lunch with father and son in March 1941, before Kim was hired to Section V. While Harry St John Philby was regarded with much suspicion in the Foreign Office for his anti-imperial views, he was a former colleague of Vivian from colonial India, and had in fact been offered the post of chief of British counter-espionage in the Middle East in 1939, but he had set conditions for his acceptance which the FO would not meet. [10] As such an offer to Philby Senior would have been, at the very least, approved by both the head of MI6 and his deputy for security (Vivian), the influence of the family connection was obvious.

While the second version of Philby's recruitment connects with the March 1941 meeting between Vivian and Philby Senior, the long delay before Kim began work in August suggests that Vivian may still have had doubts regarding his suitability for the job, and Brooman-White’s recommendation (as a member of MI5) may have been the deciding factor. Another may have been the fact that Vivian was in the midst of a battle for power with fellow deputy director Claude Dansey within MI6. Vivian had asked ‘C’ to promote Cowgill to head Section V in order to allow Vivian to spend more time at MI6 HQ in London. ‘C’ in turn had asked for stronger control (“discipline”) of the new influx of non-professional staff within the Section, and particularly the expanding Iberian Section and the Radio Security Service (RSS) which had been transferred to MI6 control. [11] Anthony Cave Brown has suggested in his book that Philby may have seemed the right person to act as conciliator between the factions, [12] though he gives no reason why this would be the case.

The assertion by John Costello (“Mask of Treachery”, 1988) that Brooman-White transferred from MI5 to Section V “to head a separate Iberian group” in the Autumn of 1941 as part of a deal brokered by MI5’s Dick White is contradicted by Tim Milne’s recollection, [13] as well as the diaries of Guy Liddell, which recorded him as an active MI5 officer in October 1942. [See Footnote b]

Once hired, Philby had swiftly arranged the recruitment of his long-time friend into the same organization - Ian Innes Milne (known as Tim) - as well as his own sister, Helena, who was employed in the Section V Registry. Philby was appointed to head the Iberian desk (Vd), and Milne joined his team. Philby at one time considered Milne for recruitment by the NKVD, according to the book "TRIPLEX" (Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, Yale University Press, 2009, p 107).

Section V’s Early Growth and Use of ULTRA

Section V – hereafter referred to as MI6(V) - at that time based at Glenalmond, was responsible for building a complete picture of the enemy intelligence services in foreign countries – personnel, organization, communications and plans. While MI6(V) was at this point its own main customer (in contrast to most other sections within the service), it was also tasked to keep MI5 briefed on the general picture abroad, and specifically to provide advanced information on any planned operations against Britain territory, as well as carrying out enquiries abroad arising from MI5’s work at home. In the sometimes acrimonious infighting for control of MI6(V) and ULTRA/ISOS material, MI5 made the somewhat tenuous argument that they should be regarded as the Section’s primary customer, and therefore be given access to all information obtained by MI6(V). Col Cowgill, as head of the section, strenuously defended his position that MI5 should receive material only where it impinged upon British or Imperial territory.

ISOS material, mentioned above, was an abbreviation for Abwehr signals decrypted and disseminated as “Intelligence Service, Oliver Strachey” material. Strachey was a leading Abwehr cryptanalyst at Bletchley. Hand ciphers used by the Abwehr for communications with its agents were first broken in March 1940, thanks to access to the code given by the Abwehr to the double agent SNOW, and ISOS was issued to government customers from July 1940. (Jason Webster in his book “The Spy with 29 Names” claimed that ISOS was online from April 1940, perhaps referring to the original breakthrough, but the regular dissemination of ISOS began later) [14]. This intelligence flow increased significantly from late December 1940, when the hand cipher of the main Abwehr group was broken.

The decrypts issued as ISK material – “Intelligence Service, Knox” (for Dillwyn Knox), were from intercepted Enigma machine signals used on the main links from Berlin to its stations abroad. [15] These were not broken until 25 December 1941, thanks in part to the information gained from the decryption of the hand ciphers, and were then codenamed ISK. [16]. Within OSS/X-2 the two sets of decrypts were codenamed PAIR and ICE, but within the British Intelligence community both were generically known as ISOS. This term also was used for other types of decrypted materials, such as ISOSICLE (which was a series of decrypts of Sicherheitsdienst traffic, issued by Bletchley from May 1941); ISTUN (material from the cipher of the Abwehr teletype system codenamed TUNNY, which was broken in early 1942); and GGG (cipher traffic between Berlin and the Abwehr stations around the Straits of Gibraltar, broken February 1942). [17] Between July 1940 and June 1945 a total of 268,107 intercepts were handled: 97,340 ISOS; 140,662 ISK; 13,047 ISOSICLE; and 17,058 other categories. [18]

Bletchley Park, home of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), was at this time subordinate to MI6 and was in close liaison with MI6(V). The material from these intercepts was, according to Tim Milne, disseminated directly to a number of organizations, including MI6 and MI5. Anxiety was expressed by members of MI5 at any potential interruption in the flow of this traffic, pointing to the value of the material in the running of the MI5 CEAs. The head of MI6(V) was properly reluctant to share raw information from and about MI6's own agents abroad, but not restricting ISOS material generally. He had no desire to provide MI5 with possible ammunition to be used in the ongoing battle for control of CE abroad. Cowgill therefore restricted for a short time dissemination of ISOS decrypts which named or referred to MI6 agents and intelligence operations, this material being given the codename ISBA. [19]

After this restriction was made known unofficially to MI5 (by a dissident MI6(V) officer, Hugh Trevor-Roper, who disapproved of restricting the dissemination of ISOS material), an agreement was reached that Cowgill would provide the ISBA material to two senior MI5 officers. An official report on the MI6(V) use of ISOS pointed out that, while MI5 and service departments received the ISOS texts, “no action on them was permissible without prior reference to Section V.” [20] This may have been the main reason why MI5 tended to chafe at the fact that MI6(V) controlled the ISOS material, since they clearly did have access to ISOS traffic.

Milne described another “potential task” for MI6(V) at this time, besides acting as a conduit of ISOS to MI5, as something

“scarcely yet embarked upon…to initiate or encourage whatever steps could be taken abroad to stifle enemy espionage organizations and activities on the spot, through diplomatic or other means.” [21]

MI6(V) generally used ISOS to act against personnel of the enemy services; to check on leakages of our own war secrets; and to control deception. Action against agents entering Allied territory under MI5 control could include arrest and interrogation and turning the agents, and in neutral countries action might be restricted to denunciation to the local authorities. An MI6 report stated that between 1940 and 1945 the enemy sent 112 agents to the UK who were captured, seventeen of whom were caught exclusively because of ISOS, and thirty-five of whom were reflected in ISOS decrypts but their arrests were not attributable to ISOS. In neutral countries the physical capture or elimination of agents was often more troublesome than was worthwhile, so denunciation either through diplomatic channels or by making it known through “a timely word either in the ear of a friendly neutral official or even…in that of the agent himself” would usually suffice to secure the removal of the agent from that country.

Every leakage report seen in ISOS material was investigated, and apart from the CICERO case in Ankara, none involving British Embassies and Consulates proved true. [See Footnote c] Most of the reports which supposedly derived from neutral journalists, businessmen or government official who had visited Britain or the USA also proved false. The need to act on ISOS material in foreign countries meant that MI6(V) had to place staff in critical spots, and the staff had to be ISOS-indoctrinated. This was a slow process and priority of posting was allocated according to the needs of MI6 rather than MI5 or SIME, which meant that the corresponding communication channels for distributing ISOS had to await the expansion of MI6(V).

ISOS proved an invaluable guide into the minds and perceptions of the enemy, which permitted the Allies to plan and carry out a successful policy of deception. ISOS revealed what the GIS wanted to find out, their intentions and what they believed the Allies intentions were. By studying what information the GIS was receiving, true and false, the Allies were able to judge the likely reception of the GIS to the deception stories they wished to deploy. Through ISOS, MI6(V) could also often monitor the movements and actions of their double agents (DAs) to be reassured as to their safety, discretion and good faith. Finally, MI6(V) could see what the GIS thought of the agent, his potential access, any questions they might have regarding his motives or conduct, and “most important, we knew how they assessed his information”. [22]

Boyle in “The Climate of Treason” alleged that “to a large extent, the counter-espionage activities of MI6 were a hollow pretense” being made “partly redundant” by the codebreakers at Bletchley, but still necessary in order to protect “the security of the source”. [23] This view fails to consider that much of the ISOS material required further research to become understandable, even after decryption. For example, codenames and numbers, often several, were used for Abwehr agents and officers, and codenames were sometimes used for technical material and locations. Former MI6(V) officer Kenneth Benton wrote an article [See Footnote d] which explained in detail how the MI6(V) staff abroad was used to provide information vital to the understanding of the ISOS messages, such as identifying people on specific flights or staying at hotels on dates when agents were known to have flown or been resident. Identified Abwehr officers and agents might be kept under surveillance if it were learned from ISOS that they were to meet with unidentified members of the Abwehr’s organization. ISOS information needed to be further developed by MI6(V) staff abroad and constantly re-interpreted by the MI6(V) desks in order to gain maximum understanding from it.

Section V Organization and Relations with MI5

Milne in his memoirs noted that MI6(V) never issued an official history of its wartime activities. [24] While the lack of official documents makes such a history impossible to any outsider (and probably at this stage – due to extensive weeding of files by MI6 in the postwar period - to any insider also), we can obtain a view of some of its activities at home and abroad through the documents of allies who worked with MI6(V), British documents released to the National Archives, and the memoirs of officers who served with or alongside of the Section.

MI6(V) had a number of geographical and functional subsections, a system set up by Col Cowgill as the section began to expand (staffing figures are presumably for the height of expansion):

 Va, with a staff of five, dealt with the Americas, the Far East and Indian Affairs worldwide;

 Vb, again with a staff of five, covered Western Europe;

 Vc liaised with MI5 and the London Reception Centre - for interrogating refugees – with a staff of two, while VcR liaised with the MI6 Central Registry. (Tim Milne stated that the desk covered eastern Europe and the Middle East, but this was covered by Ve);

 Vd was the Iberian section, headed by Philby, which had a total of six officers in 1941. Other members of the original Vd team included Tim Milne, Desmond Bristow (who arrived in September 1941), Jack Givens, Frank Hyde and Arthur G Trevor-Wilson. The whole of MI6(V) at that time was about 20 officers and 20 to 25 secretaries and cardists, [25] having expanded from a total of three officers in 1939. [26] Prior to D-Day in June 1944 MI6(V) personnel had risen to 250 officers. [27]

 Ve studied Eastern Europe (including Russia) and the Middle East (including Turkey), with a staff of five;

 Vf covered the European German-occupied countries, Scandinavia (including Iceland and Greenland) and the Baltic countries, with a staff of two;

 Vh dealt with censorship overseas, staffed by a single officer;

 Vx was responsible for double agents and deception plans, and was staffed later in the war by Desmond Bristow and Rex Hamer;

 Vl, Vr, V/RVPS, V/Photo, V/Driver, V/Translations, V/TP (teleprinting) and SP/SD were functional supporting services (V/RVPS was also reportedly the liaison with the London Reception Centre – see Vc above); [28]

 Vw was a research sub-section, run by Hugh Trevor-Roper.

From August 1941 to April 1943, the staff of Vw issued forty-six brief reports on the wireless stations used by the enemy, plus an occasional biographical list of the Axis spies in individual countries. While valuable, the product was so highly sensitive that Cowgill wanted to restrict its dissemination, despite favourable comments from other ISOS customers. This therefore added yet another issue of contention between Cowgill, his subordinates in Vw, and other ISOS customers, and increased the view within the intelligence community that Cowgill was being difficult and unreasonable in his wish to restrict dissemination of ISOS material to a minimum. This view was encouraged by both Trevor-Roper and, more surreptitiously, by Kim Philby, who gained friends in other department by giving them unofficial access to material forbidden by Cowgill.

Trevor-Roper and his staff believed they needed to share the information and get feedback from other agencies to assist them in their understanding of the ISOS decrypts. This created a tension with his superiors in MI6(V) and the RSS (Radio Security Service), a separate agency which was responsible to MI6 “for the interception and discrimination of ISOS”, [29] which was not lightened even after Vw was removed from MI6(V) and placed directly under the chief of MI6 as the Radio Intelligence Service in May 1943. Within months Trevor-Roper was trying to exchange knowledge of radio traffic with the Russians without getting the prior approval of Cowgill. Even this ill-considered move was not enough to reduce Trevor-Roper’s growing influence inside and outside MI6 regarding analysis of ISOS decrypts. His participation in a couple of inter-service committees gained him allies in MI5, Dick White and Guy Liddell being two of the more senior officers, and within MI6 he had an admirer in Patrick Reilly, Personal Assistant to the Chief.

MI6(V) worked closely with the MI5 section running the double agents in Britain who were used for deception. Despite attempts by MI5 to take over MI6(V) during the war, on a working level the relationship between case officers was good, with regular interaction on casework and also in certain cases on a social basis too. MI6(V) passed over to MI5 several double agents working against the Abwehr. Some of MI6’s agents such as Dusan “Dusko” Popov (codenamed TRICYCLE), moved between the continent and the UK, and sometimes operated further afield, such as in Iceland, Canada and the USA as well as in Iraq and Persia to the East. Through Popov, MI6 also recruited his brother (DREADNAUGHT) in Yugoslavia, who was being employed by the Abwehr; while sub-agents FREAK (the TRICYCLE network W/T operator, the Marquis Frano de Ruda), GELATINE, METEOR, and BALLOON, who were based in Britain and ostensibly part of TRICYCLE’s British network, were more firmly under the control of MI5.

According to Tom Bower’s book “The Perfect English Spy”, MI5’s DA Section B1a was not created until about October 1939, inspired by discussions on deception through controlled enemy agents between MI5 officer Dick White and the French Deuxieme Bureau. [30] MI5’s first Double-Cross DA, Arthur Owens (codenamed SNOW), was already on their books. Owens had originally been passed from British Naval intelligence to MI6 for handling. When his MI6 Case Officer, Col Edward Peal, had been informed by MI5 at the end of 1936 that Owens was playing a double game – they caught him writing to a postbox known to be used by other Abwehr agents - he was passed to the control of MI5. [31] In 1939 he collected a W/T set from a London Railway station left luggage office and began regular contact with the Abwehr, under the supervision of his MI5 Case Officers.

Section V’s Growing Role and Importance

It was not until Col Cowgill began expanding the section’s role that the importance of MI6(V) (to both the future of MI6 and British Intelligence generally) became apparent. The expansion was necessary in order to take advantage of the ISOS and ISK decrypts abroad, and Cowgill was one of the first to recognize the potential for MI6. He also realized the benefit of controlling ISOS as a means to fend off attempts at a take-over by MI5.

Anthony Cave Brown claimed that “in all, 130 male and female enemy agents became CEAs. Most of them came from the Abwehr in Iberia, and most of those through warnings provided by Philby and his colleagues in the Iberian section”. [32]

The importance of ULTRA as a wider source of intelligence was realized very early by Sir Stewart Menzies, the chief of MI6, who was also fighting suggestions within the government that MI5 and MI6 should be merged. He was therefore happy for the rapid expansion of MI6(V) abroad as well as at home, as a means to demonstrate the usefulness of the service to other government departments. As a result, the rapid appointment of MI6(V) staff with their own direct communications to MI6’s London headquarters, and mostly outside the direct supervision of the local Head of Station, became a source of resentment in some stations abroad, especially where the other MI6 staff was not ULTRA-indoctrinated. It was of little surprise that Menzies saw the creation of military CE units as another way to demonstrate MI6’s abilities to the military. As Andrew Boyle states in his book, “The Climate of Treason”:

“Indeed, when Cowgill proposed that joint Special Counter-intelligence Units should be attached to the Allied army staffs for the French North African landings, the scheme was approved at the highest level.” [33]

In late 1941 Cowgill was sent to America to establish a MI6(V) post within British Security Coordination (BSC), and after Pearl Harbor, to establish relations with the FBI and the COI (later the OSS). He returned to London in February 1942. He had placed Philby in charge of MI6(V) in his absence. Philby was given further responsibilities during 1942, until his role was expanded to that of deputy of the section. When the new military CE units were approved under the name SI(b) Units, Philby also took responsibility for their control, though the staff of these units was selected by Cowgill and were also subject to his direction. Philby was also a part of the welcoming committee for the new OSS London staff. David Bruce, the head of OSS/London, recorded being received at MI6(V) by “Colonel Cowgill and Major Philby”. [34]

In neutral countries counter-espionage matters were handled by MI6(V) officers based in British Embassies and Consulates. In Portugal, for instance, Ralph Jarvis was the MI6(V) representative who was involved in the recruitment of the famous agent GARBO. There are two versions, both by former MI6(V) officers, to the identification of Juan Pujol Garcia as the Abwehr spy ARABEL, and his recruitment by British intelligence as the Double Agent GARBO.

In the first version, Ralph Jarvis was visiting London in late February 1942 and met with TAR Robertson, the head of MI5’s B1a (double agent) section. [35] Robertson confirmed that a cut-out address provided to Pujol by the Germans was indeed real and had been issued to another agent under MI5 control. Thanks to this meeting, MI6 began to re-assess Juan Pujol Garcia, a Spanish “walk-in” whom they had regarded as a possible attempted “plant” by the Abwehr, or else an intelligence fabricator. MI6 spent the next 6 weeks searching for him in Portugal and Spain, while MI5 was busy laying claim to him as a potential DA to be operated from the UK. Cowgill was reluctant to pass to MI5 all information they had on Pujol, perhaps as a prudent security measure, fearing this might by an attempt by the Abwehr to penetrate the British services. The story of the conversation between Jarvis and Robertson is recorded in the Guy Liddell Diaries on 23 February 1942, and a subsequent talk between Liddell and Cowgill on 26 March noted that MI6(V) had known of Pujol since December, and that Cowgill wanted to debrief the agent in Britain and then return him to work from Lisbon. [36]

In the second version, ARABEL was identified from ISOS in late 1941 by Section Vd staff as a person of interest at the same time as MI5, who were reading the same ISOS decrypts. There was intense interest in both MI6(V) and in MI5 in the identity and location of this agent, who was thought initially to be in the UK. On 5 February 1942 Desmond Bristow of MI6(V) read a telegram from Lisbon describing a meeting between a US Naval Attache and Juan Pujol, and Pujol’s offer to work for the British. Realising from the text that this was probably the agent ARABEL, in the absence of the desk head Philby, Desmond Bristow notified Cowgill, who advised caution in case he was a double agent who might threaten the security of ISOS. His willingness to let the matter wait until Philby’s return made Bristow think that Philby had not kept Cowgill well informed on the intense interest in ARABEL. Philby returned to the office that afternoon and, after speaking to Cowgill, was immediately on the phone to MI5’s B1(a), getting agreement that MI6(V) personnel in Lisbon would interview Pujol and determine whether he was in fact ARABEL. Jarvis was told the following day to arrange this, and after several meetings between Pujol and a MI6(V) agent, it was decided to bring Pujol to the UK via Gibraltar. He arrived by seaplane in the UK on 25 April. [37]

Both versions agree that Pujol was brought to the UK in April 1942, interviewed by Desmond Bristow of MI6(V) who confirmed him as genuine, and was passed to Tomas Harris and Cyril Mills of B1a, who promptly named him GARBO. In either version, the importance of having MI6(V) personnel abroad to act for both MI5 and MI6 was clearly demonstrated. But the fact that we have two versions at such variance, both from prime sources, also makes it clear that personal recollection is sometimes insufficient evidence and recourse to documentary sources is often a better “official” confirmation of events. Of course, as any professional intelligence officer will know, what gets written for the file is sometimes not the whole story, and occasionally is not even the true story.

Around this time, according to Terry Crowdy’s “Deceiving Hitler” (Osprey Publishing, 2008), MI5 had “felt obliged to lease a number of officers and secretaries to SIS in order to help out [the] underfunded and understaffed Section V” because it was so important to B Division’s work (this might be when Brooman White transferred from MI5 to Section Vd, though he was mentioned as an MI5 officer in Liddell's Diaries in October 1942). At the same time (in April 1942), MI5’s Director Petrie made an attempt to have Section V transferred and amalgamated into his B Division, a move rejected by the head of MI6. [38]

MI6(V) had meanwhile continued to expand its representation in stations abroad. In mid-1941, Kenneth Benton, recruited to MI6 in 1937 and with service in Vienna prior to the war, [39] was given a MI6(V) posting in Madrid. [40] In December 1941 MI6(V) officer Major Rodney Dennys was posted to Cairo to establish what would become the main office for CE work in the Middle East. Dennys was given cover as a member of the Inter-Services Liaison Department (ISLD, an MI6 cover organization) and was located in the same building, but on a separate floor to the offices of SIME (Security Intelligence Middle East, which worked back to MI5). This made convenient the transportation of ISOS material and the meetings of the Thirty (XXX or 30) Committee, consisting of SIME, ISLD and A Force representatives.

During this posting Dennys developed his relationship with his future wife, Elizabeth Greene, sister of Graham Greene, the author. She had joined MI6 in 1938, working at Bletchley Park (where she first met Dennys) before becoming secretary to Captain Cuthbert Bowlby, the MI6 Cairo Station Head. It was apparently Elizabeth who was responsible for introducing both Graham Greene and Malcolm Muggeridge to MI6. [41]

MI6(V) officers were posted to Algiers, Madrid and Gibraltar, as well as to exotic posts like Freetown and Laurenҫo Marques (Greene and Muggeridge, respectively). One officer, Nicholas Elliott, was sent to Istanbul in May 1942, travelling via Freetown (where he was met by Graham Greene), before moving on to Lagos, then Cairo, Jerusalem and Beirut before finishing his journey by train. Neutral Turkey was the base for German intelligence activity against the Middle East, and became an important area for monitoring the German Intelligence Services (GIS). ISOS provided a good overview of Abwehr operations from Turkey, but coverage of the SD was always spotty; fortunately, local agent coverage of SD officials and suspect agents helped to fill out the picture.

“In general, throughout the latter period of the war ISOS, combined with our local records and agents’ reports, gave our representatives a clear picture of almost all Abwehr activities in Turkey and helped establish ideal conditions for offensive C.E. work, which culminated in the rapid series of defections from the Abwehr during the first half of 1944”. [42]

Other officers were later sent to Baghdad, Beirut and Smyrna, and after the liberation of Greece in October 1944 a MI6(V) office was set up in Athens with a subordinate office in Salonica. The Baghdad and Smyrna postings were not permanent positions. [43]

In September 1944, Philby, by then designated ‘Vk’ (for Kim) as the controller of several subsections of MI6(V), was posted away to command the new anti-communist Section IX, and Milne took his place (Milne had been Philby’s successor as ‘Vd’ and after that, head of ‘Vf’, the new German subsection). In December 1944 Col Cowgill resigned as head of MI6(V) in protest after being overlooked for the job as Head of Section IX, and Tim Milne took over MI6(V). [44] Milne estimated the Ryder Street establishment at home and abroad at around 200 officers and secretaries at this time. By war’s end in 1945 this figure was down, but still over a hundred staff, at home and abroad. [45]

The move by Philby to become the head of the new section was a stab in the back for Cowgill, who had originally joined MI6 under the impression he would be put in charge of anti-communist work post-war. With Cowgill out of the way, and with his old friend Tim Milne as head of MI6(V), Philby was able to head-hunt staff from the stations abroad as required, as the threat from the Nazis died and the Soviet threat grew more apparent. Philby had his pick of the staff from MI6(V) and was able to piggy-back on their communications systems to ensure he had staff loyal to him and secure communications independent of the main MI6 stations. As he explained in his book (“My Silent War”), he was keen to pick mostly from personnel who were fairly new to the service, but wished to make a career in the world of intelligence post-war. He also selected a few older officers, he said, so that he could allow for new recruits as the older men retired, and give some freedom for promotions within his section – or sections, for according to Philby, he was soon put in charge of both Section V and Section IX. [46] As it was, to some extent, a “buyer’s market”, he was able to pick the cream of the crop of the next generation of intelligence officers who would run the Service. This aspect is mentioned further in Chapter 11.

Footnotes

a) Other members of MI6, such as Hugh Trevor-Roper, were also aware (either directly or indirectly) of Philby’s communist past.

b) Nigel West has also claimed that Brooman-White was transferred before September 1940, as he was supposedly the recruiter of Philby to Section V (“MI6 – British Secret Service Operations 1909-45”, p 134, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1983) This is clearly incorrect, as explained in this chapter.

c) There were, however, other reports of leakages, such at those at the British Embassy in Italy, which had been reported in 1939 and which were later confirmed as true.

d) Benton was a MI6(V) officer based in Madrid, and later in Rome.