Читать книгу Emergency Incident Management Systems - Mark Warnick S., Louis N. Molino Sr - Страница 39

Earlier in this chapter, it was discussed how HSPD‐5 mandated NIMS to provide interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, and local response and recovery agencies. Under this directive, NIMS also was required to provide a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies that integrated with the Incident Command System, but it did not stop there. NIMS was required to provide a multiagency coordination system, pave a system for the use of Unified Command (explained in Chapter 7), and was supposed to provide training. The NIMS method was also mandated to identify and manage resources, including how to classify resources, as well as provide qualifications and certifications to ensure that potential resources met specific NIMS proficiencies.

To confirm the NIMS method was meeting the goals of the Presidential Directive, there was a mandate that there should be a method of gathering, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources. This was essential in providing quantitative reports and data to the President, as well as the public, to determine the preparedness and readiness level of the United States. As the saying goes, you cannot fix it if you do not know that it is broken. The data that was to be collected would be used for finding out where the system was broken.

HSPD‐5 placed most of the responsibility for NIMS directly in the hands of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was a new government department as of 25 November 2002. It was officially formed the day after HSPD‐5 was signed by President Bush, and a little over a year after the September 11 attacks. The formation of DHS combined multiple federal resources under one federal entity. The creation of DHS either partially, or fully, incorporated 22 independent agencies or departments under this one umbrella agency. In the NIMS method, the federal government acknowledged the roles of local and state entities and they identified that in most instances, domestic incident management was not the federal government's responsibility.

This Presidential Directive clearly authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security as the responsible party for coordinating with federal agencies. Those agencies under the umbrella of DHS were required to integrate and coordinate with state, local, and tribal entities when directed by the DHS. Beyond that, the Secretary of Homeland Security was ordered to integrate and coordinate with private and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Essentially, the new DHS Director was mandated to work toward coordinating everyone together so that when it was needed, there was a more unified response. By doing so, they would help to ensure that there was the ability to provide seamless support to a multitude of incidents, including a massive coordinated response to a terrorist attack.

In undertaking these coordination efforts with these various organizations and entities, the Secretary was also charged with guaranteeing suitable planning, adequate equipment, acceptable training, and continued and ongoing drills and exercise activities. The Secretary was under mandate and required to provide assistance in developing an all‐hazards plan as specified in HSPD‐8.

This all‐hazard plan was originally called the National Response Plan (NRP), however, it did not take long for the NRP to morph and transform into the National Response Framework (NRF). The underlying factor that helped to drive the NRF was the mandate to ensure that federal, state, local, private, and non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) were organized, integrated, and that they met core capabilities. This was especially important (and difficult) because it included integrating those with varying specialties in disaster and emergency management. Those specialties usually related to mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. While this was a tall order, most realized that if the end result was accomplished, the United States would have better and more in‐depth safeguards for the security and safety of the nation.

From the creation of the National Response Framework came a new term and a new concept that would change the way agencies planned. The use of all‐hazards planning was a unique and new way of addressing potential threats to a community. Some agencies were not impressed with the term, and in some cases, the concept itself. As was often the case in public safety, some agency administrators began complaining about all‐hazards planning before they even knew what it was, or how it would affect them or their agency. In some instances, these agencies operated on assumptions. Some agency administrators unwittingly assumed that they were expected to plan and prepare for every conceivable type of emergency, but in reality, all‐hazards planning was based on two core beliefs.

The first core belief is that a risk analysis should be undertaken to identify potential hazards that a community may face. This means that the planning would be based on the unique risks inherent to the geographical location they served. A formal risk analysis would be performed to identify the unique locational priorities and resources that were needed to be effective. Without a risk analysis, and a risk‐driven plan, the agency was essentially guessing what would be their biggest risks, or they are planning for everything and hoping for nothing. Either way, without using risk‐driven planning, the agency put their citizens unnecessarily at risk.

The second core belief was that by undertaking a risk analysis, the agency could know the potential risks, and could develop the capacity to deal with these unique hazards through practical planning. What most did not immediately understand was that many of the same tools needed for the most prevalent risks, could also be integrated into the least prevalent risks. This was based on the assumption that a multitude of core jobs associated with the highest risks would also be useful in planning for lower risk disasters.

The same methods used for warning, evacuating, and sheltering for one type of incident would usually be effective in other incidents, no matter what type of incident it was. This would then assist them in creating a baseline capability that not only could be effective with known and expected risks but also could be modified easily modified to deal with the unexpected incident or disaster. This type of planning would lead to greater resiliency for the local government. As these core concepts were put to the test, it would be found that they did increase preparedness, and they helped to better manage catastrophic incidents.

Some may wonder how the National Response Framework (NRF) factors into incident management. When we preplan what resources are available, what services they can provide, and how they can be quickly and efficiently activated, we reduce the time frame of receiving the needed resources. Ask yourself this, which is quicker, identifying what is needed and requesting it, or identifying what is needed, assigning someone to find the said resource, negotiating the logistics involved (including cost), and arranging for transportation to the incident. It does not take a rocket scientist to see that the act of just requesting the resource is substantially quicker, and agreements are already arranged. Later in this book, we will discuss the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) role in requesting resources.