Читать книгу Promoting Democracy - Manal A. Jamal - Страница 11
Оглавление2
The Political-Military Organizations and the Emergence of Mass-Based Grassroots Organizations
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but rather under circumstances found, given, and transmitted.
—Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”1
A rich history of civic organizing in El Salvador and the Palestinian territories underpinned the mass mobilization of the 1970s and 1980s. These mobilization efforts and much of the associational life that grew out of them were responses to conflicts with long historical roots: the British Mandate and Zionist colonial settlement in Palestine and, later, Israel’s military occupation in the WBGS, and massive and enduring socioeconomic inequality, characterized by extreme concentration of land ownership in the hands of a very small minority (fourteen families to be exact)2 in El Salvador. This conflict in El Salvador ultimately culminated in a civil war between the FMLN and the right-wing government. In both cases, the establishment of political-military organizations began in the latter part of the 1960s. The Arab-Israeli War in 1967 resulted in Palestinians seeking less Arab tutelage and more Palestinian autonomy and led to the establishment of various guerrilla/political-military organizations. In El Salvador, proponents of armed struggle in the Partido Comunista de El Salvador (Communist Party of El Salvador, PCS) broke away in 1969 and established the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (Popular Forces of Liberation, FPL), which similarly set in motion the founding of various guerrilla/political-military organizations.
The Political-Military Organizations: Precursors to Mass Mobilization
The Palestinian Nationalist Movement Asserts Its Autonomy
By the early 1960s, and certainly following the 1967 war, the struggle for historic Palestine assumed an increasingly Palestinian character involving diasporic Palestinians themselves. This was a marked departure from the post-1948 defeat period in which the struggle for Palestinian independence assumed an Arab character that increased the involvement of neighboring nation-states.3 Ironically, it was Palestinian students, studying and living in neighboring Arab countries, who questioned the commitments of other Arab leaders and cast into doubt the ability of these states to liberate historic Palestine.
In the late 1950s, these students founded a number of political organizations throughout the Arab world. Among these students were Khalil Wazir, Salah Khalaf, and Yasir Arafat, who took over the PLO in 1969. Two different streams dominated the Palestinian nationalist movement, the Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-ʿArab (Arab Nationalist Movement, ANM) which was more leftist in its political orientation, and Fatah, which is more nationalist in its orientation. Many of the Palestinian guerrilla and political organizations that emerged in the 1960s and thereafter owe their roots to one of these political strands.4 Eventually, Fatah emerged as the largest and strongest of the Palestinian political factions, and is the current-day leadership party of the PA and the PLO.
The defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria during the 1967 Six-Day War severely undermined the legitimacy of these states in the eyes of the Arab public, further eroding any notions that they would ultimately play an important role in the liberation of Palestine. In the aftermath, a number of Palestinian guerrilla organizations emerged.5 The ANM’s Palestinian branch, along with three other small guerrilla organizations, founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1967. In 1968, the Palestine Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command broke away from the PFLP. Then in 1969, another group splintered from the PFLP, and called itself the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (now called the DFLP).6 These groups were predominately leftist in their orientation and would come to be among Fatah’s major opposition. Fatah, the PFLP, and DFLP would come to represent the largest Palestinian political factions in the PLO, and play an important role in mass mobilization in the occupied territories, amassing substantial followings.
Communist Party activities in the Palestinian territories date back to the early 1920s, though the party became increasingly active in the late 1960s and early 1970s.7 The West Bank Communists were firmly committed to mass mobilization and nonviolent protest.8 In 1969, they reactivated the General Federation of Labor Unions, and later played a leadership role in the founding of the voluntary work programs among university and high school students.9 In 1982, the West Bank Communists founded the PCP, despite the protests of the Jordanian Communist Party.10 In 1987, the PCP joined the PLO.
Beginning in 1968, the DFLP, soon followed by the PFLP, began its transformation from a pan-Arabist organization to a Marxist-Leninist organization. These organizations were concerned with fundamental social and political change in Palestinian society, as well as throughout the Arab world. Both groups also initially called for the creation of one secular democratic state in which Christians, Jews, and Muslims would enjoy the same political rights. In the early 1970s, the DFLP began to entertain the idea of creating a binational state that would represent the Palestinian and Jewish communities, and later called for a sovereign state in the WBGS. The Palestinian Communist Party, PCP (later named the Palestinian People’s Party, or PPP), on the other hand, limited its struggle to ending Israeli occupation of the WBGS, and the establishment of an independent state in that territory.11 Although the early record of Fatah’s military operations was quite humble, the high losses that they were able to inflict on the Israeli military during the Karameh battle of 1968, further reinforced the strength of the organization.12 The growth of the guerrilla organization imposed its own logic on the structure of the PLO. By the fourth Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in 1969, it was a foregone conclusion that Fatah, because of the seats allotted to it, and the support it enjoyed from independents, would be able to elect the leader of its choice to head the PLO. During that meeting, the delegates elected Yasir Arafat as chairperson of the organization.
During the 1970s, the internal organization of the PLO was rationalized, enlarged, and consolidated, and beginning with the Lebanese civil war until its expulsion from Beirut (1975–82), the economic and social functions of the PLO were dramatically expanded. Among the divisions of the PLO established were the Palestine National Fund, the Department of Education, the Red Crescent Society for Health Services, Departments of Information, Popular Mobilization, and the Occupied Homeland, a research center, an economic development center, and a social affairs institute.13 By the mid-1970s, the PLO had developed the structures of a de facto government in exile.14
The decisive shift in terms of mass mobilization and associational activity in the WBGS took place in 1972. The PLO’s defeat in Jordan in 1970 culminated in the Palestine National Council’s 1972 decision to shift the locus of attention to the occupied territories and to incorporate the masses into the struggle.15 Hence, at the tenth session of the PNC, the members passed resolutions calling for new trade unions, student groups, women’s groups, welfare organizations, and other mass-based organizations that could mobilize the population in the territories under the auspices of the PLO.16 By the end of the 1970s, an alternative strategy had emerged that involved supporting grassroots efforts in the WBGS.17 Following the example of the PCP, then not part of the PLO but an early pioneer of mass mobilization efforts in the WBGS, the leftist factions of the PLO, the DFLP and PFLP, and later Fatah, followed suit in the latter part of the 1970s.18 In time, the Palestinian population began recognizing the establishment of grassroots organizations as the new standard mode of sociopolitical organizing. They also began to identity this grassroots expression as proof of the strength of the political factions and as a reaffirmation of their presence on the ground.
In the 1980s, activists in the WBGS founded a number of political organizations that would come to play a significant role in Palestinian contemporary politics, and amass significant followings. Although Muslim Brotherhood activities in the Palestinian territories date back to the 1940s, Islamist associations, unions, and organizations became increasingly prevalent in the early 1980s following the Iranian Revolution. In the mid-1980s, Islamic Jihad splintered from the Muslim Brotherhood, and established itself as a separate organization. Most notably, the Islamists founded the Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas), in 1988, shortly after the outbreak of the first Intifada. Following the initiation of the Madrid peace process, a schism emerged in the DFLP between those who supported the peace process and those who opposed it. Subsequently, supporters of the Madrid peace process broke away from the DFLP, and founded the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA), a splinter faction of the DFLP that supported the Oslo Accords.
The Rise of the Salvadoran Organized Opposition
El Salvador too has a rich history of political parties, but here I focus only on those institutions, including the Catholic Church, that would come to play a critical role in mass movement mobilization, and later in the establishment of NGOs, effectively laying the groundwork for a future civil society in El Salvador.19 One of the oldest political forces in El Salvador is the PCS, whose roots date back to the late 1920s.20 As a result of the economic recession of the period, international coffee prices crashed and social unrest ensued in El Salvador. Rising rural unemployment fueled strikes and protests. Although members of the Salvadoran oligarchy ruled the country directly until 1931, they were incapable of controlling the unrest. It was during this period that El Salvador’s long history of struggle against socioeconomic inequality assumed the ideological framing of the PCS’s Marxism-Leninism. The Salvadoran government outlawed the PCS in 1932. During that year, the government violently suppressed the insurrection led by the Communist leader, Farabundo Martí. By the end of the matanza (massacre or slaughter), the Salvadoran government was responsible for the killing of over 30,000 campesinos (farmers). Many regard the 1932 matanza as a culmination of another settler-colonial project also reflecting bitter indigenous resentment against Spanish land-owning usurpers.21 The magnitude of the 1932 conflict molded the repressive nature of subsequent government regimes that would have little tolerance for dissent.
Between 1931 and 1979, a series of military dictatorships ruled over El Salvador. In 1960, well-to-do middle-class professionals founded the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party, PDC), an anti-Communist party that upheld social Christian principles.22 By 1972, the PDC had amassed a substantial following and became a key target of the military dictatorship’s oppression.23 Meanwhile, the military institutionalized its political participation through the creation of political parties; two main parties were the Partido de Reconciliación Nacional (Party of National Reconciliation, PRN) and the Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrácia (Party of Revolutionary Democratic Unification, PRUD). The political-military organizations would emerge from a tactical disagreement within the PCS in the late 1960s. Disagreement within the party regarding the legitimate means of struggle and whether or not the party should adopt armed struggle resulted in proponents of armed struggle breaking away and establishing the first of the military political organizations—the FPL in 1969 and the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (Revolutionary Army of People, ERP) in 1972. Subsequent divisions would result in additional political military organizations, each of which would play an important role in establishing popular organizations.
One of the key tactical differences that distinguished the political-military organizations from one another was their approach to armed struggle. Although both the ERP and the FPL advocated armed struggle against the regime, the FPL upheld a political-military strategy. The ERP’s constituencies extended to the young Communists, youth from the PDC, and radicalized sectors of the Salvadoran bourgeoisie.24 By the mid-1970s, another schism emerged in the ERP regarding the need to accompany military struggle with a political program. Roque Dalton, also El Salvador’s national poet, advocated a more moderate line, insisting that the party adopt political as well as military strategies. The hardliners in the ERP charged Dalton with treason, tried him in absentia, and condemned him to death. In May 1975, extremists in the ERP killed Dalton. Due to these tactical disagreements and the murder of Dalton25 by Joaquín Villalobos and his faction, Dalton’s followers left the ERP and established the Resistencia Nacional (National Resistance, RN) in May 1975. Villaloboso and his followers retained the ERP label.26 In 1976, regional activists founded the Trotskyist Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers, PRTC) in Costa Rica. The PRTC’s conception was more regional in scope, though it maintained separate national units.27 Popular mobilization by the political-military organizations began in the mid-1970s, and became a central component of their work.
The dearth of political openings, mounting repression, and the deterioration of socioeconomic conditions propelled people to affiliate with the emerging revolutionary organizations in ever-increasing numbers. By the 1970s, the majority rural population did not have access to land or employment opportunities. The military and oligarchy continued to prosper, as the majority of the population was further impoverished. The mechanization of agriculture after World War II, and the introduction of export crops such as cotton and sugar cane put further pressure on cultivable land and reduced employment opportunities for Salvadoran campesinos. The military, as defender of the interests of the oligarchy, left little room for democratic participation. The ruling parties, supported by the oligarchy, prevented reformist political parties such as the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats from electoral victory and access to the government in the 1972 and 1977 elections. The military regime exiled political leaders, and persecuted and dismantled their grassroots organizations.28 José Napoleón Duarte, one of the leaders of the PDC and the presidential candidate of the National Opposition Union, won the 1972 election; subsequently, the ruling regime captured Duarte and deported him to Guatemala. Center and more radical opposition groups became more radicalized and began to advocate armed revolutionary struggle as the only solution to end repression in the country. The fraudulent elections of 1977 further exacerbated the conflict, convincing the opposition that they should employ more forceful means.29
The year 1979 was a turning point. A group of reform-minded military men overthrew the regime and installed a joint civilian-military junta composed of center-left opposition leaders. The conservative wing of the military persisted in its wave of terror, as internal disputes developed among the junta members. The PCS turned into a political-military organization in 1979 following the 1977 Plaza Libertad massacre30 and the events surrounding the coup in 1979; it too came to the conclusion that the situation required armed struggle.31 After the 1979 junta, the more left-leaning contingents of the PDC broke away and established the Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano (Popular Social Christian Movement, MPCS).32 By the end of 1980, over 15,000 had been killed.
Among the political-military organizations, the RN—at that point only a tendency in the ERP and not yet an independent organization—was the first to initiate popular movement mobilization. In 1974, the RN began working with the campesinos of Suchitoto, and quietly helped establish the Frente de Acción Popular Unificada (United Popular Action Front, FAPU) with Christian community activists. By 1979, each of the political-military organizations had founded its own umbrella organization with a number of affiliated popular, grassroots-based organizations.33 Each political-military organization also established a “wartime chain of command” and controlled a given territory, with its mass-based organizations and other affiliated NGOs.34 In January 1980, the political military organizations created an umbrella structure, Coordinadora Revolucionaria de las Masas (Revolutionary Coordinating Council of the Masses), which unified all their affiliated popular organizations. Then in October of 1980, the five political-military organizations united and formed the FMLN.
In 1980, the Coordinadora Revolucionaria de las Masas and the Frente Democrático Salvadoreño (Salvadoran Democratic Front), a more leftist branch of the Christian Democrats and two small Social Democratic parties, came together, forming the Frente Democrático Revolutionario (Revolutionary Democratic Front, FDR), one of the most organized opposition coalitions in El Salvador’s history.35 This coalition also included the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Movement, MNR), the Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano (Popular Social Christian Movement, MPCS), and a coalition of professional and technical small business organizations, the National University, six unions and union federations, and a student association, with the Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas” (José Simeón Cañas, Central American University, UCA), and the Catholic Church as observers. The FDR became the official umbrella organization of all leftist and center-leftist forces in the country.
In January 1981, the FMLN launched the “general offensive” that marked the official beginning of the civil war. Four days later, the FMLN and the FDR joined forces and created the Political Diplomatic Commission, the body that would represent these organizations in the international arena. In 1981, right-wing constituencies who wanted to ensure their own socioeconomic standing in El Salvador and to guarantee the neoliberal, free market development of the country founded ARENA. Exacerbating the country’s polarization, by late 1981, the thrice-reconstituted junta had moved to the right-of-center, headed by José Napoleón Duarte.
The US-backed Salvadoran establishment tried to defeat the FDR-FMLN coalition through different means. The PDC tried to resolve the conflict with the help of US-sponsored programs and reform, and the armed forces with the help of US military support aimed to destroy the FMLN.36 As the international community called for peace negotiations to resolve the conflict, the United States and Duarte insisted on presidential and legislative elections to lend legitimacy to Duarte’s government. Duarte managed to win the 1984 presidential elections and to stay in power until 1989, after which the more right-wing ARENA came to power. The election of Duarte, however, provided activists with new opportunities to reestablish associations and organizations dismantled by military repression in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By 1989, the armed forces and the FMLN had reached a military stalemate.
With the heightening of the Salvadoran Civil War in the early 1980s,37 most of these mass organizations were forced underground or into exile, or became clandestine.38 After 1984, the government began to decrease its repression and legalized associational activity, and as a result, those organizations repressed in the early 1980s reemerged with new names and with different leaders but still politically affiliated. With the help of European private aid agencies, both secular and church-related grassroots leaders founded a few hundred popular organizations that organized workers, peasants, students, displaced persons, and women, and delivered health, education, housing, and other services. These institutions effectively laid the foundation for rebuilding civil society after the end of the Civil War. As the Salvadoran Civil War drew to a close in 1989, over 400 mass-based popular organizations existed in the country.39 Meanwhile, pro-government groups also established worker and campesino organizations supported by US aid programs. NGOs also became polarized, mirroring the polarization between the government and the opposition political organizations.
Laying Foundations for Mass Movement Mobilization
In both the Palestinian territories and El Salvador, the political organizations played a pivotal role in establishing mass-based organizations. These mass-based organizations supported different communities and laid the groundwork for civil society. The establishment of these organizations was not a simple response to challenging circumstances, but more accurately a complex process involving constantly evolving dynamics of oppression, adaptation, and resistance. Three phases characterized associational life in both contexts. Starting in the 1920s and 1930s, there was a proliferation of charity organizations in both cases, and especially unions in El Salvador. In the 1960s through the early 1980s, there was a steady increase in mass-based organizations whose objectives were more political. And then in the mid to late 1980s, many of these organizations began to professionalize their operations and became increasingly reliant on foreign funding. These mass-based organizations, especially in the Palestinian territories, were more or less autonomous and capable of functioning without the directives of a party. This point would have important implications for the extent to which these formations could shape the nature of the future emergent civil society. The divergent trajectories that emerged and the extent of the weakening in the Palestinian case are even more puzzling given the foundations put in place. They also shed light on the not so clear distinction between political society and civil society. This analysis builds on Frances Hasso’s work, which links opposition movements to the interaction between local “political fields,” that is, “the legal-cultural-historical-political environment within which a protest movements exists,” and globalized shifts.40 Although the political settlements were local developments, they cannot be assessed as separate from the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the main superpower.
The Nationalist Movement and Associational Life in Palestine: From Charity to Resistance and Mass Mobilization
In the absence of a full-fledged state, limited local government structures, and weak social service institutions, the various political organizations in the WBGS perceived the founding of mass-based organizations and more professionalized NGOs, and other social institutions more broadly defined, as necessary support for the national liberation stage.41 NGOs have played a crucial role in the mobilization of Palestinian society, in the provision of social services, and in the interest representation of various constituencies. By 1993, Palestinian NGOs accounted for 60 percent of primary health care services, 49 percent of secondary and tertiary health care, 100 percent of disability care, 100 percent of preschool programs, and a large proportion of tertiary education, agricultural extension, welfare, housing, and other services in the WBGS.42
Associations and civic organizations in the Palestinian territories date back to the Mandate period. During this period, Palestinians from the urban upper-middle and middle class established a number of charity organizations. Fifteen percent of NGOs that existed in 2000 were established before 1967, 12 percent between 1948 and 1967, and 3 to 4 percent in the Mandate period.43 Additionally, different sectors of Palestinian society, including the Communists, initiated efforts to organize the working class.44 Despite the various efforts of groups and individuals to establish some institutions during this time period, however, these organizations were urban-based and did not extend to all sectors of society. In the late 1960s and throughout the 1980s, associational and union activity increased dramatically, growing most rapidly after 1978.45 The rise of associations during this period extended to grassroots-based organizations, including charitable societies and cooperatives,46 professional associations and syndicates, and Islamist groups, including zakat committees.47 The DFLP initiated much of the associational activity during this period, especially after 1978.48 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of NGOs—but, importantly, not all—began to access Western foreign donor funding and to professionalize and institutionalize their operations. Then after the establishment of the PA, associational actors in the WBGS struggled to reconcile their relations with the incipient government and to shift their priorities to accommodate the burgeoning state-building phase.49
A number of factors coalesced to instigate these changes, especially related to mass mobilization in the territories. Most notably, the realization began to take root that Israeli military occupation would not be ending any time soon. The entrenchment of the Israeli military occupation and the myriad ways in which it would come to dominate the lives of Palestinians living in the WBGS were becoming more and more apparent. By 1974, approximately 45 percent of the employed West Bank residents and 50 percent of employed Gazans were working in Israel.50 Meanwhile, the continued confiscation of Palestinian lands, building of illegal Israeli settlements, and increased repression resulted in activists in the WBGS developing their own political agenda, which focused on resisting Israeli military occupation, and empowering Palestinian communities.
The increasing realization that only the Palestinians themselves, and not outside “benevolent” actors, could improve their daily living conditions extended across the Palestinian political polity more generally. In 1978, Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David peace accords, which included arrangements for the autonomy of the WBGS. The PLO, along with Arab countries, opposed these agreements, especially those components related to autonomy. To avoid “strategic marginalization,” the PLO recognized the necessity for a more systematic mobilization campaign in the occupied territories.51 A more organized presence of groups affiliated with the PLO would minimize chances that external actors, particularly Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan, would come to determine the fate of the Palestinians. Few if any of the individuals involved in the grassroots organizations were actively involved in armed resistance against the occupying power, and many members were not necessarily official members of the parent political organizations.
Associational and union activity that took place after 1975 often reflected factional competition, especially between Fatah and the Communist Party.52 Groups competed not only over who would control these associations and unions, but also over who would distribute the funds received from various Arab states.53 Recruitment to the mass-based organizations often started in high schools, and initiated activists into joining one of the different political organizations. Marwan Barghouti, a founding member of Fatah’s youth wing, Al-Shabῑbeh, and later student body president at Birzeit University, and one of the leaders of the first and second Intifadas, explained:
The late 1970s through the 1980s was the golden age of Palestinian popular, mass mobilization. The reception was amazing. In addition to our nationalist activities, we led critically important social initiatives. Al-Shabῑbeh (the Fatah youth branch), which recruited members from high schools, colleges and universities, for example, organized numerous volunteer campaigns, including anti-drug campaigns in the refugee camps. Our volunteer work involved cleaning and repairing streets, cleaning and restoring grave yards, painting schools, helping in the villages with the harvest of olives and other crops, and restoring and cultivating lands that are in threat of being confiscated by the Israeli military occupation authorities for lack of use.
Our structures were so extensive that the arrest of numerous Al-Shabῑbeh leaders could not undermine the movement. Leading up to the first Intifada, we had 8000 elected youth leaders representing Al-Shabῑbeh throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. An individual who was a formal member of Fatah or of Al-Shabῑbeh could organize a group if s/he had a minimum of fifteen members in the particular town or village.54
Indeed, the social dimensions of this work paved the way for the hundreds of thousands of recruits who would carry out the first Intifada.
As a result of the Iranian Revolution, Islamist associations, unions, and organizations also became more prevalent in the Palestinian territories, especially in the Gaza Strip, in the early 1980s. Much of the activity of Islamist organizations focused on social and cultural issues and community development. Islamist institutions play an important and very visible role in the provision of services in areas related to relief and charity work, preschool and primary education, rehabilitation of physically and mentally challenged persons, primary and tertiary health care, women’s income-generating activities, literacy training, the care of orphans, and youth and sports activities.55 It is important to note that these organizations differ vastly in the extent to which they are linked to one of the Islamist political organizations.
Though these organizations were affiliated with the political factions, for the most part they maintained varying degrees of autonomy. The organizations affiliated with the PCP, the DFLP, and the PFLP had Marxist-Leninist structures organized on the basis of democratic-centralism. Although these organizations were autonomous from the “outside” political organizations, they were often much closer to the respective political organization in the occupied territories. Often, these organizations maintained close contact with the grassroots, which allowed for input from these constituencies. Because of the sheer distance between the members and supporters of the political organizations in the occupied territories and their leadership in exile, most Palestinian factions accorded a flexible degree of autonomy to their associations, unions, and affiliated committees in the WBGS. Despite the overlap in membership of factions and grassroots organizations, there tended to be a lot of disagreement between the two. Leaders in the grassroots organizations, especially in the labor unions, played key roles and maintained that “they were the ones who really knew what was happening or were truly in touch.”56 Even more so was the degree of autonomy of the popular committees established during the first Intifada. As Ali Jaradat explained, “The decision to create the popular committees came from the grassroots committees themselves, and not from the political organizations. The grassroots committees had more democratic organizational structures than the political organizations themselves, and the more sophisticated members wanted to increase their autonomy.”57 The leadership of the political organizations in exile did not control these associations, unions, and other mass-based organizations, though there was more interaction with the respective leaderships in the occupied territories.
Civic Traditions and Associational Life in El Salvador: From Charity to Revolution, and New Forms of Organizing
The transformation of associational life in El Salvador reflected political developments and attempts to cope with these changes.58 Following the establishment of charities and unions in the 1930s, there was a dramatic increase in the grassroots organizing by the Salvadoran Catholic Church. By the late 1960s, and throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, these organizations were predominately affiliated with the broader opposition movement, either with the PCS, the Christian communities, or later with one of the parties of the FMLN.59 Then, from the mid-1980s to the present, many of these organizations began to professionalize and rely on foreign donor assistance, but this would not undermine mass mobilization to the same extent as in the Palestinian case.
In the late 1960s, the Salvadoran Catholic Church, influenced by liberation theology,60 underwent a massive transformation, emerging as a radicalized force in Salvadoran politics; this transformation would have momentous consequences for Salvadoran political life in the 1970s. The Catholic Church in El Salvador came to be known as the Iglesia popular (Popular Church). At the parish level, priests initiated the mass popular organizations, or Comunidades Cristianas de Base (Christian base communities). The Christian base communities initially consisted of small groups organized by the parishes that would meet to discuss social issues and possible community strategies to address some of these daily challenges.61 The result was an explosion of community activity in rural areas, leading to the establishment of hundreds of Christian base communities. Although priests or nuns led the initial courses and sessions, the groups were encouraged to develop their own leadership. According to some estimates, the Church trained over 15,000 leaders during the 1970s.62
The Catholic Church also played an important role in forging alliances with other opposition movements. Most notably, along with other organizations, the Catholic Church in El Salvador played a critical role in the founding of the first mass-based organization, FAPU, in Suchitoto in 1974. By 1977, campesinos constituted most of the rank-and-file and much of the leadership of the mass movements, including the Christian base communities. FAPU had two factions, one oriented toward the RN and the other toward the FPL. The organization split in 1975, and activists founded a new organization oriented toward the FPL called the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (Popular Revolutionary Bloc). In 1978, ERP sympathizers founded the third of the popular organizations, Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero (28 February Popular Leagues, LP–28 1978). Finally, in 1979, the PRTC spawned the Movimiento de Liberación Popular (Popular Liberation Movement). The PCS had created the Unión Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Union, UDN) in 1967. The PCS also historically played a leading role in the teacher, student, and labor organizations. Although the UDN was not a formal mass organization, it played a comparable role in Salvadoran society.
The sectors affiliated with these mass-based movements included rural workers, teachers, students, women, and repopulated and war displaced persons.63 Despite the shared goals among the mass-based organizations and the level of coordination between these groups, important differences and disagreements existed. In particular, FAPU and the Bloque Popular Revolucionario differed regarding strategies, tactics, and the constituencies on which to focus.64
Similar to the Palestinian case, the degree to which the mass movements were autonomous is unsettled. Michael Foley, for example, argued that although there was considerable variation among the mass movements, “The logic of organization, especially once communities were reestablished in what were still combat zones, was ‘vertical,’ approximating a ‘war communism’ in which community decision-making, though founded on participatory principles, was subordinated to the exigencies of the war effort.”65 Mario Lungo Uclés, on the other hand, argued that an autonomous relationship does not mean complete separation, and that there was a mutually influencing relationship. Problems associated with vertical decision-making had more to do with individual leadership styles, according to him.66 In the latter part of the 1980s, there was growing autonomy of the mass movements from the FMLN because as the FMLN expanded its military influence from the “controlled zones” to the “expansion zones,” it loosened its control on organizations in the former. The FMLN also recognized that more autonomy served the mass-based organizations well.67 Although the degree to which these mass movements were autonomous is not settled, a sole focus on autonomy as the measure of associational efficacy obfuscates the real determinants of citizen participation and empowerment.
PLO- and FMLN-Affiliated Women’s Movements: Power in Numbers and Reach
The women’s sectors would emerge as integral sectors of the PLO and the FMLN’s mass-mobilization efforts. These sectors would share similar historical trajectories, goals, and objectives. Especially in the Palestinian case, the women’s mass-based organizations were careful to involve members in expressing their needs, and in establishing and running committees in the various locations. Much of these major achievements in the Palestinian case, however, would be reversed by the early 2000s.
Palestinian Women’s Organizing
The Palestinian women’s sector metamorphosed from a number of charitable societies founded in the 1920s,68 into an integral component of nationalist resistance during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and later to a community of institutionalized feminist organizations. In 1965, 139 women delegates convened and established the General Union of Palestinian Women, a mass-based organization affiliated with the PLO. After 1967, these societies expanded their purview from traditional welfare functions to place greater emphasis on education, health, and vocational training. These organizations were predominately run by middle-class Palestinian women and were located in Palestinian urban centers, and therefore inaccessible to the majority of Palestinian women who lived in the rural areas.69
By the early 1980s, the major Palestinian political organizations had established their respective mass-based women’s organizations. In March 1981, women affiliated with the PCP founded the Union of Palestinian Working Women’s Committees (UPWWC) with branches throughout the WBGS. Later that year, women affiliated with PFLP established the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (UPWC). In 1982, women affiliated with Fatah founded the Union of Women’s Committees for Social Work (WCSW). In 1989, the WWC was renamed the Federation of Palestinian Women’s Action Committees (FPWAC).70 The women who were involved in establishing the women’s committees were relatively young, educated, and activists in their own right. Many of them were also political cadres in their respective political factions. These women were committed to articulating women’s issues both in relation to and separate from the broader national movement.
Goals
For the most part, the women’s committees shared the same goals: to enhance the status of women by empowering them to improve their daily living conditions, and to lend support to the broader national struggle,71 though the WCSW was not as progressive as the others, and did not espouse an agenda of societal transformation. The founders of the committees were also interested in addressing women’s status in Palestinian society-at-large, including the promotion of women’s economic self-sufficiency.
Most of my interviewees, including founders of the women’s committees, talked about the increasing realization that women’s lives needed to be improved. Each committee wanted to increase support for its political faction, and eventually to recruit more members. In turn, by strengthening women’s role in the national movement, they hoped they would be able to realize women’s full potential in Palestinian society. The UPWWC, the UPWC, and the FPWAC stood out as more willing to address socially contentious issues relating to the status of women, such as early marriage and polygamy, and more willing to promote less traditional roles of women, including employment outside the home. But, generally, the committees focused on addressing women’s immediate practical needs, as well as their economic, political, and social consciousness, while providing them with greater economic opportunities by establishing self-help and productive ventures. There was also particular focus on addressing the needs of working women and women in rural areas.72
Organization, Membership, and Decision-Making
In the pre-Madrid and pre-Oslo period, the most important and uncontested achievements of the Palestinian women’s committees were their ability to recruit large numbers of women from different sectors of Palestinian society, including remote villages, and to involve them effectively in decision-making structures. These committees had radical democratic structures, in which the members were directly involved in choosing their immediate leaders and the types of projects and programs that they implemented. The ability of the various women’s committees to forge horizontal links with grassroots constituencies and directly involve them in decision- making laid the groundwork for what could become an effective civil society that could contribute to democratic development in Palestinian society.
By the mid-1980s, all four women’s committees had amassed a substantial following, with a visible presence in terms of projects and activities in the public realm. Despite the fact that the exact membership of these committees was difficult to verify, all four committees claimed to have a membership base in the thousands, covering most geographic locations of the West Bank and later the Gaza Strip. By 1986, the members of the FPWCA claimed to have over 5,000 members.73 At the height of the Intifada at the end of the 1980s, one organizer estimated that their membership had reached 15,000 individuals.74 Also, there was a high level of participation, as demonstrated through the daily activities of the Intifada such as sit-ins, marches, and neighborhood committee meetings. The UPWC estimated to have about 5,000 members up until 1994,75 and by 1990 the WCSW estimated that its membership had reached 12,000.76
The official policy of these committees, especially those in the leftist-leaning organizations, was to recruit members from all geographic locations, especially rural areas, which were considered the most in need of organizational support. One entry strategy into the villages was to establish nursery schools and kindergartens.77 Other activists initiated collective recruitment drives in which organizers would meet with women in a village. A representative from the steering committee of an organization would visit an area and help set up a local committee. The women would discuss some of the activities they wanted to initiate and then they would hold an election. Although each committee was responsible for its own local projects, it was also part of a nationwide network in which it participated by electing a representative to a regional committee, which in turn elected a national executive and steering committee. The women in the village would continue to meet on a regular basis, and regional organizers would visit the respective location every three to four months
Most of the women I spoke to discussed the consensus decision-making approach used in the various locations. When women were not able to reach a decision by consensus, they would often vote on the particular issue. One grassroots coordinator explained, “We used to meet with women in the villages every two weeks. We would put together a needs-assessment list based on what the women wanted. Then we would vote to prioritize what they wanted to see accomplished.”78 Though the respective political organization might have had some general suggestions regarding the types of programs being implemented, the women also had a direct say in the projects and programs that were being carried out. Another grassroots women’s committee organizer explained, “When we met, the women told us what they wanted. There was a lot of autonomy in decision-making and in choosing events.”79 Moreover, the political organizations knew that increasing membership in these women’s committees was contingent on satisfying the women’s demands and needs.80 Hence, ideas and initiatives flowed both ways between the local committees and the executive. The WCSW differed in this respect because it never aspired to organize the masses per se, but rather sought to gain their support through charisma and patronage.81
Although there was some competition and political disagreement among the different women’s committees, there was also a degree of cooperation. In 1984, the women’s committees set up a mechanism to facilitate informal coordination, especially related to consciousness-raising programs, and in the activities to protest Israeli occupation.82 The lack of overt and acrimonious competition between the different women’s committees facilitated their ability to recruit members in such high numbers.
In reminiscing about this period, all of the activists recalled with nostalgia their commitment to the committees and the important roles they played in shaping their programs and in meeting the needs of women in Palestinian society. In “Feminist Generations,” Frances Hasso traced the impact of women’s previous involvement in these committees on their later life choices, and demonstrated how the activists had developed a higher sense of self-efficacy and were differentiated by their gender egalitarian ideology.83 Indeed, women who were involved in the committees were likely to make life choices that reflected their greater sense of self-empowerment.
Programs
Although the specific programs and activities tended to vary from one region to another, especially between the rural and urban areas,84 many of the programs dealt with women’s practical needs such as literacy classes, health education, small-scale vocational training, the provision of childcare, and the establishment of ventures, such as cooperatives, for producing goods.85 Consciousness-raising was also central to the activities of the women’s committees in both the rural and urban areas. The members usually chose the committees’ topics for the consciousness-raising programs. Health-related topics were also very popular and included family planning, prenatal and postnatal care, and preventive medical treatment for children, such as the importance of immunization.
All the committees were involved in enhancing women’s economic self-sufficiency, especially through the development of productive ventures such as co-operatives. Some of the goods produced in the co-operatives included baby food, engraved brass, embroidered clothes or linens, hand-woven rugs, knitted sweaters, concentrated fruit juices, frozen vegetables, and bakery products. Members of the FPWAC even established a carpentry factory. At one point, the UPWC managed ninety cooperatives in the Ramallah area alone.86 Most of the committees also took part in the organization of annual cultural bazaars. These activities had two goals: to promote women’s productive capacity87 and to increase reliance on Palestinian domestic goods in place of Israeli and other foreign imports.88
To facilitate women’s integration into the public sphere, the committees also established nursery schools and kindergartens. By the late 1980s, the FPWAC managed between thirty and thirty-five nursery schools and kindergartens,89 the UPWC managed eighty-six nursery schools and kindergartens, and the WCSW managed fifty kindergartens90 throughout the WBGS. Along with Islamist institutions, the women’s committees were among the main providers of nursery schools and kindergartens in the WBGS.
The types of program and the related goals espoused by the women’s committees played an important role in the empowerment of its members. By incorporating women and providing them with fora to identify their immediate needs and the opportunity to develop programs to address them, women’s committees helped to equip its members with the skills that are critical for the development of an effective civil society that can contribute to democracy.
Resources and Funding
The various committees supported their activities primarily through membership fees, small income-generating activities, occasional seed money from solidarity organizations, and funding from the parent political organization. Because all the committees had more or less the same access to resources, especially through their membership fees, they operated on a more or less equal playing field. The funding discrepancies between the different committees were not significant. Few, if any, of the activists were paid for their involvement in the women’s movement; this ensured that the spirit of voluntarism was the driving force behind civic and political participation.
The committees created a number of income-generating activities and programs. They all hosted annual bazaars and earned profits from the products they sold. The UPWC hosted occasional fundraising dinners, and also sold agendas, planners, and calendars for profit. Some of the women’s committees also ran cooperatives in the hope they would generate income for some of the women involved. In most cases, however, the cooperatives were not very successful or economically viable.
The women’s committees also received minimal funding from different donors, including Western foreign donors, often in the form of seed money for specific projects. During the mid-1980s, for example, the UPWC received seed funding to help in the establishment of a baby food production facility.91 Until 1992, the FPWAC received some funding from Oxfam-Netherlands (NOVIB) for the salaries of kindergarten and nursery school teachers, and for teacher training.92 During the 1980s, FPWAC also received funding from al-Najdeh North America, a Palestinian women’s organization based in the United States.93 The women’s committees also received occasional funding from their respective parent political organizations; this was especially the case for the WCSW. Dynamics between the different women’s committees, however, began to sour once certain committees and some members began to receive preferential treatment in terms of access to higher amounts of foreign funding and to political institutions and decision-makers.
Salvadoran Women’s Organizing
Salvadoran women’s organizations date back to the 1930s.94 From the 1930s to the late 1960s, Salvadoran women founded a number of charitable organizations, as well as more political organizations. From the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, the existing political organizations founded a number of affiliated mass-based women’s organizations that were quite successful in incorporating and mobilizing women in large numbers from all parts of El Salvador. During the latter part of the 1980s and early 1990s, these organizations began to professionalize their operations, but unlike in the Palestinian case, all the mass-based organizations had access to donor funding, and grassroots incorporation was often a precondition for the receipt of foreign donor funding.
In 1957, women established the Fraternidad de Mujeres Salvadoreñas (Fraternity of Salvadoran Women), which became one of the first organizations to attempt to incorporate women into the political opposition by addressing their specific needs. Although the organization accepted women from all political backgrounds, it was loosely affiliated with the PCS. The organization produced a monthly magazine called Fraternidad (Fraternity), and also carried out a number of cultural, political, and social activities. In addition to providing secretarial and sewing classes, they started a school for members’ children. The group was also active in the protest movement that supported trade unionists and political prisoners.95 The Fraternidad de Mujeres Salvadoreñas would serve as a model for all women’s organizations founded in the 1970s.96
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, mass-based opposition organizations, known as popular organizations, emerged in El Salvador. These groups were predominately affiliated with the Christian communities or with the PCS. During the latter part of the 1970s and early 1980s, women’s organizations emerged that were more closely affiliated with one of the existing political organizations; these included right-wing organizations in San Salvador, as well as leftist opposition-affiliated women’s organizations that sought to mobilize and address the needs of women in the controlled zones. Finally, during the mid-1980s, more professionalized women’s organizations that were also closely linked with one of the political organizations were established in San Salvador.
During the late 1960s through the early 1970s, the Popular Church and the broader leftist opposition established a number of women’s groups, and encouraged women to participate in non-women’s groups, often targeting laborers. Of particular concern to the Salvadoran Popular Church was the promotion of women’s equality. The Church leaders encouraged women in different communities to join Christian base communities and self-help groups or trade unions. Women became active in a number of organizations established at that time, the most notable of which were the Federación Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreños (Christian Federation of Salvadoran Farm Workers)97 and the Comité de Madres y Familiares de Presos, Desaparecidos y Asesinados de El Salvador “Monseñor Romero” (Committee of Mothers and Relatives of the Disappeared, Assassinated and Political Prisoners, COMADRES). COMADRES was established in 1977 by women who were looking for information about relatives who had disappeared, were imprisoned, or killed.98 Among the first of the organizations targeting women in the labor force was the Asociación Nacional de Educadores Salvadoreños (National Association of Salvadoran Teachers), which was founded in 1968. Although not solely for women, approximately 90 percent of the group’s members were women.99 By the early 1980s, Asociación Nacional de Educadores Salvadoreños claimed to represent 20,000 of the 23,000 teachers in El Salvador, of whom only 10,000 were official members since open affiliation carried tremendous risks. In 1969, labor activists founded the Comité de Mujeres Sindicales (Committee of Women Trade Unionists), followed by the Asociación de Mujeres Progresistas (Association for Progressive Women of El Salvador) in 1975. Asociación de Mujeres Progresistas claimed direct continuity with the Fraternidad, and its leadership also concentrated on recruiting women workers in cooperation with the PCS trade unions. In 1978, the FPL founded the Coordinating Committee of Market Women, “Luz Dilian Arévalo,” which organized market women on issues relating to their rights, and set up political meetings to denounce the government. Women also founded the Asociación de Usuarias y Trabajadoras de los Mercados (Association of Market Workers) in 1979, which specifically addressed market women’s working conditions by campaigning against the corrupt market administration.
The organizing during this period concentrated on recruiting women to the unions and helping them organize around their working conditions. Following the crackdown against and persecution of popular organizations in the late 1970s, many of these organizations went underground and were reestablished in the controlled zones in 1981. Unlike the previous generation of women’s organizations, these groups did not target specific populations of women, but rather were concerned with broader mass mobilization. Right-wing groups also founded a number of women’s organizations during this period.
In 1978 and 1979, the FPL established the Asociación de Mujeres de El Salvador (Association of Women of El Salvador, AMES). AMES was one of the largest women’s associations and operated in Nicaragua and Honduras as well as in El Salvador. (See table 5.3, which lists the year in which each of the political organizations established its respective women’s association.) The PRTC and ERP founded women’s organizations along the same lines. In 1982, forty-seven women combatants of the PRTC and members of the popular organizations founded the Asociación de Mujeres Salvadoreña (Association of Salvadoran Women, ASMUSA). By 1984, the persecution of opposition groups made it almost impossible to organize as ASMUSA in El Salvador, so PRTC members founded a new front organization, the Asociación por Mejorar de la Mujer y el Niño (Association for the Improvement of Women and Children).100 During that same year, members of the RN founded the Asociación de Mujeres Lili Milagro Ramírez (Association of Women—Lili Milagro Ramírez), for women in the FAPU.101 Then following the seizure of power by the 1979 Junta, right-wing women’s organizations appeared on the political scene, including the Cruzada por Paz y Trabajo (Crusade for Peace and Work), a broad organization that united all women to the right of the Christian Democrats, and the Frente Femenino Salvadoreño (Salvadoran Women’s Front), which was unofficially affiliated with the right-wing ARENA party.102 Although these organizations were not as involved in mass organization, they did launch high-profile media campaigns through paid advertisements in daily newspapers.103
Following the election of Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte in 1984, there was increased political opening in El Salvador. As a result, many of the political-military organizations of the FMLN and the Christian communities were able to operate more openly, and they established their own women’s mass-based organizations, many of them in San Salvador. Most of the women’s mass-based organizations that emerged during this period were founded between 1985 and 1988. The first of these was the Organización de Mujeres Salvadoreñas (Organization of Salvadoran Women, ORMUSA), which was founded in 1985 and affiliated with the MPCS. In 1986, the Instituto de Investigación, Capacitación y Desarrollo de la Mujer “Norma Guirola de Herrera” (Institute of Research, Training, and Development of Women “Norma Guirola de Herrera,” IMU), and the Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres (Salvadoran Movement of Women, MSM) were founded. The IMU was established by university women, and was affiliated with the PCS.104 MSM was created by the midranking PRTC cadre and incorporated its previous organization, ASMUSA. That same year, the FPL founded the Asociación de Mujeres de las Zonas Marginales (Association of Women of the Marginalized Zones), a group dedicated to helping women to access public services and become economically independent.105 In 1987, a group called Christian Mothers, along with women’s committees of the north of San Miguel and Morazàn, founded the Asociación para la Autodeterminación y el Desarrollo de Mujeres Salvadoreña (Association for the Self-Determination and Development of Salvadoran Women, AMS); the organization became affiliated with the ERP.106 Subsequently, in 1988, the PCS founded another women’s organization, the Asociación Democrática de Mujeres (Democratic Association of Women, ADEMUSA). During this period women also founded the first association for indigenous women in El Salvador, the Asociación de Mujeres Indígenas Salvadoreñas (Association of Indigenous Salvadoran Women).
These organizations were more formal and also in a better position to access foreign funding than their predecessors, especially from Western solidarity groups and foundations. Given the high levels of repression of the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, most of the mass-based organizations worked in the FMLN-controlled zones, and not in the capital city, San Salvador. By 1985, however, these women’s organizations were predominantly openly based in San Salvador.
Goals of the Mass-Based Women’s Organizations
In general, the FMLN’s five political organizations shared the same goals in establishing the mass-based women’s organizations: These were to address women’s basic needs, including literacy; to raise their awareness and consciousness; and to incorporate them into the struggle. As with the founding of other associations and organizations during this period, each respective political organization also sought to gain mass support. One of the main distinguishing features of the newer women’s organizations was that they were more likely to incorporate feminist gender analysis into their work.107 Moreover, the last wave of women’s organizations differed from the previous waves in that they also sought to gain the support of and to mobilize women in the urban center, San Salvador, while continuing to work with their grassroots communities in the FMLN-controlled zones.
Organization, Membership, and Decision-Making
As with the Palestinian women’s sector, the most important and uncontested accomplishment of these women’s organizations was their ability to recruit and organize women in large numbers from the remotest parts of El Salvador. When the security situation permitted, there was an attempt to develop radical democratic structures in which the local community organizations elected their own representatives, and then the elected representatives would meet on a regular basis to coordinate the activities of the organization.108 In most instances, however, much of the organizing was very discreet. As Carmen Medina explained, “Everything was dangerous, so the approach was very low profile. Even in the association, the meetings were not open.”109 For the most part, women in each community decided on their priorities when the situation allowed.
Although the membership of these organizations was in the thousands, exact numbers were difficult to come by given the clandestine nature of much of the work. In many cases, leaders did not keep official records of the exact membership. Some of the organizers, however, were able to provide rough estimates of their membership. For example, by 1982, AMES was estimated to have approximately 8,000 members—most of whom were members or supporters of the FPL.110 Similarly, by March 1988, AMS claimed to have enrolled nearly 4,000 women in literacy and self-help training,111 and, by 1985, ORMUSA was estimated to have 2,000 members.112
Programs
The programs and projects of these organizations addressed women’s practical needs, but were sometimes distinguished by the particular needs of women in a given region. As Yanera Argueta succinctly explained, “We [AMS] addressed three systematic demands: health services for women, literacy, and sustenance.”113 Many of the women’s organizations also ran literacy classes, health workshops, and nurseries. The newer women’s mass-based organizations were more likely to set up programs that went beyond practical gender interests, especially in the 1990s. The geographic demarcation of territory between the different groups ensured that there was less replication of programs and projects.
Consciousness-raising was central to the programs of the various women’s organizations. In addition to running literacy courses, they provided workshops on health issues, such as first aid, hygiene, prenatal health, and childcare. Some of the organizations also provided ideological and political training, as well as lectures and discussions on domestic violence. Azucena Quintera further elaborated, “A number of the comrades beat up their wives, so we tried to address that problem.”114 ORMUSA, for example, organized consciousness-raising sessions and reflection groups in which the women discussed issues pertaining to labor, violence, and political participation.
Many of the organizations also focused on improving the material conditions of women by addressing their most basic needs, as well as providing material support to women combatants. As Jeanette Urquilla explained, “The main concern of our members was not to die of hunger during the war.”115 Accordingly, various political organizations distributed food through the women’s organizations. Women in ASMUSA, for example, cultivated beans and corn in the various communities. The women’s organizations also attempted to improve women’s economic conditions by providing them with more opportunities to produce goods. ORMUSA, for example, had a clothing production center in one of the communities, and AMES provided sewing classes for its members. They also provided women combatants with boots, clothes, sanitary napkins, and spending money; food was also provided for their children.116 Moreover, women members of the FPL leadership began demanding that the FMLN-FDR adopt a “Minimum Women’s Program”—a program of basic women’s demands.
Resources and Funding
During the war, most of the funding to mass-based women’s organizations was predominantly from committees of women’s organizations based abroad, from solidarity organizations, and from women’s organizations based in other countries, especially in Europe.117 Most of the popular women’s organizations in El Salvador had committees or women members who were responsible for fundraising. ASMUSA representatives, for example, fundraised in Nicaragua, Mexico, and Costa Rica.118 Similarly, the FPL set up a committee to organize solidarity work and raise funds in Nicaragua and Mexico for their women’s groups.119 These organizations also received funding from abroad, especially from solidarity NGOs whose primary raison d’ȇtre was to fundraise or lobby for the Salvadoran left. Among these solidarity NGOs were the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador and the Salvadoran Humanitarian Aid, Research, and Education Foundation.120 These solidarity groups seldom distributed the funding directly to the women’s organizations, but rather funneled it through their affiliated political organizations.121 Besides the payment to women combatants, almost all women’s work in the organization was voluntary, and therefore members were not paid for their work.
Conclusion
As in the Palestinian case, among the important accomplishments of the different Salvadoran women’s organizations during the 1980s was their ability to recruit women from all walks of life and locations, including the remotest parts of El Salvador, and to address their most basic needs, while involving them in decision-making when the situation allowed. By the early 1990s, the Palestinian and Salvadoran women’s sector shared substantial similarities in terms of their social and political organization, their functions, their social reach, and their relationship to political organizations. Ultimately, the unfolding political settlements in these two societies, and the mediating role of Western donor assistance that was introduced to buttress these processes, resulted in dramatically different outcomes for the women’s sectors in these two contexts. In what follows, I discuss the contrasting political settlements that emerged in the Palestinian territories and El Salvador.
