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Political Settlements and the Reconfiguration of Civic and Political Life

Life, Works

… Discovering,

deciphering,

articulating,

setting in motion:

the old works of liberators and martyrs

that are our obligations now …

—Timoteo Lue, pen name for Roque Dalton, student of law and Salvadoran poet; born in Suchitoto in 1950

In the early 1990s, the Palestinian territories and El Salvador began their conflict-to-peace transitions. A key difference between the evolving settlements in the two cases was the level of inclusivity. This distinction would have important implications for how the political organizations would develop in the postaccord period, especially related to their patterns of professionalization of their mass- based organizations, their relationship to mass movements, and the creation of national and local government institutional openings. Understanding the variation in mass movement activity in postsettlement cases requires an appreciation of how these agreements came to shape associational and civic life.

Palestinian Territories: From the Madrid and Oslo Accords to the Post-Oslo Era

On 13 September 1993, the PLO and the state of Israel signed the historic Oslo Accords. Fatah, as the leadership party, negotiated these agreements on behalf of the PLO. Although, these accords were only meant to serve as interim agreements and their authors emphasized that their contents would not “prejudice” the outcome of permanent status agreements,1 the accords failed to meet minimal Palestinian nationalist aspirations. Ultimately, the Oslo peace process and initiatives related to this process would enjoy narrow support in Palestinian circles, and would marginalize important sectors of Palestinian political life. The establishment of the PA, and its associated institutions, would serve to reinforce these dynamics.

Palestine: Negotiations from a Point of Weakness

The circumstances under which the negotiating parties came to the table in many ways portended the outcome. Three factors decisively propelled the PLO to begin negotiations with Israel at a less than opportune time, when conditions were not in favor of the Palestinian bargaining position: (1) the PLO’s military defeat in Lebanon; (2) international geopolitical changes, specifically the demise of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s; and (3) the PLO’s near bankruptcy after it was estranged from Egypt and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf following the Gulf War of 1991. By the end of the summer of 1982, Israel had destroyed the PLO in Beirut—not only its military potential, but also the entirety of its administrative and political apparatus in Lebanon.2 The PLO’s military defeat in Lebanon and its expulsion to Tunisia thereafter made clear that a military solution to the conflict was not a feasible option. Then, in 1988, during the PNC’s nineteenth session, the PLO made two momentous decisions that would forever alter the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict: a renunciation and rejection of armed struggle, and a declaration of a willingness to negotiate “directly” with Israel on the basis of UN resolutions 2423 and 338.4 These decisions tacitly implied acceptance of both Israel’s right to exist and a two-state solution. The shift in international public opinion and the new urgency that the international arena assigned to the conflict obliged the United States to turn its attentions to the region. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, many Arab regimes, particularly Syria, lost the economic, political, and diplomatic support they had previously received from the Soviets. Effectively, this was the end of an era for a Middle East that had previously been one of the Cold War’s most active playing fields.

Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War asserted the United States as an uncontested hegemonic power in the region.5 A deeply divided Arab world and an end to Soviet involvement in the region created an environment conducive for new US policy initiatives in the Middle East.”6 In the aftermath of the Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush announced to Congress that he would pursue new strategic goals in the region, including a just settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Then Secretary of State James Baker maintained that the Madrid Peace Conference was a necessary part of President Bush’s “new world order” after the fall of Communism.7

Accompanying these changing regional dynamics was a weakened PLO. The PLO’s ill-fated decision to support Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait cost the PLO US$120 million in annual donations from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Confiscation of Palestinian deposits in Kuwaiti banks brought the PLO’s losses to about US$10 billion. As punishment for Arafat’s solidarity with Saddam Hussein, Kuwait summarily expelled 400,000 Palestinians. These financial losses completely undermined the organization’s ability to sustain itself, and by 1993 the PLO had closed a number of its offices in Tunis and elsewhere because of lack of funds.8 The grassroots Intifada, which had commenced in the WBGS at the end of 1988, and the ascendance of the local PLO leadership, also challenged the continued relevance of the exiled PLO leadership to developments in the occupied territories.

At the Madrid peace conference, the Palestinians did not attend as an independent delegation under the auspices of the PLO, but as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The conference set in motion bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighboring countries, including the Palestinians. Simultaneously accompanying the ten rounds of negotiations between Israel and the PLO in Washington, DC, was a second track of negotiations: Israel and the PLO were secretly negotiating in Oslo.

The Oslo Accord’s Inadequate and Problematic Provisions

The fourteen meetings in Oslo culminated in the 13 September 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles. The DOP began:

The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the “Palestinian Delegation”), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.9

The DOP was not a peace treaty, but rather an agenda for negotiations covering a five-year “interim period” that would lead to a permanent settlement. The agreements outlined the principles that would govern relations between Israel and the PLO for the five-year period. They were nonbinding, and they stipulated that “nothing in the interim would prejudice the outcome of final status negotiations.” After the first two years, final status negotiations would begin on the most critical issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—namely, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the status of Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees, water rights, borders, and security arrangements.

The main provisions of the DOP included the establishment of a “Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority”—what would become known as the Palestinian Authority, or PA—for Palestinians residing in the WBGS, an elected legislative council, withdrawal of the Israeli military from parts of the WBGS, and a final permanent settlement within five years from the signing of the Interim Agreements. The DOP also stipulated that the permanent settlement would be based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Within the first two months of the DOP’s implementation, the Israeli military would commence redeployment from Gaza and Jericho, and would be replaced by a Palestinian police force responsible for Palestinian “internal security and public order.” At a later point Israel would redeploy from the major Palestinian population centers—Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Bethlehem, and Hebron. Shortly after the Israeli military redeployment, Palestinians in the WBGS would hold elections for a Palestinian Legislative Council. In the interim, Israel would control the borders. Finally, the agreement called for the establishment of a joint Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee to carry out economic development programs for the WBGS.10

In many ways, the DOP resembled previous proposals relating to Palestinian autonomy, such as in the Allon Plan and Camp David Agreements, but for the notable exception of the PLO’s participation. Supporters of the DOP pointed out that the agreement de facto implied Israel’s formal recognition of the PLO, allowed the Palestinians to administer their own affairs, and addressed the Palestinians inclusively “as a people.”11 Critics pointed out that the Palestinians had not received any guarantees for a future independent, sovereign, viable state, as well as no guarantees for a halt to Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied territories. The DOP also failed to address Israel’s illegal claim to the “occupied territories”; rather, the DOP identified the territories as “disputed territories.”12 One of the most damning critiques of the PLO was that it had allowed itself to be transformed from a liberation movement into a governing body in the WBGS.13 Key Palestinian leaders pointed out that the Executive Committee and other representative bodies of the PLO—“the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”—were absent from the negotiations, and that unknown names of little relevance to the organization’s structure and their advisors were negotiating on behalf of the Palestinian people.14

Absent from the DOP and all the implementation agreements that followed was any recognition of the Palestinians’ historic grievances. The ambiguity enshrined in the political settlement was not unique to these agreements. This lack of precision, often referred to as “constructive ambiguity,” is a common feature of political settlements that address substantive causes of the conflict.15 The most striking feature of the DOP’s constructive ambiguity, however, was that it compromised the lowest common denominator of consensus among different Palestinian groups and political organizations: the demand for Palestinian sovereignty.

Not surprisingly, then, the Oslo peace process and related initiatives did not receive solid support from the Palestinian leadership and Palestinians in the territories and diaspora. According to a Center for Policy Research poll, 38 percent of Palestinians in the WBGS opposed the DOP and 20.4 percent were not sure how they would evaluate the agreement.16 On 3 September 1993, Arafat convened the PLO executive committee in hopes of ratifying the DOP. Some of the most prominent members of the PLO, such as Mahmoud Darwish and Shafiq al-Hout, resigned and a number of members abstained. The cabinet resolution in favor of the DOP passed by only one vote, compared to sixty-one in favor and fifty opposed in the Israeli Knesset.17 Prominent Palestinian intellectuals, as well as political organizations such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the leftist PFLP and DFLP, opposed the DOP. Even former PLO negotiators, most notably Haidar Abdel Shafi,18 and to a lesser extent Hanan Ashrawi, were vocal in their opposition to Oslo. The PPP did not outright reject the Oslo Accords, but adopted more of a wait and see approach.

A series of agreements followed that effectively outlined the nature of implementation after the DOP. Among the most important of these agreements was the Paris Protocol,19 Gaza-Jericho First Agreements, the Oslo II Agreements, and the Protocol concerning redeployment from Hebron. The two parties signed the Paris Protocol in April 1994; this agreement outlined the economic arrangements between the two parties, including issues related to the customs union, import tariffs, trade taxes, import licensing regulations, and trade standards. One month later, in May 1994, the two parties signed the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement, also known as the 1994 Cairo Agreement. These agreements gave the Palestinians autonomy in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho and established the Palestinian self-governing entity, the PA.20 On 27 August 1995, the parties signed the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, which put the PA in charge of labor, commerce and industry, gas and petroleum, insurance, postal services, local government, and agriculture.21

The two parties then signed the Interim Agreements on Implementation of the DOP, Oslo II, on 28 September 1995. The Oslo II Agreements fully detailed the interim arrangements between the two parties during the next five years and the transfer of certain powers to the PA. These agreements established institutions of self-government including a legislative council and an elected “President,” and also elaborated on redeployment arrangements outlining how the WBGS would be divided into three distinct areas—A, B, and C—each with different security and civil power arrangements. There would be four different phases of Israeli military redeployment from the WBGS. By the third military redeployment, Area A would consist of approximately 17.2 percent of the West Bank. In this area, the PA would be responsible for internal security and civil affairs, and Israeli checkpoints would surround each of these areas. Area B would consist of 21.8 percent of the West Bank, over which the PA would have civil control over Palestinians and maintain a police force to protect “public order for Palestinians,” and Israel would maintain overall security control. Area C would consist of 60 percent of the territory where Israel would retain full territorial jurisdiction, and the PA would have functional jurisdiction over Palestinians and “only in matters not related to territory.”22 The two sides, however, did not agree on the territorial size of the fourth and final redeployment. Once the Israeli military redeployment from any area was complete, the Israeli government would transfer the civil powers for education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism of that area to the PA. These agreements would come to supersede the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities. On 15 January 1997, the two parties signed the Protocol concerning redeployment from Hebron, which outlined the nature of Israeli withdrawal from this Palestinian town.23

Formidable Undertakings

The PA became responsible for public sector functions in the WBGS under substantial adversity in a conflict situation. The body was expected to build public sector institutions and assume responsibility for these functions while promoting good governance, democratic political institutions, a robust civil society, security (both internally and for Israel), and a free market while lacking key requisites such as jurisdiction over the land for whose population it would be responsible, or control over water resources. Moreover, it was expected to build a fiscal administration and guarantee fiscal stability without control over monetary policy or its own currency.24 A substantial portion of the PA’s budget would rely on the value-added tax (VAT) and other fees transferred from Israel. From the onset, it would be confronted with the challenge of Israeli closure policies that disrupted the movement of goods and labor, dealing an immense blow to the economies of the WBGS.25 Israel would retain control over the external borders, airspace, water, and the electromagnetic spheres of the WBGS.26 Despite these challenges, the PA succeeded in establishing functioning state institutions.27 From the onset, however, the founding of these institutions privileged certain groups and political organizations.

Opposition to the unfolding Oslo Accords was by no means limited to extremists. The implementation agreements would draw mounting criticism, as each stage increasingly appeared to address Israel’s security concerns at the expense of Palestinian nationalist aspirations. The negotiation of these agreements did not expand beyond the initial narrow participation of the DOP,28 further entrenching the noninclusivity of these agreements. The institutions that historically represented all Palestinian political organizations, such as the PNC and the Executive Committee of the PLO, were not included in this process. An overriding criticism revolved around the PA’s lack of control over jurisdiction. The unfolding agreements also did not bring an end to settlement expansion; on the contrary, settlement expansion would continue unabated as negotiations were under way.29 The issue of Israel’s control over almost every land aquifer in the West Bank was also absent from these agreements and postponed to final status negotiations. Moreover, the subsequent agreements of the Oslo Accords did not move beyond the autonomy framework, with no guarantees toward sovereign statehood.30

The Paris Protocol, Annex IV of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, established the transitional framework that would govern economic relations, including policies related to trade, specifications, taxation, and banking between Israel and the PA for the next five years, until 1999. The agreement extended control to the PA in some areas, such as the authority to collect domestic taxes, set its own industrial policy, and resume limited imports from Arab countries. The agreement also stipulated a gradual elimination of export restrictions on agricultural products, and it allowed for the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian Monetary Authority for the interim period. The Monetary Authority would perform limited central bank tasks, such as financial sector supervision and regulation; this would not include the issuing of a national currency.31 As the permanence of the agreement took hold, and its disadvantages to the Palestinians became increasingly apparent, it would draw damning condemnation from many quarters. One of the overriding criticisms centered on the creation of a “Customs Union,” and the aligning of Palestinian customs tariff rates, procedures, and taxation policies with those of Israel.32 This arrangement reinforced Israel’s economic control over external borders. Moreover, the alignment of the Palestinian economy with a more advanced, industrial outward-looking economy would not help equip the Palestinian economy to become more competitive in international markets. Since Israel would be required to transfer import taxes and VAT pertaining to revenues collected for goods and services sold in Israel and destined for the WBGS, the overdependence on the Israeli economy facilitated fiscal leakage. According to a 2011 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) study, over US$300 million was “leaked” or not transferred to the Palestinian economy, as a result of weak customs control, dated clearance arrangements, and tax avoidance on the part of Israel.33 Control over these transfers also provided Israel with additional political leverage to penalize the PA if it deemed necessary. Initially, proponents rationalized that the arrangements would allow Palestinian labor free access to Israeli markets. Israel, however, unilaterally and gradually limited the entry of Palestinian laborers into its markets.

The Hebron Agreements of January 1997 divided the city into H1 and H2 zones; H1 was handed over to the Palestinians, and H2, the Old City, where 450 Israeli Jewish settlers would remain, would continue to be under complete Israeli security control. Provisions for H2 were designed to separate Arabs and Jews, dividing the city with barbed wire and privileging the Jewish settlers with bypass roads and extra security arrangements. After the Hebron Protocol was signed, Israel issued a “Cabinet Communique” elaborating on its understanding of the Oslo Accords and declared that “details of the further stages of the redeployment in Judea and Samaria will be determined by the Government of Israel.”34 These gestures were not simply symbolic but reaffirmed Israel’s insistence that it would unilaterally shape the final outcome. Benjamin Netanyahu’s term as prime minister, like his subsequent terms, further pushed Israel’s unilateralism.

Twenty years after the signing of the DOP, the Israelis and Palestinians were no closer to peace: no progress had been made in terms of final status negotiations. In terms of military presence, the Israeli military had simply redeployed around Palestinian towns and was still very present. According to a number of Western mainstream narratives, the two sides were close to reaching an agreement at the Camp David negotiations of 2000. Palestinian accounts, however, maintained that the negotiating positions of the two sides were unbridgeable. By the close of 2017, Israel’s policies of institutionalized separation between the occupied territories and Israel had created a mental chasm that blinded and prevented the Israeli establishment, and perhaps even the public, from grasping the extent to which Palestinian lives had deteriorated and their circumstances had become unsustainable.

The Post-Oslo Era and the Reconstitution of Palestinian Political Life

The noninclusivity of the Oslo Accords and subsequent implementation agreements further polarized the Palestinian political landscape. In general, three political tendencies emerged in relation to the Oslo accords: Fatah and its clientelistic networks, the Opposition, and the Liberal Moderates. These tendencies included the relevant political organization, as well as loosely affiliated individual and groups—affiliations based on various forms of group membership, political beliefs, or sometimes even shared labels, such as “Islamist.”35 They (the tendencies) vis-à-vis the accords remained relatively unchanged over time, albeit with minor shifts in tone or degree in various periods; the changes were often tactical and not fundamental in terms of how they related to the accords. Each of these tendencies initially adopted a different strategy in relation to the peace accords that was often conditioned by their ability to access Western foreign donor funding or other sources of funding. Because of the interests of Western foreign donors, especially state-sponsored donors, they were more likely to fund groups that supported the peace accords and were in a better position to promote a “post–Cold War liberal order.”36 The availability of Western foreign donor assistance, hence, played a critical role in mediating relations between these different groups.

Members and groups affiliated with Fatah, the leadership party of the PA and the broker of the Oslo Accords, were the staunchest supporters of the Oslo peace process. Although groups and individuals affiliated with Fatah were eligible to receive foreign donor funding, often these groups did not seek Western foreign funding because of their more steady flow of funding from Fatah and the PLO. After the Oslo Accords, Fatah was better able to consolidate its financial base in the territories, and therefore enlarged its clientelistic networks, including those involved in its affiliated volunteer and grassroots organizations. Fatah institutions have become the backbone of the PA. As the governing body of the PA, all groups affiliated with Fatah sought to expand their grassroots bases so as to maintain Fatah’s primacy in Palestinian society.

Promoting Democracy

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