Читать книгу Английский для военных/Military English. Метод кейсов/Cases. Решения, ответы, словарь, глоссарий - Марина Юрьевна Грабарь - Страница 5
PART 1
ОглавлениеMILITARY LEADERSHIP STYLE
CASE NUMBER 1
State Loses Control Over Its Nuclear Weapons Illustrative Scenario:
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) DPRK Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and Missile Sites
The DPRK’s WMD and missile programs include approximately 141 sites (excluding tactical sites) identified as being of potential interest for WMD-E operations, 39 of which are associated with its nuclear program, 38 are related to its CW program, and 15 are related to its bioweapons (BW) program. An additional 49 sites are associated with the ballistic missiles that might launch WMD.
For WMD-E operations, we assess that the order of priority of these sites would be:
– Nuclear fuel enriching and processing sites, and nuclear weapon manufacturing, testing, and storage sites
– Missile garrisons holding missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons
– Research and development sites and nuclear-related universities
– Other nuclear sites – including mines, low-grade ore processing
– Biological weapons research and development, manufacturing, testing, and storage sites
– CW research and development, manufacturing, testing, and storage sites.
Unclassified sources identify nine sites in the DPRK that fall into the first category: Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, one nuclear test site, four additional undeclared nuclear enrichment sites, one suspected underground nuclear storage site, one undeclared underground enrichment and reprocessing site, and one site associated with nuclear weaponization. These nine nuclear sites are shown in Figure 1.1.
The figure also depicts a notional buffer line that might be established by Chinese forces—50 km in this example – in the event that China decides to establish a zone within North Korea to control the flow of refugees or otherwise manage further developments on the peninsula. An interesting feature of such a zone would be the number of priority WMD and missile sites remaining outside it. In this notional case, five nuclear and seven missile sites would remain on the U.S. side.
A key operational decision – and one that will be greatly affected by the quality of available intelligence – will be whether and in what priority to seize and reduce each site. The combined commander/JFC would then develop a campaign plan to exploit these and any other sites found during the course of operations.
Table 1.1
Table 1.2
Table 1.3
