Читать книгу The Tribalization of Europe - Marlene Wind - Страница 6

Not so long ago, most Europeans believed that our common destiny was to exist as a Union with no internal borders. Nationalist sentiments, a destructive cold war, and restrictive ideologies had been eradicated and replaced by a united Europe, inclusive rights, values, and dreams held in common.

As the Soviet Union crumbled and the Berlin Wall fell, the large majority envisioned the world becoming a better place, with fewer hindrances to travel, trade, and communication, not more. The protection of basic rights, the rule of law, democracy, and economic prosperity would now flourish in the East just as they had in the West since the Second World War. The vision of Europeans living, working, and marrying across borders, of the unity in diversity that EU treaties speak so warmly about, was finally something that most people actually believed could be accomplished. It encapsulated the idea of a Europe that could and should consist of many different regional identities, with Scots, Catalans, Bavarians, Lombardians, and Sami living side by side with (and in) established nation-states.

Unity in diversity also suggested that Europeans – despite their ethnic and cultural differences – had acknowledged that only common aspirations for peaceful co-existence and cooperation could heal the wounds caused by forty-four years of division. In such a world, state borders would have become irrelevant. Separatists and secessionists would serve no purpose, and their raison d’être would have vanished. Why would anyone want to leave their mother nation to create small new city-states if borders had become obsolete? With the important – and extremely bloody – exception of the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, no one imagined that borders and bombastic territorial symbols would reenter the European mind, let alone enjoy a renaissance. When liberal democracy had finally triumphed over repressive competing ideologies, including nationalisms new and old, new attempts to mark boundaries would look old-fashioned, even ridiculous.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, scholars, too, were optimistic, speaking of “A New World order”¹ and the “end of history,”² with belief in liberal democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and freedom of speech replacing divisiveness and creating a (global) community without partitions.

In Europe 2004 – only fifteen years after East German border guards opened the Berlin Wall by accident – eight new democracies from the former Soviet bloc embraced these ideals and joined the EU. For many Central and Eastern Europeans, the European Community represented hope for the future and for a better life without repression. They had escaped the tutelage of the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain, which had cut them off from the free world for so long. For more than forty years, becoming part of a borderless, open, liberal Europe had been an unobtainable dream. Now it was a reality.

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All this now feels like ancient history. What we have witnessed in Europe over the past five, ten, or fifteen years is an entirely different development from the one described above. Many Europeans seem to have given up on their universalist aspirations and are pulling up the drawbridges – returning to the tribe. The rhetoric of “us” and “them” has returned and identity politics is a winning argument in elections and referenda.

According to a prestigious global research project³ measuring the state of democracy in the world, Europe is the place where liberal democracy has declined most precipitously in recent years. Probably because democracy here had come to be regarded as a given and because we have become incredibly bad at recognizing when important democratic institutions are being gradually undermined. According to the study, as many as six European countries can no longer be classified as liberal democracies but should instead be referred to as hybrid regimes or semi-autocracies. These countries may hold elections, but no longer heed those basic principles that have defined us as European democratic polities since the Second World War.

The main question addressed in this book is: are we witnessing a general tribalization of Europe? Or is it sporadic declines that can be reversed? I will try to argue that the answer depends not only on where we look, but also on the extent to which we are willing to face our own demons. What is undoubtable is that the most original, successful, and innovative supra-statist project that the world has known, the European Union, is in trouble. It – and not least the values it represents – needs new defenders. This book is such a defense.

So, what is tribalization? As I understand it, tribalism is a phenomenon in which cultural, ethnic, and nationalist groupings of various sizes and organization emphasize themselves as the “true” tribe, nation, or culture while verbally or in practice excluding named “others” from being a part of the community. At the same time, they strive increasingly to regress from internationalist structures, if not formally then in practice, by no longer recognizing previously adopted laws, conventions, and common ground rules. If tribalization is a long-lasting trend, as much evidence suggests, it could eventually splinter the continent into hundreds of more or less homogeneous enclaves, undermining the Europe we know today. A Voltairean nightmare, as some would call it, recollecting the Holy Roman Empire’s resolution and the patchwork of small entities in constant infighting.

Despite the stunning success of European integration over the past six decades, there seems to be an increasing temptation – even among those who consider themselves progressive – to rally around new exclusionary identities rooted in a more or less fundamentalist version of the nation-state or in regional separatist movements. What do these projects have in common? They all represent – despite their differences – a tireless yearning to stand in opposition to neighboring identities. Chasing enemies and creating opponents is clearly far from a new phenomenon, but the regression we are experiencing in Europe in these years is something new. And now the enemies are apparently not just those who do not share your culture, religion, or identity, but also liberal elites, the EU and the liberal values we have jointly cherished since the Second World War.

Tribalization, in the form I address in this book, also has something in common with the term “ethnocentrism.” Ethnocentrism is often characterized as the attempt to reinforce one’s own identity by disparaging others. William Graham Sumner defines ethnocentrism as “a view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything and all others … scaled and rated with reference to it.”⁴ However, tribalization has an extra, almost activist dimension, which is directed outward. It can be said to be a reappearance of a form of cultural fundamentalism, which sustains its momentum through active demonization and distancing from others. It is an ugly mix of generic populism combined with rage against those who do not share a particular cultural, linguistic, religious, historical, national, or even ethnic origin. I have chosen to describe it as tribalism insofar as it often draws on exclusionary language and the building of walls and borders (sometimes merely symbolically) to keep the others out. However, the purpose is not to be mistaken. First and foremost, it serves to stiffen up the “tribe” itself while underlining who does and who doesn’t belong.

Where Europe was built on the ethos of common values and inclusiveness, the continent is now split into what the British weekly The Economist describes as “the new political divide” between “wall-builders and globalists.”⁵ Unfortunately, the wall-builders have the upper hand at present, and the globalists are increasingly keeping mum. I will refer here to tribalization and tribalist tendencies as a kind of Balkanization, by which I mean the breaking up of the continent into several distinct (ethnic) enclaves – either literally or as a metaphorical solution to Europe’s problems as currently perceived. Leaving historical circumstances aside, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Dayton Accords were in many ways a defeat of a European ideal: that ethnicity should never take center stage and define who we are. Although sometimes assuming more civilized forms and simulating something quite different, such as with the separatists in Catalonia or among the many extreme Brexiteers, the rhetoric that was so central to the escalation of the conflicts in the Balkans has now come back to haunt us.

The tribal way of being in the world is spreading and regaining popularity in old Europe as well as new. Not only among more or less ignorant voters who get carried away by populist leaders who cynically exploit primitive language (and social media) to create a feeling of exclusive unity. More frighteningly, perhaps, the rhetoric is spreading among established politicians and opinion makers. Tribalism has become the new political megatrend and also the go-to argument for demonizing the so-called liberal elites who still believe in the merits of a liberal international order, the dissolution of borders, and joint solutions to common challenges.

The ideal and cultivation of a common past are absolutely central to the current tribal discourse. To the extreme Brexiteers as well as the Catalan separatists and ethnic-nationalists like Hungarian leader Vikor Orbán, the reference to prior historical greatness is crucial. Research has shown that referencing an often threatened or lost common past both polarizes societies and constitutes the recipe for modern tribalism. The narrative of an identity under threat is thus the very foundation of most autocratic regimes centered on a “strong leader” with a cynical personal interest in stoking hatred and antagonism to maintain his power base. As the American scholars Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have addressed in their book How Democracies Die, the modern death of democracies rarely materializes at a coup or a tyrannical seizure of power. Rather, the strategy often involves a polling station to at least make the exercise look like “real” democracy.

What are the flashpoints for tribalism today? Tribalism, or neo-nationalism, is apparent from one end of Europe to the other. In Catalonia, for instance, where secessionists claim to urgently need a separate Catalan state, despite having one of the highest degrees of regional autonomy in Europe. Or in Britain, where tribalism for more than three years has resonated in Brexiteers’ call to defy Europe in the name of a long-expired glorious past. Similar developments are evident in Central and Eastern Europe – and more recently Italy, where Matteo Salvini’s Lega party employs identity politics, inventing new enemies, while at the same time blaming Europe for everything that is deplorable. Today, however, tribalization is reappearing everywhere and identity politics is used offensively to create a sense of community that “others” can never become a part of.

Precisely because these identity-political projects need attention to flourish, well-orchestrated drama and divisiveness are frequently staged as media stunts, with a conflict-obsessed press happy to serve as backup chorus. On many occasions, hype and tribal aggression are a mere cover-up, a distraction from underlying corruption and power grabbing among populistic leaders. This is plain to see among the political elite and establishment in Hungary and the Cezch Republic, for instance, where aunts, uncles, sons-in-law, and old friends of Viktor Orbán and Andrej Babiš have become wealthy by greedy scams with EU funds.⁶ Meanwhile Orbán, to divert the attention of the blatant kleptocracy, stages noise in the public sphere about non-existing migrants who will soon invade the country and transform Hungary into a multiethnic doomsday scenario. By simultaneously undermining the free press and preventing the public prosecutor from investigating these transactions, Orbán avoids any accountability for his actions. Corruption has also been thriving among the separatists in Catalonia, but has been blotted out with as much solid media coverage of pro-independence and anti-Spanish troubles in the streets as possible.⁷

Apparently, the strategy is to keep the focus of the population elsewhere and silence critical media, so that the more or less corrupted elites can make their dubious transactions in peace. However, tribalization is not reserved for autocrats who need to blur their activities. Tribalist rhetoric is rearing its head in the old, well-established democracies as well. In a desperate attempt to regain support from lost voters, the political mainstream relies on tribalistic gesture politics exemplified in everything from intensified border control to laws prohibiting burkas and taking away refugees’ jewelry, as has been legislated on in Denmark.⁸ It also relies upon the belief that identity politics is the only strategy left “in town” when trying to hijack voters at national elections in a global, European time. For example, a recent study found that in many Western democracies, rival political blocs agree and vote together on the large majority of issues in parliament, making identity politics and harsh rhetoric against foreigners (and the EU) the only thing left to catch voters’ attention. Of course, this does not mean that identity issues cannot be significant; for example, problems of the integration of immigrants (which is often the locus) can be very real. Of course such problems have to be addressed. The point here is merely that in many contexts, identity (posturing as real problems) has become the central focal point of modern politics – even in those parts of Europe that on the surface appear more peaceful.

The question is now: how will all this affect the future of Europe? What consequences will tribalization have for the Union’s survival? I will try to answer these questions by looking at three cases that, in my view, are emblematic of the tribal tendencies overtaking Europe in these years. Each is different and has its different features, but all are symptomatic of the present epoch of disintegration. The Catalan independence campaign, the anti-European Brexit crusade, and the animosity-ridden democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe epitomize Europe in the year 2020. In the pages that follow, I will try to unravel the dynamics behind the smokescreen, and even more, our strange unwillingness to forcefully counteract it.

My overall argument is that after Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism in numerous European countries, we face a fundamental lack of confidence in the values and institutions we have built since the Second World War. Rather than insisting on our common principles and ideals, many erstwhile defenders of the liberal world order have become apologetic and therefore complicit cheerleaders for tribalism. To understand the severity of the transformations we are witnessing, we need to reconsider how the shift toward identity politics has also influenced our way of understanding democracy. In the book’s second half, I argue that both populism and tribalism have helped undermine our former awareness that democracy is more than just elections, referenda, and parliamentary majorities. In the age of populism, where the “the people” have taken center stage, democracy seems to have atrophied to just that: majorities (also in referenda) without the rule of law, absent an open and critical exchange of views. One today rarely gets sympathy for insisting that independent counter-majoritarian institutions like courts (sometimes even supranational!) should be strengthened to uphold basic principles. Attacking counter-majoritarian bodies as well as law beyond the state has become part of the tribal spirit.

Democracy in the age of populism has thus become unconstrained majority rule, with political debate reduced to fake news and cultural fundamentalism. Equating democracy with an extreme version of majoritarianism, in which the rule of law and judicial institutions (inside as well as outside the state border) are readily questioned and even sometimes dismantled, is an extremely dangerous path to go down. And when this is wedded to crude campaigning centered on identity politics, with greater stress placed on getting the message across than on it being true, then the original meaning of liberal democracy is long lost.

In contemporary Europe, leaders also seem hesitant to insist that the European Union must embrace fundamental democratic values and ideals and make these the focal point of the community. Or rather: they insist on it in their speeches, treaties, and laws, but when push comes to shove, when it truly counts and action is needed, the courage vanishes. And yet our values need defending, now more than ever. In a world where we as Europeans are surrounded by non-democracies and regimes that fundamentally question and suppress the ideals of the Enlightenment, there can and should be no cherry-picking – no compromise when it comes to standing up for our values and ideals. We must insist on all those aspects of democracy that secure our right to speak up against the government, to hold free and fair elections, to host free universities and a free press. If we do not insist on this and if European leaders cease backing this up, in my opinion, the EU has signed its own death warrant. What is Europe meant to defend, at home and abroad, if not these values? If we fail to go on the offensive and actively oppose the tribalist forces we currently face, democracy in its true conception may soon become a thing of the past.