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“Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way to survival or extinction.”

— Sun Tzu

“War is the continuation of policy by other means. It is not only a political act, but also a true political instrument.”

— Carl von Clausewitz

The martial arts have a long tradition emphasizing the wisdom of Asian philosophers, such as Sun Tzu¹ and Miyamoto Musashi, who owe much of their longevity to their use of universal principles for fighting. Sun Tzu, in the Art of War which might be the most widely studied of the Asian military treatises, did not speak of a mutually agreed upon code of conduct in battle but assessed the terrain, weather, and leadership to determine if the conditions favored military success. Although his battle philosophy emphasized quick victory, tactics of trickery and deception were elevated and described as virtues of great generals. Relatively little is known about Sun Tzu, but it is believed that he was a military strategist during China’s turbulent Eastern Zhou Dynasty (c. 770-256 BCE). However, it is also possible that he was merely a writer who demonstrated an exceptionally pragmatic approach to warfare. According to some scholars, Sun Tzu’s habit of prefacing many of his sayings with the phrase, “In ancient times,” is an indication of the timeless nature of his ideas.²

The Japanese swordsman Miyamoto Musashi (c. 1584-c. 1645 CE), in Book of Five Rings, likewise viewed warfare as a pragmatic undertaking which purpose it was to defeat the enemy by killing him. A warrior taking up the sword to strike a fatal blow was expected to display an attitude of earnest intent.³ Miyamoto Musashi followed a set of “natural” (scientific) principles and attributed his victories to proper understanding of these principles; one of which was the ability to stop an attack at the outset in order to stifle an opponent’s speed and power (in sword fighting, for example, by blocking and redirecting the opponent’s sword before the blow has fallen through the apex; in empty hand fighting, by jamming an opponent’s kick at the chamber before his leg is fully extended).

The most prominent military thinker in the West was Carl von Clausewitz, an early nineteenth century Prussian soldier and strategist. Clausewitz presented his ideas as timeless and consistent theory of conflict. Like the Asian philosophers, he sought to uncover a universal nature of combat while illustrating his principles through the use of specific examples.⁴ At the heart of his theory is the theme that combat is talked about in one way and exercised in another. He was foremost a practical soldier over a theoretician and had spent most of his life participating in warfare in one way or another. His varied career and experiences—he served in several positions including soldiering, staff officer, and educator of military personnel—and the fact that the national state in Prussia was militarized quickly and performed reasonably well in war, most certainly influenced his ideas. He was also affected by the Napoleonic Wars (c. 1803-1815 CE), where the constant aim seemed to be to occupy and subjugate the enemy country and destroy its armies. However, Clausewitz’s ideas were not new. Three centuries earlier, Florentine statesman Niccolo Machiavelli had stressed that the aim of war was to achieve military superiority over other states, thereby avoiding becoming their victims. As a matter of survival, a state that waged war successfully could count on continued existence.

The purpose of this book is to compare and contrast Sun Tzu’s and Carl von Clausewitz’s theories of conflict and relate their findings to the development of the martial arts in the East and West. However, before embarking on a journey to discover how Asia’s and Europe’s historical views on tactics and strategy have affected the development of the combat arts, it is prudent to offer an overview (albeit a brief one) of the military histories of the respective regions and the origins of the ancient texts. China has a long dynastic history of rise and fall. China emphasized civilian supremacy over the military, and the highly bureaucratic state allowed the country to mobilize large resources for war. In early China (seventh century BCE), smaller states entered into defensive alliances against aggressive territorial states. In the Warring States period (453-221 BCE), these alliances collapsed as stronger states swallowed smaller states and grew even stronger. These larger states were able to raise armies numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Power was established and maintained through military means. Wars built states and dynasties, and warfare therefore proved necessary for the development of society. Military service provided an opportunity for upward social mobility, and professional armies replaced conscript armies according to military and social need.

The history of Asian military writings spans roughly 2,500 years. Not until the early twentieth century did Western texts come to dominate military thought. The classic texts of ancient China (the Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, including Sun Tzu’s Art of War) are fundamental doctrines of tactics and strategy and demonstrate a preference for aggressive measures in war, often for the purpose of restoring the accepted social and political order.⁵ Consider the harsh standards of discipline in the army as outlined in Wei Liao-Tzu: “If a drummer misses a beat he is executed.”⁶ Or according to The Methods of the Ssu-Ma: “What is the army’s law regarding those who arrive after the appointed time?” The reply: “They should be decapitated!”⁷ The underlying reason for this brutality was said to be the preservation of love and harmony among men. From an ethical viewpoint, if bringing peace to the people meant killing the enemy (or even one’s own who failed to uphold the standards of military service), then killing was permissible.⁸ In contrast to the Asian texts, Clausewitz held the view that “[g]rim severity and iron discipline may be able to preserve the military virtues of a unit, but it cannot create them.”⁹

Chinese military theory was further stimulated by battlefield requirements and political and individual philosophies. Although historical accounts can be used as pillars of strength for building military theories, soldiers from different parts of the world have relied on a wide array of combat systems, and have exercised tactics and strategy in whichever way they have deemed the most appropriate for the particular geopolitical situation. China fought wars in order to overcome its enemies, but did not consider military force the only means by which the state could accomplish its goals. Many of the historical Chinese sources also stress the importance of ruling with moral authority. If the ruler did not maintain the social order, he would forfeit “Heaven’s Mandate” and be considered unfit for holding authority through moral sanction.¹⁰

In contrast to the Western texts, which underscore the importance of aggressive action and scientific analysis, Asian philosophies further stress that studying, listening, and thinking are the keys to success. The long battlefield tradition of ancient China displays a strong relationship between the wu (military) and wen (civilian) spheres. Confucian philosophy promoted peace, yet military values shaped society’s inclination for war. While the literati strove to elevate wen, warrior epics and tales often celebrated wu and spoke of the importance of combat and individual heroism. Analogies were frequently used to illustrate a point, as described in T’ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings, “If you grasp a knife but do not cut anything, you will lose the moment for profits. If you hold an ax but do not attack, then bandits will come.”¹¹

Sun Tzu’s Art of War has proven particularly popular in the West because it appears to uncover the wisdom of the Asian philosophers, with focus on flexibility and deception rather than pitched battle and force. For example, contrast practitioners of the Chinese internal martial art of hsing-i chuan, who yield to the opponent’s power and through a burst of energy use it against him, with Western wrestlers pitting strength against strength. Anecdotal stories and the paradoxical use of complementing opposites (yin and yang) further differentiate the Asian texts and martial arts from their Western counterparts.¹² They are attractive because they provide specific steps for every conceivable battlefield situation (for example, “On encircled terrain, I obstruct any openings”). Sun Tzu offered suggestions for fighting on narrow roads, in wild expanses, in forests, and in the darkness of night. The Chinese classics seem particularly fond of lists, as in the “ten fatal terrains,” the “nine prohibitions,” or the “five factors” from which victory can be drawn. Note that The Methods of the Ssu-Ma takes a slightly different tack by beginning many of its statements with “In general,” thus leaving room for the variances of combat.

Although the Asian texts seem to offer a “cookbook” type approach to warfare through brief and precise statements, they are not meant to be read as “100 easy ways to win on the battlefield.” Individual judgment is crucial to the successful application of the advice.¹³ The fact that many of the historical sources have survived only in part, have not been translated, and contain popular story-telling and sectarian beliefs have complicated the Westerner’s understanding of Asian warfare.¹⁴ Furthermore, combat is neither simple nor simplistic; it is both scientific and artistic and requires the ability to grasp the essence of each unique situation.

Japan, including Okinawa where karate was used as a nonprofessional combat art, and Korea, faced different military and social environments than China. In Japan’s forested and mountainous terrain large infantry armies proved inefficient. The common regional threats relating to robbers and bandits were resolved easier through specialized military elite forces. The samurai class developed from the need for court nobles to maintain order and ensure a continuous flow of resources from the countryside to the capital.¹⁵ The samurai gained power in the provinces by assisting the state militarily and subduing rebellious uprisings. When the samurai were firmly established in the countryside, they developed their own networks which grew in size until the shogunate, a form of military government, was formed. It is debatable, however, whether or not service to the state was the primary goal of the samurai, as the strife to justify their continued existence even in times of peace is an indication of self-serving interests.

Korea was heavily influenced by the fighting arts of ancient China. However, it is worth noting that the tribal martial arts of Korea date to 2000-900 BCE.¹⁶ From the sixth century CE, the state was provided with elite fighters through the Hwarang organization, which prepared young men for war by instructing them in military strategy and philosophy. These elite warriors lacked the political influence enjoyed by the Japanese samurai class.¹⁷ There was also a growing need for the commoners to learn the combat arts. As late as the aftermath of the Korean War (1950-1953 CE), skill in taekwondo was viewed as a necessity for survival.¹⁸

The West likewise has a long battlefield tradition that can be traced to Classical Greece and Rome. The Greek historian Polybius expressed in the second century BCE that soldiers regarded “their one supreme duty not to flee or leave the ranks,” and were “expected never to surrender or be captured.”¹⁹ Technology, innovation, discipline, massed attack, free flow of information, and the right to question authority are elements that have been credited with the military successes of the West for nearly three millennia. Since the Greeks formed governments early in their history, they were also some of the first to organize an effective army. The states of ancient Greece and Rome were hostile toward one another, so naturally many battles were fought. All male citizens were expected to participate in warfare. But they also had a stake in the outcome; they did not fight only for their king or ruler but for personal freedom and the security of their family, farm, and civilian lifestyle. These ideals allowed them to develop effective armies that fought brutal and short wars using shock tactics, often resulting in severe casualties on both sides. Writers of the Classical World include such personalities as the Greek historian Thucydides, who authored The History of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century BCE, and Roman military and political leader Julius Caesar, who wrote the history of Rome’s wars with Gaul in the first century BCE.

From the fall of the Western Roman Empire until the Middle Ages, social and economic reform resulted in new developments in military tactics and weaponry. A feudal system emerged where the king granted land to distinguished soldiers; it was essentially a mix between a military and social organization. The cavalry knightly class developed from this system because only rich noblemen could afford the expense associated with ownership of horses, armor, and weapons.²⁰ By the time of Carl von Clausewitz, Europe had been through the Protestant Reformation, French Revolution, and Napoleonic Wars.

Based on his experiences of warfare, Clausewitz sought to write a book that identified “the permanent elements of war.”²¹ He emphasized that various “frictions” such as uncertainty, ignorance, confusion, and fatigue often interfere with one’s combat plan and prevents one from exercising full control over the enemy. He believed that a useful theory must include all elements that pertain to battle; not just those that are measurable such as distances, but also the intangibles of morale and common sense. He stated that “[a] critic should never use the results of theory as laws or standards but only—as the soldier does—as aids to judgment.”²² Having participated in combat and suffered the humiliating experience of defeat, he was more concerned with examining the strategic elements of warfare than prescribing scientific measures for its conduct.²³ He viewed combat in relation to its surroundings and recognized that a theory is not a simple thread that links two deductions. Rather than presenting answers through an immediate and utilitarian tool such as a handbook for fighting, he asked questions in the hope of gaining insight into the complexity of conflict. His greatest contribution to military theses may lie in the organization and compilation of commonly known facts rather than in new discoveries.

Clausewitz’s interpretation of combat can be attributed in part to his long and varied military career which spanned four decades. Although he was a minor player in the great conflicts of his time, he became a military man at age twelve and saw combat not long thereafter. He dedicated his life to the study of warfare. “In whichever way I might like to relate my life to the rest of the world, my way takes me always across a great battlefield; unless I enter upon it, no permanent happiness can be mine,” he wrote in a letter to his fiancée, Countess Marie von Brühl.²⁴ He served both on the Prussian and Russian front; he endured “heat and dust” and “the lack of food and water,” as well as time in captivity.²⁵ He graduated at the top of his class of forty students from the Berlin War College, or Kriegsschule, and was eventually promoted to Major-General. The fact that he did not command troops in battle distanced him from the leadership and allowed him to be critical of the command.

Clausewitz’s On War has been printed in several editions and languages and has been widely studied at the military academies. This, alone, speaks of its posterity. It was left as a work in progress at the author’s death in 1831, to be interpreted and built upon for generations to come. For example, in 1916 and 1917, the British during their attacks on the Western Front relied on using maximum force at the main point to bring the enemy to its knees. By the end of World War I, Clausewitz’s principles could be found in the U.S. Army Field Service Regulations. During the Korean War, continued studies of Clausewitz led to grappling with problems of conducting warfare for a limited aim rather than the total overthrow of the enemy. Combat became synonymous with the struggle for peace. The Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, first published in 1989, relies extensively on Clausewitzian philosophy. Clausewitz has thus written the most enduring military treatise in existence in the Western world and has shed light on the trinity of conflict: the politics of battle; its physical dimensions (or violence); and the passions of the people (or chance, which makes allowances for the creative spirit).

Although the martial arts as practiced today find many uses including personal protection, sports competition, and self-cultivation, war was historically a political instrument used to compel an enemy to do the will of the victor. How one viewed conflict and developed systems of fighting was part of the political climate. The long military traditions of Asia and Europe contributed to the development of individual combat arts, which evolved from battlefield tactics and strategies used in warfare within and between the countries in the respective regions, and have further been influenced by local cultural beliefs. Their diversity has remained a fascinating subject as evidenced by the great numbers of instructional books, philosophical studies, and accounts of personal experiences that have been written about the traditional Chinese, Japanese, and Korean martial arts, in addition to Western grappling, boxing, fencing, and mixed martial arts. Each martial style displays unique characteristics. The words kung-fu, karate, taekwondo, jujutsu, savate, kickboxing, and pankration, for example, evoke images of Asian and Western customs and lore.²⁶

Despite the influences of different cultural beliefs, Asia and the West experienced similar problems with respect to the security of the state and external and internal unrest. Both viewed combat as “a true political instrument” and the highest expression of a person’s will to live, “the basis of life and death, the Way to survival or extinction.”²⁷ The differences between Sun Tzu and Clausewitz may at first seem profound. Yet on a conceptual level, their discourse displays far more similarities than differences which further demonstrates that factors such as time period (Sun Tzu and Clause-witz were separated in time by more than two millennia), geographical location (Asia versus Europe), and cultural issues (debated by military historian Victor Davis Hanson in his book, Carnage and Culture) are less significant in combat than are an understanding and embrace of a universal human nature. Whether Asian or Western in origin, the different styles of martial arts employ techniques similar in concept and execution. Once individual fighters have corrected for the geographical area (or the modern sports arena) and the “political” situation (or the mores under which one studies the art), they will face similar difficulties with respect to power, deception, confusion, physical conditioning, and morale.

The author acknowledges that the military histories of Asia and Europe are long and complex and that this book merely scratches the surface. However, by engaging in critical study of the respective regions, one can eliminate inappropriate methods of analysis and reach a greater appreciation for the complexity of events that have led us to this day. Rather than emphasizing spiritual paths, “ways of living,” or self-cultivation, this book differs from other philosophical or historical martial arts studies by presenting the military theories behind the development of tactics and strategy in the combat arts. Theory gives structure to fact, relates the past to the present through logical links, and strengthens and refines judgment. Many of the distinct fighting styles that exist have been practiced since antiquity. Others are hybrids or modern inventions. It is not possible to cover all fighting styles or even a majority in a book this size; however, the author hopes that the martial arts surveyed will at least provide a fair sampling of what is available for study to the interested scholar.

Chinese bamboo book of Sun Tzu’s Art of War, commissioned or transcribed by the Qianlong Emperor (1711-1799 CE). (Image source: Vlasta2, Wikimedia Commons)

Although Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s powerful assertions will likely challenge common approaches to success and hopefully spark debate, the aim of this book is to establish a solid foundation for further study, decentralize the martial arts, and bridge the gap between the traditional Asian arts and their Western counterparts.