Читать книгу Politicians and the War 1914-1916 - Max Aitken - Страница 4

Table of Contents

I have had it in mind for some time to write a history of British politics during the Great War, and the period of reconstruction. With this object in view I have collected a large quantity of material bearing on home politics from 1914 to 1925, including notes I made at one period or another myself.

On reflection, I am of opinion that some part of this material may be utilised in the form of an outline sketch of the principal events and the outstanding characters of the period. Such a selection cannot, of course, pretend to be final in the view it takes either of events or individuals, but none the less its publication may be of value in fixing public attention while interest is still vivid.

Obviously, such a book is not history in the strict sense. It is merely a contribution to history. Neither is it a day-to-day record of politics. It deals in the high lights which shine on big events of the epoch and on the vital decisions of the personalities who took part in them.

These characters are in most cases interpreted in the light of personal knowledge. I have ventured to deduce some of their motives from the views I have formed privately, and to indicate the nature of my opinion by the anecdotes I relate of them.

I publish this account in the hope that it will interest, and in the certainty that it will do no harm. In fact, in so far as it interests it may prove of some public advantage. Democracy depends to-day for its successful practice on the judgment and knowledge of every citizen on the problems of government. If that judgment is to be in any way sound, it is of importance that people should have accessible some guide to the conduct of the war by their elected rulers, some picture of the personalities which played a part in it, and still play a part before us. Such an outline of history must either be given promptly or not at all. Nothing is so quick to fade as the immediate memory of public events. Men know less of what happened twenty years ago than of what happened in 1880. A kind of twilight period of boredom and forgetfulness soon supervenes, and by the time the stage of authentic and final history is reached only a few will read the page. But to-day the events of the war are not so long past, and most of us still have a lively memory of those exciting days.

The week immediately preceding the outbreak of war saw the two historic parties locked in a fierce grapple over the Irish question. Attempt after attempt at compromise had broken down just as the protagonists seemed on the very edge of agreement. I mention this at the outset because the impression caused by the struggle over Home Rule was slow to fade from the minds of many of the politicians on both sides, and, during the early months of the war, exercised an important influence on the relations between the two parties from 1914 to 1916, which is the principal topic of this volume. This “Irish” atmosphere is therefore important, and I shall come back to the subject in the next chapter. But with the first vital threat of war with Germany it ceased to be the dominant factor in the complex of Liberal-Conservative relationship and faded into a side issue.

The problem which leapt into the forefront the moment that war was seen to be inevitable was that of Coalition. Was the War Government to be the Liberal Government then in Downing Street, or were the Conservatives and the Liberals to combine to form a National Coalition War Ministry? Leading men on both sides gave opposing answers to this question, and indeed sometimes changed their minds as circumstances altered. But it is the dominating issue of the period with which I am dealing in this book. The reader who wants a sure guide through the labyrinth of the shifting policies and the conflicting personalities who figure in these pages will do well to take the idea of “Coalition” as a clue to much which would otherwise be mysterious or even incomprehensible.

There were three separate attempts to form such a Coalition. The first was made by Mr. Churchill in those days of July and August 1914, immediately preceding the ultimatum, when the unity of the Liberal Cabinet seemed imperiled. The attempt failed. The second attempt was made by Mr. Churchill in March 1915, when he persuaded Mr. Asquith to invite Mr. Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne to the meeting of the War Council which offered to give Constantinople to Russia in the event of victory. This failed too.

The third effort at Coalition was the result of Lord Fisher’s resignation from the Admiralty. It was initiated by Bonar Law, welcomed by Lloyd George and carried through successfully against the wishes and interests of Mr. Churchill. I trace the career of the Coalition so formed up to the point when the outbreak of conflicting forces, no longer based on party divisions within it, prove its decay as a governing instrument and point to its early dissolution.

The personalities engaged in these struggles for or against Coalition assume sometimes attitudes tinged with the drama of irony. Mr. Churchill induced Lord Birkenhead to act as mediator with the Tory leader in the first effort to effect Coalition—and the plain proposition was rejected. In the second attempt he induced Mr. Asquith to approach Bonar Law with a concealed offer, which was ignored. The third time he is found fighting Coalition and trusting in Lord Balfour to save him from the Tories. And when Coalition comes, he goes.

Bonar Law, on the other hand, rejects Coalition twice and on the third occasion he is the architect of the First Coalition Government.

I am not suggesting, of course, that in either case was there the slightest inconsistency. Mr. Churchill was perfectly entitled to hold his view that the introduction of a Tory element into the Cabinet at the outset would strengthen the war spirit in the Government. He was equally justified later on in defending his own control and administration of the Admiralty against Lord Fisher—and this, as it turned out, involved, too, fighting against the Tories and their inclusion in the Ministry.

Bonar Law’s position was completely self-consistent in this matter. He had no abstract objection to Coalition. On the contrary, he thought it was the form of Government to which a long and severe war must inevitably bring the nation. But he considered this to be the last step to take and not the first. So long as a Liberal Government had credit for success and good management, and a patriotic Opposition was content not to oppose, all was well. While such a national asset remained unexhausted why draw on another?

But if the Liberal Government failed, if the party truce showed signs of being broken, why then unity could be maintained and national confidence restored by forming a mixed Ministry. To make a Coalition at the start was like leading the ace of trumps.

When one considers how in the course of the four years of war the capacity and credit of Ministry after Ministry was exhausted, it is clear that Bonar Law showed a penetration into the future which exceeded that of most of his contemporaries in the fateful summer of 1914, and a commanding wisdom beyond that of his age. So long as the Liberal Ministry could be defended he sustained it from the Opposition benches, but when its hour struck he made a Coalition in a day.

The first crisis in party Government synchronises with the last night of July 1914, when the Conservative leaders were at Lord Wargrave’s house, at Wargrave. There, by pre-engagement, I arrived very late to find Bonar Law, Carson and Birkenhead. The composition of the party suggested that it had been summoned to discuss Ulster and Home Rule. But the conference instantly found itself involved in a discussion of the attitude the Opposition should adopt towards the war and the Government. While this was proceeding news reached us of acute dissensions in the Cabinet on the subject of British intervention.

Churchill, in a word, was in communication with Birkenhead, and the first attempt to form a Coalition Government had begun. By this means the views of the Liberal interventionists in the Cabinet—for Churchill believed he had Grey’s support in his action and the unspoken assent of the Prime Minister—were put before the leader of the Opposition. The information given Birkenhead was briefly this: Liberal Ministers, like the Radical section of the country as a whole, were seething with doubt and agitation. While most of the leading Liberals were determined to stand by France, the majority of the Liberal newspapers were dead against war, and this view was finding such strong expression in the Cabinet itself that in the event of intervention some seven or eight resignations might be expected.^[1]

In considering the list of the threatened seceders the formidable name of David Lloyd George immediately flashed through the minds of men. If these resignations took effect, would the Opposition be prepared to come to the rescue of the Government, not merely with parliamentary support, but by forming a Coalition to fill up the vacant offices? Such was the message that Birkenhead conveyed to Bonar Law, and he added that he was informed that the knowledge of a favourable Tory decision in this matter “would affect the Prime Minister’s mind.” And indeed it is obvious that any Prime Minister faced with the prospect of a secession would be immensely strengthened in his own attitude by such a promise of Opposition support. He would be in a position if he chose to call in Tory support, and even Tory Ministers, to make good his own defections.

Bonar Law would give no encouragement to Birkenhead. He objected to Mr. Churchill as the medium, and commented on the fact that overtures were made through him. This method of indirect communication so common in political circles never suited Bonar Law, and he would take no action.

The whole method of negotiation by Churchill through Birkenhead savoured too much of an intrigue to suit Bonar Law, who liked the plain, straightforward course. His view was that if any help or support was wanted from the Opposition it ought to be asked for openly and directly by Mr. Asquith himself, and in that case he would go to London. Matters, therefore, advanced no further than the acceptance of the general idea that the Tories should support the Government if it declared for war, and Churchill’s effort, though well intentioned, failed.

The truth of the matter was that there were two schools of thought both in the Liberal and Conservative camp. The strong interventionists in the Government would undoubtedly have welcomed an accession of strength in the power of embarking on or waging war from the Conservatives in exchange for a number of Liberal Ministers who were in principle pacifist and not likely to shine in a metier they disliked.

F. A. Swaine, New Bond St., London

These glittering Birds of Paradise.

On the other side, many of the Conservatives would have welcomed a direct inclusion of their party in the Ministry. Birkenhead, who was the only strong advocate of Coalition at Wargrave, could have obtained plenty of support for his opinion had he gone forward with it. There were many members of his party who were deeply disappointed at not being able to serve in a War Government. They had to content themselves as it was with very minor positions of service, while they considered that their talents gave them the right to higher places which they could fill to better advantage to the country than the Liberal occupant.

But the movement was checked at the very outset by the clear and unalterable view expressed by Bonar Law that he was opposed to Coalition. As long as the leader was of this opinion, colleagues or followers could really effect nothing in the contrary direction.

On the Saturday morning everybody wished to return to town at once. Bonar Law, however, suggested that it would be better to wait for further news, and that he should go to London later in the day, so that we could all go together. Eventually the whole party motored to town in the afternoon.

Churchill, on our arrival in London, was anxious that Bonar Law should dine with him and Grey that night, presumably with the intention of renewing his efforts to secure an offer of coalition. Bonar Law, however, was too prudent to accept, for the reasons already given. As a matter of fact, no question of a formal offer ever arose, because the situation in the Cabinet did not develop in the direction anticipated by Mr. Churchill, for reasons which will be understood if we consider the balance of forces and the trend of opinion within the Government circle.

The crisis in the Liberal Party was for several days acute. Three main groups of opinion immediately disclosed themselves. There were those who were against intervention at any price, those who were in favour of intervention, and those who were ready to engage in or abstain from war, according to conditions. On the Friday, 31 July, the day that the Tories gathered at Lord Wargrave’s house at Wargrave, the Liberals were still divided. Lord Morley, Mr. John Burns, Sir John Simon, Lord Beauchamp, and Mr. Hobhouse were for an immediate declaration of neutrality without imposing any conditions on Germany.

Allied with this group were Lloyd George and the late Lord Harcourt, who were for peace, but were prepared to leave the door open behind us in case it became necessary to intervene. Beyond these, and shading off to the left of peace and the right of war, was a body of opinion represented by Lord Crewe, Mr. McKenna, and Sir Herbert Samuel, who were not definitely committed to either side. Viscount Grey was solid for intervention, and Churchill, going even beyond him, was pressing for instant mobilisation. The Prime Minister, while in his personal opinion leaning strongly towards Grey and Churchill, was chiefly anxious to maintain unity at all costs. In the ultimate resort he would have stood by Grey, but he hoped to avoid resignations and all ultimate expedients. So strong was the division of opinion in the Liberal Party that it seemed quite impossible to reconcile it on 31 July without resignations from the Government. But a rupture was avoided, and on Saturday it was decided to instruct Viscount Grey to inform M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, that our Navy would not allow the German Fleet to attack the French Channel ports. Mr. Burns would not even agree to this, and resigned as a protest against any course but unconditional non-intervention, but his resignation was by consent held back, and only announced after further sittings.

On Sunday morning, 2 August, the Cabinet met again to face letters of resignation from Lord Morley and Sir John Simon, but, none the less, the resigning Ministers attended the conclave. This Sunday morning meeting was in reality the decisive one. Lord Crewe, who throughout this crisis, and indeed in the war as a whole, showed remarkable moderation, judgment and patriotism, was at this period specially urgent with his colleagues that what was undoubtedly Liberal majority opinion should not separate itself from the policy of Grey and Churchill, behind which stood the threat not only of the resignation of these Ministers, but of the withdrawal of the Prime Minister, the disruption of the party, and the fall of the Government in the very moment of the most acute crisis which had threatened the British Empire for a hundred years; events themselves would settle the issue.

He was successful. It was finally agreed to postpone the actual decision of peace and war, but to mobilise both the Army and the Fleet at once. This action undoubtedly decided the question, but when the final decision for war was taken only Lord Morley and Mr. Burns resigned,^[2] Lord Beauchamp, Sir John Simon and Mr. Hobhouse, no doubt for good reasons, preferring to continue their support of the Government. It will be observed at once from this narrative how small in numbers was the interventionist party in the Cabinet; and it had, in addition, ranged against it several minor members of the Ministry who were in the Government but not in the Cabinet, and the great bulk of the Liberal Press.

Even inside the Cabinet itself a majority for non-intervention could certainly have been obtained if a strong man had stepped forward to lead the pacifists. It was a case of quality against quantity of opinion, and the Prime Minister himself, though temperament and judgment ranked him with Grey and Churchill, was handicapped by his position of chairman to the debates and weakened by a desire to maintain Liberal unity at all costs.

In these circumstances practically everything depended on the attitude of Mr. Lloyd George. The pacifists were strong in numbers, but without a leader they were helpless, as indeed the event proved. Would Mr. Lloyd George consent to fill the role of leader?

Letters and diaries will be published in the future which will give a full account of Mr. Lloyd George’s actions, of the various motives which swayed him, and of the conflicting emotions which surged in his mind. I will only say this much in anticipation of further evidence.

Those who insist on regarding Mr. Lloyd George as the inveterate Jingo of the war from start to finish are wrong in their facts and mistake their man. The then Chancellor of the Exchequer approached the prospect of intervention with the greatest reluctance, and suffered far-reaching incertitudes of mind.

He consulted with those of his colleagues who had pacifist leanings—or at least they consulted with him. He brought forward a theory, held by the existing French General Staff, that if the Germans violated Belgian neutrality they would pass only through the furthest southern corner, leaving Brussels and the plains of Flanders north of and untouched by their armies.

In the course of these conversations Mr. Lloyd George demonstrated to his friends with a map how small an infraction of neutrality such a military move would imply. He marked on the map with his finger the direction he thought the German march through Belgium would take. “You see,” he would say, “it is only a little bit, and the Germans will pay for any damage they do.”

At the eleventh hour he came down on the right side. When the Germans invaded Belgium he was influenced in favour of the decision. With this decision there vanished the last hopes of the pacifists and any prospect of that kind of anti-patriotic opposition which supported France and Napoleon against the Ministries of Pitt and his successors. Mr. Lloyd George alone had the genius to play Charles James Fox, and he declined the role.

It appears to me that both Mr. Lloyd George’s hesitation and his final decision do him equal credit. He was reluctant to abandon the schemes of social amelioration he had devised and to plunge into war. He did not wish to put the future happiness and prosperity of all the people of the Empire on the hazard of a throw. But when he realised that his country was up against a Power which knew no moral scruples and was dangerous both to the Empire and humanity he took his decision firmly.

Once Mr. Lloyd George was in the war the very power of imagination which had given him pause gradually wrought him up to the fiercest activity in the struggle.

[1]	“The Cabinet was overwhelmingly pacific.” “The World Crisis, 1911-1914,” by Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill. Page 199.

[2]

Viscount Grey, writing in praise of Mr. Asquith’s handling of the Cabinet at this juncture, says: “Had it not been for Asquith the outbreak of war might have found us with a Cabinet in disorder or dissolution, impotent to take any decision.”—cf. “Twenty-Five Years,” by Viscount Grey of Fallodon. (Vol. II, page 242).