Читать книгу The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George - Max Aitken - Страница 4

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1921 was a year of sunshine and warmth, while drought prevailed. The nation benefited by the fine weather, though suffering a miserable, severe and disastrous industrial and financial depression with widespread unemployment on a scale unprecedented. Civil war devastated Ireland, with nearly all of the population of the South arrayed against British rule there.

Civil war also reigned in the Cabinet at Westminster, where Ministers quarrelled over personal problems, domestic issues and foreign policies. Many of them discussed their differences and disputes in the Lobbies and Smoking Room of the House.

Fleet Street was as critical of the Coalition Leader as some of his own colleagues. Newspapers had much to say in condemnation and very little in praise of the Prime Minister. An attempt to unseat Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, was launched by several contenders, brought together only by hostility to their leader. Lloyd George, like a beast of the jungle, was hunted here and there by many marksmen who trained their weapons upon him. He described the hunt as a “Plot”, and, in an hour of optimism, made a premature declaration that he had scattered his enemies. He was wrong.

For the purposes of clarity, I am obliged at the outset to describe the composition of the Coalition Government and the attitude of the Parties in the opening years of the decade following the war. My readers will, I hope, put up with this recital of Parliamentary dispositions and public issues.

At the General Election of December 1918, when Lloyd George went to the country as Prime Minister with Bonar Law, Leader of the Tory Party^[1], as his coadjutor, the Coalition had won an overwhelming victory. As a result, the Tories under Bonar Law had a majority in the House over all Parties serving in Parliament. But most of the Tory Members believed themselves to have gathered at the election a measure of votes which, in fact, they owed to Lloyd George. Some even considered themselves dependent on Coalition Liberal support for their majority.

In 1921, this Coalition Government was sustained by 333 Tories and 128 Lloyd George Coalition Liberals, 12 Coalition Labour and 43 Independent Unionists. In opposition were the Labour Members of the House, who numbered 67, and a group of 31 Asquithian Liberals, known as the “Wee Frees”. 73 Members of the Sinn Fein Party refused to take their seats.

At this time, the Protection issue was a stick of political dynamite. Imperial Preference was the traditional policy of the Tory Party. Joseph Chamberlain, after some preliminary skirmishes, had introduced the plan in September 1903. It involved the setting up of tariff barriers against imports from foreign countries entering the British market, while imports from Empire countries would be admitted free of duty or given preferential treatment. The Empire would be invited to maintain tariff barriers against foreign countries and to admit British manufactures free of duty or with a preference.

There could not be an Empire tariff policy without a tax on foreign food, for at that time the principal export from the Dominions consisted of foodstuffs. It would be useless to seek a preference for British manufactured goods in Empire markets unless a corresponding advantage could be given by providing for the free entry into Britain of Empire and Dominion food products.

But at the election of 1918 a pledge had been given by the Government promising in effect to maintain Free Trade and positively excluding a tax on the import of food from foreign and Empire countries alike. Bonar Law, a strong supporter of Empire Tariffs including Food Taxes, and the long-time Leader of the Tory Party, joined in the election pledge of “No Food Tax”, as a necessary sop to Liberal supporters of the Coalition, who were fanatical Free Traders. Their “Free Food” cry had always won elections and they believed the Free Trade cause was invincible. Many Conservative back-benchers held that the pledge did not preclude the imposition of protective duties on foreign manufactures imported to Great Britain. The agitation against iron and steel from Continental sources reached a high pitch as unemployment mounted and industry languished.

The Government gave quarter to the Tory Members demanding Protection by introducing a measure known as the Key Industries Bill, providing for the exclusion of unfair and abnormal industrial competition due to depressed currencies. Much was made of the need for safeguarding British industrial employment, with demands for anti-dumping legislation. The Act, as finally passed, was a poor substitute for the protective measures against foreigners so ardently desired by most of the Tory supporters of the Coalition. It did not satisfy any section of the House.^[2]

Lloyd George, throughout the debate in the House, conspired with the newspapers to defeat the Bill and to destroy it by amendments. He was firmly convinced that if he tampered with the existing duties by introducing Protectionist tariffs his Liberal following, who were an important section of his total support in Parliament, would run away. They would turn their backs on the Prime Minister and join the “Wee Frees” on the other side of the House—in opposition. He also believed that their constituents felt the same way.

Food Taxes and Protection were bitterly opposed by all Liberals and also by a section of the Tory Party which included Lords Salisbury and Derby, the two Cecils, Lord Robert and Lord Hugh, and Northcliffe in his newspapers. “No Stomach Tax” was the slogan of these Tories. “Tariff Reform Means Work For All” was the answering cry of the Protectionist group.

Lloyd George’s fear was that he would find himself the prisoner of the Tories, with his Liberal support evaporated and all prospects of Liberal Party reunion utterly destroyed. He himself had no intention of being tied down to Protection or Free Trade. Sometimes he favoured Free Trade; at other times he toyed with Imperial Preference.

My own position in this controversy was not in doubt. On the platform of Imperial Preference and Food Taxes I had gained a seat in the House of Commons in 1910. Empire Fiscal Union was, in fact, my only reason for entering politics in Britain and for continuing to take an interest in public life. My devotion to Bonar Law, my belief in his Leadership, my faith in his ability to give to the Empire some day, perhaps some day soon, the Union I so ardently desired, had kept me in close and intimate touch with him and his political problems. My newspaper interests were designed to give him support. Indeed, I had undertaken the arduous duty and dangerous financial obligation of rescuing the bankrupt Daily Express for the sole and only purpose of promoting Empire solidarity and the political fortunes of Bonar Law. For, as I firmly believed, he was destined to give us of the Empire movement the prize we sought—Empire Free Trade.

The Vineyard—Once upon a time a refuge for Palmerston

The tiny drawing room at the Vineyard—Lloyd George sat near the window. Bonar Law in the same type of chair with his back to the fireplace. Birkenhead and Beaverbrook on the sofa.

The distressing and most painful economic conditions, and widespread and growing unemployment, increased the pressure of the Tory group for rejection of the “No Food Tax” pledge, too. Lloyd George stood in the way. Then remove him from the “path to prosperity”! “Tariff Reform Means Work For All”. A powerful group of enemies of the Prime Minister aimed at his destruction.

Bonar Law, who was looked upon as the main prop and indeed the necessary support of the Prime Minister in and out of Parliament, would not depart from the election pledges of 1918. He was embarrassed by the masterful and arrogant conduct of Lloyd George, not only in the distribution of offices, but also in his insistence on building up a personal Political Fund by the sale of honours and other methods that he believed reflected upon the good name of the Tory Central Office. Bonar Law was worried by the frequent protests of Sir George Younger, the Conservative Party Chairman. His Tory followers in the House of Commons and in newspapers were constantly reminding him of their dissatisfaction and disillusionment because of the Government’s failure to deal with the problems of unemployment and a deepening depression which was overwhelming the nation.

Meanwhile Bonar Law’s health was suffering under the strain of trying to curb Lloyd George’s ambition to undertake foreign projects and expeditions which might endanger the alliance with France and even the peace of Europe. In this unhappy atmosphere, Bonar Law was attacked by a bout of influenza. His temperature was high. His spirits were low. He resigned on March 17th, 1921.

Lloyd George, though regretting the departure of his colleague, did not make any sustained effort to retain his second-in-command. Possibly the Prime Minister was somewhat wearied by the frequently repeated newspaper comment that the Government’s fortunes depended upon the support of Bonar Law. The Prime Minister’s friends said that he was confident he would reign successfully without the need for any helper to hold his arms on high. His hands would be steady “until the going down of the sun”.

Saturday, the 19th of March, was cold with bursts of cheerless sunshine. A blustering wind raced down the Strand. From Charing Cross railway station, Bonar Law was about to set out for Cannes and retirement. The little knot of friends surrounding the traveller at the railway station was undistinguished. Three secretaries about to transfer their allegiance to other Ministers, several members of the family, and I—that was the company. There were no photographers exploding their flashbulbs and there were no reporters. No Ministers attended on the traveller. The Prime Minister did not take time off to speed his departing colleague.

Bonar Law stayed the night at the hotel in Dover. He wrote to Lloyd George. I knew nothing of this letter. But researching the Lloyd George papers, I came upon it written in Bonar Law’s own hand.

Lord Warden Hotel,

Dover,

19 Mar. 1921^[3]

My dear P.M.

I hope you will not feel inclined to tell me to mind my own business but I am still very much interested in yours.

You will have noticed from The Times that Northcliffe has evidently given orders to make a set against Chamberlain.

I think it would be worth your while, if you can do it, to send for Max just to have a talk with him for I think that he could now be easily influenced by you to support you.

He must be doing something but I really believe he has more sympathy with you than with any one else & the feeling he has had that I prevented him having a free hand (of which I admit there was no sign in his action) perhaps made him more difficult than if I had been out of it altogether.

He is certain to take a strong line one way or the other.

Excuse my bothering you about it but I think it worth while making the suggestion.

I hope your family do not bear me a grudge. Isabel says that if you had needed to go instead of me she would have found it hard to forgive you.

Yours sincerely,

A. Bonar Law

It is true that I was asked in late March to meet Lloyd George at Sir Philip Sassoon’s house. But as I was committed to taking part in an organized attack on the Prime Minister, the invitation was side-tracked.

The succession to Bonar Law as Leader of the Tory Party was the immediate issue in politics. All the signs indicated that Austen Chamberlain would be selected. He was a traditional Protectionist. Could he be induced, before taking office, to pledge himself to rid the Party of the “No Food Tax” commitment in preparation for another election? It swiftly became clear that the task would not be easy. Chamberlain explained to his Tory followers that there were difficulties in the way. A leader who pledged himself to tariffs as a means of dealing with unemployment after an election would be asked why there should be any delay in applying the remedy. Why not an immediate election?

Parliament had only run half its course. Chamberlain believed and declared that the House was not willing or ready for a dissolution and election. He would give no pledge for the future. Was it possible to subject him to pressure and perhaps win some advantage through opposing his selection as heir to the Tory Leadership?

There were other candidates. A letter to Lord Stamfordham disclosed the opinion of His Majesty, a powerful influence in the ranks of the Tory Party.

His [Lloyd George’s] difficulty will be finding a successor to Bonar Law. Could he get the same advice and support from Chamberlain? Personally I expect he would find Horne^[4] easier to get on with, but the Unionists will of course elect Chamberlain as their leader.^[5]

Lord Birkenhead was favoured by many of the Members of the House of Commons, and he had the advantage of important newspaper support (Daily Mail and The Times). Lord Curzon was mentioned and also Lords Derby and Salisbury.^[6] The prospect of putting forward one of these competitors was of course thoroughly considered and hopefully canvassed by the Empire group as a means of stampeding Chamberlain into giving tariff pledges. He would not respond. His rejection of the overtures was firm, though courteous. The position was summed up by Captain Frederick Guest, Chief Liberal Whip, in a letter to Lloyd George written on the eve of the Tory Party meeting:

House of Commons,

Saturday evening,

March 19 [1921]

Dear Prime Minister,

You will probably wish to hear what news there is anent the Unionist Party Meeting arranged for Monday.

Firstly Talbot^[7] tells me to convey to you that he expects all will go well for Austen and that small differences of opinion as to proceedings, title, & period are being smoothed away.

There are a handful who would like to push the Lord Chancellor^[8] forward but they are finding no encouragement. Hicks^[9] is the chief mover; but his motives have an ulterior object, namely the splitting of the Coalition. You will remember that he has been on this line for some months....

Yours sincerely,

Frederick Guest

At the Party meeting on March 21st, 1921, Chamberlain, though not acceptable to some Members, was elected Leader of the Tory Party without a dissenting voice. This unanimity is the common practice of the Party. He was at once appointed as Lloyd George’s Leader of the House of Commons.

Although Austen had always been an ardent supporter of Joe Chamberlain’s policy, he appeared to be wavering in his enthusiasm. His mind was turning to Irish affairs. Always, however, he was a most attractive member of the Tory High Command.

Mrs. Ivy Chamberlain was the ideal wife for Austen. They were frequent week-end visitors at Polesden Lacey, the beautiful home of Mrs. Ronnie Greville, on a hillside in Surrey. Mrs. Greville was particular in selecting her guests. There it was in the house on the hill that political parties were held. The guests, drawn from the Front Bench, spent happy hours talking of Lloyd George and Ireland, with occasional discussions on fiscal reform, commonly called Tariff Reform. The food was good and the wine well chosen. Mrs. Greville was rich, generous, outspoken and sometimes rude.

Occasionally important members of the outer circle found themselves included in the list of dignitaries. Sir John Simon, a strange bird quite different from the glittering peacocks that always strutted on the well-kept lawns, was admitted to Mrs. Greville’s favour after making a Tory speech in Parliament.

It was Sunday night. The dining table was laden with sparkling glass and shining silver. Pyramids of fruit and sweets scattered here and there in reach of everybody. Gay and happy conversation was exchanged from one neighbour to another and also across the wide table.

Only one detail was going wrong. The butler was obviously tight.

Surely Austen was the most important and impressive guest. An effort to invite a discourse on the Empire policy failed. Instead in a pause in general conversation he casually mentioned that the Empire must not be wrecked on an Irish issue. He carried on with an interesting and informed monologue on Ireland and the difficulties confronting his Party. He had reached the story of the momentous decision of the Unionist group in 1886.

Mrs. Greville’s attention wavered. On a scribbling pad she was busily writing. Summoning her butler, well known for his intemperate habits, she handed him the written message—which was indeed amply justified. It read: “You are drunk—leave the room at once.”

The butler placed the note on a big and beautiful salver and, walking unsteadily to Austen Chamberlain, with a deep bow presented the message.

Austen paused in his admirable exposition of the intransigence of the Irish race. He slowly fixed his monocle and read the startling message, “You are drunk—leave the room at once.” Of course he was astonished. Why had Mrs. Greville sent him such an incredible message? Written in her own hand and delivered to him by the butler who had spent many years in the service of Polesden Lacey.

Austen Chamberlain was well balanced and fortunately not easily offended. He could not be described as a touchy man. So he knew just how to deal with such an emergency. As explanations were resolving the crisis and brushing away the misunderstanding, the butler fled from the room midst shouts of hilarious laughter.

Good and friendly relations were restored and Austen returned to telling the long story of Ireland’s grievances and Britain’s patience and toleration.

And like all good dinner-time stories, the dinner ended and so did the story.

But there it was for all to hear, that Austen, the new leader of the Tory Party, and the heir apparent to the Prime Minister’s place, was not meditating on the why and wherefor of Tariff Reform and Imperial Preference.

What now? The Protectionist section of the Party and those who favoured abandoning the “No Food Tax” pledge were themselves driven to abandoning hope. Chamberlain, they said, had rejected the faith of his father (Joe Chamberlain). He would not be acceptable as an alternative Prime Minister. Harnessed to Lloyd George by ties of common policy and by bonds of loyalty, he would not be available as Lloyd George’s successor.

But how could Lloyd George be defeated? That was the question anxiously debated by dissident Ministers, dissatisfied Protectionists, and the ancient houses of Hatfield and Knowsley (Salisbury and Derby), traditional Tory strongholds. There were many factors which favoured the Prime Minister against his antagonists.

(1) His right to ask and obtain a dissolution of Parliament. This right, if exercised, would send many Members of the House unwillingly to their constituencies. Some would object because they would sustain defeat. Others would dodge because they would be obliged to pay election expenses. Lazy fellows would want to be left in occupation of their seats. Only the ardent and faithful seekers after the defeat and destruction of Lloyd George could be relied upon to accept willingly the upheaval of a General Election.

(2) His patronage of office and honours which counted with all those who were striving after promotion.

(3) His strength in the constituencies, though dwindling, his reputation abroad and his war record.

He would be a hard nut to crack.

But, on the other hand, the tally of worries and troubles besetting the Coalition and its Prime Minister was long and formidable. These liabilities, his enemies had a right to hope, would help to bring down the old bad system of Coalition Government by Lloyd George, his captive Chamberlain, and all of the Coalition Liberals. A Tory Government would come in, without the Coalition Liberal allies and without Lloyd George. This was most ardently desired by many Tories of right and left, by nearly every Tory newspaper, and by the aristocratic Tory landed and titled families, then of real importance in political circles.

(1) By the summer of 1921 trade conditions were the worst in a hundred years. Unemployment was mounting—by June there were over two millions out of work. Wages were reduced in every industry. Agriculture languished under the devastating flow of foreign imports. Bankrupt farmers and poverty-stricken farm workers distressed and dismayed the shopkeepers, seed and feed merchants and implement dealers throughout the country districts. Wages fell; in Yorkshire the pay of women employed on the land was cut down from 10d. to 7d. an hour. The prices of commodities tumbled: food and raw materials by one third; wheat, pig iron and steel by one half. The cost of living fell 24 points between January 1st and mid-March. The Stock Exchange was in the shadows. With stock markets plunging down, unemployment figures mounting up, and the shipping industry almost at a standstill, foreign exchanges were in chaos.

(2) Serious friction had broken out between the two wings of the Administration, Tory and Liberal. In Parliament, Lloyd George’s group of supporters, the Coalition Liberals, were relatively few in number, but held an unreasonable share of offices in the Government. The distribution of honours was also a continual and exasperating cause of dispute. Tory claimants were neglected and a disproportionate share in the list of honours was allotted to the other Coalition Party.^[10] Another cause of bitter complaint among the Tory hierarchy was the activities of Captain Guest, Chief Whip of the Lloyd George Party. He was gathering corn in Tory fields. “Spoiling the Egyptians” did not entirely summarize the case against the Coalition Liberals. A more serious complaint against the Coalition Liberals was the charge by Tories that they were debasing the coinage. A gentleman (whom I will not name) had become a Baronet in the New Year Honours List. Sir George Younger complained violently. He directed the Conservative Central Office with unchallenged authority and was the guardian of the Party’s financial interests. He wrote to Bonar Law^[11] at the outset of the year 1921, when the New Year’s Honours were announced, strongly criticising the apportionment of awards and the unsuitable character of ....^[12]

(3) It was known to the Tories that Lloyd George was discussing reunion with the “Wee Frees”—the Opposition Liberals. Many Conservative Members of Parliament believed that a Lloyd George plan existed to ditch the Tories by means of a Liberal reunion and a “No Stomach Tax” appeal to the electors, under Lloyd George’s leadership. Miss Stevenson,^[13] the Prime Minister’s secretary, who was familiar with every move of her master, recorded in her diary meetings between Lloyd George and the “Wee Frees”:

Meanwhile the Wee Frees are making frantic advances to D. [David Lloyd George]—lunches,—dinners etc. A meeting was held on Wednesday when they discussed their position, and all but four voted for taking D. as their leader (with certain conditions of course). The four opponents were Asquith,^[14] Maclean,^[15] Wedgwood Benn^[16] and Thorne.^[17] Hogge^[18] has given an interview to the Evening Standard saying they are willing to join D.—with certain conditions. It appears that Hogge’s great grievance at the moment is that he has never met D. socially! What a change of front from six weeks ago, when they were howling down D.’s portrait from the walls of the Nat. Liberal Club. But they find Asquith is no leader and they have no hope or trust in him.^[19]

(4) Ireland aroused growing political interest throughout the year 1921. The issue always tended to sever the two wings of the Coalition—the Tories and the Coalition Liberals.

(5) A violent and cunning campaign for economy, carried on by the Northcliffe newspapers, found many supporters among the Tory Members of the House of Commons. Three independent candidates, dubbed “Anti-Waste”, won Conservative constituencies at by-elections against Conservative nominees. This movement agitated many Members with narrow majorities, who feared that the “Anti-Waste” opposition might destroy their chance of election to the next Parliament. The criticism of these anxious supporters alarmed the Prime Minister and excited his Ministerial colleagues, thus weakening the Government and strengthening the forces hostile to Lloyd George.

(6) Stanley Baldwin, stalwart Tory and fervent advocate of Protection for the steel industry against German competition, was considering resignation. Although he did not at that time rank as a leader of opinion in the Party, his discontent was of importance. It reflected back-bench sentiment. He wrote to Bonar Law to say—“I nearly took advantage of the shuffle to go back to private life and to business.”^[20]

(7) But most important of all useful instruments for removing the Prime Minister were the discontented Ministers serving in Lloyd George’s own Administration: Churchill, Coalition Liberal and Free Trader; Birkenhead, Tory and Protectionist; Curzon, Tory and often a Protectionist, sometimes a Free Trader; and Montagu, Liberal and Free Trader. Two Tories and two Coalition Liberals—two Protectionists and two Free Traders. Then there was Lord Derby, leader of the Tories in Lancashire and hostile to Lloyd George, and Lord Salisbury, irreconcilable, the hereditary leader of those Tories who gave their allegiance to “Hatfield House”.

It was a goodly list of discontents. But what was to be done with them?

Should the Protectionist and Imperial Preference movement undertake the task of raising throughout the country the old Joseph Chamberlain cry of “Tariff Reform Means Work For All”? Certainly the vast numbers of unemployed might be expected to listen with attention and possibly with approval too. The farming community would respond with enthusiasm. Most Tory Members of the House could be relied upon to rally to this cause. Lord Salisbury had said, on the subject of Protection, that the Conservative Party was like dry wood; that any man with a match would set it ablaze.

No. Although there was much to be said for a propaganda campaign in favour of tariffs and Imperial Preference, with emphasis on this cure for unemployment, it would be necessary at the outset of a revolutionary movement against Lloyd George and his Free Trade Liberals in the Cabinet to make use of the grievances of Ministers who were convinced Free Traders. If Lloyd George could be defeated—then it would be soon enough to manœuvre for a new Government, pledged to go to the country on a programme of Imperial Preference and Food Taxes.

Churchill, a confirmed Free Trader, and Lord Salisbury were both bitter opponents of Lloyd George and also of Protection. They could be mobilised for the defeat of Lloyd George, but not for the victory of Tariff Reform. Derby was also a Free Trader. And Northcliffe, who was the foe of Lloyd George in The Times, the Daily Mail and other newspapers, might waver if the “Stomach Tax” became an immediate issue.

There should be no compunction about making use of the Free Trade elements to promote the prospects of the tariff cause. They knew the faith we held. They would not hesitate to make full use of the Empire group in furthering their own designs.

[1]	Tory Party, Unionists, Conservatives—synonymous terms in this narrative.

[2]	See Appendix 1, E. S. Montagu to Lord Reading, May 12th, 1921.

[3]	Envelope addressed to Lloyd George at Chequers and postmarked Dover 8 p.m. March 20th, 1921.

[4]	Sir Robert Horne, the President of the Board of Trade.

[5]	Windsor Archives K.1681.9.

[6]	There was no objection at that time to a Prime Minister in the House of Lords.

[7]

Lord Edmund Talbot, afterwards Viscount Fitzalan, Chief Whip of the Tory Party. He was a most popular Chief Whip. He was appointed Viceroy of Ireland and as he was a Roman Catholic it was expected that the choice would be popular with the nation. But the Irish leaders said that a Catholic Viceroy was no more welcome than a Catholic hangman.

[8]	Lord Birkenhead.

[9]	Sir William Joynson-Hicks.

[10]

Lloyd George did not take part in the distribution of honours. But he did take full advantage of the benefits to himself and his Coalition Liberal supporters. Recommendations were finally dealt with by J. T. Davies, principal secretary, who reported to his Chief in Welsh, and to the Palace in English. When Lord Stamfordham criticised the Knighthood for William Watson because he had written The Woman with the Serpent’s Tongue, Lloyd George insisted upon keeping the name on the list because he said Watson had written The Man Who Saw.

[11]

Bonar Law’s own attitude to honours is summed up in a short letter written to Sir George Younger—“My dear Younger, Many thanks for your letter of the 23rd. I am very pleased to hear what you say about Walter Neilson. I think we should almost give him the Order of Merit for not wanting a title! ...” (B.L.P.101/3/53). (The reference is possibly to Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Gordon Neilson.)

[12]	See Appendix 2, George Younger to Bonar Law, January 2nd, 1921.

[13]

Miss Stevenson joined Lloyd George’s staff as a secretary in 1911. Her diary with frequent entries between September 1914 and the end of 1922 has not been published. It is a startling political document. In 1943 she married Lloyd George. He became Earl Lloyd-George in 1945. Her autobiography, written after Lloyd George’s death, contains much valuable material. It has not been published.

[14]	Herbert Henry Asquith, Leader of the Liberal Party, former Prime Minister, driven out by Lloyd George.

[15]	Rt. Hon. Sir Donald Maclean, fifty-seven years of age; he was well-liked on both sides of the House. He was interim Leader of the Liberal Party while Asquith was out of the House following his defeat at East Fife in 1918 until his return for Paisley in 1920.

[16]	Capt. William Wedgwood Benn, M.P. for Leith. Small of stature, vigorous in debate and swift in repartee. He joined the Socialists in 1927.

[17]	George Rennie Thorne, M.P. for East Wolverhampton, Chief Independent Liberal Whip since 1919.

[18]	James Myles Hogge, M.P. for East Edinburgh, 1912-24. Joint Chief Whip Wee Free Liberals, 1918-22.

[19]	Miss Stevenson’s diary, June 24th, 1921.

[20]	See Appendix 3, Baldwin to Bonar Law, April 2nd, 1921.