Читать книгу The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George - Max Aitken - Страница 5

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As for the four Ministers who opposed Lloyd George, they did so each for a different set of reasons.

Churchill disagreed and rebelled over several public issues. The Prime Minister, for his part, believed he was being harassed for personal reasons, and his attitude to Churchill was harsh and overbearing, at times almost insulting. Relations between Lloyd George and Churchill were never entirely comfortable. Lloyd George was explaining a point when Churchill interrupted him, saying: “I don’t see ...” Lloyd George broke in sharply: “You will see the point, when you begin to understand that conversation is not a monologue.”

Churchill advocated peace with Turkey. On February 22nd, 1921, he wrote to Lloyd George a letter which showed prescience. He foretold accurately the course of events in the war between Turkey and Greece.^[1] By inference, but very clearly, he charged Lloyd George with the fearful responsibility of letting loose the Greeks and reopening the war.^[2] He renewed the attack on June 11th, inviting Lloyd George to demand of the Greeks that they replace their royalist commanders with generals of Venizelist^[3] sympathies. The Greeks should also be required to evacuate Smyrna. Churchill predicted that another offensive would result in the destruction of the Greek army.^[4]

When it appeared that the Greeks were likely to refuse an offer of mediation, Churchill suggested to the Prime Minister that Great Britain should definitely intervene to stop the war by blockading Smyrna against Greek ships. As late as September 26th, 1921, Churchill was arguing in favour of a blockade of the Piraeus if Greece should be unreasonable.^[5] The Prime Minister made no effective response, and disaster did indeed fall upon the Greeks.

Further disagreement arose between the two men on domestic policy:

(1) Churchill supported Dr. Christopher Addison, Coalition Liberal, colleague and friend of the Prime Minister, whose failure to provide “Homes for Heroes” infuriated the Tories. Lloyd George was embarrassed because he intended to sacrifice his Minister and satisfy the Tory critics.

(2) Churchill attacked the failure of Government measures for dealing with unemployment.

(3) The Irish negotiations brought the Prime Minister and Churchill into conflict.

(4) The dispute over Russia raged throughout the year. Churchill held that there should be “Peace with the German people, war with the Bolshevik tyranny”. He accused the Prime Minister of following the opposite course.

(5) Then again there was a personal dispute of a serious character. Austen Chamberlain had been Chancellor of the Exchequer. With his promotion to the Leaderships of Party and House, that office fell vacant. Winston Churchill rightly believed that he was entitled to the job, which was looked upon as the highest executive post in the Government.

He had served as Secretary of State for War, and took over the Colonial Office on February 12th, 1921. He had demanded before taking office:

(1) Complete responsibility for civil and military affairs in Mesopotamia, then under the India Office and claimed by the Foreign Office.

(2) A Middle East Department under his control as Colonial Secretary.

(3) Egypt to be transferred from the Foreign Office to the Middle East Department after the meeting of the Imperial Conference in June 1921.

(4) The authority of the Colonial Office should extend to Palestine, Aden and Basra—“The Arabian Triangle”—which would of course include domination of the affairs of:

Ibn Saud, King of Nejd

Hussein, Sherif of Mecca and King of the Hedjaz

The Imam of Yemen

The Sultanates of Oman and Kuwait

The Emirate of Bahrein

The British Protectorate of Aden.

Winston Churchill and Lloyd George

“The changes that are sure to come, I do not fear to see”

By early March Churchill set out for his new kingdom, where he exercised immeasurable authority over Kings and Countries, over High Commissioners and Ambassadors. His retinue was adorned by many important officials, and by Lawrence, Lawrence of Arabia, listed as an adviser.

Like Antony of Shakespeare’s play, Churchill was engaged in dividing up the Near East. He proclaimed Feisal King of Mesopotamia. The crown of Transjordan was conferred upon Abdulla. Zones for Arabs and Zionists were mapped out in Palestine. British troops stationed in Mesopotamia were ordered to embark for England. The Kingdoms of Antony were distributed to his sons. Our own Colonial Secretary gave kingdoms to the sons of the Sherif of Mecca.

When he heard of changes in the Government in London, he hurried home. Chancellor of the Exchequer was his rightful post and he was quite certain the place would be at his disposal, along with the fringe benefit of residence at 11, Downing Street, just once removed from the Prime Minister’s establishment at No. 10.

Lloyd George held different views. A rival too near the centre of power was not to his liking. He would not have three kings in Whitehall, himself, Chamberlain and Churchill. Sir Robert Horne had strayed just a night and day journey from London. He had wandered as far as the Casino at Cannes. He was summoned and on him the Prime Minister conferred the accolade.^[6]

Churchill returned from his Egyptian conquests on April 10th. No Roman triumph for him, not even a laurel wreath. He was angry. He gave up his social contacts with the Prime Minister. No more dinner parties. No more intimate conversations. Formal relations only. Lloyd George and Churchill looked out on one another like two distant snow-clad mountain peaks.

The Prime Minister had the highest opinion of Churchill’s intellectual qualities but decried and derided his political performance: quite often it seemed to me a demonstration of jealousy of which I believed there was a real big store, skilfully concealed. Rudeness was usually one-sided, though Churchill often made up for Lloyd George’s aggressiveness in speech by his exceedingly embarrassing letters of protest over numerous policies. While discussing the plan for yet another Coalition, Churchill said: “If you are going to include all Parties (in a Coalition) you will have to have me in your new National Party.” “Oh no,” replied Lloyd George. “To be a party you must have at least one follower. You have none.”

Strange that these slighting and wounding remarks by Lloyd George did not result in a breach of relations. But the Colonial Secretary was free from rancour. And, if offended, he would never conceal his hostility. It was not wise to give him secrets. He would often stumble into disclosure in one form or another and always without any intention of betraying a confidence.

I recall Lloyd George’s description of his difficulties with Churchill and Reginald McKenna. He compared them to trees in the forest. Churchill, like the oak, he said, gave warning before crashing. McKenna he likened to the elm, the branch falls without any notice.

Mentally, morally and physically Churchill was of stouter build than Lloyd George. Churchill’s firmness of purpose, right or wrong, made a profound impression on his colleagues and reinforced his power and authority. He worked harder and longer than Lloyd George and he had a wider vision. For countless years and in face of valiant efforts he was unable to capture and hold public confidence. Quite often he appeared to be popular, but never during the years between Wars was he regarded as a leader. He always walked in the shadow of kingship. Promise perhaps, yet the shadow never became the substance. He had a group of friends. He held them throughout. Lloyd George shed his friends like the ermine sheds its winter coat.

Miss Stevenson wrote in her diary two weeks and two days after the return of Churchill from Egypt:

Winston [is] still very vexed with the P.M. as a result of, as he thinks, having been neglected in the recent promotions. D. [David Lloyd George] says Winston fully expected to be made Chancellor of the Exchequer when all the changes were made, and he has not been to see D. since his return. D. has only seen him in Cabinets and meetings of the kind and Winston writes him “Dear Prime Minister,” whereas it used to be “Dear Ll. G.” or “My dear David” even.^[7]

Lord Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor, was the second Minister at odds with Lloyd George. He had no standing with the Prime Minister. They treated each other with every sign of distant and polite relations when they were together, but they showed distrust and even dislike when they were apart. A quarrel over legal appointments brought on a serious rupture.

The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Reading, was appointed Viceroy of India,^[8] thus creating a vacancy on the Bench. Sir Gordon Hewart, the Attorney-General, was the proper, traditional and legitimate choice for the post.^[9] Lord Birkenhead put Hewart’s name forward. Lloyd George, however, did not approve. It suited him to delay the Attorney-General’s departure from the Government for a year or two.

Hewart was a brilliant Parliamentarian and Lloyd George’s most capable Coalition Liberal colleague. If he had been allowed to go, Lloyd George would have had to put Ernest Pollock, the Solicitor-General, in his place. Pollock was a Conservative. His promotion would have disturbed the balance of representation of Parties in the Government, which would have been an embarrassment to Lloyd George at a time when he was seeking Liberal reunion. Hewart’s constituency, East Leicester, if opened up, might be lost to Lloyd George’s dwindling Parliamentary group.

Most Ministers are unwilling to go; Hewart was most unwilling to stay. To hold him, the Prime Minister was compelled to put him in the Cabinet and also to promise that the office of Lord Chief Justice would be at Hewart’s disposal on the eve of the next dissolution of Parliament. That pledge could be implemented only if Lloyd George had in his possession the resignation of a caretaker Lord Chief Justice.

He put forward the name of Lord Finlay, a former Lord Chancellor, nearly eighty years of age and showing it. Finlay was willing to place his resignation in Lloyd George’s hands. Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor, was outraged by the plan, for he had a deep respect for the traditions of the Bench. Lloyd George’s proposal was in defiance of all precedent and practice. Birkenhead made a lively protest.

There were two grounds for complaint. The Prime Minister had rejected the recommendation of Hewart by his own Lord Chancellor, who was the head of the Judiciary. But far more serious was the proposal that the Prime Minister should hold in his hand an undated letter of resignation from Finlay. That plan would make the Lord Chief Justice subject to removal at the will of the Prime Minister, thus depriving the highest judicial officer in the Kingdom of his independence of the political machine.

Birkenhead warned the Prime Minister:

The matter is, in my opinion, of the gravest importance both in relation to the future of our judicial system and to the credit and indeed the existence of the present Government.

Although it was a proper, reasonable and rightful dissent, Lloyd George replied to Birkenhead’s written protest in anger, and contemptuously. He sent Birkenhead an insulting letter, distorting the facts. He referred in acrimonious tones to the Lord Chancellor’s lengthy typewritten document. And he concluded the defence of his action by quoting Sir Edward Carson,^[10] who was not a member of his Government and who was, of course, hostile to the Prime Minister’s projects for an Irish settlement.^[11]

The correspondence between the Prime Minister and Birkenhead took on a threatening form. They addressed each other as “My dear Chancellor” and “Dear Prime Minister” with a “Sincerely” instead of the usual “Yours ever,” which is in common use among friendly colleagues in government.

Lloyd George was compelled to retreat from the Finlay plan because of the obvious physical weakness and failing mental powers of his nominee. However, he substituted Sir Alfred Lawrence, who was also nearly eighty, though in good health and full possession of his faculties. The Lawrence appointment was made in defiance of hostile opinion in Parliament and Press.^[12]

Birkenhead was outraged by this incident, and his personal relations with the Prime Minister became strained and embittered.

The strange conduct of Carson will come as no surprise to those colleagues who worked with him. He advised Lloyd George to appoint Finlay. He wrote to Hewart that Lord Birkenhead had told him the plan to appoint a stop-gap was illegal. He told Hewart it was a shameful thing if the Attorney-General was not at once appointed to succeed Reading. He said to Hewart that Lloyd George really intended to keep the Lord Chief Justice post warm for Reading and not for Hewart, thus unsettling the Attorney-General and disturbing the relations between the Prime Minister and his subordinate.^[13]

Within a year Lloyd George acted on the Lawrence resignation. The Chief Justice was travelling up to town on Friday, March 3rd, 1922, to hear a case that had been adjourned from the previous day. He read an account of his resignation in the morning papers. He went into court, finished the case, and retired with a pension.^[14]

Then there was Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India. He was bitterly and unalterably opposed to Lloyd George’s support of Greek claims and pretensions. So was the Indian Government and also the Viceroy, Lord Reading. Montagu had strongly resisted the terms of the harsh Turkish peace treaty and had written to Lloyd George threatening resignation on that issue. He could not agree with the policy, advocated by Balfour and supported by the Prime Minister, of running the Turks out of Europe. He had demanded that a public announcement be made that the British Government did not wish to turn the Turks out of Constantinople.^[15]

Then the quarrel exploded. Montagu wrote to Lloyd George, insisting on his right as plenipotentiary for India to send a memorandum in favour of Turkey, a Mohammedan power, to the Peace Conference at San Remo. Lloyd George was furious. He absolutely rejected this claim and Montagu gave way, accepting the Prime Minister’s rebuff and rebuke. Personal relations were embittered by a written report^[16] from the Tory Central Office that Montagu and Mrs. Montagu had voted against the Coalition Liberal candidate at a by-election in South Norfolk.

And, of course, there was Lord Curzon, who was continually falling in and out with Lloyd George. In April 1921, the occasion of dispute between them was the question of representation at the Lympne Conference.^[17] Curzon, in a letter to Lady Curzon^[18] on April 22nd, gave a vivid description of the quarrel. He wrote that the Prime Minister was troubling him with extraordinary tactics over the meeting at Lympne. With Briand, the French Prime Minister, Berthelot, the French Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs, would be present. But Curzon had not been asked to attend. Believing he might be the victim of a deliberate affront, he consulted Balfour, who promised, after lunching with Lady Cunard, to seek information.

“Girlie,” wrote Curzon, “I am getting very tired of working or trying to work with that man. He wants his Forn. Sec. to be a valet almost a drudge ...”

Balfour returned to Curzon with apologies from the Prime Minister: “A.J.B. protests most earnestly to me,” Curzon wrote, “that it would be a calamity if I were to resign.... To me he discourses about the peculiarities of the temperament & character of L.G. [Lloyd George] which he regards with stupefaction. I wonder what he says to him about me!”^[19] Curzon was always “being driven to resignation,” but never reaching that destination.

Another source of weakness in the Lloyd George Coalition flowed from the disputes between Curzon and Churchill. These two Ministers quarrelled over many issues.

Curzon wanted a better place in the Government for Lord Crawford,^[20] and a “big place”. Churchill wanted Ormsby-Gore^[21] as his Under Secretary in the Colonial Office. Curzon objected. He claimed the holder should be a Peer.

Churchill’s insistence on taking over for the Colonial Office control of Egypt along with the Arab Kingdoms met with resistance from Curzon. The struggle persisted and was yet another source of weakness to the Government. It was on February 14th that Curzon secured a decision in favour of his Foreign Office. Although Churchill’s claim was defeated it was not destroyed. The quarrel over Egypt became a continuing event and yet another cause of disintegration in the Ministry.

Many years after Churchill told me that he would have succeeded in seizing Egypt from Curzon’s clutches if the Government had lived a little longer.

Curzon, in the hour of victory, wrote his wife:

... Then Cabinet 12-2, rather a long and worrying controversy between Winston & myself over the Middle East. He wants to grab everything into his new Dept., & to be a sort of Asiatic Forn. Secretary. I absolutely declined to agree to this, & the P.M. took my side. But it was hot fighting while it lasted.

Notes were passed during meetings between these two Ministers. In May 1921 the following exchange took place:

Curzon: I am against Ministers without portfolios.^[22]

Churchill: I am afraid my own portfolio (although substantial) is sometimes only a frail defence against yr. displeasure.

Curzon: & vice versa.

On June 9th, 1921, Churchill wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, sending a copy to Curzon.^[23] He proposed to meet the objections of the U.S. Government and the covetousness of Standard Oil of New Jersey by offering to transfer Mandates over Palestine and Mesopotamia to the U.S. Government. He asked permission to announce the offer in the House of Commons.

Curzon was angry, complaining once more that Churchill aimed at establishing for himself a separate Middle East Foreign Office. He wrote the Prime Minister on June 10th.^[24] His complaints were vigorous and his rejection of Churchill’s proposal went beyond a mere refusal. The following day Lloyd George sent a harsh and hostile letter to Churchill, addressing him as “My dear Colonial Secretary”, and putting forward a very strong argument against Churchill’s proposal.^[25]

Churchill was not put off. He spoke again, impinging upon the province of the Foreign Secretary in Curzon’s opinion. Another bullying letter was dispatched by Curzon to Churchill with, as usual, a copy to the Prime Minister:

... on two recent occasions you have made public references to the Egyptian question (which does not lie in your Department) which were without Cabinet authority, which in each case have evoked an immediate protest from Egypt, and which have rendered the already difficult task of the Foreign Secretary there more difficult.^[26]

As usual Churchill replied at length, claiming liberty to speak on Egypt, dissenting from Foreign Office policy and asserting the right to present his views, alleging Cabinet authority.

I am not at all prepared to sit still & mute & watch the people of this country being slowly committed to the loss of this great & splendid monument of British administrative skill and energy. ... I can quite understand that those in Egypt who wish to see our troops relegated to “drinking condensed water on the banks of the Suez Canal” will not appreciate the reference.^[27]

Curzon was now convinced that Churchill meant to seize Egypt from the Foreign Office, adding it to his Colonial Office Kingdom of the Middle East. He wished to administer all of the Arab territories, was the tale.

Lloyd George wrote to Curzon and separately to Chamberlain on June 14th, criticising Churchill.^[28] To Chamberlain Lloyd George wrote:

Curzon is going for Winston over his unauthorised pronouncement on questions of foreign policy. He has written him a strong letter on the subject. Curzon is undoubtedly right, but I hope there will be no flare up until I arrive.^[29] Winston has always been in the habit of making these pronouncements on his own. He did it under the Asquith administration constantly whenever there was a chance of a real limelight effect!^[30]

His letter to Curzon on the same day approved in sweeping terms of the Curzon contentions with undertones of reflection on Churchill.

I agree with you that it is most improper and dangerous for any Minister to make a pronouncement upon questions of foreign policy, not only without having had previous consultation with the Foreign Secretary, but without actually a specific request from him to do so.^[31]

The bombardment by Churchill continued. He wrote next day^[32] to Curzon about the Greek offensive in Asia Minor. A mission should be sent to Kemal the Turk and if stated terms were agreed upon, pressure should be put upon the Greeks, “including if necessary naval action off Smyrna or the Piraeus to compel them [the Greeks] to close with them [the terms].”

On July 4th, 1921, at a meeting of the Imperial Conference, an interesting and even amusing exchange of notes passed across the table between Curzon, Lloyd George, Chamberlain and Churchill. Curzon wrote Lloyd George:

It seems to me entirely wrong that the Colonial Secretary should on an occasion like this air his independent views on a F.O. question.

I would not presume on a Colonial Office question, either to intervene at all or to take a line independent of the C.O.

Lloyd George replied:

I quite agree. I have done my best to stopper his fizzing. Montagu, Chamberlain & Balfour would be entitled to join in—so on each item we should have six British speeches. It is intolerable.

The same day Austen Chamberlain pencilled a note to Curzon, while the Conference was meeting:

I think you are right to show Winston that you profoundly resent his constant & persistent interference. It goes far beyond anything that I at least have ever known in Cabinet even from the most important members of a Govt.

Unless you make him feel that it is a matter which you feel personally I despair of doing anything with him. To a personal appeal I think that he is nearly always open (I mean to an appeal on personal grounds).

Curzon wrote:

My dear Winston, I wonder what you would think^[33] say if on a Colonial Office [question?] I felt myself at liberty to make a speech at this Conference—quite independent of the Colonial Office and critical of the attitude adopted by its chief.

Churchill replied:

You may say anything you like about the Colonial Office that is sincerely meant: but there is no comparison between these vital foreign matters wh. affect the whole future of the world and the mere departmental topics with wh. the Colonial Office is concerned.

It wd. be impossible for me.^[34]

In these g[rea]t matters we must be allowed to have opinions.

Although Curzon did not love Churchill, he hated Lloyd George. Gladly he would have helped to pull down the Welsh champion. Nothing could be gained, however, by seeking the support of the Marquis^[35] in the movement against Lloyd George, even though he had always hankered after the Leadership of the Tory Party in Bonar Law’s day, and his passion to become Prime Minister outstripped every other emotion in his chequered career. He would bite at any hook baited with hope of the highest office. He was a ready and eager rebel.

But, in the words of John Calvin—“There is no likelihood that these things will bring grist to the mill.” Curzon always tried to take up with the winner when battle was joined. He changed sides for personal reasons and without regard for principles. His attitude to Protection varied between neutrality, indifference and hostility. He never took any part in the tariff campaign. But he was frequently criticising Salisbury, Derby and others for being opposed to tariffs. Of the powerful Tory leader he wrote: “Jim Salisbury has gone abroad & the Free Trade Conservatives are sulky & silent, except E. Derby [Lord Derby] who goes about trying to prove that he is both a Free Trader & Protectionist”,^[36] and of the popular Lancashire Tory leader: “... poor old Derby tries every night to loop the loop, as both a Free Trader and a Protectionist and only makes himself ridiculous.” Again he wrote to Lady Curzon: “E. Derby gets back from Cannes tonight & has wired to come and see me at 10 p.m. about the passages in the King’s Speech about Protection which he and I want to abandon. We shall have a tough fight over it in Cabinet tomorrow.”^[37]

The tariff supporters did not want Curzon. He was inconsistent, unreliable, untruthful and treacherous. Nobody wanted him.^[38]

Lord Derby was a very different type, even though his conduct was unpredictable. He was honest and upright, highly regarded in the country—particularly in Lancashire. There was nothing mean or treacherous in him. He did not deliberately make mischief. His influence in the Conservative Party after the departure of Bonar Law possibly outstripped that of any other leader, not excepting Austen Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury.

Derby had refused to join the Lloyd George Coalition when offered the Colonial Office in succession to Milner.^[39] He was hostile to the Government in the early months of 1921 and ready for any move that would detach the Tory Party from Lloyd George’s coat-tails. In April, he was preparing to attack Lloyd George in a speech at the annual dinner of the Junior Imperial League. But the Prime Minister forestalled him. He had a conversation with Derby on April 15th and invited him to go over to Ireland in disguise to negotiate with the Sinn Feiners.^[40] Derby at once changed his attitude. His speech at the dinner on April 16th was intended to be friendly to Lloyd George, but unhappily he muddled his role. He welcomed the Prime Minister as “the newest recruit” to the Conservative Party, thus embroiling Lloyd George with the “Wee Free” Liberals, whose support Lloyd George was also seeking at that moment. By the 18th of that month Lord Derby was rejecting his own past and defending Lloyd George against his critics. He wrote me:

On the subject of L.G. I do not think you and I quite agree. You think he is a spent force. I do not, and I am not quite sure that when it comes to this dumping bill that you and I won’t find that he represents our views better than Austen Chamberlain does. I have got a genuine liking for the little man. I know his faults and they are many but at the same time I never can forget what he did in the War and be grateful for it.

Derby was never steadfast. In every controversy he was influenced by both sides, and nobody knew for certain where he would come down. He was like an eagle soaring through the sky, turning around and about, surely intending to settle, yet leaving everyone uncertain where he would find his perch. He would give encouragement to a movement for detaching the Tory Party from Lloyd George. But he would never be a convinced advocate of Protection and Imperial Preference. He hated Food Taxes.

Lord Salisbury, another enemy of Lloyd George, was bitter and unrestrained in his attacks on the Prime Minister. This nobleman had immense influence and authority. He persistently counselled the Tory members of the Coalition to break away from Lloyd George. He was, however, as hostile to tariffs as to Lloyd George. He regarded the fiscal issue as a disturbing and disintegrating force, which might split the Tory Party.

His opposition to Imperial Preference had reached full flower when the Welsh Church dispute occupied the attention of Parliament. He had held to the fixed belief that Tory resistance to the spoliation of Church funds would be ruined by Party differences over Tariff Reform. The Church funds came first and always over every other issue.

An early Easter (March 27th) brought political activities to a halt.

Lloyd George, joined by his friends Lord Riddell, Robert Horne and others, made up a jolly house party at Sir Philip Sassoon’s home at Lympne. Lloyd George was always happy to take refuge with the young Member for Hythe.

Singing sessions at Lympne with many colleagues were a habit. The most interesting Chorus Minister was Churchill. He dwelt on old Music Hall songs with enthusiasm. But he was not quite successful in carrying a melody, and his voice did not justify his selection for the Westminster Abbey choir. Reading, who had served before the mast in his boyhood, sang sea shanties in a gentle, timid voice with much success. The robust Hewart’s songs of the northern circuit made a favourable impression. But the leading performer whose efforts were respected—if not admired in secret—was the Prime Minister himself. And his choice was “Glorious Welsh Hymns”.

Sir Philip Sassoon—A most proficient private secretary. He had served Haig during the war—Geddes during the peace—and Lloyd George through the fateful years. He had many houses and most capable chefs.

Sir Philip Sassoon, the host of the Minister Singers, was the grandson of a Rothschild. I remember his maiden speech in the House of Commons. It was an indifferent performance but it brought forth a flood of notes of congratulations—not because he had made a good speech but because he had big houses and even bigger funds to maintain them. North of London—Trent; London—Park Lane; South of London—Lympne: these were his headquarters.

He was a brilliant gossip and an habitual flatterer, indifferent to the status of his subjects. At my house in the midst of a large company I was asked, “Where is Philip?” I replied: “Flattering somebody somewhere.” From behind a pillar nearby Sassoon cried: “Not you, Max!”

His advancement in political office was swift and sure after Miss Stevenson offered him the post of Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Prime Minister. He did not lack secretarial experience—first with Haig and then with Eric Geddes. It would be interesting to examine the guest lists of the young host who gathered the aged, the beautiful, the clever and over all the powerful at his dining room, wonderfully decorated by the Spanish painter Sert.

Two weeks after Easter, at “Trent”, another Sassoon home near London, Miss Stevenson’s diary gives an account of a “perfect Sunday”:

Went down to Trent over Sunday after hectic week of unfruitful negotiations over coal strike. P.[rince] of Wales came on Sunday with Mrs. Dudley Ward. We spoke of Strachey’s life of Queen Victoria, which had just been published and the Prince said: “That must be the book the King was talking about this morning. He was very angry and got quite vehement over it.” P. of W. had not seen the book, so we showed it to him and presently was discovered in roars of laughter over the description of the Queen and John Brown.

Had a perfect Sunday—ideal weather—and returned Monday morning.^[41]

Over Easter other Ministers were scattered here and there. Newspapers dropped their political leading articles for essays on holy days and holidays.

Nothing had been accomplished in the design to substitute another for Mr. Lloyd George in the Premiership.

[1]

After being defeated in the war, Turkey was subjected in 1920 to the Treaty of Sèvres, by which Greece gained possession of Eastern Thrace, Gallipoli and the Aegean Islands. Smyrna was to be administered by Greece for five years, and the Straits and Dardanelles were placed under international supervision. Lloyd George had wanted terms more favourable to Greece. He urged on his colleagues that the Turks should be driven out of Europe. The Sultan of Turkey signed the Treaty under pressure, but Mustapha Kemal, leader of the Turkish forces, had retired on Angora and taken up arms against the Greeks.

[2]	Letter, Churchill to Lloyd George, February 22nd, 1921—Churchill: The World Crisis—The Aftermath, page 394.

[3]	Venizelos, friend of Britain, had been defeated at a Greek General Election. He fled to France. His generals were dismissed and replaced by pro-German King Constantine’s soldiers.

[4]	See Appendix 4, Churchill to Lloyd George, June 11th, 1921.

[5]	See Churchill: The World Crisis—The Aftermath, page 402.

[6]	Stanley Baldwin’s name was mentioned and his appointment to the Exchequer was widely supported by Unionist Whips and many of the backbench Members. (See Daily Mail, March 22nd, 1921.)

[7]	Miss Stevenson’s diary, April 26th, 1921.

[8]	January, 1921.

[9]	See Appendix 5, Miss Stevenson’s diary.

[10]	In the month of May, Carson was named by the Prime Minister as a Law Lord, with a seat in the House of Lords.

[11]	See Appendix 6, Lloyd George to Birkenhead, February 11th, 1921. Also see Appendix 7, Birkenhead’s reply, February 11th, 1921.

[12]	See Appendix 8, George Younger to Bonar Law, April 13th, 1921.

[13]	See Appendix 6, Lloyd George to Birkenhead, February 11th, 1921. See also Robert Jackson’s The Chief, page 140.

[14]

Lawrence took up the title Lord Trevethin in August 1921. Lord Trevethin on retirement received a pension of £4,000 yearly. He bought an estate on the river Wye, with fishing water which was in the end his undoing. On August 3rd, 1936, he fell into the river while catching a salmon and was carried away by the current. His chauffeur went to his rescue but Lord Trevethin called out, “I’m all right, I can swim.” Unhappily after the chauffeur brought him out of the water he died of heart failure, thus bringing to a close at the age of ninety-two a remarkable life.

[15]	Now Istanbul.

[16]	Memorandum from Sir Malcolm Fraser to Sir George Younger, October 11th, 1920.

[17]	Talks between France and Britain on the question of reparations began at Sir Philip Sassoon’s house at Lympne on April 23rd, 1921.

[18]	See Appendix 9, Curzon to Lady Curzon, April 22nd, 1921.

[19]	See Appendix 10, Curzon to Lady Curzon, April 23rd, 1921.

[20]	27th Earl of Crawford, formerly popular Chief Whip of the Tory Party.

[21]

William George Arthur Ormsby-Gore, M.P., later Lord Harlech, allied to the House of Cecil by marriage. He declared in a public speech after the fall of the Coalition that his sole aim in remaining in politics was to exclude Lloyd George, Churchill and Beaverbrook from any office. Ormsby-Gore ultimately served under Churchill.

[22]	Curzon referred to Dr. Addison, who in the Vice-Regal conception was a notorious bore.

[23]	See Appendix 11, Churchill to Lloyd George, June 9th, 1921, and covering letter (Appendix 12) Churchill to Curzon, June 9th, 1921.

[24]	See Appendix 13, Curzon to Lloyd George, June 10th, 1921.

[25]	See Appendix 14, Lloyd George to Churchill, June 11th, 1921.

[26]	See Appendix 15, Curzon to Churchill, June 13th, 1921.

[27]	See Appendix 16, Churchill to Curzon, June 13th, 1921.

[28]

On the same day that Churchill was attacked furiously by the Prime Minister in these two letters, Chamberlain wrote to Lloyd George—“Winston has had a great success both as to his speech & his policy, & has changed the whole atmosphere of the House on the Middle East question. Send him a line or wire of congratulation.” Churchill answered the Prime Minister, thanking him in restrained though formal and courteous terms. He signed the letter “Winston S. Churchill.”

[29]	From Criccieth in Wales.

[30]	See Appendix 17, Lloyd George to Austen Chamberlain, June 14th 1921.

[31]	See Appendix 18, Lloyd George to Curzon, June 14th, 1921.

[32]	See Appendix 19, Churchill to Curzon, June 15th, 1921.

[33]	Word italicized is crossed out in original.

[34]	Words italicized are crossed out in the original.

[35]	Curzon was created a Marquis on June 3rd, 1921.

[36]	Letters, Curzon to Lady Curzon.

[37]	Letter, January 6th and 9th, 1924. The Earl and the Marquis won the tough fight.

[38]

George Harvey, the American Ambassador, wrote to President Harding on December 9th, 1921. He gave an interesting example of Curzon’s troubles with his servants, his valets and his chefs.Harvey wrote that a coachman, who had served the Marquis for most of his life, was translated to chauffeur. Naturally, he was not very successful and Curzon dismissed him. Swiftly he repented of his harsh decision. In fact he decided that he could not improve upon him and would reinstate him. (In any case it was a Government car that was at risk.)On the evening when Curzon made this decision, the coachman asked to see him. Being told that he was to be spared and reinstated, he informed his astounded patron that in seeking an interview he wished merely to inform His Lordship that he was the damnedest cad in England.

[39]	Derby did not want office, he wanted power and popularity.

[40]	See Appendix 20, Beaverbrook to Bonar Law, undated but written in April, 1921.

[41]	Miss Stevenson’s diary, April 11th, 1921.