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Prime Minister Pierre Laval meeting with Reich Marshal Hermann Göring. Photo Archive, Yad Vashem.

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The Trial of Pierre Laval

Criminal Collaborator or Patriot?

Once Germany began its conquest of Europe, the only European countries that could stop the German military onslaught were the other regional military powers: France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Nazi Germany never succeeded in conquering Britain and the Soviet Union. It conquered France in just thirty-three days.¹ What came afterwards remains one of the most shameful periods in French history.

Approximately 75,000 Jews were deported from French transit camps to their deaths in occupied Poland between 1942 and the end of German occupation, in December 1944. Almost a third of these were French citizens, and over 8,000 were children under thirteen. The roundup of the Jews was conducted by the French police and pursuant to laws enacted by French authorities. It took over forty years for France to finally acknowledge its role in the Holocaust. In 1995, President Jacques Chirac spoke for the first time about France’s responsibility for the deportation of Jews: “The folly of the occupiers was seconded by the French, by the French state,”² he said.

President Chirac’s statement referred not only the ignoble role France played in the Holocaust, but also the larger shame that a large portion of the French population collaborated with the German occupiers.³ And this collaboration included much of the French political class. One of those was a major political figure in prewar France: Pierre Laval.

Laval was born in 1883 in Châteldon, a small town in the central Auvergne region of France.⁴ His early political affiliations were socialist but, as he commented at the end of his life, he was not a doctrinal socialist but more a socialist of the heart. Laval was first elected to the French National Assembly at age thirty and simultaneously elected as mayor of Aubervilliers, a working-class suburb of Paris. He held this latter position for over twenty years until he was removed from it in 1944 by the provisional French government of Charles de Gaulle. In addition to success as a politician, Laval was a successful lawyer, representing mainly workers and frequently attaining favorable results. Trials would mark both the beginning and the end of his professional life.

Laval’s political career witnessed more electoral wins than losses and, as he moved upward in the French governmental structure, he also drifted to the right. In the 1920s, he occupied subcabinet and cabinet positions in various center-right governments, leading to his selection twice as prime minister of France in the 1930s: from January 1931 to February 1932, and then again from June 1935 to February 1936.

As a government minister, Laval had to deal with many of the issues that arose in the last ten years of the French Third Republic. It appears that Laval’s views on Germany and on international relations in general were formulated during this period. These came to shape his conduct as a leading figure in the Vichy regime, which followed the military defeat and collapse of France in 1940, the armistice with Nazi Germany, and the end of the Third Republic.

In his prewar tenures as prime minister, Laval’s principal concern with Germany–pre-Hitler Germany–dealt with reparations owed by the Weimar Republic to France, France’s debt to the United States, and the burden the international economic crisis imposed on these financial obligations. Laval’s efforts in this area resulted in a 1931 trip to the United States, when he met President Herbert Hoover and other leading American political figures. All seemed to have been impressed with his practicality and intelligence.⁵ The seven months of Laval’s tenure as Vichy France’s prime minister, four years later, were in an entirely different world—rendering the financial issues he dealt with in 1931 almost inconsequential, if not even quaint.

Hitler had written in 1925 in Mein Kampf that France and Germany were intractable enemies. Once he became Germany’s chancellor in 1933, his public message changed. In a 1934 speech to the Reichstag, Hitler announced that there was no reason for France and Germany to remain foes. To demonstrate the absence of tensions between Germany and France, Hitler renounced any claim to Alsace and Lorraine and stated that the only issue between the two countries was the status of the Saar, where a plebiscite was to be held to determine whether it would be French or German territory. That plebiscite, held in 1935, resulted in the Saar reverting to Germany, a result that France and the rest of Europe accepted. Unfortunately, Hitler’s statements in Mein Kampf presented a far more accurate depiction of his objectives than those in the conciliatory speech before the Reichstag.

Laval’s approach to Germany also envisaged cooperation between the two continental powers. His underlying philosophy was that France and Germany, as powerful neighbors, would clash on the battlefield every twenty years unless they reached some long-term accommodation. To keep its belligerent neighbor at bay, Laval sought to isolate Germany from other European powers. Clearly, an alliance between Hitler and the United Kingdom was not realistic. Thus Laval tried to work out an alliance between France and Italy. The latter was an especial focus of his foreign policy, an objective complicated both by Italy’s colonial ambitions in North Africa, which conflicted with French interests there, and Italy’s expansive policies in Abyssinia (Ethiopia), which generally came in conflict with the position of Western liberal democracies. Nevertheless, Laval felt that a union of France and Italy, coupled perhaps with Nationalist Spain, would preclude Germany from implementing any aggressive objectives. Laval saw himself as a friend to Italy and was convinced that he had an almost unique ability to resolve issues with it, an ability that had to lie dormant during the critical years between his tenure as prime minister, which ended in 1936, and the beginning of the Second World War. There was a certain delusional quality to Laval’s conception of himself as a unique facilitator of Italian issues.⁶ With or without Laval, during this period Italy drifted inexorably into a military alliance with Germany.

The last part of the 1930s saw increased belligerence and expansionism on the part of Germany. The notion that all Germany wanted was to regain the Saar was quickly shown to be nonsense. In addition to defaulting on its post–First World War reparations obligations, Germany also remilitarized the Rhineland in direct defiance of the Versailles Treaty. This was followed by (1) the annexation of Austria in the spring of 1938, (2) the annexation of the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1938, and (3) the annexation of all of Bohemia and Moravia in the spring of 1939. All of these military takeovers went unchecked. Following its August 1939 nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, Germany invaded Poland the following month. France and the United Kingdom now declared war on Germany and the Second World War began.

Germany’s Western front remained quiet for several months as its military efforts, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, were directed to the obliteration of Poland. On May 10, 1940, Germany launched its invasion to the west, attacking first the Low Countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) and then France through the Ardennes, bypassing the purportedly impenetrable barrier of the Maginot Line. Five days later, German tank divisions broke through at Sedan and, in that short time, France’s military situation completely deteriorated.

The panicked French government, headed by Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, began making cabinet changes and brought on First World War hero Marshal Philippe Pétain as a deputy prime minister. The French military was placed under the leadership of General Maxime Weygand, also a First World War veteran who had seen success in battle. These changes were useless; the German offensive continued and German troops broke through the French lines in early June.

At this point, the Reynaud government had a choice: it could try to reach an agreement with the Germans or flee and carry out resistance from abroad.⁷ Laval urged the government to stay, claiming it would be treason to abandon France to a German Gauleiter (regional Nazi Party leader). President Albert Lebrun, on the other hand, strongly urged a government-in-exile. Laval’s view prevailed.⁸ A few days later, Reynaud resigned and Pétain was asked to form a new government. Pétain offered Laval the Justice Ministry portfolio but Laval declined, since he wanted to be foreign minister. This meant that Laval was not part of the new government, which was immediately tasked with ending hostilities before France was completely crushed militarily.⁹

France received Germany’s armistice terms on June 21. If France agreed to the terms, Germany would occupy two-thirds of the country, including the entire Atlantic and English Channel coasts, and France would bear the cost of the occupation. The French military would be reduced to a police force of one hundred thousand, and its weapons and equipment would be made available to Germany. The French naval fleet would be disarmed, except as necessary to protect the colonies, but would remain under French control. Germany would not use the fleet for its military objectives. The French colonial empire would be left intact, and a new and emasculated French government would administer both the occupied and unoccupied zones of France. France would also be obliged to hand over Germans living in France to the Germans; these were essentially German Jews and political opponents who had fled Hitler’s Germany for what they had thought was the safe haven of the French Republic.

France signed the armistice agreement on June 22.¹⁰ The following day, Laval was appointed minister of state and several days later, he was made deputy prime minister.¹¹ Since Paris was in the zone occupied by the Germans, the new French government had to locate elsewhere. It selected the spa town of Vichy, located centrally in France, but in the northern section of the unoccupied zone. The new government then became known as the Vichy government or regime.

The criminal trial against Laval at the end of the war related to his conduct as a minister in the Vichy government. Laval was part of the Vichy government twice: first from June 1940 to December 1940, and then again from April 1942 until the war’s end. The following pages focus on Laval’s conduct during these two stages, which formed the core of the charges against him. Such conduct was, of course, but a small fraction of what Laval did over the almost three-year period covered by his position of power in the Vichy regime.

Laval as Deputy Minister: June to December 1940

As deputy prime minister, Laval had two primary objectives. The first was to create a governmental structure that differed from that of the just-defeated Third Republic. Convinced that the many changes in government and its leftist tinge had weakened the French state, Laval favored a more authoritarian and right-wing form of government. Second, his long-standing view that Germany and France had to reconcile was now made even more urgent by France’s military defeat at the hands of Nazi Germany. In Laval’s view, this latest round of European warfare would end in Germany winning the war, including the conquest of England. Moreover, as others mistakenly believed at the time, Laval felt that Hitler could be worked with and perhaps even managed.¹²

The first objective of substituting a more authoritarian form of government for the existing Third Republic did not take long to implement. Pétain shared Laval’s notion that the democracy of the Third Republic weakened France and that a stronger, more authoritarian form of government was desirable. On July 10, 1940, Pétain and Laval prevailed upon the French National Assembly to vote itself out of existence, which it did by a vote of 569 to 80. This formally ended the Third Republic. Pétain now launched the Révolution nationale, an authoritarian regime aimed at restoring France.¹³

In October, Laval was in Paris when informed by the German ambassador to Vichy France, Otto Abetz, with whom Laval had established a close relationship, that he would soon be meeting the German foreign minister, Joachim Ribbentrop. The meeting turned out to include Hitler as well, who said he would like to meet with Pétain. On October 24, 1940, Hitler, Ribbentrop, Pétain, and Laval met at Montoire, a Parisian suburb. “Montoire,” as it was to be known, was more significant for its symbolism than for any concrete results. The German leaders had hoped that France would declare war against England, but Pétain, who still had a semblance of authority, did not accede to the request. Pétain and Laval did agree that France would fight the British to retain control over French colonies.

Shortly after the conference, Pétain made an infamous radio address to the French people in which he announced that he had experienced no pressure from Hitler but that “a collaboration was envisaged between our two countries.” Collaboration was undertaken, according to Pétain, to preserve French unity and French sovereignty.¹⁴

Prior to Montoire, Laval had insisted that the French foreign minister, Paul Baudouin, not attend the meeting. This caused Baudouin to resign. Laval was then named foreign minister, a position from which he could effectuate the goal of cooperation with Germany.¹⁵ Laval was able to quickly resolve two separate issues of importance to Germany. The first related to Belgian gold reserves that had been given to the Bank of France for safekeeping after Germany’s occupation of Belgium. Just before the fall of France, these gold reserves were transferred to French West Africa to keep them out of German control. Germany now wanted to ensure that these gold reserves not fall into British hands. Initially, they were to be returned to the Belgian National Bank, and the Germans insisted that, as an occupying power, they stood in the shoes of the Belgian National Bank. Laval assented to this position.¹⁶

A second issue after Montoire, again indicating French cooperation with Germany’s war effort, involved the French-owned Bor copper mines in Yugoslavia. Because of the need for copper in the production of war materiel, the Germans wanted to purchase these mines. Prior to Montoire, the French government rebuffed these requests. After Montoire, Laval instructed the directors of the French company to sell the Bor mines to the Germans. The sale took place and ownership was placed in German hands.¹⁷

Laval’s first tenure with the Vichy regime was to be of short duration. On December 13, 1940, Pétain asked for the resignation of all his ministers, which he received. He then announced that he accepted the resignations of Laval and one other minister. Why Pétain sacked Laval has been the subject of much speculation over the years. Geoffrey Warner, in his political biography of Laval, concludes it was a personality clash between the military approach of Pétain and the more casual, parliamentary approach of Laval. ¹⁸ Pétain liked decision-making along clear lines of authority; Laval tended to make decisions without “going through channels.” A more mundane explanation is that Pétain was tired of Laval blowing smoke in his face, something that Laval quite literally is supposed to have done.¹⁹ Whatever the reason, Laval’s first association with the Vichy regime ended, and he was to proceed into oblivion for the next sixteen months.²⁰

Laval as Prime Minister: April 1942 to April 1944

By April 1942, the nature of the Second World War had changed. Following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the United States entered the war. Events on the Soviet front, however, were more likely of concern to Germany. Contrary to the expectations of Hitler and his generals, the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 did not lead to a quick victory. Even though the German military was still on the offensive on its eastern front, the war now promised to be lengthier and more demanding than Hitler and the German military had anticipated. This led to Germany expecting more from France, its vassal ally. Playing on his background as someone who could deal with Germany, Laval began to orchestrate his return to power by suggesting that only he could finesse the tension between France’s independence and its cooperation with Germany.²¹

At this time, the United States still maintained diplomatic relations with the Vichy government. When American diplomats learned of Laval’s possible return, they made clear that this move would lead to the rupture of such relations.²² Once Hitler was informed of American pressure against Laval’s return, he “issued an ultimatum of his own to the effect that he would judge France’s willingness to collaborate with Germany by the presence or absence of Laval in the French Government.”²³ This made Laval’s return inevitable.

On April 15, 1942, a new government was formed. Laval was to hold several ministries, including the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Laval was also designated as “head of the government,” responsible only to Pétain, now the figurehead head of state.²⁴ In effect, Laval now ruled Vichy France, with the acquiescence and support of his German overlords.

In one critical sense, cooperation with Germany was more important to Laval in 1942 than it had been in 1940. Two years earlier, it was simply a matter of attempting to ameliorate the harshness of the German occupation and retaining whatever was left of French sovereignty. Now Germany was fighting the Soviet Union, and to Laval this made all the difference. Laval viewed the spread of Soviet communism as a greater threat to France than Germany’s National Socialism. Laval was convinced that Germany’s defeat at the hands of the Soviets would result in Soviet expansion to the Rhine, leaving France at the mercy of the Soviet Union. As Laval saw it, Germany’s interests and France’s objectives were now the same: the defeat of the communist Soviet Union.²⁵

Thus, Laval’s oft-quoted radio statement to the French people, made during his second tenure with the Vichy government: “je veux la victoire de l’Allemagne” (“I wish for a German victory”). ²⁶ The statement certainly proved damaging to Laval at his trial in 1945. However, as he saw it, this sentiment made him a French patriot who was acting in his country’s best interests.

As of April 1942 no major turning points had been reached in the war. The German army on the Russian front was still on the offensive and a major German victory at Tobruk in North Africa was a month or two in the future. Britain had staved off an invasion by retaining control of the skies over the English Channel, but it surely posed no threat to Germany. The United States was engaged in a full-fledged retreat in the Pacific and its major Pacific naval victories were still months away. But it was to be a long war and the war’s duration required virtually complete conscription in Germany, which in turn left its home-based industrial machine understaffed.

Recognizing the need for foreign laborers, Hitler appointed Fritz Sauckel as special labor czar in March 1942. Some of the shortages were to be filled by bringing forced laborers from the East, primarily Slavs, to Germany. But France was not immune. Sauckel set an immediate goal of three hundred thousand workers from both the occupied and unoccupied zones of France to be recruited in the month following May 15, 1942.²⁷ Laval, however, wanted a quid quo pro, in part because the program had to be sold to the French public. The over one million French soldiers who remained POWs since their capture by the Germans in 1940 were of great concern to Laval and the French nation.²⁸ Laval originally proposed that for every worker sent to Germany, one of these French POWs would be released and returned to France. The Germans refused. Finally, it was agreed that for every three French workers sent to Germany, one prisoner from a farm family would be allowed to return home.²⁹

Laval announced this agreement on the radio on June 22, 1942. In his address, he told the French people that his first concern on returning to power was the return of these captured French soldiers. The worker-for-prisoner exchange program, called the Relève program, would serve two purposes. First, it would bring POWs back to their families. Second, it would make a significant contribution to end the war. As Laval saw it, France could not remain “indifferent in the face of the huge sacrifices Germany is making to construct a Europe in which we must take our place.”³⁰ In his effort to sell the Relève program to the French public, Laval stated in this radio address that he wished for a German victory, insisting that this would give him latitude to obtain future concessions from Germany.³¹

Germany had multiple war objectives. One was to defeat the Allied powers and establish hegemony over Europe. Another related to the extermination of European Jewry, a policy formally implemented in July 1941 when the initial German military successes in the Soviet Union made clear that the vast majority of Europe’s Jews would now be living in places under German occupation.³²

France first implemented an anti-Jewish policy in the early months of the Vichy regime with the repeal of the “Marchand Law” in August 1940. That statute prohibited the French press from attacking any particular group on grounds of race or religion when the purpose of the attack was to arouse hatred.³³

Two months later, in October 1940, the Statut des juifs was passed—though Laval opposed it. This statute excluded Jews from top positions in the civil service and certain other high-ranking professions. There followed a series of laws permitting the confinement of foreign Jews and a statute stripping Algerian Jews of French citizenship. Postwar inquiry into the passage of these statutes reveals little German pressure towards their enactment; they appear to have been totally French-inspired initiatives.³⁴

While there were notorious anti-Semites in France, Laval does not appear to have been one of them.³⁵ Nevertheless, when it came to implementing the German plan to murder all of European Jewry, Laval participated to a degree; the degree was defined by the difference between Jews in France who were French citizens and those who were refugees from Germany or German-occupied territories. In June 1942, Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS, announced that all Jews in France were to be deported. Laval became aware of the announcement a month later.³⁶ By the end of the summer, twenty-seven thousand Jews, mostly foreign Jews, had been deported. Laval was not reluctant to have the French police assist in the round-ups that preceded deportation. When the Catholic Church protested the arrest of foreign Jews, Laval made clear to Otto Abetz, the German ambassador, that he would use the local police to drag Jews out of any church or religious building in which they were given shelter. Indeed, Laval indicated that he was glad for the opportunity to get rid of the foreign Jews, as they had always been a problem in France.

As Germany’s military successes became fewer, the intensity of its efforts to murder Jews increased. Laval was somewhat successful in preventing the deportation of Jews who were French citizens when the Germans asked for legislation depriving Jews of citizenship, or at least voiding any citizenship granted as of 1927. Laval actually refused to assent to such legislation.³⁷ The end result was that of the three hundred thousand Jews in France, about a quarter were sent to Poland, where most were gassed immediately. About a quarter of the seventy-five thousand Jews were French citizens.³⁸ Therefore, it is safe to say that Laval clearly assisted in the process by which a large number of Jews were killed. His policies, however, undoubtedly also saved a large number of Jews.³⁹ Laval himself linked the two: “[E]very time a foreign Jew leaves our territory, it’s one more gained for France’s.”⁴⁰ Thus, Germany’s efforts to eradicate Jewry from the face of Europe received some, but by no means complete, assistance from Laval.

Arrest, Flight, and Prelude to Trial

By mid-1944, the tide turned clearly against Germany. As a consequence, the powers of the Pétain regime and its ability to maneuver vis-à-vis the Germans continued to erode. On August 17, 1944, Laval was in Paris with Abetz, when Abetz, implementing a directive from German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop that the seat of the Vichy government was to be transferred from Vichy to Belfort in eastern France, told Laval he had no discretion on the question. When Laval responded that he would not assent to the transfer, Abetz then had him arrested and transferred to Belfort where, along with Pétain, he was held in custody.⁴¹

Perhaps Laval’s last official act was to turn down a request that he and others meet with Hitler. He indicated that, as a person in custody, he could not negotiate on behalf of France, and that for him to do so would jeopardize his future political career.⁴² In the meantime, the Allies were quickly advancing eastward across France. After about a month in Belfort, Laval and others were transferred to a castle in Germany where they remained until the following spring. With the complete collapse of German authority in April 1945, Laval was momentarily free. He flew to Spain, hoping that his earlier support of the Nationalists would convince Francisco Franco, Spain’s dictator, to grant him asylum. Franco, sensing the direction in which the war was heading, refused and gave Laval a choice of going to either Ireland or Portugal, both neutral countries. Laval declined and remained in custody in Spain, probably in the hope that Franco would have a change of heart.⁴³ It was not to be.

General Charles de Gaulle had by then established a government in France. De Gaulle’s desire to arrest Laval was communicated to American and British officials, who in turn made it known to Franco. Franco, not inclined to defy the victorious Allies, assented. Consequently, on July 31, Laval was flown to Linz, in the American zone of Austria; he was immediately transferred to a different plane and taken to Innsbruck, where the French authorities arrested him.⁴⁴

On August 1, 1945, Laval was flown to Paris and detained at the Fresnes prison facility. The following seventy-five days were to be full and decisive for Laval. He began by testifying as a defense witness in the trial against Pétain, appearing on the stand within two days of his arrival in France.

Once Paris had been liberated on August 25, 1944, General de Gaulle’s government wasted no time in dealing with persons seen as having betrayed France by cooperating with the Germans. It became essential to create a formal mechanism for dealing with “collaborators.” The most pressing reason was that vigilante justice was rampant. It is not clear how many persons were killed as collaborators between the successful Allied landing at Normandy on June 6, 1944, and the complete withdrawal of German forces from France several months later. The figures range from as low as nine thousand persons to one hundred thousand.⁴⁵ Because the regular courts were slow and heavily laden with judges who functioned during the Vichy regime, an ordinance of November 18, 1944, established special courts to try collaborators: a High Court of Justice for cabinet ministers and a Court of Justice for others. Magistrates for these purge courts were picked from among the less compromised members of the French judiciary. This selection method was driven by the embarrassing fact that only one French magistrate had refused to swear an oath of allegiance to Marshal Pétain.⁴⁶ Hundreds of thousands of persons were processed through these courts, and about fifteen hundred executed. Many of the imprisoned received amnesty once the immediate ardor of the postwar period cooled in the early 1950s.⁴⁷

The charges against Pétain, drawn under the same provisions of the penal code that were later applied to Laval, alleged that he acted against the interests of France in creating a form of government similar to the Franco dictatorship in Spain (Article 87) and that he collaborated with the enemy (Article 75).⁴⁸ The presiding judge and prosecutor were the same as in the Laval trial and the jury was drawn from two lists: one was comprised of members of the National Assembly who had not voted to end the Third Republic, and the second consisted of names provided by various Resistance networks. Under the French legal system, three judges and a jury deliberate jointly and the verdict is a composite of their votes.

Pétain’s trial began on July 23, 1945. As a defense witness, Laval testified that Pétain never desired to set up a dictatorship. Pétain’s very able lawyers cross-examined prosecution witnesses and delivered a stirring closing argument, urging that as peace spread throughout Europe at last, France should not bruise itself further by condemning its own. Pétain himself ended the proceeding by saying: “Dispose of me according to your consciences. Mine does not reproach me because during a long life and having arrived by age [he was eighty-nine] at the threshold of death, I affirm that I had no ambition other than to serve France.” On August 15, 1945, Pétain was found guilty and sentenced to death. General de Gaulle, however, commuted his sentence to life imprisonment. Pétain was to remain in prison until his death of natural causes in 1951, at the age of ninety-five.⁴⁹

Before turning to the trial against Laval, we briefly set out the basics of the French criminal process. Understanding this process is essential to appreciate how it was ignored in Laval’s case. The French system is a two-stage procedure that relies heavily on the judiciary.⁵⁰ During the initial investigatory stage, an investigating magistrate collects all relevant evidence, both inculpatory and exculpatory, and then decides whether a prosecution should go forward and a trial take place. In Laval’s case, the investigative stage began within three weeks of his testimony in Pétain’s trial. The investigative stage is central to the criminal process since it defines the crimes that may be considered at trial. Given its importance and given the complexity of the case against Laval, it is not surprising that on August 21, 1945, his lawyers were promised that the preliminary stage would be lengthy, involving perhaps twenty-five sessions that would take them well into November.⁵¹ Had that procedure been followed, Laval would have been given pertinent documents and participated at length in presenting his defense. Whatever charges were then recommended would be tried by a court with a jury. Laval would be questioned by the court and the prosecution and allowed to call witnesses in his defense. This would be followed by the French equivalent of closing arguments. The process that was promised never materialized.

Early on in the preliminary phase, Laval’s lawyers learned through the press that the first stage would be terminated after just five sessions. Several more sessions were quickly arranged, but they were brief and largely ineffective. Laval had a right to review prosecution documents so that he could present a complete defense. When he asked for those documents, Laval was told that the examining magistrate had them in his locked files and was away on vacation. Around the same time, the president of the High Court announced that the trial had to be over by the time of the general elections in France, scheduled for October 21, 1945.⁵² The law required that there be more potential jurors than the number ultimately selected, to give the accused an ability to challenge jurors. When the trial began, however, the number of jurors called was exactly the number required, precluding the ability to strike objectionable jurors.⁵³

Laval was charged with violations of articles 87 and 75 of the French Penal Code, plotting against the security of the state and collaboration with the enemy (the French term is “intelligence”).⁵⁴ Both the presiding judge in the trial, Pierre Mongibeaux, and the prosecutor, Andrei Mornet, had been active in the judicial process during the Vichy period but, as has been noted, it was impossible to staff a judicial proceeding immediately after liberation without recourse to such jurists. The lawyers assigned to represent Laval, senior counsel Albert Naud and Jacques Baraduc and junior counsel Yves Jaffre, were excellent lawyers. However, given the irregularity of the procedures, they were unable to properly defend their client. The defense lawyers were not given access to key documents, and because the preliminary phase had been completed in such a hurried fashion, they were unable to fully confer with Laval to prepare both him and themselves for trial. The time sequence, with preliminary investigation beginning in late September and trial scheduled for early October, to end before October 21, was just too compressed. Nevertheless, the trial began on October 4, 1945.⁵⁵

As a lawyer with extensive criminal defense experience, Laval was to be active in his own defense. His lawyers, however, felt there was little they could do because of the hurried and aberrational nature of the legal process. The transcript does not reveal any participation by these lawyers from the inception of the first day of trial until its tumultuous adjournment later in the day. The frustration of Laval’s lawyers was demonstrated at the opening of the proceedings when the presiding judge read a letter from the lawyers in which they asked to be relieved from the responsibility of representing Laval because of the premature termination of the preliminary stage. In their letter, the lawyers also expressed their concern that the haste which characterized the proceedings was driven not by judicial considerations but politics.⁵⁶ The court denied their request. It mattered little, however, since the lawyers were not even present to hear the ruling.

After the charges were read, including a reference to the deportation of Jews, Laval stated that he wished to be judged by the Jews of France. According to Laval, French Jews knew that he saved them.⁵⁷ In defending himself against the charge that the termination of the Third Republic constituted plotting against the security of the state, Laval observed that 569 out of 649 deputies voted to end the Third Republic and provisionally substitute the more authoritarian form represented by the Vichy regime.⁵⁸ When Laval mentioned that France was now free, a juror shot back: “No thanks to you.” This reaction was perhaps an omen of things to come.⁵⁹

It was around this point that events became even more heated. Laval kept complaining that his right to counsel had been denied by the irregularity of the proceedings and their rushed nature. The court responded that it had appointed lawyers to represent Laval and the fault lay with them, since they chose not to involve themselves in his defense.⁶⁰ The transparency of this comment, oblivious as it was to the abandonment of procedural norms in the case, seemed to bring Laval to a boil. He then told the court to condemn him right away. Taking this as an insult to the supposed impartiality of the tribunal, the presiding judge instructed the guards to take Laval away.⁶¹ A spectator apparently made a comment supporting Laval, at which point a juror shouted that the spectator should be arrested. Either another or the same juror then shouted: “he [the spectator] deserves 12 bullets in his hide, like Laval.”⁶² On this foreboding note, the first day’s proceedings ended.⁶³

It should be clear that regardless of whether Laval was guilty as charged, the proceedings were seriously flawed. The preliminary examination, an integral part of the French criminal process, had been prematurely and unjustifiably terminated. Defense counsel, though able, was thwarted from participating on behalf of Laval because of the truncated nature of the proceedings and the inaccessibility of key documents. The stated determination to finish the trial before the national elections scheduled for October 21 made it impossible for both the charges and Laval’s defense to be thoroughly aired, since each would have entailed a detailed and close examination of the Vichy regime. Finally, it was perfectly clear from the comments of the jurors, whose selection was flawed to begin with, that they did not have an open mind and that their expressions to that effect went unnoted by the court.⁶⁴

When the trial resumed the next day, Laval’s lawyers again asked to be relieved from representing him. They specifically pointed to the broken promise that the investigatory stage would take place over at least twenty-five sessions. In light of the stated need to end the trial before the elections, then just two weeks away, they felt there was not nearly enough time to present a defense that touched on all facets of France’s complex history during the Second World War. Raising the bar, they asked that Laval be given at least the same rights as the “monsters” of the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, being tried at the same time by the British in occupied Germany⁶⁵

Mornet, the prosecutor, responded that the case was not complex. Rather, it was based almost entirely on documents, specifically Laval’s speeches or other public statements that were not disputed and which made France the accomplice of its aggressor and dishonored it in the eyes of the world.⁶⁶ The court then took a recess. On its return, the court announced that it did not have the power to reopen the preliminary investigation. The trial would proceed. Laval could raise whatever defenses he felt were appropriate during the course of the trial.⁶⁷

The trial continued with Laval representing himself, with his roles as witness and advocate constantly shifting. The prosecution focused on his involvement in the transport of thousands of French men to work in Germany, a major component of the collaboration charge. Laval had repeatedly justified his involvement by noting that he arranged for the release of French prisoners of war in exchange for sending workers to Germany. In a rejoinder, the prosecution alluded to evidence that Laval said that most French prisoners would have to wait until the end of the war to be released.⁶⁸ Agreeing that he signed documents that directed workers to Germany, Laval urged it was important to know why he signed such documents and then restated the moot point that this type of investigation should have been done during the preliminary stage.⁶⁹ In a concession to Laval, the court noted that the charge was not that he was complicit in the creation of the new form of government—the National Assembly had voted overwhelmingly in favor of it—rather, he was liable for abuses that occurred under the new form of government.⁷⁰

Laval spent much of the balance of the October 5 session going into extraordinary depth and detail with regard to the history of his leadership. One of his lawyers, present, though not participating in the proceedings, commented that “Laval finished up by being terribly verbose and boring. His interminable expositions on the birth of the Vichy regime were listened to by an icy jury, upon whom no argument seemed to have any effect…. [The] hearing which had begun in a high state of excitement ended in somnolence.”⁷¹ Of course, this is precisely why ordinarily an accused should not represent himself. It is difficult to remain objective and perceive events through eyes and ears other than one’s own if one is also the litigant in the case, with a direct and powerful stake in its outcome.

The following day, October 6, began tranquilly enough. Laval read into evidence correspondence relating to his efforts at having a full preliminary examination and a lengthier trial.⁷² His reiteration of a lost issue seemed to have raised the emotions of everyone in court again. The prosecutor asked about the enactment of laws under the Vichy regime that Laval had signed. Laval replied that the prosecutor had applied these laws without objection at the time. The court then rushed to the defense of the prosecutor by warning Laval of the serious consequences of contempt.⁷³ A dispute then arose when Laval, with his “nonparticipating” lawyers, added they had been deprived of documents. The prosecutor responded that everything they needed to know was in the indictment. The court then asked several questions, and at one point interrupted Laval’s answer by observing that France knew all about what he had done over the four years of the Vichy regime.⁷⁴ Laval observed that the court asked the questions and at the same time answered them.⁷⁵ Several jurors then shouted that “justice would be done,”⁷⁶ and “French justice”⁷⁷—whereupon Laval said he would not answer any further questions. As he did on the trial’s first day, the presiding judge directed the guards to remove Laval from the courtroom. Jurors then shouted out “instigator,” “a bastard,” “twelve bullets,” and “he will never change.”⁷⁸ Laval remarked that this was extraordinary.⁷⁹ The wild scene ended with the disturbingly accurate statement by a juror that Laval had already been judged and France had judged him as well.⁸⁰

When the trial resumed later in the afternoon, Mongibeaux, the presiding judge, announced that the court had completed the first phase of the case relating to the charge of plotting against the state. It now turned to the second charge: collaboration with the enemy.⁸¹ This was remarkable since no witnesses had yet been called by the prosecution; the entire process had been a dialogue with Laval resulting in a narrowing of the charge, so as not to include the actual creation of the Vichy regime. Laval responded that in light of the way the court had questioned him and the reactions of some of the jurors, he felt he might be the victim of a judicial crime and, therefore, he would remain silent, not wishing to be an accomplice to the process.⁸² The court then directed Mornet to call the first prosecution witness. When Mornet said he had none, Mongibeaux adjourned the proceedings for the day.⁸³ When the trial resumed the next day, Laval was not present.

The first witness called by the prosecution on the following day was Albert Lebrun, the last president of the Third Republic. Lebrun testified as to Laval’s part in the transition from the Third Republic to the Vichy regime. This was odd since the court had previously indicated that Laval’s part in the transition would not be part of the charge, but only what he had done afterwards. Lebrun testified it was his view that after the collapse of the French army, it would have been better to have a government-in-exile than a French government that would only be endorsing the policies of the occupier.⁸⁴ This was juxtaposed with Laval’s view that to leave France was treasonous.⁸⁵ Lebrun’s testimony ended with a less than ringing endorsement of the prosecution’s position. When asked whether the creation of the new government was an abuse of power, Lebrun answered, “If you say so.”⁸⁶

The next witness was General Paul André Doyen, director of the French Armistice Commission that formally ended hostilities between Nazi Germany and France in 1940. His testimony was emphatic: Laval’s policy of collaboration in 1940 helped Germany in its fight against England and its allies, and constituted a political crime that dismembered and destroyed France.⁸⁷ Laval’s rebuttal to this evidence came at the end of the proceeding when he pointed out in a written submission that Doyen had not resigned from the chairmanship of the Armistice Commission until June 1941. Laval then asked how Doyen could have participated so long in a policy he condemned so harshly in his testimony.⁸⁸

Following General Doyen, the prosecution called Henri de Lapommeraye, a former secretary of the dissolved French Senate, who testified that in the fall of 1940, Laval, referring to the new regime, said that “this is how one reverses the Republic.”⁸⁹ De Lapommeraye, however, did not give Mornet everything he wanted. He described conversations during the same period in which Laval said that France was beaten like never before, England would be brought to her knees in six weeks, and to avoid more brutal treatment, it would be necessary to adapt to German institutions.⁹⁰ When the prosecutor asked Mornet whether Laval used the term “national socialism,” the witness responded emphatically: “No, Mr. Laval never used that term in front of me.”⁹¹

The prosecution then called Maurice Beauchamp, secretary-general to the National Federation of Deported Workers. He represented 400,000 of the 750,000 workers drafted for work in Germany, including 50,000 who had not returned and were presumed dead. Beauchamp described the brutal conditions French workers faced in Germany: they were underfed, underclothed, and exposed to Allied bombardment. Mornet placed into evidence circulars Beauchamp brought with him soliciting workers for work in Germany, signed by Laval.⁹² Upon completion of Beauchamp’s brief testimony, the prosecution once again ran out of witnesses. It then read a deposition into evidence, resulting in the gradual withdrawal of the spectators.⁹³

The prosecution continued its case by reading into evidence questions put to Laval during the investigative stage and his answers. Laval had responded to most of the questions by deferring his answer to what he thought would be a later stage in the proceeding, which, of course, never came. Nevertheless, by placing into evidence even these truncated exchanges, the prosecution put some of Laval’s more inflammatory statements made during the war before the court. Given Laval’s failure to deny the facts explicit in the questions, this process had some evidentiary value.

1. Why was he on list of possible ministers for Pétain? Because he had been in many ministries before and had been Prime Minister several times.⁹⁴

2. Wasn’t the creation of the new government with extraordinary powers delegated to Pétain an abuse of power? Deferred answer.⁹⁵

3. Did he stop France from instituting a real government abroad by intrigue and threats? Deferred answer.⁹⁶

4. Explain his discharge from the cabinet and subsequent arrest after the meeting with Hitler at Montoire and why he was known as “the Germans’ man.” Deferred answer.⁹⁷

5. Why did he return to the government in 1942 after his humiliating dismissal in 1940? Deferred answer, except to note that he wasn’t humiliated, only those who squeezed him out were.⁹⁸

6. Why did Marshal Pétain send a telegram to the Germans congratulating them on their success in repelling a British raid at Dieppe in August 1942? Answer: He (Laval) had nothing to do with telegram.⁹⁹

7. In the summer of 1942, in an infamous radio address, Laval had said he wished for a German victory.¹⁰⁰ Why did he say that, especially since the United States had joined the war at that point, allied with England, and with the Soviet Union also fighting against Germany? Did he really think Germany would win as he wished? Deferred answer.¹⁰¹

8. Later in 1942, did he not say that Germany would win the war, that England had stolen colonies from France, and that the real menace was Bolshevism, and it should not come wrapped in the fur of England and the United States to destroy French civilization? Deferred answer.¹⁰²

9. In a December 1942, press conference, had he not said that France had to choose sides without equivocation and that he wanted the victory of Germany¹⁰³ and not that of Bolshevism; and that Roosevelt carried in his baggage the double triumph of the Jews and communists and he must break them at all costs? Deferred answer.¹⁰⁴

10. Had he not thanked the French volunteers on the German side of the eastern front for fighting with Germany against the Soviet Union in the interests of France, their sacrifices complementing the efforts of the many French citizens working in Germany? Deferred answer.¹⁰⁵

11. Had he not threatened doctors who provided false certificates to persons facing the draft to work in Germany and also threatened their parents? Deferred answer.¹⁰⁶

12. Had he not placed the French police at the service of the Gestapo in the arrest of 25,000 Jews in Paris, the nights of July 15 and 16, 1943? Deferred answer.¹⁰⁷

In elaborating on his deferrals in the interrogatories, Laval added that had he not used the words attributed to him, he would not have been able to resist certain German demands, and, as a result, his actions benefited France.¹⁰⁸ The reading into evidence of Laval’s answers to the interrogatories consumed the balance of the October 8 session. The next-to-last interrogatory asked him to explain why he had signed a law on December 12, 1942, requiring Jews, both French nationals and others, to carry cards identifying themselves as Jews. Laval’s response was that he had been questioned since 9:00 a.m. with a three-hour break; it was now 5:45 p.m. and he was tired. He again noted his astonishment that the preliminary phase of the case was brusquely closed and demanded that it be continued so that he could defend himself, a right given to all accused. The question posed to him went unanswered.¹⁰⁹

On October 9, the last day of the trial, the prosecution called Leon Noel, the French ambassador to Poland from 1935 to 1939. Noel noted that his early statements in opposition to the Vichy regime had prematurely ended his diplomatic carrier. In Laval’s favor, he noted that Laval had helped Noel secure the freedom of a friend who had been a member of the Resistance and was under arrest. Noel then took a principled position, which precluded any assistance to the prosecution. Since Laval was not present to listen to Noel’s testimony, ask him questions, or offer rebuttal, Noel stated he could not in good conscience continue to testify and asked to be excused. The court granted his request.¹¹⁰

The case then proceeded to closing arguments, or more accurately, to one closing argument, since Laval and his lawyers were not present. The prosecutor summarized the evidence and asked for the death penalty.¹¹¹ Laval, for his part, had submitted a three-and-a-half-page statement, dealing largely with the credibility of prosecution witnesses. The document did not even closely resemble a closing argument. The court then recessed.

The court resumed later in the day. After noting the charges,¹¹² the court found Laval guilty on both charges, sentenced him to death, and directed that his property be confiscated.

Three days later, on October 12, Laval’s three lawyers met with General de Gaulle. They did not ask for a commutation of the death sentence, but rather for a new trial. Defense counsel Albert Naud pointed out that, as a member of the Resistance, he had absolutely nothing in common with Laval. Nevertheless, Naud argued that the trial was conducted in a scandalous fashion and that the execution of a former prime minister after such a trial would be disgraceful and set a dangerous precedent. The three defense lawyers also provided details as to the deficiencies of the trial.

Earlier, Paul-Henri Teitgen, minister of justice in the de Gaulle cabinet, agreed with the defense lawyers on the indefensible nature of the proceedings. However, when later consulted by de Gaulle, Teitgen said that events which took place during the trial were regrettable but that Laval had provoked them.¹¹³

Unbeknownst to Laval’s lawyers, de Gaulle was comparably duplicitous. While he clearly suggested to the defense lawyers that he had not decided what to do prior to the meeting with them, he had already made clear to his fellow ministers that there would not be a new trial. Predictably, the defense request for a new trial was denied.¹¹⁴

Three days later, on October 15, Laval faced a firing squad. Even the moment of Laval’s death could not pass without high drama. Immediately before his execution, Laval tried to kill himself by taking a cyanide capsule, which he had secreted in his clothes. However, the age of the poison had eroded its effectiveness. Laval was brought before a firing squad still suffering from the nonlethal effects of the poison, revived, and then shot and killed.¹¹⁵

In his prison cell, he left the following note: “For my advocates—for their information: to my executioners—for their shame. I refuse to be killed by French bullets. I will not make French soldiers accomplices in a judicial murder. I have chosen my death—the poison of the Romans, which I have carried with me through my long wanderings and which has escaped the searchings of my guards. I wish to be buried with the Tricolor scarf round my neck. I die because I loved my country too much. My last thought is for France.”¹¹⁶

Was Justice Served?

The narrowly drawn jury pool, the aborted preliminary examination, the hurried nature of the trial itself circumscribed by the arbitrary date of the pending election, the unchecked demonstrations not just of jury bias, but also of court bias, make it impossible to conclude that Laval received fair treatment. The question remains, did the French authorities execute a guilty man or an innocent man?

The charge of plotting against the security of the state (Article 87) seems most problematic. An axiomatic notion in criminal law is that before there can be a crime, there has to be notice that the complained-of conduct is unlawful. The unique situation that France found itself in after its ignoble military defeat at the hands of the Germans makes it difficult to conclude that the actions Laval took amounted to plotting against the security of the French state. Was it in the best interest of the state at that time to avoid a complete German administrative takeover of continental France, or better that its government not be beholden to the German occupiers? A strong argument can be made that everything Laval did, he did to preserve whatever little French sovereignty remained after the armistice with Germany.

This leaves the charge of collaborating with the enemy (Article 75). Was there an enemy? A proponent of Laval’s position might argue that the real enemy was the Soviet Union. There are two main difficulties with this argument. First, historically, Laval had no difficulty in trying to come to terms with the Soviet Union. In 1934, while foreign minister, he negotiated a Franco-Soviet protocol with one of Stalin’s henchmen: the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, Maxim Litvinov.¹¹⁷ Second, there was no state of war between France and the Soviet Union; indeed, during Laval’s second tenure at Vichy, the Soviet Union was engaged in a death struggle with France’s invader.

In contrast, France had declared war against Germany in September 1939 after Germany’s invasion of Poland. The following year, Germany invaded France, crushing its military forces. The terms of the ensuing armistice reflected the hapless French position. While there was a truce or armistice, there was no peace treaty. Absent a peace treaty, Germany and France were at war with one another. This made Germany the enemy.¹¹⁸

If one had to point to specific policies Laval pursued as falling under collaboration with the enemy, two would seem the most likely candidates: (1) siphoning French workers to Germany to assist it in its war effort, and (2) facilitating the deportation of Jews in France to help Germany attain its goal of annihilating European Jewry.

Transfer of Workers to Germany

As noted above, as prime minister of Vichy France, Laval reached an agreement in the spring of 1942 with Fritz Sauckel, Hitler’s forced-labor czar. Sauckel’s responsibilities were simple: to obtain workers from occupied countries to be transported to Germany so that their labor would assist in its war effort. Beauchamp’s testimony at Laval’s trial was that 400,000 French workers were sent to Germany. That number, however, included only those workers who were members of the organization that Beauchamp represented. General estimates place the number of workers sent to Germany under Laval’s aegis at about 700,000, a number consistent with Laval’s own estimates.¹¹⁹ While in prison at Fresnes prior to his trial, Laval prepared extensive notes and memoranda to be used in his defense. In the memorandum relating to the Relève program, Laval conceded that 641,500 French workers had been in Germany as of July 30, 1944.¹²⁰ Since Sauckel and the Germans agreed that one farm worker prisoner of war could be released for every three workers sent to Germany, Laval apparently considered the exchange beneficial to France. As a result, Laval stated that both he and Pétain were “sincerely grateful” for Hitler’s generous gesture¹²¹—somewhat surprising since Laval had originally asked for a one-for-one exchange.

On its face, it would seem that providing labor to a belligerent power to assist it in continuing its war effort is criminal collaboration. The enemy’s goal is to retain an efficient domestic production system while the majority of its working-age men are in the military. That goal is implemented if a large number of foreign workers are imported to staff domestic production. Nor is there anything benign about the massive transfer of civilian populations for use as workers in a foreign country. Sauckel himself was convicted of war crimes at Nuremberg for precisely such conduct and hanged. ¹²²

There is also evidence that at some point in mid-1943 Laval refused to cooperate further with Sauckel.¹²³ Logically, however, such a refusal is more inculpatory than exculpatory. First, if there had been collaboration up to the point of refusal, then a subsequent refusal cannot undo what had been done. Second, that Laval was able to say “no” to Sauckel would suggest he could have, and should have, done so earlier. It could be, however, that Laval’s refusal was triggered not so much by his newly found backbone, as by the changing wartime conditions, both external and internal. By then the tide of the war had begun to turn against Germany. The French police were no longer as cooperative in implementing the draft of French workers for Germany and the French Resistance was draining off considerable manpower from the French population, making the number of persons available for transport to Germany much smaller.¹²⁴ Until this point, however, Laval’s actions had served the Germans in their war effort. This is collaboration.

Deportation of Jews

Vichy France passed legislation directed against the Jews during Laval’s first tenure with the Vichy regime.¹²⁵ Although he opposed such legislation, he nevertheless signed it.¹²⁶ Even so, it is a stretch to see domestic legislation, even if anti-Semitic in substance, as amounting to collaboration with Germany. Such legislation was the product of internal motivation, not external pressure from the German occupier.¹²⁷ If there was collaboration, it would have to be Laval’s role in deporting Jews from France to their deaths as part of the Nazi plan for the extermination of Jews in Europe.

No doubt certain comments Laval made would suggest anti-Semitism on his part, especially his December 1942 statement at a press conference that he wished for a German victory, and that President Roosevelt carried in his baggage the double triumph of Jews and communists. Nevertheless, the general consensus, both by Laval’s biographers and by Holocaust historians, is that Laval was not an anti-Semite.¹²⁸ In the end, however, his general attitude towards Jews is a side issue since the critical question is his actual involvement in the deportation of Jews to their deaths.

There is no question that a large number of Jews, about 75,000 of the 300,000 in France at the beginning of the war, were sent to Poland, almost all of whom were killed. Certainly, the German effort to deal with Jews in France and the Vichy government’s assistance during the period he was out of office—December 1940 to April 1942—cannot be attributed to Laval. German efforts at deporting French Jews did, however, extend well into his second tenure with the Vichy government—and, in fact, became even more intense during that latter period.

On June 23, 1942, Himmler ordered that all Jews of France be deported. When Laval was informed of this shortly afterwards, probably by Adolf Eichmann who came to Paris with that message a week later,¹²⁹ Laval saw deporting foreign Jews as his only option, in the hope of saving Jews of French citizenship.¹³⁰ Thus, the Vichy regime agreed “to the deportation, as a first step, of all stateless Jews in the Occupied and Unoccupied zones.”¹³¹

In order to deport Jews, they first had to be rounded up and this required the extensive cooperation of the French police who, in the last analysis, were in the administrative hierarchy under Laval and Pétain. The authority to cooperate was given.¹³² The July 1942 efforts in Paris yielded about 13,000 Jews. When it became clear that Jews were in danger of arrest and deportation, one of their options was to head for French colonies in Africa. To prevent this, Jews were barred from voluntarily leaving the country. In explaining why, Laval stated that “it would be a violation of the Armistice agreement with Germany to permit Jews to go abroad for fear they would take up arms against Germany.”¹³³ Laval was doing his part.¹³⁴

Considerable controversy related to Jewish children. Initially, after the Parisian roundups and deportations, families were separated, and children left behind, as parents were sent to the death camps. The United States, on October 15, 1942, offered to extend visas to up to 5,000 Jewish children. In negotiations with the United States, Laval insisted that there be no publicity in connection with Jewish children leaving France without parents under such visas.¹³⁵ However, once Allied forces landed in North Africa in November 1942, technically an invasion of French colonies, negotiations broke down and no visas were issued. The breakdown of negotiations was probably preordained since Laval, speaking on French radio in mid-September 1942, said that the Vichy government was prepared to make a concession with regard to the deportation of Jewish children. Henceforth they would be deported together with their parents instead of being separated. He added, however: “No one and nothing can deter us from carrying out the policy of purging France of undesirable elements, without nationality.”¹³⁶

Clearly the cooperation of the Vichy regime in the deportation of 75,000 Jews to Poland, where most were murdered, assisted the Germans in implementing their Final Solution. Laval bears responsibility for such cooperation. His explanation, of course, was that his concern was saving French Jews and if that meant sacrificing non-French Jews in France, that was a choice he could reasonably make. It is doubtful whether a defense to a charge of collaboration with the enemy can be that collaboration was committed to avoid more damaging collaboration. And Laval did show that he could say “no” to German demands. In 1943, when Germany wanted legislation to denaturalize any person who had attained French citizenship after 1927, Laval refused. Even though this refusal cast doubt on his commitment to cooperation, the Germans took no action against Laval.

Laval’s Motivation

To the end, Laval insisted that he was a patriot who did everything in the best interests of France. It may well be that he genuinely felt that way. But that cannot be the end of the discussion. How does his subjective sincerity bear on the question of whether he collaborated with the enemy, sham trial aside?

Generally, criminal law sees intent and motive as different mental states. Intent is the state of mind at the time of conduct; conduct is intentional if it is done on purpose and not accidentally or negligently. Motive is the underlying reason that spawns the conduct. A man who reveals state secrets may have a benevolent motive. Such motive, however, does not undo the underlying crime. So too with Laval. He provided significant assistance to Germany, France’s enemy, on behalf of its two major goals: victory in the war and annihilation of European Jewry. He did it intentionally—clearly aware of the purpose he was serving. Moreover, this intentional conduct was not on its face benevolent: it breached international norms, as expressed in numerous treaties relating to the treatment of civilian populations.¹³⁷ Laval’s assistance facilitated Germany’s attainment of its dual wartime goals. Surely, this is criminal collaboration.

To defend against the collaboration charge, Laval would say that Soviet Bolshevism represented a greater threat to Europe than Germany’s Nazism. Even his “I wish for a German victory” statement was tied to the communist threat. Thus, however mistakenly, until the end, Laval felt genuinely that he could negotiate with Hitler while the ideological thrust behind Soviet expansion left no room for negotiation with the Allies. Under these circumstances, as Laval perceived them, France’s interests would best be served by a German victory and a Soviet defeat. How could it be a crime to act in France’s interest?

Hitler’s track record of broken promises makes this position difficult to appreciate, no less to defend. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and annexation of Austria came after Hitler had said that all he wanted was the Saar—which he had gotten. And, after all, it was the German military that invaded Poland in 1939, without a semblance of provocation, and then thrust across the Ardennes in 1940, utterly humbling France. It was the German, not the Soviet, administration that imposed the harsh armistice conditions on France, and at various places subjected French citizens to the brutality of the SS. In siding with Germany, Laval ignored the pattern of recent events. The only promises Hitler kept were those of death and destruction. On all others, his word was worthless. At some point, Laval’s concerns about the theoretical spread of communism in the future had to bump up against the reality of whom he was dealing with—and who was actually harming his country. This was a reality he never squarely faced.

Did Laval just guess wrong as to who would win the war? Given the same information on the war’s progress that Laval had, many Frenchmen opted to resist and refused to cooperate with the German occupiers under the Vichy regime. No one forced Laval to lead the collaborationist government. Laval’s preeminence in the Third Republic left him with the same choices faced by other former French prime ministers. Unlike other politicians, Laval sided with the Vichy government because he saw an opportunity for political advancement. Laval opted to pursue that opportunity, and it carried a price.

The Sentence

Pétain’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, while Laval was sentenced to death. Did Laval deserve a greater punishment than Pétain? This is a difficult question. Pétain was much older and mostly a figurehead in the Vichy regime. Laval, from April 1942 until he was placed in custody, was the de facto head of the government. Nevertheless, Pétain’s status as a genuine French hero is what gave the Vichy regime a semblance of legitimacy—far more than Laval could have given it. And Pétain had not been reticent about his feelings, having sent a congratulatory note to Germany after its forces successfully repelled the British raid at Dieppe. While Pétain and Laval were both reviled after the war, age alone could form a rational basis for the distinction between the two sentences, coupled also with Pétain’s heroism on behalf of France a full generation earlier. Perhaps both should have been executed, but the mercy de Gaulle showed by commuting the death sentence of the eighty-nine-year-old Pétain to life imprisonment does not, on its own, render the sentence imposed on Laval an injustice.

If the question is whether a guilty man was railroaded, the answer is “yes.” Laval collaborated with the enemy. It is, however, a stain on the de Gaulle postwar government that it failed to prosecute the leader of the Vichy regime in accordance with its own established procedures. Laval was entitled to a fair trial and he did not receive it. It is unfortunate that when the history of this period is reviewed, a tinge of martyrdom colors Laval’s collaboration.¹³⁸