Читать книгу The Central Legislature in British India, 192147 - Mohammad Rashiduzzaman - Страница 17

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DEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTRAL LEGISLATURE FROM 1861 TO 1920

The historic but failed Indian revolt in 1857, downgraded by the British Raj as little more than the Sepoy (soldiers) Mutiny save for the Indians who cherished the episode as the “first war of independence,” signified a change in the British Colonial imagination: the imperial government grasped that the great gap between the ruler and ruled in India should be bridged for better administration and peace in the subcontinent. Several British leaders felt that an institutionalized process of associating the Indians with the country’s law making process was essential for peace and stability of India.¹ The Legislative Council under the Act, 1853 had six “legislative members” but none of them were Indian. It was hardly possible for the Government to know the Indian views on the legislative measures except through indirect sources. To remove this shortcoming, the Indian Councils Act, 1861, enabled the Governor-General to associate the “sons of the soil” with law-making. In addition to the ordinary members of the Council, not less than six and not more than twelve additional members (of whom at least one half were not government officials) could be appointed by the Governor-General. The additional non-official members were appointed for a two-year term. For the first time in the British period, the Indian members were directly associated with the legislative bodies: it was the significant new British Colonial stratagem. It is for this reason ← 1 | 2 → that the Indian Councils Act, 1861, is regarded as an important milestone in the Indian constitutional history, but as a matter of practice, those bodies were functionally restricted. Their role was decisively limited to legislation and they were even forbidden to ask questions or criticize executive policy.

The Indian lawmakers nominated to the Central Legislative Council from 1861 to 1891 were either the Indian Princes or big landowners or rich merchants or retired high officials. By modern standards of representative institutions, they could hardly be called the spokesmen of the Indian people at large. The Council proceedings indicated that the Indian members had hardly shown sufficient interest in the debates except on rare occasions: their speeches were, as a rule, short, read out of the manuscripts prepared before the actual debate. As a rule, they showed keener interest only in serious discussion of the Bills relating to property, taxation and inheritance, and most legislative proposals were passed with little deliberation, and often at a single sitting. Most initiatives of sending the Bills to the Select Committees or moving amendments to the Bills were too taken by the official members. The Indian members, as a rule, did not seriously challenge to the Government; as an example, the Vernacular Press Bill 1878 was passed in the Council at a single session on the plea of urgency.² It was, however, one of the most discreditable measures passed by the then Viceroy. Even more disappointingly, not a single Indian member opposed this Bill on the Council floor, though it was universally condemned outside as the “Black Act.”³ An Annual financial statement (which we could now be called a budget) was laid on the table. It was not permissible to discuss the budget except when a new tax was proposed. From 1861 to 1892, there were only 16 new taxation proposals and on those occasions, the budget was discussed. Most of the time, the Governor-General presided over the Council meetings: any Bill passed by the Council could be vetoed by the Governor-General who could also promulgate ordinances tenable for a period of six months.

Habitually, the non-official Indian members did not show much eagerness to attend the meetings of the Council. After a few years of its working, Sir Henry Maine wrote in a minute in 1868 that the offers of seats in the Legislative Council were often declined and members who were nominated showed the “utmost reluctance to come and the utmost hurry to depart.”⁴ According to Sir H. Maine, the reason for such reluctance was the abominable weather in Calcutta.⁵ But in reality it was, perhaps, the narrow scope which made the Council sessions rather unattractive and useless. In the absence of adequate scope to influence the Executive it must have been too dull for the Indian ← 2 | 3 → “Maharajas” or “Nawabs” to sit in the Council Chamber. It could also be argued that the Indian members were not the typical lawyer-politicians who succeeded them in later years. The post-Mutiny period was rather politically dull in India. Possibly, the Indian law-makers were not interested in politics as it came to be understood later. But this transitional stage was soon to be replaced by a group of more western educated politicians. The “sham” character of the Legislative Councils was soon to be revealed. An awfully cynical comment about the Councils was made by Subramania Iyer in his address to the first session of the Indian National Congress: “The functions of these Councils are limited to registering the decrees of the executive government and stamp them with legislative sanction.”⁶ The stance of the legislative councils from 1861 to 1892 could also be described by another quotation: “The character of the legislative councils was simply this, that they were Committees for the purpose of making laws, committees by means of which the Executive Government obtained advice and assistance in their regulation and the public derived the advantage of full publicity being ensured at every stage of law-making process. Such laws were in reality the orders of the Government, but, made in a manner which ensured publicity and discussion, they were enforced by the Courts and not by the Executive; they could not be changed but by the same deliberative and public process that by which they were made, and could be enforced against the Executive or in favor of individuals whenever occasion required.”⁷ It was rightly observed by the Montagu/Chelmsford (M/C) Report that the operation of the Councils under the Act, 1861 marked the close of a Chapter in the Indian Constitutional History.⁸

While the Imperial Legislative Council functioned more or less as a Durbar of the Viceroy, the political opinion in the country outside was gradually changing. The Indian National Congress formed in 1885 was already pressing for further expansion of the legislative bodies. The shortcomings of the nominated Indian representatives were even realized a little earlier. In a letter to the Secretary of State in 1881, Lord Ripon suggested that the indirect election to the legislative councils through the local bodies should be introduced, so that the Government could run in accordance with growing public opinion.⁹ But the Secretary of State regarded that suggestion as premature and ignored it.¹⁰ Under the obvious pressure of the Congress demands, Lord Dufferin made certain important recommendations for liberalizing the legislative bodies which were finally embodied in the Indian Councils Act, 1892. It enlarged all the legislative councils and the new Central Council consisted of at least ten additional members, the maximum number being fixed at 16. ← 3 | 4 → Not more than six of the additional members could be officials. In order to maintain an official majority, however, not more than ten non-officials were admitted:¹¹ four of those were allotted to recommendations by the non-official members of the four provincial councils and one to the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce. The remaining five seats were nominated by the Governor-General on the recommendations by the Municipalities, University Senates and several commercial bodies. This was but a cautious acceptance of the principle of election. The members were given the right to ask questions,¹² and to discuss, though not to vote upon the budget. To this extent, the Legislative Councils recognized that their function thenceforth was more than merely legislative or advisory.¹³ But no member was allowed to move any resolution; the Budget was to be discussed as a whole and not item by item.¹⁴

The shortcomings of the 1892 Reforms were obvious since the nonofficial members constituted a permanent minority before the official bloc: it was impossible for a non-official member to press any demand against official opposition. Questions asked on the whole had been rare and supplementary questions could not be put. For example, only 13 questions were asked in the two years 1905 and 1906; the subjects of the questions were Services, Railways, Revenue and Exchange. There were very few questions on political grievances, but from 1905 onwards there were some questions on the partition of Bengal. Sometimes information could be denied if the answer to any question involved the officials in lengthy preparation. On the 10th March, 1905, G. K. Gokhale’s (Gokhale) question was not answered by the Government on the plea that it would involve unnecessary pressure on the officials.¹⁵ Amendments to the Bills moved by non-officials were too rare indeed. Legislative divisions were seldom pressed except in extreme cases and then only perhaps to put on record the Indian opposition to any particular measure. In the event of any unanimous opposition by the Indian members, the Government exercised its official majority to pass legislative measures. On many occasions, the Government passed Bills disregarding the strong opposition of the Indian members. For example, in 1905 the Indian Universities Bill was passed though it was stoutly opposed by the Indian members; the divisions held on the Bill indicated that only one Indian member voted in its favor.¹⁶

The authors of the M/C Report claimed that the experience of the 1892 Reforms was on the whole favorable¹⁷ and they offered two main reasons for it. Firstly, criticism had been generally temperate and informative. Secondly, participation in public affairs even in a restricted sphere gave the Indian members certain insight into administrative matters. But the presence of some ← 4 | 5 → able persons in the Councils was perhaps the more important factor for their success. In the Imperial Legislative Council, men like G. K. Gokhale, Sir P. S. Mehta, Ashutosh Mukherjee, Rashbehary Ghose and Nawab Salimulla of Dacca made their positions felt and they were respected by the Government. It was during the working of the 1892 Reforms that Indian politicians began to show greater interest in the Council’s debates. Their speeches generally lasted longer than those of their predecessors in the earlier Councils while there was a distinct attempt by the Indian members to air the complaints through the constitutional procedures provided by asking questions, moving amendments to bills and criticizing the Government through the financial procedures. Most of the leading members in the Councils were prominent lawyers in the country; they showed genuine ability in expounding public policies on the floor of the House. Gradually, a new breed of politicians emerged who were more at ease in modern style of debate. It would be a mistake to belittle the value of the work of these and other members only because their attempts did not always bear fruit. It is certain that if the majority of them had been failures, if they had lacked capacity or a sense of responsibility and if they had not acted in the best interests of the people there would have been no Morley-Minto Councils in the after years.¹⁸

In a confidential letter on June 20, 1902 to Lord Cross, the Secretary of State, Lord Curzon described the 1892 Reforms as a great success. He was particularly happy with the Imperial Council where the members, according to him, were respectful of procedures.¹⁹ Behind this story of complacent success, there was a growing demand for liberalizing the legislative bodies.²⁰ Firstly, the inability to influence the administration on important matters such as Indianization of the bureaucracy, reduction of military expenditure and taxes, and admission of Indians in the Executive Councils caused frustration to the non-official members. The Government failed to pay attention to non-official opinion on some vital issues, which later took the shape of outpouring political grievances. In 1875 the Government imposed excise duty on cotton goods produced in India to counterbalance the duty imposed on British-made cotton goods. During the discussion of the budget, this matter was from time to time raised in the Council, but the Government did not take any significant step to redress these grievances. The perceived ineffectiveness of the Indian members was further illustrated by the Government’s policy of large scale imprisonment and deportation during the agitation against the partition of Bengal. The policy of repression continued even after its vehement disapproval in the legislative bodies. Secondly, there were important political developments ← 5 | 6 → outside the Councils which put enormous pressures on the Government to think about remodeling the administration. The Indian National Congress (Congress) outside gradually gained ground as a powerful organization for discussing political grievances. There was a great famine and plague epidemic in Bombay in the 1890’s which killed a large number of people. The alleged inefficiency and negligence of the administration came to be known to the public. During this period, Bal Gangadar Tilak came to prominence as a leader of Hindu orthodoxy and a passionate critic of the Government: there were certain revolutionary crimes in this period, one of them resulting in the killing of Mr. Rand, the Plague Commissioner in 1897.

The Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon (1898–1905) was full of certain controversial events such as the Bengal Partition, the curtailment of the powers of the Calcutta Corporation, the University Reform and the Official Secrets Act which contributed to the country’s political unrest. The division of old Bengal into two provinces roused a storm of protest throughout this period while the terrorist activities of the extremists increased considerably. The agitations against that partition also brought the Congress to the forefront of national politics; most of the anti-partition demonstrations were led by distinguished Congress leaders.²¹

Lord Minto’s Viceroyalty which began in November 1905 confronted a deep and widespread political discontent. He rapidly recognized the need for further constitutional advance and conciliation in order to satisfy the moderate leaders of the country.²² A Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Arundel which was as well known as the Arundel Committee was appointed to consider the question of increasing the Indian constituents in the legislative councils.²³ In 1906, Lord Minto sent a dispatch to Lord Morley giving his reasons for further constitutional advance and the rationalization he gave could be condensed into one single sentence: the political spirit had reached a stage in India when further space for the country’s political opinion in its government could no longer be resisted.²⁴ The dispatch was followed by a long and voluminous correspondence between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State and, after that, Lord Morley introduced the Indian Councils Bill on February 17th, 1909, which became an Act of the Parliament on May 25 the same year. Obviously, the 1909 Reforms were not intended for the introduction of a parliamentary system; Lord Morley categorically stated in the House of Lords that he would have nothing to do with the reforms if they directly or indirectly led to the establishment of a parliamentary system in India.²⁵ In opening the first session of the Imperial Legislative Council under ← 6 | 7 → the Reforms, Lord Minto said: “We have distinctly maintained that representative government in its western sense is totally inapplicable to the Indian Empire. We have aimed at the reform and enlargement of our councils, but not the creation of Parliaments.”²⁶ To put it in the words of the M/C Report, the Reforms were intended to establish a kind of “constitutional autocracy” blending the principle of absolutism possibly derived from the Mughal Emperors or Hindu Kings with the principle of constitutionalism derived from the British Crown and Parliament.²⁷ Though the Reforms were welcomed on general terms, they fell short of the Congress expectations.²⁸ As far back as in 1889, the Congress demanded that at least half of the members in the Council should be elected.²⁹ Speaking at the Caxton Hall in 1909, Surendra Nath Banerjea said that the Reforms did not come up to the expectations of the Congress in many important matters.³⁰ But some of the most influential leaders in India, for example, Gokhale, set very high hopes on the reforms as they hoped that the authorities would pay greater attention to public opinion in the country.³¹

The salient features of the 1909 Reforms could be summarized under several heads: Firstly, the legislative councils were enlarged and the Imperial Legislative Council consisted of 60 members (nominated and elected) at the maximum and not more than 28 of them could be government officials. The Governor-General nominated 3 non-officials to represent certain special communities. Secondly, the principle of election which remained implied in the 1892 Reform was embodied in the Indian Councils Act, 1909.³² Thirdly, the power of the Councils was broadened by the authority of moving resolutions and asking supplementary questions. The resolutions were expressed as recommendations to the executive government and the legislative division votes could also be held on the budget and other resolutions on matters of general importance. The right to ask supplementary questions served the purpose of an inquest into the affairs of the government.³³ Lastly, it would be fair to say that the Morley-Minto Reforms constituted a decided step forward in the constitutional evolution of British India.³⁴

The most controversial measure introduced by the Morley-Minto Reforms was the separate electorate for the Muslims; in addition to the general unrest in the country, Lord Minto had to face the discontent among the Muslims in India. The main grievance of this community was their inadequate representation in the legislative councils under the 1892 Reforms.³⁵ The Muslims constituted about 23 % of the total population, but the percentage of the “elected” Muslim members from 1893 to 1903 was only 12 %. A similar ← 7 | 8 → anomaly existed also in the Provinces: in Bengal the Muslims constituted nearly 52 % of the population, but only 5·7 % of the elected representatives were Muslims.³⁶ Perhaps it was the failure of the Muslims to get adequate representation in the Councils that caused frustration or distrust about the vast Hindu majority in India. On October 1, 1906, a Muslim deputation under the leadership of Aga Khan met the Viceroy and demanded a separate electorate for the Muslims and ultimately that was granted”³⁷ which raised a vehement criticism by the Hindu leaders of the Congress as well as the Hindu elite of the Indian civil society.

An excellent review of the working of the Morley-Minto Councils given in the M/C Report is summarized under the following heads.³⁸ Firstly, the franchise was exceptionally restricted and as such it failed to give adequate political training to a larger segment of the population. Secondly, the elected members were predominantly lawyers. Thirdly, the official bloc that maintained its characteristic rigidity caused irritation to the non-official Indians. Fourthly, the presence of a very small number of elected members contributed to the “unreality in the proceedings.” Fifthly, the Indian Legislative Council showed an apparent lack of interest in legislative business: over a stretch of eight years, 1910–17, the Council passed 131 laws of which no fewer than 77 or 59 % were passed without any discussion whatsoever. Sixthly, the privilege of asking questions and moving resolutions was more frequently used; while the number of resolutions moved from 1909 to 1917 was 168, only 24 were accepted by the Government. Seventhly, the elected and nominated Indian members developed a certain amount of common outlook on all major issues. Lastly, for the first time the Indians were admitted as members of the Executive Councils at the centre and the provinces.

The chief contribution of the Morley-Minto Councils was the parliamentary experience that the Indian members gathered from the process.³⁹ Evidently, the quality of speeches in the Councils improved; there was less reading of manuscripts prepared earlier without any reference to the actual debates and there was less repetition of points and the non-officials were on the whole precise in their speeches. In the old Councils, members made their speeches sitting, but the Morley-Minto Councils changed the rules requiring the members to stand up to make any speech. Under the Rules of the Imperial Legislative Council (1862–1920), the President could suspend any of the rules and procedures to expedite the passage of a Bill. But this power was less frequently exercised under the 1909 Reforms; by and large more discussion of legislative Bills was possible. The non-official members also showed a great ← 8 | 9 → eagerness to discuss measures of technical importance; however, the legislative record of nearly 59 % of the Bills passed without discussion was unimpressive. But that figure ignored the fact that a lot of discussion was also done in the Select Committees. Non-official members tried to discuss very elaborately certain Bills of great importance; for example, the Indian Court Fees Bill, 1910; Indian Factories Bill, 1911; Indian Patent and Design Bill, 1911; the Criminal Tribes Bill, 1912; the Indian Companies Bill, 1912 which were also modified by their amendments. To give one specific example, as many as 30 non-official amendments were moved to the Indian Factories Bill, 1911, and 7 of them were accepted by the Government.⁴⁰ Private Members’ Bills had been rather scanty; only 5 private Bills were passed by the Council up to 1917.⁴¹ Nevertheless it shows that even within a very narrow sphere, the non-official Indians could initiate legislative policy. As a result, a legislative tradition had grown side by side with the bureaucratic tradition.⁴² Public interest about the role of the Indian Members was also increasing; if any repressive measure was supported by the elected members, the nationalist press habitually came out with strong criticism.⁴³ The more elaborate discussion of the budget and other financial measures helped the Indian members to learn more about the administrative intricacies; a lot of information about bureaucratic policies was also elicited by way of questions.

In spite of the general step-forward in the country’s constitutional evolution, the Morley-Minto Councils soon failed to satisfy the escalating “political hunger” of the country. It was because the fundamental purpose of the Reforms was not to train Indians in self-government but only to enable the government to realize better the wants and sentiments of the governed.⁴⁴ In a sense, the Morley-Minto reforms refused to face the basic question posed by the Indian nationalism: What is the goal of the British Rule in India?⁴⁵ Morley’s insistence on retaining the official majority further circumscribed the ambit of the Indian Legislative Council. The control of the Whitehall over the Indian Government was not even slightly relaxed under those changes, and, as a result, even the provincial governments could not respond to the pressure of the Indian representatives where they constituted a majority.

For some time after the introduction of the Reforms, the Councils gained the utmost prominence in the country as the moderate leaders believed they could be used as effective instruments to make the Government amenable to non-official demands. But the failure of the Government to make greater concessions to nonofficial opinion caused their frustration. Writing of his experience in the provincial as well as the Indian Legislative Councils, one ← 9 | 10 → member said in 1917 that resolutions and questions were on many occasions arbitrarily disallowed by the President.⁴⁶ He also complained that the rules and regulations were too inelastic to allow the Indian members to exert their position and, as a result, there was a growing frustration and a sense of helplessness among Indian representatives.⁴⁷ And certain repressive measures were passed in defiance of the Indian opposition. The worst of them was the notorious Rowlatt Bill passed in 1919: as many as 150 amendments were moved to modify the Bill’s spirit but the government refused to alter the measure in any substantial mode. Gradually the role of the Indian members came to be one of criticism only, which was often futile. World War I accelerated the political impulse of the country; India’s political horizon was widened. There was no more enthusiasm left for the Morley-Minto Councils; in October, 1916, nineteen members of the Indian Legislative Council submitted a memorandum to the Government outlining the need for post-war reforms. The memorandum could be called the country’s mandate supported by the Congress leaders.⁴⁸ It was in these circumstances that the proposals of the 1919 Reforms were being shaped. The famous declaration of August 20, 1917 outlined the general goal of British Rule in India; in elaborating the announcement, Lord Chelmsford declared that any advance in India would also make further advance in the legislatures.⁴⁹

Up to 1920, the Indian Legislative Council played, for all practical purposes, the role of an advisory body; it could not press any proposal against the official majority. Nor could it be successful in censuring the Executive. Furthermore; the financial powers were virtually restricted to the discussion of budgets. With a non-official majority and all the paraphernalia of a modem legislature, the new Central Legislature created under the 1919 Reform came to use greater power. It marked a new milestone in the growth of Indian Legislatures, which was the avowed purpose of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. The autocratic power of the Government of India and the local governments was veiled, not impaired by the legislative councils of the Morley-Minto period. But the changes wrought by the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms was, as Sir Frederick Whyte, the Central Assembly President once wrote, so substantial as to amount to a political revolution.⁵⁰ The new legislatures, both at the Centre and the provinces, were no longer mere consultative committees with a modicum of powers; they were legislatures with larger political opportunities.⁵¹ ← 10 | 11 →

Notes

1. In 1860, Sir Bartle Frere, a member of the Executive Council, made the following comment: “The addition of the native element has, I think, become necessary owing to our diminished opportunities of learning through indirect channels what natives think of our measures and how the native community will be affected by them….It is a great evil of the present system that the Government can rarely learn how its measures will be received or how they are likely to affect even its European subjects till criticism takes the form of settled and often bitter opposition.” Quoted in para 60, M/C Report.

2. Proceedings of the I.L.C. Oct. 16, 1878.

3. Ibid. (A fairly elaborate account of the protests raised against the Vernacular Press Bill is found in Surendra Nath Banerjea’s A Nation in Making. pp. 58–63).

4. Sir H. Maine’s Minutes (1862–69). (Minute No. 69, Feb. 1868. p. 167).

5. Ibid.

6. Quoted in Punnaiah, K. V. Constitutional History of India, p. 95.

7. Cowell, H. History of the Constitution of the Courts and Legislative Authority in India, p. 95.

8. Para 65, M/C Report.

9. Quoted in Gopal, S. The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, 1880–1884, p. 85.

10. Hartington’s letter to Ripon written almost a year later. Quoted in Gopal, S. Ibid.

11. Banerjee, A. C. Indian Constitutional Documents, Vol. II, p. 99.

12. S. N. Banerjee appreciated the right of asking questions in his address to the Congress session at Poona in 1895. Congress Presidential Speeches (1885–1917), edited by Natesan—p. 195.

13. Para. 69, M/C Report.

14. The proceedings of the Council show that the financial statement was given in a greater detail than before the 1892 Reforms.

15. Proceedings of the I.L.C. 10th March, 1905.

16. Proceedings of the I.L.C. 10th Feb., 1905.

17. Para. 27, M/C Report.

18. Chintamani, C. Y. Indian Politics since Mutiny, p. 46.

19. Text of the letter is reproduced in Lord Cross’s Political History which was privately printed.

20. Even in the letter mentioned above Lord Curzon commented that the “natives clamored for more.”

21. India Office Tract, 1037 (All about partition) pp. 56–86 quoted in History of Freedom Movement by Pakistan Historical Society, Vol. III, Pt. I, p. 18.

22. Banerjee, A. C. op. cit. p. 285.

23. Countess of Minto. India: Minto and Morley, 1905–1910. p. 414.

24. MacDonald, R. The Government of India, p. 69.

25. Mukherjee, P. Indian Constitutional Documents, p. 330.

26. Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council, 25th January, 1910. Also Rothermund, D.—Constitutional Reform and National Agitation in India, 1900–1950 in the Journal of Asian Studies, August 1962.

27. Para. 73, M/C Report.

28. Chirol, V. India, Old and New, p. 127. ← 11 | 12 →

29. Banerjee, A. C. Op. cit. p. 269.

30. Quoted in B. P. Singh Roy, Parliamentary Government in India, p. 56.

31. See his Budget speech at the Imperial Legislative Council on the 29th March, 1909.

32. Morris-Jones, W. H., Parliament in India, p. 48. See also Chapter III (Nature of Electoral System and Elections).

33. Para. 79, M/C Report.

34. Para. 79, M/C Report.

35. Pakistan Historical Society. Op. cit. pp. 64–65 also The Memoirs of Aga Khan, pp. 92–93. (“Our experience from the time of the Cross-Lansdowne reform in 1892 onwards had pointed out that there was no hope of a fair deal for us (Muslims) within the fold of the Congress Party or in alliance with it”).

36. These figures have been taken from History of Freedom Movement (Vol. III) Pt. I. pp. 64–65.

37. See also Chapter III (Nature of Electoral System and Elections).

38. Chapter IV. M/C Report.

39. Morris-Jones, W. H. Op. cit. p. 49.

40. Proceedings of the I.L.C. 21st March, 1911.

41. Para. 93, M/C Report.

42. “Kerala-Putra”The Working of Dyarchyp. 6.

43. On March 9, 1913 the daily Bengalee came out with an editorial condemning the elected members who opposed the amendments and supported the Criminal Conspiracy Bill, 1913. Similar comments about various controversial measures supported by the Indian elected Members are available in the files of the daily Bengalee from 1910 to 1917.

44. Despatch of the Secretary of State, Cmd. 4426, 1908.

45. Mehrotra, S. R.—The Politics behind the Montagu Declaration of 1917, an article in Politics and Society in India, edited by Philips, C. H.—p. 73.

46. Pantulu, S. Post War Reforms in Indian Review, March 1917.

47. Ibid.

48. Indian Review, May, 1917 (Memo. of the Nineteen Members.).

49. Proceedings of the I.L.C. 5th September 1917.

50. Sir Frederick Whyte’s article Political evolution in India in Foreign Affairs, January, 1926, p. 224.

51. Ibid.