Читать книгу The Central Legislature in British India, 192147 - Mohammad Rashiduzzaman - Страница 18

| 13 →

· II ·

THE CENTRAL LEGISLATURE AND INDIAN POLITICS, 1921 TO 1947

Without an iota of reservation, M. K. Gandhi’s (Gandhi) non-co-operation movement was a direct affront to the institutions created by the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms: the boycott campaign was so successfully carried out by the Indian National Congress Party (Congress) and the Khilafatists that only about 25% of the voters dared to cast their votes in the 1920 legislative elections.¹ Many competent persons who would have been assets to the deliberative bodies stayed out of the first election that heralded the new-fangled legislative institutions offered by those constitutional reforms. As a result, only the so-called “moderate Indians” who refused to toe the line with the Congress and the Khilafatist non-co-operation protest throughout India entered the Legislatures; for sure, the newly elected law-makers found themselves in an uneasy predicament that could ruin their political future. Outside the legislatures, they were bullied as the “title-hunters and job-hunters.”² Inside the legislatures, the Government apparently showed a degree of readiness to accommodate the non-official legislators’ demands and, in their turn, the elected representatives were too expected to co-operate with the Government to make the Reforms a perceptible success. Nevertheless, the elected representatives had to be extremely cautious in extending any collaboration with the Colonial Government as there was a vigorous political ← 13 | 14 → push against them in the larger political arena. And yet, the best contribution of the self-assured politicians was the acceleration of the 1919 Reforms to test their real worth in practice—their strategy was to assert their accomplishments in the new floor of constitutional politics. Without the support of those politicians at that juncture and without their dare to work the new reforms, the history of constitutional politics and institutional configuration in British India and the post-independent India, Pakistan and Bangladesh could have taken entirely different shapes.

With the visible decline of the country-wide non-co-operation rebellion and the large-scale arrest of the campaign leaders and their cohorts, the immediate and the unflinching threat to the legislatures seemingly weakened. No longer, it was a great secret—Gandhi had little faith in the legislatures as the training ground for self-government and steady organizational growth.³ However, several among his colleagues, such as C. R. Das, Pandit Malaviya, Lajpat Rai, V. J. Patel, B. C. Pal and Motilal Nehru saw the prospect of utilizing the new legislative bodies for exerting added pressure on the Government for making further political concessions. So it was almost an anti-Gandhi rise up when those leaders took initiative to enter the Central and provincial legislatures. Thus, the schism between the two groups inside the Congress: one with Gandhi’s boycott of legislatures and the other willing to enter the new legislatures culminated in the creation of the Swaraj Party in 1923; it was a new political forum under the leadership of C. R. Das and Motilal Nehru, which put forward the controversial agenda to put themselves into the legislatures.⁴ Few doubted that the 1923 election was a thumping victory for the Swarajists in the central as well as in a few provincial legislatures.

With the 48-strong Swarajists headed by Motilal and Patel and a few outstanding Independents like Jinnah and Rangachariar, the centre of gravity of Indian politics, for a while, shifted to the Central Legislature in 1924. With an eye towards the Congress Party-led nationalist movement in the country and also to establish the new group’s credibility in the legislature, the immediate Swarajist goal was to set forth the well known political grievances.⁵ Their main target was to keep up the spirit of resistance to foreign rule at a juncture when the non-co-operation stir was no longer in the highest gear and the nationalist churn was rather at low ebb.⁶ The moderates among the nationalists seemingly felt that certain good things could be achieved through the legislatures and a range of constitutional opportunities were indeed offered by the new reforms.⁷ On his election as the President of the Assembly, V. J. Patel openly admitted on the floor of the House that the working of the Reforms ← 14 | 15 → convinced him to give up non-co-operation and go into the legislatures. He outlined a number of achievements by his predecessor Sir Frederick Whyte.⁸ For a while at least, the Swarajists appeared to be the legislative wing of the Indian National Congress although few would then admitted it openly. Their political actions inside the Central Assembly such as the rejection of budget and periodic censures of the Government habitually received the utmost publicity in the country outside. Public opinion was fully aware of the limitations of the new legislatures, but they seemed to be impressed by the vigor and acumen with which the political questions were pushed in the Assembly floor. Summing up the Swarajist achievements in the Second Assembly, the daily Hindu wrote: “It has to its credit solid achievements in the direction of asserting and in some cases at any rate, receiving recognition of the rights of the subjects. It was this Assembly, again, that repeatedly rejected by majorities of 63 to 56, the Government demands for grants and subsequently threw out the Finance Bill by 60 votes to 57, acting on the principle of redressing grievances before supply.”⁹ Such reactions of the press confirmed how far the Central Legislature was alive to the political mood outside. The British press was also watching then with a great interest what was happening in the Central Legislature: The Times, for example, came out with editorial comments on all major events in the Central Assembly.

The years from 1924 to 1926 offered an excellent opportunity to the Government to take a forward step in Indian constitutional development when the Swarajists were ready to co-operate with the Government on a range of social, economic and political issues. A positive response, on behalf of the British government, to the demand for a Round Table Conference in 1924 would have strengthened the hands of those politicians who wanted to exercise only constitutional methods for India’s political emancipation. Motilal Nehru’s amendment demanding a Round Table Conference in February 1924 was far more conciliatory than had been expected of the Swarajist leader.¹⁰ He said: “We have come here to do something which we have not been doing so far. Sir, we have come here to offer our co-operation, non-co-operators as we are, if you will care to co-operate with us; if you don’t, we shall, like men, stand upon their rights, continue to be non-co-operators.”¹¹ The reasons for not responding to the Swarajist pleading to the Assembly were never fully revealed; however, some would blame Lord Reading, the then Viceroy for the lack of creative imagination for constructive initiatives.¹² His biographer, however, revealed that the constitutional debate in 1924 was taken seriously by him.¹³ He wrote to Lord Oliver, the ← 15 | 16 → Secretary of State for India, explaining the need for some “cautious move” forward to “offer some inducement for goodwill and co-operation.”¹⁴ Lord Oliver seemed to be reluctant to concede any wider scheme of reforms.¹⁵ At this stage there was also some speculation about a “conference” between the Indian leaders and a few British statesmen to settle the questions of further constitutional advance.¹⁶ But eventually only a departmental enquiry popularly known as the Muddiman Enquiry was held into the working of the Reforms to explore the possibilities of further expansion within the precincts of the 1919 Act.¹⁷ It was a great disappointment for the Swarajists and Motilal refused to serve on the Committee but several Independent leaders like M. A. Jinnah and Sir Sivasawami Iyer were among the other members who agreed to work with the team. The Report of the Committee was, however, not unanimous and when it came up for the consideration of the Assembly in 1925, the Swarajists rejected it.¹⁸

The frustration over the questions of further constitutional expansion led the Swarajists to stage a walk-out from all the legislative bodies on March 8, 1926. It was but a political demonstration marking the Swarajists’ impatience with the Government. But in September 1926, they had to go back to the legislatures to stop the Government from rushing certain important bills. In the Central Assembly, the Government introduced the Currency Bill which would fix the exchange ratio of Indian Rupees. It was a matter of national importance and the Swarajists went back to the Assembly to adopt a motion postponing the Bill’s further consideration till the next session.¹⁹ There were several other significant developments at this stage which brought defection among the Swarajists and indeed the key controversy was over the utility of the legislatures in British India. Lajpat Rai resigned from the Swaraj Party as a protest against its policy of “walk-out” from the legislatures since he held that it was more harmful to the Hindus than any other class or community.²⁰ He further argued that the “walk-out” of 40 to 50 Swarajists in the Assembly deprived only 4 or 6 Muslim constituencies of the services of their representatives, while the Hindu constituents’ loss of representation (from that walk-out) was about 6 or 7 times higher.²¹ The Swarajists who opposed such storming out of the legislative floor was known as the Responsive Co-operators who later formed an Independent Congress Party with a Central Board consisting of Pandit Malaviya, Lajpat Rai and Raja Narendra Nath for conducting elections.²² In the autumn of 1926, the Swarajist’ position was indeed unhappy; there was a mounting perception that they would possibly disappear at the future elections.²³ ← 16 | 17 →

Much recorded in the British Indian Colonial history: the communal harmony achieved by the Khilafatists and Gandhi’s followers in 1920 and 1921 did not last long. The Hindus in general were doubtful of the extra-territorial patriotism that the Khilafat agitation implied.²⁴ There was a sort of rebellion in Malabar by the Muslim Khilafatists who were better known as Moplahs. The rebels defied law and order and terrorized the public. Rumors had it that the Hindus were forcibly converted to Islam in that area, which, across the spectrum, offended the Hindus and a plethora of resolutions were moved in the central and provincial legislatures calling upon the Government to restore law and order in Malabar. It was not too difficult for the Government to bring the situation under control but the incident contributed to the Hindu-Muslim discord especially in South India that evidently spilled in other parts of British India too.²⁵ In 1923, there were several riots in the Punjab and Bengal; one of the worst riots took place in Kohat where the entire Hindu population fled away in terror.²⁶ Such communal riots killing the Hindus as well as Muslims continued to increase in number and intensity in various places; the climax reached in 1926 in Calcutta where 40 riots took place in that year killing 197 and injuring 1,600 persons.²⁷ From 1923 to 1927, nearly 450 persons were killed and 5,000 injured in various communal riots.²⁸ The Hindu-Muslim tension outside had also its impact on the proceedings of the Central Legislature; from the late 1920s the number of questions asked by the Hindu and Muslim members eliciting information about communal riots escalated.

By the end of 1926, the Hindu-Muslim bitterness was worse and the Committee appointed under Gandhi’s chairmanship in January 1925 to inquire into the communal questions did not produce any encouraging result.²⁹ Earlier in 1924, a scurrilous pamphlet called Rangilla Rasul (debauched prophet) written by a fanatical Hindu author created communal bitterness in Lahore as it was directed against Prophet Muhammad. The matter was discussed in the provincial legislatures and eventually the Central Legislature passed an enactment in 1926 in order to stop such publications inciting religious conflicts.³⁰ Another horrible incident in 1926 was the murder of Swami Shraddhanand, the leader of the Arya Samaj by a Muslim fanatic. In British India, the Arya Samaj was one of the foremost Hindu communal organizations which started a “shuddi,” and “sangathan” (reconversion to Hinduism of those who had become Muslim or Christian) movement. At this stage, the Muslims also retaliated with Tablig and Tanzim movement to keep the Muslims on the right track.³¹ Two outstanding leaders of the Assembly, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Lala Lajpat Rai were directly associated with the ← 17 | 18 → activities of Arya Samaj. They looked upon the legislatures as the key arena for serving the Hindu interests and, therefore, their followers never seriously thought of boycotting the legislative bodies. As a range of people anticipated it, the 1926 elections were dominated by the intense communal feeling that carried far reaching consequences in Colonial Indian politics.³² Pandit Malaviya and Lajpat Rai constantly harped upon Hindu interests as opposed to Muhammadan interests; it scared the Muslims in those days.³³ Religious fervor was roused at the elections;³⁴ as a result, the difference between Hindu and Muslim groupings in the newly elected legislatures was sharp in 1927. In the Central Legislature a Hindu communal group known as the Nationalists under Pandit Malaviya emerged:³⁵ on the other hand, there was as well a Muslim communal group known as the Central Muslim Party under Nawab Sir Zulfiquar Ali.³⁶

Worthwhile to note at this stage was the failure of the Swarajists in wrecking the new legislatures as they apparently changed their political trajectory. The policy laid down at the Coconada (also spelled as Kakinada) session of the Congress in 1923 was remarkable in more than one way. It formally ended the Congress alliance with the Khilafatists; furthermore, it specified that the Swarajist members of the Central and Provincial Legislatures must shun the ordinary legislative business unless the Government accepted the party’s ultimatum for the release of all political prisoners, the repeal of all repressive laws and the convention of a Round Table Conference to frame a new Constitution for India.³⁷ Now this uncompromising attitude haunted the Swarajists while they entered the new legislatures in January 1924. Except in the Central Province (C.P.), no other provincial legislature had an absolute Swarajist majority; consequently an indiscriminate obstructionist policy was viable only in one province. More to the point, Bengal was the other Province where the Swarajist leader C. R. Das could find a working majority in alliance with other members to thwart the Government. Emphatic protest against the policy of not participating in the ordinary legislative business was made by the Swarajists even in those provinces where they were in a minority but soon they realized that such a “go-alone” policy would deprive them of all opportunities of influencing the administration on a range of issues.³⁸ The opposition to the negative policy of hindrance was sharply expressed by the South Indian politicians who wanted to co-operate in any action or policy which they believed to be clearly and entirely in the interests of India.³⁹ So the Swarajists had to modify their policy and they took part in the ordinary sessions and also sat in the Committees and some of them even wanted to accept offices.⁴⁰ ← 18 | 19 → V. J. Patel, the Deputy Leader of the Swaraj Party was elected President of the Assembly and Motilal, the leader of the Swaraj Party in the Central Assembly agreed to serve on the Indian Sandhurst (Skeen) Committee. Gradually, it was impossible to disguise the fact that they were in effect associating themselves with the machinery of the new reformed constitution.⁴¹ It was felt across the spectrum that the Congress should not control the Swaraj Party policy and program inside the Indian Legislatures and they should have full liberty to act in the best interests of the country.⁴² By the end of 1926, the Swarajist newspapers were no longer calling for unbridled non-cooperation and obstruction.⁴³ In the fourth legislatures (1927–30) under the Reforms, the Swarajists were reduced in number and those places were taken by the newly styled Responsivist faction of the Swaraj Party. To their leader, Lajpat Rai, the country through the election outcomes had repudiated the policy of arbitrary hitch and “walk-outs.”⁴⁴ What’s more, the machinery of the 1919 Reforms, notwithstanding the nationalist drive against the innovations, could not be totally ignored while the Swarajists worked hard to gain control of the perceived “puppet legislatures.”

From the inauguration of the Government of India Act 1919, numerous Congress party activists felt that the Swarajist role in the legislatures was of little significance for the country’s larger emancipation.⁴⁵ Such negative attitudes gradually gained ground since 1921 but when an all British Statutory Commission (Simon) was appointed to enquire into the possibilities of furthers Reforms, the nationalists realized that the real battle for country’s liberation should be fought in the streets among the larger population. But when a formal denunciation of the Simon Commission flared in the Central Assembly floor on February 16th, 1928,⁴⁶ it irrefutably signaled the beginning for a prolonged agitation throughout the country on the most extreme lines ever yet attempted in India.⁴⁷ On that day, the public galleries of the Central Assembly were crowded for watching the debate on the Simon Commission and 134 out of 145 members were present.⁴⁸ One incident showed how seriously the non-official leaders took this occasion for demonstrating their anger against the government. Harchandri Vishindas (a non-official member from Sind) died when he was being brought to the House in an ambulance car. The member was very ill in Karachi and only came to New Delhi in response to an urgent call by the Nationalist Party whip so that he could vote against the Commission.⁴⁹

A number of the lawmakers, however, felt that the Assembly’s no-confidence motion did not necessarily reflect the political opinion outside.⁵⁰ ← 19 | 20 → This belief was partly confirmed when a few amongst the Muslim leaders wanted to co-operate with the disputed Commission. Two sessions of the Muslim League were held at the same time in December 1927, one in Calcutta and another in Lahore.⁵¹ The Calcutta Session was presided over by Muhammad Yakub, the Deputy President of the Assembly; Sir Muhammad Shafi presided over the other session in Lahore. It was the question of offering co-operation to the Simon Commission that divided the League and resulted in its two separate sessions. The Calcutta session passed the following resolution almost unanimously with only two delegates dissenting (one of them was Tamizuddin Khan who later became President, Pakistan Constituent Assembly and Speaker National Assembly, Pakistan): “The All-India Muslim League emphatically declares that the Statutory Commission and the procedure, as announced, are unacceptable to the people of India. It, therefore, resolves that the Mussalmans throughout the country should have nothing to do with the Commission at any stage or in any form.”⁵² Jinnah was an active supporter of the Calcutta session: the resolution of the Calcutta League was welcomed by the Congress press.⁵³ On the other hand, the Lahore League repudiated the Congress decision in Madras not to co-operate with the Commission.⁵⁴ One of the prominent leaders of the Lahore session was Nawab Sir Zulfiquar Ali Khan who led his dissident Muslim group in the Central Assembly to vote in favor of the Simon Commission on February 16, 1928.⁵⁵ The Justice Party in South India also felt that it would be to their advantage if they co-operated with the Commission and by the end of September 1928, all but one of the nine Legislative Councils in the major provinces had decided to appoint their respective Committees to work with the Commission.⁵⁶ The Council of State also passed a resolution supporting cooperation with the Simon Commission and it elected three members to the Central Legislative Committee for co-operation with the Simon Commission. Eventually, only two Legislatures, the Central Assembly and the C. P. Legislative Council did not revise their previous stand and the Central Legislative Committee was completed by including the members nominated by the Government from among the members of the Assembly.⁵⁷

The place of the Central Legislature in Indian politics was not strictly that of a national Parliament—it was a kind of quasi-parliament. One can hardly overstress the influence of outstanding leaders of the Central Assembly like Motilal, Jinnah, Lajpat Rai, Malaviya, Jayakar and Moonjee. Their views in the Legislature undoubtedly reflected the general trend of opinion outside. But their influence could not be universal since the British Indian provinces ← 20 | 21 → with their regional, racial and linguistic differences had distinct features. Each of the provinces had its own local leaders who often overshadowed the personalities of the Central Legislature. Pandit Motilal Nehru was undoubtedly one of the most important Indian political leaders of the time under review. His influence in some of the northern Indian provinces such as U.P., Bihar and Orissa was considerable, but his influence in Bengal, Bombay and Madras was overshadowed by that of local leaders.⁵⁸ To the Bengali Hindus, there could be no greater leader than C. R. Das popularly known as “Deshbandhu” (Friend of the Country), who was the Swaraj Party leader in the Bengal legislature. Bengal was rather poorly represented in the Central Legislature as none of her representatives there was outstanding. After the death of C. R. Das in 1925, the prominent Bengali congressmen like J. M. Sen Gupta, Sarat Chandra Bose and Dr. B. C. Roy continued to serve the provincial legislatures and dominated the local scene. To the Justice Party in South India, Motilal’s Swaraj Party was a Brahmin threat to the non-Brahmins. In the Punjab, the Unionist leader Sir Fazl-i-Husain was more prominent than anyone else. Yet the Central legislature was the only forum for all-India politics and the all-India matters could be discussed in this body only.⁵⁹ It was an important meeting place of all the divergent forces of Indian politics.

The record of Indian politics from 1924 to 1930 marked a distinct swing towards constitutionalism and then a steady decline towards extra-constitutional mass actions projecting more on the demands for independence: it was a gradual drift to the left wing movement which believed more in direct action.⁶⁰ The left wing younger generation of Congress was represented by Jawaharlal Nehru and Subash Chandra Bose and the Calcutta Session of the Congress in December 1928 had given to the British Government, to use the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, “an offer of one year’s grace and a polite ultimatum.”⁶¹ By December 1929, the period of grace came to an end when the offer of minimum national demand embodied in the “Nehru Report” was not conceded. The Lahore Congress which started its session on December 31, 1929 was a momentous event; more appropriately, it was a gathering to declare a revolt.⁶² It took certain decisions which changed the course of events for the subsequent years. Firstly, the Congress members in the Central and Provincial Legislatures were called upon to resign. Secondly, the Congress resolved for complete Independence for India. Thirdly, the All-India Congress Committee was given full authority to launch civil disobedience. The items of that radical program included: (a) breaking of the salt law, (b) boycott of foreign clothes and other British goods, (c) non-payment of land revenue, and ← 21 | 22 → (d) boycott of liquor and opium. The call of 1920, as Gandhi wrote, “was a call for preparation. The call of 1930 is for engaging in the final conflict.”⁶³ At this critical hour, the Viceroy made a speech to the Central Legislature on the 25th January 1930 apparently to rally support for the coming Round Table Conference.⁶⁴ But one thing was made clear that the Dominion Status for India was not coming too soon, which shattered all hopes of any peaceful settlement between the British Government and the Congress and so the Civil Disobedience campaign was launched in full vigor.

The years from 1930 to 1934 saw the big nationalist struggle in the shape of civil disobedience which under the Congress leadership reached its height and then gradually declined. During this period, the public attention surely moved away from the legislatures; the elections of 1930 were boycotted by the Congress; so the legislatures were again dominated by the moderates from 1931 to 1934. Though the general nationalist trend favored mass agitation, there were a few strands of opinion which were reluctant to totally abandon the legislatures. Out of 38 Swarajists in the Central Assembly, only 21 resigned and in the provincial legislatures also, all the Congressmen did not resign at the first call. J. Nehru said that Congress legislators who retained their seats had resigned from the A.I.C.C.⁶⁵ while the Nationalists under Malaviya did not first resign from the Central Legislature to join the Civil Disobedience. But soon the passage of the Textile Industries (Protection) Bill which gave preferential treatment to the British textile products disappointed them. When Malaviya’s amendments to modify the Bill were lost, he walked out with his associates on the 31st March, 1930.⁶⁶ This reluctance of the so-called Responsivists to leave the legislatures was further expressed by N. C. Kelkar, a prominent Maharastra leader and a member of the Central Assembly. In his Presidential address to the session of the Hindu Maha Sabha, he observed: “Non-cooperation with the Legislative Councils by the Hindus would not only be futile but suicidal. So long as no parallel Government is established, the boycott of Councils would be a self-imposed injury for which there is no remedy.”⁶⁷ It was felt outside that the Congressmen should not leave the legislatures to those who were “subservient to the bureaucracy.”⁶⁸

Broadly speaking, the Muslims stayed away from the Civil Disobedience movement; they did not boycott the elections of 1930.⁶⁹ Only in the North West Frontier Province, the Muslims under the leadership of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan participated in the Civil Disobedience movement.⁷⁰ There was a great response on behalf of the Muslim leaders to take part in the Round Table Conferences. It seems that the Muslim leaders at this stage were more ← 22 | 23 → attracted by the prospect of contributing to the growth of a new constitution.⁷¹ This attitude became very clear when the Muslim League later agreed to give a trial to the 1935 Reforms for “what they were worth.” The main reason for not taking part in Civil Disobedience was the growing feeling that the Congress movements were detrimental to the Muslim interests.⁷² It was the Nehru Report which roused the Muslim suspicion about the Congress motives; Jinnah was disappointed about the recommendations of the Nehru Report and he tried to bring the dissident Muslim groups together. The All India Muslim League Committee wanted to introduce certain amendments to the Report. On behalf of the League, Jinnah moved those amendments at the All-Parties Convention but they were lost.⁷³ This rejection deeply shocked him personally; to him, it was the “parting of the ways between the Hindus and Muslims.”⁷⁴ In the legislative bodies, suspicion about the Congress objectives was mounting—the demands for more Muslim representation in the services and welfare of the community in various spheres of life surely gained ascendancy. The Muslim support to defeat the Government on the legislative floor was no longer readily available. To the Muslim leaders, the Civil Disobedience Movement was little more than a contrivance to frighten the Government to grant Dominion Status to India with the communal settlement proposed in the Nehru Report; however, it was unacceptable to the Muslims.

The Congress leaders’ decision to contest the 1934 elections of the Central Assembly had a mixed reception. On the liberal sector the party, the leaders congratulated the Congress politicians for their “wise and patriotic decision” to re-enter the legislatures.⁷⁵ It also pointed out that the Congress efforts of direct action outside had been a dismal failure.⁷⁶ One delegate opposed the Congress resolution to enter the legislatures in its Bombay session of 1934: he pointed out that it was a mere waste of time to go to legislatures and it was a grave mistake to hope that the program would carry them nearer their ultimate goals.⁷⁷ The newspapers representing the left wing of the Congress Party also opposed the decision;⁷⁸ their main reason was the “failure” of the Swarajists in the past.⁷⁹ One Hindu communal organ, the Rishi welcomed the Congress decision on the condition that it must agitate against the Communal Award.⁸⁰ It also recommended that Congress members in the legislatures should work in co-operation with the Hindu Maha Sabha.⁸¹ To the Congress leaders themselves, the purpose of contesting the 1934 elections was “to use every weapon put into their hands.”⁸² It was quite clear that the Congress Party wanted to enter the Central Assembly to pass its verdict on the proposed constitutional reforms.⁸³ The Congress entry in the election contest after a long period of ← 23 | 24 → civil resistance and abstinence from parliamentary activities attracted great public attention.⁸⁴ With the emergence of a strong Congress group inside the Central Assembly, New Delhi again became the centre of political activities.⁸⁵ The Assembly opened on January 21, 1935, when 40 members of the Congress Party in Gandhi caps occupied the opposition benches.⁸⁶ Public galleries were then filled to capacity when the Viceroy had arrived to address the Assembly on the 24th January. The changed political mood which had brought the non-co-operators into constitutional places was hinted at even in the galleries where there were many adherents of the Congress.⁸⁷

The country’s political mood at that time was basically defined by the controversy over the Communal Award announced by the British Government on the 17th August, 1932. As the Award retained separate electorates and also gave “weightage” to the Muslims in various provincial legislatures, the Muslims were largely satisfied with it. The Bombay session of the Indian National Congress held in October 1934 decided that its attitude to the Communal Award would be neutral.⁸⁸ But there was a powerful section among the Congressmen known as the Congress-Nationalists who were bitterly opposed to the Award. Pandit Malaviya, leader of the Congress-Nationalists, went to the Congress Session in Bombay and moved amendments opposing the Congress neutrality to the Award; but his amendments were lost.⁸⁹ Later the Congress-Nationalists contested the 1934 elections as a separate party and their faction of eleven Congress-Nationalists formed a new party in the Assembly with M. S. Aney as its leader. Outside the Assembly, the Congress-Nationalists started a regular protest against separate electorates and the Award: the dispute became the undeniable marker of the increasing Hindu-Muslim differences across the country. The All-India Anti-Communal Award Conference sponsored by them was held on 23rd February 1935—it appointed a Committee to carry on active agitation against the Award.⁹⁰ The Muslims, on the other hand, held a pro-Communal Award Conference in New Delhi on the 24th March, 1935; this body reiterated its faith in the Award as the only way to an agreed settlement of the communal problem, and they condemned the sponsors of the on-going anti-Award movement.⁹¹

The newly elected Assembly reflected all these forces of nationalism and communalism that cast a spell of disunity inside the legislative body. On February 4th, 1935, the historic debate on the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee was launched; it continued for three days and brought political divergence on the fore.⁹² As many as 9 amendments were moved to the motion expressing various views of which three bids stood for the principal ← 24 | 25 → trends of Indian body-politic. Bhulabhai’s proposition stood for the Congress views: (a) a “root and branch” rejection of the Report and (b) the “neutrality” to the Award. But Jinnah’s motion implied (a) a trial of the Constitution for what they were worth and (b) acceptance of the Communal Award which rallied the support of practically all the Muslims. Bhai Parma Nand, representing the Congress-Nationalist views, demanded rejection of the Report as it was allegedly an arbitrary and unjust Communal Award.⁹³ Eventually, Jinnah’s amendments were accepted by the House that also impacted the growing Hindu-Muslim schism over the subject.⁹⁴ This Assembly was different from its predecessor in composition and outlook; it was now obvious to more people than ever before that the real battle for the country’s political liberation could be fought more vigorously among the people outside the floor of the House. The Central Assembly, politically speaking, lost its earlier political prestige; now the All-India legislative chamber was little more than a sounding board for the Congress leaders. Hitherto, its main role had been to criticize and censure the Government from time to time in order to justify their further demands for India’s constitutional progress. As a change of its strategy, the Congress leaders were no longer speaking of a wholesale holdup as they did in the 1920s; in fact, they supported, directly or indirectly, many measures which were intended to serve the country’s interest. Another observable phenomenon in legislative politics: though the Congress did not command a majority in the Central Legislative Assembly in New Delhi, the Congress supporters could find many issues on which other groups came forward to censure the Government.⁹⁵

The Congress leaders repudiated the 1935 Act but they decided to participate in the provincial elections under it in 1936–37 (results of those elections were published in 1937). For them, the central purpose of entering the legislatures was “not to co-operate in any way with the Act but to combat it and end it from within.”⁹⁶ In the (provincial) general elections held in the winter months of 1936–37, the Congress found itself in an absolute majority in the legislatures of the five provinces, namely Madras, U.P., C.P., Bihar and Orissa. With the support of pro-Congress groups, the Congress could also command a majority in Bombay and it was the largest single party in the North West Frontier Province, and in Assam. With this position at hand, the Congress refused to accept office in any province unless the Governor gave an assurance that he would not use his special powers in defiance of the provincial cabinet. So minority ministries were formed in the provinces where Congress members were in a majority but refused to form the cabinet. The ← 25 | 26 → constitutional deadlock was, however, settled in a rather conciliatory declaration by the Governor General on 22nd June, 1937. After this announcement, the Congress-led ministries were formed in 7 provinces: Bombay, Madras, Orissa, North West Frontier Province and the U.P., C.P., and Bihar. However, the acceptance of office by the Congress leaders and their sharp political turn was rather paradoxical as they earlier pledged to combat the constitution. It was difficult to ignore that in reality, a kind of dual control was imposed on the newly formed provincial Ministries. Firstly, they were invariably under the control of the Congress “high-command” asserting a sway from outside.⁹⁷ Secondly, they were also expected to work within the precincts of the constitutional stipulations of the Government of India Act 1935. An outstanding example of the partisan hegemony by the Central Congress authorities was at last manifested when the Congress ministries resigned in the autumn of 1939 under the Congress Party’s central directives.⁹⁸ Earlier in 1939, the Congress as well called upon its members in the Central Legislature to refrain from attending its session.

The outstanding reason for the withdrawal of Congressmen from the legislatures and ministries was the declaration of WW II.⁹⁹ It would have been feasible, tactical and wise to give the Central Legislature an opportunity to declare by a resolution the hostility of India to the Axis.¹⁰⁰ But the Viceroy declared India’s participation in the War and he suspended the Federal Scheme (of the 1935 Act) in his address to the Central Legislature on the 11th September, 1939.¹⁰¹ The explicit purpose of the address was to rally support for the war effort; but to the Congress leaders, it was an open defiance of public opinion to drag India to a global war. Earlier on the 15th February, 1938 the Congress had given its verdict by passing a resolution in the Legislative Assembly: it clearly stated that the Indian troops should not be dispatched outside without consulting the Central Legislature.¹⁰² When Indian troops were sent out to Egypt and Singapore without consulting the Central Legislature, the All India Congress Committee (A.I.C.C.) took a serious exception to this. This action was, however, defended by Lord Birkenhead on the plea that the party-leaders of the Central Assembly were consulted privately about the dispatch of Indian troops.¹⁰³ The deadlock created by the Congress-resignation stood as a big challenge; it amounted to India’s “forced” participation in the raging war. In November 1940, the Government met a formidable situation when the Congress-members dramatically returned to the Assembly Chamber to reject the Supplementary Finance Bill for additional revenue of two cores of rupees to meet the war expenditure. As the Muslim League ← 26 | 27 → remained neutral, the Congress members were successful in rejecting the Bill and thereby re-affirming its stand on the war policy of the Government.¹⁰⁴ In the momentous debate on the Finance Bill, the Government tried to persuade the Congress leaders and other political groups to accept the War as a threat to India’s security. Had it been possible to get the Bill passed, it would have been easier for the Government to show to the outside world that India’s war efforts had the sanction of her elected representatives. The denunciation of the excessive war expenditure by the Congress-members in the Assembly had earned appreciation from outside among people.¹⁰⁵

From 1940 to 1943, the Congress elements absented themselves from the legislative sessions most of the time and the absence of the Congressmen reduced the Central Legislature to only a formal entity that could be easily neglected by the British Raj. Its foremost job was only to discuss the normal routine business: the absence of Congress Party’s members gave an easy time to the Government-led legislation. The rump that existed could not resist the Government from rushing several controversial measures, such as the Defense of India Act and the Excess Profits Act. Political demonstrations were rare as the security was tight. Relevance of the legislative proceedings so declined that several times, the House business had to be postponed even though a few leaders felt that the country’s interests were not best served by the policy of abstention from the Assembly floors.¹⁰⁶ The Congress-Nationalists, however, stuck to the policy of attending the sessions regularly as they felt their abstention would be harmful to the country and the Muslim League members also continued to participate in the sessions.

The legislative standing in British India during the war years was further dwarfed by the range of unprecedented political developments beyond the walls of the Central Assembly, the continuing war and the devastating Bengal famine killings hundreds of thousands of civilians. One the most significant and unparalleled developments in the Indian political history since the WW II surfaced was the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan in 1940. This history-making resolution emphatically rejected the scheme of Federation embodied in the 1935 Act and put forward the alternative plan of Pakistan for the future constitutional set up of India. Henceforth the unleashed communal issues accelerated the political acrimony throughout India that overshadowed the Central Legislature’s standing and influence. From 1940, the Muslim League leaders made it a point to raise the Pakistan demand on the floor of the House whenever constitutional grievances were brought forward. Two other great events which took place outside the Legislature had also their impact ← 27 | 28 → on it; one of them was the so-called Cripps offer. The concluding stages of the budget session in 1942 triggered another kind of tension when Sir Stafford Cripps came to the Central Legislature in New Delhi.¹⁰⁷ His Mission was not even discussed in the Legislature as all parties agreed that it would be embarrassing to do so while negotiations were in progress.¹⁰⁸

After the failure of the Cripps mission, the Congress decided upon a mass disobedience on August 8, 1942 known as the “Quit India” movement—it was also an unprecedented phenomenon that diverted public attention from peaceful constitutional politics practiced through legislatures. It was an attempt for direct action against the “British Raj” for national independence, which soon took the shape of a virtual “rebellion.”¹⁰⁹ In order to exhort the Indian politicians to support the government in suppressing the “rebellion,” the Home Member introduced a vital debate on the 15th September 1942 which lasted for four days.¹¹⁰ The debate provided an opportunity for the Government to justify its “preventive action” in dealing with the situation. None of the parties openly justified the Congress action of an implicit rebellion, as it was understood then. The Congress-Nationalists sought to explain why such a defiant step was initiated by the Congress; even in its waning period, the Central Legislature was able to bring the both sides face to face on the floor though it was indeed a heated moment in the Indian legislative history. The Muslim League joined the Government to deplore this “Quit India” movement as it was intended not only to force the British Government but to coerce the Muslims to surrender to the Congress terms and action. The Budget session of 1943 was overshadowed by Gandhi’s fast and the excitement it caused.¹¹¹ An adjournment motion was moved on the 15th February 1943 to draw the Government attention to the great apprehension caused by Gandhi’s fast, and eventually, the proposition was talked out.¹¹² At this time, the devastating famine and terrifying food crisis of Bengal was causing great disquiet to the legislators. During the November session 1943, most of its time was spent on the discussion of the food situation.

With the return of the Congress Party to the legislative session in the autumn of 1944, the Assembly regained its enthusiasm and delivered several censure motions on the Government.¹¹³ As no elections had been held after 1934, the Legislature was already out of date and the elections of 1945 and 1946, as indicated earlier, were a great victory for the Congress and the Muslim League in the Central as well as provincial legislatures. The Congress-led ministries were formed in Assam, Bihar, U.P., North West Frontier Province, Bombay, Madras and C.P. and Orissa and soon the Congress Party ← 28 | 29 → in the Assembly saw a new leader in Sarat Chandra Bose. The Congress hold over the House was proved by the election of G. V. Mavalankar as its President. During the inter-war period, the Viceroy customarily made important political pronouncements to the newly elected members of the Assembly, but on the 28th January, 1946, while the Governor General came to address the newly elected members, he stated categorically that he would not make any striking political pronouncement.¹¹⁴ He also asked the House not to make any discussion which would reduce the prospect of a settlement of the constitutional issues or increase the bitterness already prevailing in the country.¹¹⁵ Indeed, the Legislature did not play any effectual role in the country’s political development from the beginning of the war. The impending Constituent Assembly was expected to assume the role of a forum for decisive political discussion. Soon when the Interim Government was formed in the autumn of 1946, the Assembly lost the status of a hostile critic as the Executive had the support of all the major political parties. There were numerous larger issues and excitements outside: prospects and fear of the expected partition, transfer of power worries, the specter communal killings etc. Yet the Central Legislature was not entirely a neglected institution; numerous important measures in the spheres of fiscal, commerce, industry, post-war development, international agreements etc. were debated in the Legislature. In fact, it was sustaining the Government at a critical juncture of Indian political history.

Notes

1. Cotton, H. E. A. Parties and Policies in India published in Contemporary Review, Feb., 1921. See also Chapter III.

2. Ray, P. C. India at the Cross-Roads in Contemporary Review, Feb., 1922.

3. Nanda, B. R. Mahatma Gandhi, p. 201.

4. See also Chapter III and Chapter V.

5. See Chapter IX.

6. Nanda, B. R. The Nehrus, p. 341.

7. See Chapter VI for discussion of the beneficial measures which could be achieved through the legislatures.

8. L.A. Deb., 1925 (Simla) pp. 24–25.

9. Hindu, September 9, 1926.

10. The Times, February 9, 1924. See also Chapter IX.

11. L.A. Deb., 1924, p. 370. (8th February, 1924).

12. Spear, P. India: A Modern History, p. 365.

13. Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess of Reading by his son the Marquess of Reading, p. 295.

14. Ibid. ← 29 | 30 →

15. Ibid., p. 296.

16. Nanda, B. R. The Nehrus, p. 231.

17. The Times, February 20, 1924 commented that it was utterly impossible to go beyond this enquiry.

18. See Chapter IX.

19. The Congress leaders were forced to change their mind and go back to the Central Assembly under the pressure of the Bombay businessmen. Vide, J. J. Coatman’s article “India on the Eve of Autonomy,” Asiatic Review, April, 1938.

20. Hindu, September 2, 1926.

21. Ibid.

22. Hindu, September 16 and September 23, 1926.

23. The Times, September 2, 1926.

24. Durrani, K.K. The Meaning of Pakistan, p. 110.

25. India in 1923–24, p. 248.

26. Ibid.

27. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission (Simon) 1930, para. 277.

28. Lal Bahadur. The Muslim League, p. 163.

29. Chintamani, C. Y. Indian Politics since Mutiny, p. 140.

30. Vide, L. A. Proceedings on the 20th, 24th and 25th August, 1926.

31. The Tablig and Tanzim organisations used to publish their views in the Indian languages—mainly in Urdu and Bengali. A Bengali pamphlet published in 1927 (India Office Catalogue No. BEN. D/609) gives an idea about the nature and activities of such organisations.

32. The Times, October 1, 1926. See also Chapter III.

33. Hindu, December 16, 1926. (Motilal Nehru’s press interview on the causes of defeat of the Swarajists in the U.P.). See also Chapter III.

34. See previous footnote.

35. See Chapter V.

36. See previous footnote.

37. India in 1924–25, pp. 298–99.

38. The Times, January 15, 1924.

39. Coatman, J. Years of Destiny, p. 94.

40. Gopal, S. The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin 1926, 1931, p. 13

41. India in 1924–25, p. 297.

42. Mukand Lal, “Who Should Control the Swaraj Party in the Legislatures,” Modern Review, July 1926. The writer was a member of the Bengal Legislative Council.

43. The Times. November 26, 1926.

44. Hindu, December 16, 1926.

45. Caveeshar, S. S. India’s Fight/or Freedom, p. 146.

46. See also Chapter IX.

47. The Times, February 13, 1928.

48. The Times, February 17, 1928

49. Ibid.

50. Sir Reginald Craddock. “Indian Reforms and the Simon Commission,” Contemporary Review, April 1928. ← 30 | 31 →

51. Rajput, A. B. Muslim League: Yesterday and Today, p. 49.

52. Indian Annual Register, (July–Dec., 1927), p. 438.

53. Hindu, December 31, 1927.

54. Same as above 1, p. 456.

55. See Chapter IX.

56. India in 1928–29, p. 27.

57. Ibid., p. 28.

58. Coatman, J. Ibid., p. 94.

59. In his opening address to the Central Legislature on the 9th February, 1921, the Duke of Connaught said that it was intended to serve the whole of British India whereas the provincial legislatures would meet the requirements of individual provinces. See also Chapters VII & VIII.

60. See Wilson, F. W. The Indian Chaos, p. 87.

61. Nanda, B. R. Mahatma Gandhi–p. 279.

62. Gopal, S. op. cit., p. 53.

63. Nanda, B. R. Ibid., p. 290.

64. Vide address of the Viceroy, L.A. Deb., 25th January, 1930, pp. 277–82.

65. Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, 1930, p. 340.

66. L.A. Deb., 1930, p. 2718.

67. Indian Review, Nov., 1932. p. 810.

68. Modern Review, Dec., 1933. Also U.P. Native Newspaper Report March 25, 1933, p. 6.

69. See also Chapter III.

70. Ram Gopal. Indian Muslims (1858–1947), pp. 226–27.

71. Shafaat Ahmed Khan. Indian Federation, p. 13.

72. Congress and Muslim Society, 1930, a Bengali pamphlet gave elaborate reasons for not taking part in Congress movements.

73. Indian Annual Register (July−Dec.), 1927, p. 456.

74. Bolitho, Hector. Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan, p. 95.

75. U.P. Native Newspaper Reports, Week ending April 17, 1934.

76. Ibid.

77. Indian Annual Register, 1934, Vol. II. p. 252.

78. U. P. Native Newspaper Reports, Week ending April 28, 1934.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. The Times, March 10, 1934.

83. Pioneer, October 28, 1934.

84. Raja Gopalachari, C. “The Congress Campaign,” Indian Review, August, 1936.

85. The Times, January 16, 1935. See also Chapter V.

86. The Times, January 22, 1935.

87. The Times, January 25, 1935.

88. Indian Annual Register, 1934 (Vol. II), p. 252.

89. Ibid., p. 25. (There were cries of “shame” “shame” from the Bengali group of Congress delegates when results of Malaviya’s amendments were declared). ← 31 | 32 →

90. Indian Annual Register, 1935 (Vol. I), p. 325.

91. Op cit. p. 328.

92. L.A. Deb., 1935–p. 262. See also Chapter IX.

93. L.A. Deb., 1935 (4th February), p. 269.

94. See also Chapter IX.

95. See Chapter V.

96. Vide Indian Annual Register, 1936 (Vol. II), p. 189 for Election Manifesto of Congress Party.

97. Coupland, R. Indian Politics (1936–42), p. 125.

98. Ibid.

99. B. P. Singh Roy. Parliamentary Government in India, p. 243.

100. Whyte, Sir Frederick. India: A Bird’s Eye View, p. 131.

101. Vide address of the Viceroy on 11th September, 1939, L. A. Deb., 1939 p. 431.

102. L.A. Deb., 1938, p. 664.

103. H.L. Deb., 1939 (Vol. II), p. 214.

104. Vide L.A. Deb., 11th to 13th, 16th, 18th, 19th and 20th November, 1940.

105. Leader, 15th November 1940. Also Modern Review, December 1940, pp. 85–86.

106. Modern Review, July 1940, p. 16 (Notes).

107. Sir Frederick James.The Indian Legislature in War-time, Asiatic Review, July 1945.

108. Sir Frederick James. op cit.

109. An elaborate account of the “Quit India” movement is given in Govind Shah’s 42 Rebellion.

110. Vide L.A. Deb., from 15th to 17th and 18th September, 1942.

111. Sir Frederick James. op cit.

112. L.A. Deb., 1943, p. 265.

113. See also Chapter IX.

114. L.A. Deb., 1946, p. 167.

115. Ibid.