Читать книгу The Politics of Suffering - Nell Gabiam - Страница 11

No single definition of the term humanitarianism exists, and humanitarianism’s boundaries have historically been fluid (Calhoun 2008; Feldman 2007a). In the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the apparent increase in intrastate conflict, humanitarianism went through significant transformations, and the issue of where to draw its boundaries became the subject of intense debate (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Calhoun 2008; Chandler 2001; Kennedy 2004; Rieff 2002; Terry 2002). Since the late 1980s, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) definition of humanitarianism–predicated on “the impartial, independent, and neutral provision of relief to those in immediate need because of conflict and natural disasters”–has ceased to be the industry standard (Barnett and Weiss 2008:5). Humanitarianism can now be understood to include an entire range of activities, including development, human rights, democracy promotion, gender equality, peace building, and even military intervention (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Calhoun 2008; Chandler 2001). Still, aid agencies distinguish humanitarian aid from development aid. Humanitarian aid tends to be associated with the attempt to alleviate suffering and save lives in an “emergency” situation that typically emanates from natural or man-made disasters or organized violence (Calhoun 2008; Fearon 2008). Development aid is generally associated with improving the normal state of affairs (Fearon 2008).

Development defined as “improving the normal state of affairs” is not entirely new to UNRWA. Established in 1949, the agency made its initial purpose not just to provide emergency relief assistance but also to promote large-scale socioeconomic development in its areas of operation. However, for reasons that will be explained in greater depth in chapter 2, by the late 1950s it had given up the development aspect of its mandate but has since then engaged in targeted interventions such as education and small loan programs that fall under the definition of development. What is new today, however, is UNRWA’s comprehensive embrace of development as the main ideology through which it frames its assistance to Palestinian refugees. The key concepts that informed the agency’s development approach during the implementation of the Neirab Rehabilitation Project were “sustainability,” “capacity building,” and (refugee) “self-reliance.”

UNRWA’s shift must be understood partly as the result of a severe funding crisis that the agency was facing at the turn of the twenty-first century. To address this crisis, it organized a conference in June 2004 in partnership with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) (UNRWA 2004). Held in Geneva, the conference featured sixty-seven countries and thirty-four intergovernmental organizations. Shortly afterward, in 2005, UNRWA finalized a “Medium Term Plan” that had been the subject of review and discussion at the conference. It presented the plan as an effort “to restore the living conditions of Palestine refugees to acceptable international standards and set them on the road to self reliance and sustainable human development” (UNRWA 2005a:2).

A second factor accounting for UNRWA’s recent reforms is the broader global policy shift that is taking place in refugee assistance, especially when it comes to protracted exile. UNRWA’s purported transition toward a more developmental approach in Palestinian refugee camps follows a broader reform process in the UN. Since the 1990s, UNHCR has taken steps to incorporate development in its policy on durable solutions for refugees (UNHCR 2003).

A third factor responsible for UNRWA’s recent reform process is the Oslo peace process or, rather, the post-Oslo climate. An obstacle that had stood in the way of UNRWA engagement in large-scale socioeconomic or infrastructural projects in Palestinian refugee camps was opposition (to varying degrees) from Arab host states. Officially, the main host states–Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria–consider the camps as temporary spaces housing refugees until they are able to exercise their right of return to their Palestinian homes. The advent and subsequent failure of Oslo seems to have ushered in a shift among the host states, which appear to be more flexible regarding attempts to comprehensively improve camp conditions (Al Husseini and Bocco 2009; Oesch 2014). It must be noted that these shared policies toward large-scale improvement projects in Palestinian refugee camps have not translated into identical policies on the legal status of refugees. In the 1950s, the Jordanian government extended Jordanian citizenship to its Palestinian population and the Syrian government extended most Syrian citizenship rights to its Palestinian population without officially granting them citizenship. Lebanon differs drastically from Jordan and Syria in that its refugees are denied citizenship and face severe restrictions with regard to access to health care, employment, and property ownership (Suleiman 2010).

A final factor that helped lay the ground for UNRWA’s current reform process is an apparent shift in refugee attitudes concerning attempts to drastically change the living conditions or features of their camps (Al-Hamarneh 2002; Misselwitz 2009; Al Husseini 2011, 2010). Indeed, host states have not been alone in opposing drastic changes to the fabric of the camps; the refugees themselves have historically been concerned that the camps maintain an aura of temporariness as a means of asserting refugees’ commitment to the right of return and as a form of resistance to what they see as attempts to resolve the refugee issue through economic rather than political measures. With the failure of the Oslo peace process–a sign that there was no imminent durable solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict–it became more acceptable in refugee circles to broach the idea of comprehensive and long-term improvements (Misselwitz 2009).

This emerging shift among Palestinian refugees cannot be told as the linear story of a progressive change in attitude. This story has been, and continues to be, rife with tensions and contradictions. As noted by Muna Budeiri (2014), compared with outside actors, including UNRWA, Palestinian refugees are mostly responsible for the progressive urbanization and modernization of their camps. Additionally, it is not unusual for Palestinian refugees to criticize what they see as UNRWA’s lack of concern for the harsh living conditions in some camps. For instance, over the course of my fieldwork I routinely heard refugees in Neirab and Ein el Tal, the sites of the Neirab Rehabilitation Project, complain of UNRWA complacency in the face of their hardships. These complaints were occurring at the very same time that UNRWA was facing significant resistance in the camps with regard to implementation of the project.

Indeed, there were two major rumors circulating in both Neirab and Ein el Tal at the time of my fieldwork in 2005: the first argued that the project was a deftly articulated plan by UNRWA and its Western donors to promote the permanent settlement of Palestinians in Syria and to do away with the right of return; the second argued that the real aim of the project, which drew on an understanding of development as self-reliance, was the progressive dismantlement of UNRWA and consequently the disappearance of the Palestinian refugee issue. At the same time that these rumors were making the rounds and jeopardizing UNRWA’s credibility, it became evident that in Ein el Tal, some resistance to the project was (paradoxically) due to anger over what refugees saw as UNRWA’s failure to fulfill previous promises to improve camp conditions.³

The complex and contradictory ways in which Palestinians react to camp improvements bring to light that “many of the things that development promises–whether it is electricity, roads, formal education, and biomedical healthcare or greater prosperity and consumption–are, in fact, highly desired by vast numbers of people in the nominally developing world” (Ferguson 1999; Smith and Johnson-Hanks 2015:436). However, Palestinian refugees’ complicated engagement with the discourse of development must also be read within a specifically Palestinian context. It is my contention that the complex and contradictory ways in which Palestinian refugees view improving camp conditions are indicative of two seemingly opposed currents that, while not necessarily tied to a deliberate plan on the part of a particular actor, have different political implications for the refugees. This is especially the case when it comes to the right of return. I refer to these two seemingly clashing currents as the “politics of suffering” and the “politics of citizenship.”