Читать книгу The Nuremberg Trials: Complete Tribunal Proceedings (V. 11) - nternational Military Tribunal - Страница 8
ОглавлениеNow we come to the memorandum which you have already mentioned. I want you to describe to the Tribunal the reasons which caused the Reichsbank Directorate, with Schacht at the head, to submit that memorandum to Hitler, and what the tactical purposes were which the Directorate, and therefore Schacht, hoped to achieve by that memorandum.
VOCKE: If we had been able to speak frankly, of course, we would have said: You must stop armaments. But the Reichsbank itself could not do this. Instead, we had to limit ourselves to the question of our responsibility for the currency. Therefore, the Reichsbank memorandum dealt with the question of currency. It said: If the financing of armaments is continued, German currency will be ruined and there will be inflation in Germany.
The memorandum also spoke of limitless credits, of unrestrained expansion of credits, and unrestrained expenditure. By expenditure we meant armaments. That was quite clear.
THE PRESIDENT: We have all seen the memorandum, have we not?
DR. DIX: He is not speaking about the contents of the memorandum, but of the reasons, the tactical reasons.
[Turning to the witness.] You understand, Herr Vocke, the Tribunal knows the text of the memorandum, so please confine yourself to what I have asked you.
VOCKE: The memorandum had to deal with the question of currency, but at the same time, we made quite clear what we wanted: Limitation of foreign policy. That shows clearly what we wanted: Limitation of expenditure, limitation of foreign policy, of foreign policy aims. We pointed out that expenditure had reached a point beyond which we could not go, and that a stop must be put to it. In other words, the expenditure policy, that is the armaments program must be checked.
DR. DIX: Now tell us, did you anticipate the effect that that memorandum would have on Hitler? What did you expect, tactically?
VOCKE: Either the memorandum would result in a halt of this intolerable expenditure which had brought us to ruin—for at the end of 1938 there was no more money available, instead there was a cash deficit of nearly 1,000 million. That had to be faced, and the Minister of Finance was on our side. If this was not recognized, then the smash would come and we would have to be released. There was no other alternative. We took the unusual step of getting the whole Directorate to sign this document.
DR. DIX: That, in my experience, is quite unusual, because generally an official document of the Reichsbank is signed by the President or his deputy, is it not?
VOCKE: That is true. We wanted to stress that the entire Directorate unanimously approved this important document which was to put an end to armaments.
DR. DIX: That, Witness, is clear. Have you any reason for believing that Hitler recognized that fact?
VOCKE: Yes, Hitler said something to the effect that that would be “mutiny.” I think that is the word they use in the Army. I have never been a soldier, but I think that when a complaint is signed by several soldiers, it is looked upon as mutiny. Hitler had the same ideas.
DR. DIX: Yes, something like that does exist. But you were not present there. Who told you about that expression “mutiny”?
VOCKE: I cannot remember that any more. I believe it was Herr Berger of the Finance Ministry. But I cannot say exactly.
DR. DIX: So there was talk about this expression in ministerial circles?
VOCKE: Yes.
DR. DIX: Now, that memorandum also contained a compliment to Hitler, a reference to his success in foreign policy.
VOCKE: Yes, Schacht had adopted the habit of using flattery in his dealings with Hitler. The greater an opponent of the Hitler regime Schacht became, the more he made use of this flattery. Therefore, in that memorandum, at any rate at the beginning where he spoke of Hitler’s successes, he also used those tactics.
DR. DIX: And what was the consequence of that memorandum? Please tell us briefly.
VOCKE: The result was that first Schacht was dismissed, then Kreide and Huelse, then I, Erhard, and Lessing. The result, however, was that they knew abroad what things had come to in Germany. My colleague Huelse had made unequivocal statements in Basel, and said that if we should be dismissed, then our friends would know to what pass things had come.
DR. DIX: Did Herr Huelse tell you that?
VOCKE: Yes, Huelse told me that.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, shall we make a short pause here? I have not much more, but I still have the documentary evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: How much longer do you think you will take before you finish?
DR. DIX: It is very short and then the documentary evidence is also very short. Shall I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. DIX: Now, Witness, you have described to the Tribunal how that dismissal of Schacht and yourself came about. Why did Schacht not take that step before? Did he talk to you about it?
VOCKE: No. Throughout the years 1936 and 1937 we could not make up our minds. At first there was still hope that Hitler would steer a reasonable course as a statesman. Finally, in 1938, we reached a crisis, particularly in connection with the Munich Agreement and then after the Munich Agreement. Then, indeed, there was real anxiety that things would lead to war, and we then saw that we had to force the decision.
However, one has to consider the following: As a bank we could not bring up political or military arguments or demands which were not within our competence. The danger of inflation, which we had stressed in that memorandum, did not show until 1938, when the note circulation during the last ten months had increased enormously—more than throughout the five preceding years.
DR. DIX: So that it was not until that year that, let us say, a pretext, a means, was found to take that leap?
VOCKE: Yes.
DR. DIX: Now I will end with a general question. The high intelligence of Dr. Schacht is not disputed—that he was disappointed in Hitler and deceived by him, he says himself. You yourself, with your knowledge of Schacht’s personality must probably have had your own ideas as to how this mistake on the part of Schacht could be explained, how he could have been so deceived. Therefore, if the Tribunal permits, I should be grateful if you could give us your personal impressions about it, but...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, may I make an objection? I do not understand how the operations of Dr. Schacht’s mind can be explained by someone else. I have had no objection to any facts which this witness has known. We have even let him detail here at great length private conversations. However, speculation on Schacht’s mental operations, it seems to me, is beyond the pale of probative evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, as I think I have said before, you cannot give by one witness the thoughts of another man; you can only give his acts and his statements.
DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship. When I put the question, I said “if the Tribunal permits.” I, too, was aware of the question of admissibility...
THE PRESIDENT: You have the answer now: The Tribunal does not allow it.
DR. DIX: Then we will leave that question. May I ask Your Lordship this? Of course, I can still put questions about the treatment of the Jews by Schacht. I personally think that this chapter has been dealt with so exhaustively that it is not necessary for this witness to give us more examples of the attitude of Schacht. I would only ask to be permitted to put the same question concerning the Freemasons, because nothing has been stated about that.
[Turning to the witness.] Do you know anything about the treatment of Freemasons or the attitude of Schacht to Freemasons?
VOCKE: Yes. The Party demanded that the Freemasons should be eliminated from the Civil Service. Schacht said: “I refuse to let anybody tell me what to do. Everybody knows that I myself am a Freemason; how can I take action against officials simply because they belong to the Order of Freemasons?” And as long as Schacht was in office he kept Freemasons in office and promoted them.
DR. DIX: Now, one last question. Do you know whether Schacht ever received any gifts or had any economic advantages during Hitler’s time beyond his regular income as an official?
VOCKE: No; that was quite out of the question for Schacht. Besides, he was never offered gifts. In all his dealings, as far as money was concerned, he was absolutely clean and incorruptible. I can give examples. For instance, when he left in 1930 he reduced his pension to less than half the pension of the vice president or of any board member. He said: “These people have devoted their whole life to the bank, whereas I have given only a few years incidental service.” I could give more examples of Schacht’s absolute correctness in that respect.
DR. DIX: I believe, if the Tribunal does not wish so, it will not be necessary to give further examples. That brings me to the end of my interrogation of this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other counsel for the defense wish to ask any questions?
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Witness, do you remember the financial-political measures on the occasion of the annexation of Austria in March 1938; that is to say, in general terms?
At that time two laws were issued, both of 17 March 1938, one concerning the conversion of schillings into marks, and the other for the taking over of the Austrian National Bank by the Reichsbank.
Dr. Schacht, as a witness, stated yesterday that on 11 March he was asked what exchange rate he would consider correct in the event of an entry into Austria, and he answered that question by saying that according to the latest market rate two schillings for one Reichsmark would be correct.
After the Anschluss, my client, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, objected to the under-valuation of the schilling, and he succeeded in getting the schilling converted at 1.50 to the Reichsmark. Is that correct?
VOCKE: Before the entry into Austria I had not heard of any ratio being fixed by the Reichsbank Directorate. They were entrusted with that question only after the entry into Austria, and as experts and bankers they proposed a ratio which was in accordance with the conditions; and only a slight modification was made for the exchange. It was for the Government to make concessions, if it wanted to win over the Austrian population or make it favorably inclined.
DR. STEINBAUER: The second law deals with the Austrian National Bank. The witness Dr. Schacht has said today that the Austrian National Bank was not liquidated, but—as he expressed himself—amalgamated. I have looked up that law and it states expressly in Paragraph 2 that the Austrian National Bank was to be liquidated. That is Document Number 2313-PS. Now I ask you, Witness, do you know anything about it? Was the Austrian National Bank left in function as an issuing bank, or was it liquidated?
VOCKE: The right to issue notes in Austria, of course, went to the Reichsbank, which, as far as I know, took over the Austrian National Bank in Vienna and carried it on. I do not remember any details. My colleague Kesnick took care of that.
DR. STEINBAUER: But maybe you will remember if I quote from the official reports of the Austrian National Bank that the gold reserve of the Austrian National Bank in March 1933 amounted to 243 million schillings in gold and the foreign currency reserve to 174 million schillings, which means that roughly over 400 million schillings in gold were taken over by the Reichsbank from the Austrian National Bank.
VOCKE: I do not recall these facts any more; but if it was done, it was done by law, by the Government.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. I have that law of 17 March. I just wanted to correct a mistake which Herr Schacht must have made today unintentionally. The law he himself signed says “shall be liquidated.” I have no other questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you said earlier that the fundamental difference between Dr. Schacht and the high military leaders was that he remained a free man in his attitude to the regime. I want to ask you now, since that statement seems to imply an opinion of the high military leaders: Which of the high military leaders do you know personally?
VOCKE: Not a single one.
DR. LATERNSER: Then would you maintain that opinion?
VOCKE: In our circle of the Reichsbank Herr Keitel and other gentlemen were considered too servile and too acquiescent toward Hitler.
DR. LATERNSER: But since you had no personal acquaintance with these people do you think that you can express a somewhat critical opinion on them, as you have done?
VOCKE: Yes, I think so.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other counsel wish to cross-examine?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Witness, when you met Dr. Schacht first, as I understood it, it was on the occasion of an official visit which you paid to Von Lumm in Brussels?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During the first years of the first World War?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Schacht then held some position on Von Lumm’s staff?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was his position, Schacht’s?
VOCKE: I cannot say that. He was just one of the staff. How I came to meet him was that on one occasion when I was sent to Brussels to discuss something with Von Lumm, the latter took the opportunity to introduce his collaborators and among them was Schacht. We were merely introduced.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what was Von Lumm’s position? What was he doing in Brussels?
VOCKE: He was Commissioner for Banking with the General Command.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: General Command of the German Army?
VOCKE: Commissioner for the Banks with the Occupation Army.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Named by Germany.
VOCKE: Without doubt.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, he was a German, not a Belgian?
VOCKE: Yes, he was a German.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, some time after that Schacht was dismissed by Von Lumm, was he not?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had a discussion with Von Lumm about that and also you had one with Schacht about it, did you not? Tell me whether you had the visit...
VOCKE: I read the official reports in Berlin about the dismissal of Schacht. I was working in the Reich Office of the Interior. I only spoke about these things with Schacht when he became Reichsbank President and he spoke to me about it one day.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, before Schacht went on the staff of Von Lumm, he was director of the Dresdner Bank.
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the dismissal was because Schacht had delivered to that bank a considerable amount of Belgian francs.
VOCKE: Yes. I do not know how large that amount was.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it was considerable.
VOCKE: Maybe.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that, Von Lumm thought, gave to the Dresdner Bank an advantage which was incompatible with Schacht’s duties as a public official?
VOCKE: That, at any rate, was Von Lumm’s view. He took a very serious view, which Schacht, not being a civil servant, could not quite appreciate.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Von Lumm called a meeting and reproached Schacht?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Schacht then gave an answer to Von Lumm which Von Lumm considered was not sincere, but was merely a lie?
VOCKE: Yes. That was Von Lumm’s point of view.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, that is what Von Lumm told you about?
VOCKE: That was in the written report which I have read.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you came to talk to Schacht about it and about his answer to Von Lumm, Schacht told you that it was perhaps not quite an open answer, but not a lie?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: However, having heard both sides of it, you along with all of the other directors of the Reichsbank were opposed to Schacht’s appointment as President, as you have testified.
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you took the view, along with all the other directors, that the behavior of Dr. Schacht in the Belgian bank affair was not quite fair and not quite correct?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when Dr. Schacht came back to the Reichsbank under the Nazi regime, as I understand it, there was a good deal of resentment and reserve against him on the part of the Reichsbank Directorate, because he “in our eyes then was a Nazi. He was in close touch with Hitler and kept some things secret from us, his colleagues.” That is correct, is it not?
VOCKE: I could not say that. It is true there was a feeling against Schacht. As I explained before, because we had assumed, and I had assumed—though we were wrong about it—that he was a Nazi. It is possible that Schacht did keep things secret from us, but at any rate I do not know whether he did, or what those things were.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you not say in a statement that he was in close touch with Hitler and kept some things secret from “us, his colleagues”?
VOCKE: I do not know whether he kept things secret from us. It is possible, but I could not prove it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not true that years later, when already some fatal moments were reached in the currency system, circulation, price and wages system, “rumors came to our ears through semiofficial channels that Dr. Schacht had given Hitler the promise to finance armaments”? Did you not say that?
VOCKE: That Schacht had given the promise to Hitler? Well, in certain circles there were rumors of that nature. Whether it is true I could not say.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you felt after the Munich Agreement and after Hitler’s speech at Saarbrücken that that destroyed all hopes of peace, did you not?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And from that date, together with Pilseck, you did all in your power to persuade Schacht that a decision had to be forced?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht agreed with you, but hesitated to take the decisive step?
VOCKE: Yes. He said—Schacht was not against it in principle, but he wanted to decide himself when our memorandum should be submitted, and as this memorandum was to be signed by all of us, and each one of us wanted to make corrections, the handing in of this memorandum was delayed from October until 7 January.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The agreement was prepared by you and Pilseck?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you approached Dr. Schacht again and again on it?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he kept the draft all this time and told you that he was in doubt about the best moment to bring it before Hitler?
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was not until Hitler refused to see him at Berchtesgaden that he finally sent him the memorandum?
VOCKE: That I do not know. I have heard here for the first time that Hitler refused to receive Schacht at Berchtesgaden. It may be. I only heard that Schacht was at Berchtesgaden, and after his return, according to my recollection, he talked about his meeting with Hitler and that now the moment had come to send him the memorandum.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, your memorandum is the only source of my information, and according to my translation it says: “Finally, in December 1938, he resolved to sign it after a last attempt to speak with Hitler in Berchtesgaden.”
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At that time, there was something of a financial crisis.
VOCKE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Considerable difficulty, inflation was just around the corner, as you might say.
VOCKE: The Government was confronted with the 3,000 million mefo bills which were about to fall due and which had to be covered, and the Minister of Finance had a cash deficit of 1,000 million. The Minister of Finance came to see us and asked us to tide it over, because otherwise he could not pay the salaries on 1 January. We refused. We did not give him a single pfennig. We told him that the best thing that could happen would be that bankruptcy should become manifest in order to show how impossible it was to continue this system and this policy. He then received money from private banks.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you and Huelse, particularly Huelse, had long warned against this course of the Reichsbank, is that not true?
VOCKE: No, that is not true.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Had not you and Huelse, long before this, warned that this mefo business would end up in trouble?
VOCKE: Of course, the Reichsbank had for years fought against the mefo bills, which were to mature in March 1938, and from then on the Reichsbank did not give any more armament credits.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after his dismissal from the Reichsbank, you very frequently discussed matters with Schacht and you found that he had turned very bitter against the Government. Is that not true?
VOCKE: I did not have frequent meetings with Schacht. We met every few months in the beginning and then, when Schacht went to Guehlen, our meetings stopped; I saw him there only once or twice. But it was not only after his dismissal that Schacht became a bitter enemy of Hitler, but he had been that during the whole of 1938.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you said, “I think in his heart he hoped he would be called after Hitler’s defeat to help build a new and better order of things in Germany”?
VOCKE: Certainly. Schacht spoke to me in Guehlen about the men who would have to come after Hitler had been finally overthrown, and in conversation we mentioned the ministers who then could save Germany from despair, and Schacht was certain that he also would be called in to assist.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No further questions, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Prosecution Counsel want to cross-examine?
DR. DIX: Herr Vocke, in reply to the questions of Mr. Justice Jackson, you have explained the attitude and the statement of Herr Von Lumm about the incident in Brussels. You also told the Tribunal about the statement by Minister Severing, which he made about that incident not so long ago.
VOCKE: Yes.
DR. DIX: Did you not also speak to the President of the Supreme Court of the Reich, Simons, who was at that time in the Foreign Office and knew the case very well? Did you not speak to him about that case?
VOCKE: Yes, I spoke to him and Ministerial Director Lewald. At that time I was a young assistant judge.
DR. DIX: You will have to tell the Tribunal who Lewald was.
VOCKE: It is correct that I spoke to Simons, who later became President of the Supreme Court of the Reich, and to His Excellency Lewald, who later became Undersecretary of State in the Reich Office of the Interior, about these matters which came officially to my knowledge in my capacity as expert in the Reich Office of the Interior.
Both gentlemen smiled at the self-important attitude of Von Lumm who made mountains out of mole hills, and also at the misfortune of Herr Schacht. They smiled benevolently and saw the whole thing as a tremendous exaggeration.
DR. DIX: Thank you, that is enough. I have no further questions.
However, if the Tribunal will permit me, I should like to point out that Schacht mentioned here that on 2 January 1939 he spoke at great length to Hitler, in Berchtesgaden. I do not know whether I am confusing that with a statement made by a witness or with a statement made by him. I just wanted to point it out. If he were still sitting here as a witness, he could tell us about it.
Your Lordship, I bring that up because it was stated by Mr. Justice Jackson that Hitler did not receive Schacht in Berchtesgaden and that that was the cause of Schacht’s decision to forward that memorandum. I only mention, as this witness here cannot know it, that Schacht did speak to Hitler. If he did not say so this morning or yesterday, he will say it at any time.
I cannot remember now. Sometimes one confuses private information with what one has heard in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Put the microphone where the Defendant Schacht can speak from there and ask him the question.
[The microphone was placed before the defendant.]
DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you have witnessed the cross-examination. Would you like to tell the Tribunal what happened?
SCHACHT: When I spoke here I said that I had a long conversation on 2 January 1939 with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on the Obersalzberg, and that after that conversation, in which the suggestion was put to me to create an inflation, I considered that the time had come to take that step which the Reichsbank afterwards took, to dissociate itself from Hitler and his methods.
[The microphone was returned to the witness.]
THE PRESIDENT: There is one question I want to ask you, Witness. Did the Defendant Schacht ever tell you that he had been appointed Plenipotentiary General for War Economy?
VOCKE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: When?
VOCKE: Well, I believe he was appointed to that office in 1935. I believe that is the date. I could not say for certain.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask you when he was appointed. I asked you when he told you.
VOCKE: I cannot recall that because we had nothing to do with these things. I only know that either in 1935 or 1936—I believe it was 1935—he received such an appointment.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The question I asked you was: Did the Defendant Schacht ever tell you that he had been appointed?
VOCKE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: When did he tell you?
VOCKE: I think in 1935.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. DIX: May I put one last question to this witness?
Witness, did you have any idea of the importance of that office?
VOCKE: No. I never heard that Schacht had done anything in that function except that he had special letter headings for this. His activity in the Reichsbank continued in the same way as previously, without his selecting a staff for that office, and without—at least as far as my knowledge goes—his using the premises and facilities of the Reichsbank for this new office.
DR. DIX: Have you any knowledge as to whether he had a separate office or a separate staff for carrying on his activity as Plenipotentiary?
VOCKE: You mean commissioner general for armaments?
DR. DIX: Plenipotentiary for War Economy.
VOCKE: No, he had no separate office, and as I have said before, as far as I know he never had a staff.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
DR. DIX: May I begin with my documents? I can make the presentation of documents very brief and I am sure that I will conclude it before the end of the session, because I had an opportunity to submit a large portion of my documents during the interrogation of witnesses. May I make the general request that judicial notice be taken of everything I have not read and everything I do not propose to read. In this connection, I should like to point out that the entire contents of my document book have, with one exception, either been submitted or will be submitted now as exhibits. The exception, the document which has not been submitted, is Exhibit Number 32. That is the frequently mentioned article of the Basler Nachrichten of 14 January 1946, which, for the reasons mentioned yesterday, has not been and will not be submitted by me.
I come now to Volume I of my document book, to the exhibits which have not yet been submitted; that is, first Exhibit Number 5 (Document Schacht-5) Adolf Hitler’s Reichstag speech of 23 May 1933. That exhibit was read by Schacht in the course of his interrogation and is now being submitted.
I further submit Exhibit Number 23 (Document Schacht-23), the letter from Schacht to Hermann Göring, of 3 November 1942. Although that letter has been submitted by the Prosecution, we submit it again, and for the following reasons: In the copy which was submitted by the Prosecution, the date and the year were left out and, of course, as it has been translated literally, also in our copy. However, a confirmatory note by Professor Kraus based on the testimony given by Schacht has enabled us to make a note on it to the effect that it must be the letter of 3 November 1942, because it was that letter which caused the dismissal in January 1943. It is only submitted in order to make it easier for the Tribunal to ascertain the date. That was Exhibit Number 23.
Then I wish to submit Exhibit Number 27 (Document Schacht-27). I am not going to read it; I only ask that judicial notice be taken of it. That is the address given by Dr. Schacht at the celebration meeting of the Reich Economic Chamber in January 1937.
Then I submit Exhibit Number 29 (Document Schacht-29), excerpts from the book by Gisevius, which we want to put into evidence, and I ask you to take judicial notice. I will not read anything.
Exhibit Number 33 (Document Number Schacht-33) in my document book is a letter from a certain Morton, a former citizen of Frankfurt-on-Main, who emigrated to England, a man who was highly respected in Frankfurt. The letter is directed to the Treasury Solicitor in England and we have received it here from the Prosecution. I also ask that judicial notice be taken of its contents and want to read only one sentence on the last page. I quote:
“I last heard from Schacht indirectly. Lord Norman who was then Mr. Montague Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, told me confidentially in 1939 shortly before the outbreak of the war, that he had just come back from Basel where he had seen Schacht who sent me his greetings. Lord Norman also told me that Schacht, who had returned to Germany from Basel, was in great personal danger as he was very much in disgrace with the Nazis.”
That concludes Volume I of my document book and I pass on to Volume II, which begins with the affidavits. I must go through the individual affidavits, but I shall not read any.
The first is Exhibit Number 34 (Document Schacht-34), which has frequently been quoted, the affidavit of the banker and Swedish Consul General, Dr. Otto Schniewind, who is at present in Munich. It is a very instructive and very exhaustive affidavit and in order to save time—there are 18 pages which would take up a lot of time—I will confine myself to what I have read from this affidavit; I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the remainder. It has already been submitted.
However, I still have to submit Exhibit Number 35 (Document Schacht-35), which has not yet been submitted. I beg your pardon, but it has been submitted before. It is the affidavit of Dr. Franz Reuter. I submitted it when I spoke here about the biased nature of this biography. I ask you to take judicial notice of the rest of this affidavit.
The next Exhibit Number 36 (Document Schacht-36) is an affidavit by Oberregierungsrat Dr. Von Scherpenberg, formerly Embassy Counsellor at the Embassy in London, afterwards departmental chief at the Foreign Office and now at the Ministry of Justice in Munich, the son-in-law of Dr. Schacht. I have read a passage and I ask that judicial notice be taken of the unread portion.
The next is Exhibit Number-37(a) (Document Schacht-37(a)). It has been submitted. Here also a passage on Page 154 of the German text has been read, about the warning signal given abroad when Schacht resigned as Reichsbank President. I ask that judicial notice be taken of the remainder.
The next affidavit is by the same gentleman, who was also a colleague of Dr. Schacht in the Reichsbank Directorate at the same time as the witness Vocke, whom we have just heard. I submit it. There is no need to read anything. I only ask you to take judicial notice of its contents.
The next affidavit, Exhibit Number-37(c) (Document Schacht-37(c)) is by the same gentleman and has already been submitted. I ask you to take judicial notice of its contents. There is no need to read anything.
The next is Exhibit Number 38 (Document Schacht-38), an affidavit by General Thomas. It has not been submitted yet, and I submit it now and ask to be permitted to read one passage, beginning on the first page; that is Page 172 of the English text and Page 164 of the German text:
“Question: Schacht claims to have influenced Blomberg to delay rearmament. Can you give any information on this matter? When was it?
“Answer: I was Chief of the Army Economic Staff, that is the Army Economic and Armament Office at the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) from 1934 to the time of my dismissal in January 1943. In this capacity I had connection with the Reich Minister of Economics and Reich Bank President Hjalmar Schacht. Up till 1936 Schacht undoubtedly promoted rearmament by making available the necessary means. From 1936 on he used every opportunity to influence Blomberg to reduce the tempo and extent of rearmament. His reasons were as follows:
“1. Risk to the currency.
“2. Insufficient production of consumer goods.
“3. The danger to the foreign policy, which Schacht saw in excessive armament of Germany.
“Concerning the last point he frequently spoke to Blomberg and me and said that on no account must rearmament be allowed to lead to a new war. These were also the reasons which led him to hold out to Blomberg in 1936 and again in 1937 the threat that he would resign. On both of these occasions I was delegated by Blomberg to dissuade Schacht from carrying out his threat to resign. I was present during the conference between Blomberg and Schacht in 1937.”
I ask you to take judicial notice of the remainder of that affidavit by General Thomas.
The next Exhibit is Number 39 (Document Schacht-39); parts of it have been read, that is to say, the part Schacht played in the incident of the 20th of July together with General Lindemann; it is the affidavit by Colonel Gronau. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the remainder.
The same applies to the next Exhibit Number 40 (Document Schacht-40). That is a sworn statement, also by a colleague of Schacht in the Ministry of Economics, Kammerdirektor Asmus, now in retirement. I have also read parts of this already, namely, the passages concerning the happenings at the time of the dismissal as Minister of Economics; and I ask you to take judicial notice of the remainder.
Then we come to Exhibit Number 41 (Document Schacht-41), which is the affidavit by State Secretary Carl Christian Schmid, also in retirement. I have not yet read anything and I ask to be permitted to read two passages.
The first one is on Page 182 of the German text; Page 190 of the English text:
“When the Brüning Cabinet, which had been arranged by General Von Schleicher...”—That is not legible. I think that should be different, but it is not legible.—“When that was torpedoed by Schleicher himself, Schacht considered the early appointment of Hitler as head of the Government to be unavoidable. He pointed out that the great mass of the German people said ‘Yes’ to National Socialism, and that the Left as well as the Center had come to a state of complete passive resignation. The short life of the transition cabinets of Papen and Schleicher was clear to him from the very beginning.
“Schacht decisively advocated the co-operation in National Socialism of men experienced in their respective fields, without acceptance of its program as a whole, which he always referred to ironically, later frequently calling it ‘a really bestial ideology’ in conversation with me; but he held that the influencing of developments from important inner power positions was an absolute patriotic duty, and he strongly condemned emigration and the resort to easy armchair criticism.”
And then on Page 184 of the German text, 192 of the English text, two very short passages:
“I recall numerous talks with Dr. Schacht in which he stated that war was an economic impossibility and simply a crazy idea, as, for instance, when he was in Mülheim at the house of Dr. Fritz Thyssen, who was closely associated with Göring and Hitler before 1933 but was in strong opposition from 1934 on and also opposed any idea of war as madness.”
And, then, further down on the same page, only one sentence:
“When Schacht spoke to me he used to refer ironically to the Himmler-Rosenberg Lebensraum plans against Russia as an example of the mad presumption of extremist Party circles. Schacht’s special fad was an understanding with England,”
and so on; and I ask you to take judicial notice of the remainder of the document.
The same applies to the whole of Exhibit Number 42 (Document Schacht-42), an affidavit by the director of the Upper Silesian Coke Works, Berckemeyer.
I come now to Exhibit Number 43 (Document Schacht-43). That has already been submitted and read in part. It is the correspondence between the publisher of Ambassador Dodd’s Diary and Sir Nevile Henderson. I ask you to take judicial notice of the part not yet read, and whatever comes after Exhibit 43 has been submitted. I ask you to take judicial notice of its contents, and I forego the reading of it.
That brings me to the end of my presentation in the case of Schacht.
THE PRESIDENT: Now the Tribunal will continue the case against the Defendant Funk.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): Mr. President, with your permission I call first the Defendant Dr. Funk himself to the witness box.
[The Defendant Funk took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
WALTER FUNK (Defendant): Walter Emanuel Funk.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The defendant repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I begin with one observation: The Defendant Funk has been a sick man for many years now, and before he came into the prison he had been in hospital for some time. He was supposed to undergo an operation, which, however, due to conditions at the time, could not be carried out. He still is under medical treatment. In consideration of that fact, and because the defendant is extremely anxious to conclude his own interrogation as soon as possible, I shall put only those questions to the defendant which are absolutely necessary to give you a clear picture about his person and his activities.
[Turning to the defendant.] Witness, when were you born?
FUNK: On 18 August 1890.
DR. SAUTER: So you are now 56?
FUNK: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: First, I want to put to you the most important particulars of your life, and to simplify matters you may answer only with “yes” or “no.”
You are 56 years old. You were born in East Prussia?
FUNK: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: You come from a merchant’s family in Königsberg?
FUNK: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Then you studied in Berlin at the university, law and political science, literature and music. You also come from a family which has produced a number of artists.
FUNK; Yes.
DR. SAUTER: During the World War you were first in the Infantry, and in 1916, because of a bladder ailment, you became unfit for service?
FUNK: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Then you became an editor with several large newspapers, and you told me that for a long time you could not make up your mind whether to become a musician or a journalist. Then you decided for the latter, and in 1922, I believe, you became editor in chief of the Berliner Börsenzeitung. Is all that correct?
FUNK: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Now perhaps you will tell us what were the political tendencies of that paper on which you worked for about ten years as editor in chief?
FUNK: The tendency of the paper was somewhere between the Center and the Right. The newspaper was not tied to any party. It was owned by an old Berlin family of publishers.
DR. SAUTER: What was the attitude of that paper to the Jewish question before you took on the editorship and during the time when you were editor in chief?
FUNK: Absolutely neutral. It did not deal in any way with the Jewish question.
DR. SAUTER: From an affidavit by Dr. Schacht, I have seen that at that time—that is to say, during the twenties—you moved in circles which were also frequented by Jews, and where economic and political matters, such as gold currency, et cetera, were often discussed. Is that correct?
FUNK: I do not know anything about that.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Schacht has asserted that in an affidavit of 7 July 1945 (Document Number 3936-PS).
FUNK: I had a lot to do with Jews. That was in the nature of my profession. Every day at the stock exchange I was together with 4,000 Jews.
DR. SAUTER: Then in 1931 you resigned your post as editor in chief?
FUNK: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: What were the reasons for that?
FUNK: I was convinced that the National Socialist Party would come to power in the Government, and I felt called upon to make my own political and economic opinions heard in the Party.
DR. SAUTER: Would you like to explain a little more in detail what kind of opinions you had, Dr. Funk, especially concerning the clashes between parties, between classes at that time?
FUNK: The German nation at that time was in sore distress, spiritually as well as materially. The people were torn by Party and class struggle. The Government, or rather the governments, had no authority. The parliamentary system was played out, and I myself, for 10 or 12 years before that, had protested and fought publicly against the burden of the Versailles reparations, because I was convinced that those reparations were the chief cause of the economic bankruptcy of Germany. I, myself, have fought all my life for private enterprise, because I was convinced that the idea of private enterprise is indissolubly bound up with the idea of the efficiency and worth of individual human beings. I have fought for the free initiative of the entrepreneur, free competition, and, at that time in particular, for putting an end to the mad class struggle, and for the establishment of a social community on the basis of the industrial community.
All those were ideas to which I found a ready response in my conversations, particularly, with Gregor Strasser.
DR. SAUTER: Who was Gregor Strasser, would you tell the Tribunal briefly?
FUNK: Gregor Strasser at that time was leader of the Reich Organization Office of the National Socialist Party and was generally considered to be the second man after Adolf Hitler. I have...
THE PRESIDENT: This is the time to break off.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 4 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]
