Читать книгу Understanding Contemporary Ukrainian and Russian Nationalism - Olexander Hryb - Страница 11

The emergence of nationalist revivals2 in Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism stimulated debate in a number of social science disciplines. Identity, generally, and national identity in particular, became central to scholarly debates on the nature of nations and nationalism. In the 1990s scholars began to explore identity politics and the role of inter-national relations as opposed to inter-state ones, in order to explain the disintegration of the multi-national Soviet state, and inter-ethnic violence in the post-communist world.

Increased attention given to the problem of national identity and nationalist revival in recent years appears to have resulted, according to some scholars, in an “over-production of theories,”’, i.e., in the introduction of new theoretical concepts, but ones insufficiently based on empirical and comparative research. The objective of this work, therefore is, first, to compare existing theories of nations and nationalism in the Western and Eastern (Soviet) European traditions in order to develop a synthetic perspective on nationalism and nationalist revival; and, second, to provide empirical grounding for this synthesis.

As previously discussed, nationalism as an ideology and a political movement is often a major cause of inter-group violent conflict. James Kellas (1991) has argued that the principal task of any theory of nationalism is to find out what kind of force makes people go for “the highest sacrifice” and die for their nation (1991, 170). Yet, nationalism is also a largely unavoidable element of nation building in modern European societies. It is therefore crucial to find out the conditions under which individuals form nationalist groups according to one or another nationalist project.

Modernist theories of nationalism do not explain why individuals decide or happen to choose ideological movements that are new to them and not rooted in their existing cultures. The only systematic research in this direction was done by the Czech scholar, Miroslav Hroch. Hroch enquired into why and under what circumstances individuals move from a simple awareness of national belonging to an active national identity or patriotism. Although Hroch’s Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe was written in 1968, this question remains unanswered, although new comparative research was published involving case studies from around the world (See Maxwell 2012).

Hroch (1985) identifies three main phases of national revival: Phase A—the period of scholarly interest; Phase B—the period of patriotic agitation; and Phase C—the rise of a mass national movement. As Hroch (1998) points out:

We know of a number of cases in which the national movement remained in Phase B for a long time, sometimes down to the present: here we may point to Wales, Brittany, Belarus or the Eastern Ukraine. How can these differences be explained? … The question of the ‘success’ of the national movement cannot be posed in the abstract, but concretely within the individual phases of the national movement. … The first level of the problem [Why did some of the patriots from Phase A decide to begin national agitation? In other words, why did Phase B begin?] has so far been accorded scant attention in empirical research. … This is a serious weakness of my work of 1968—which, however Gellner overlooks. But even from this model we cannot explain why some individuals decided in favour of the new identity and embarked on national agitation. (Hroch 1998, 98, 105 n. 14)

Lack of knowledge about the reasons why individuals sacrifice their lives for an “imagined community” not only limits our understanding of national phenomena, but also makes it extremely difficult to predict what will motivate individuals to sacrifice their or others’ lives and what, therefore, can potentially be a security threat, e.g., Chechen suicide bombers in Russia or a Breivik-style attack in Norway.

Hroch explored the creation and development of new national movements in Europe during the nineteenth century and suggested the importance of considering the concept of “groups of patriots,” those most actively promoting a national project and who are not nationally known leaders. A “patriot” for Hroch is a person who consciously and continuously devotes his time and effort to the success of a national project. Self-sacrifice and even risk count as a measure of such patriotic activity rather than money or other forms of contribution. In this way Hroch includes in the category of patriots, not only the ideological leaders of national movements, but also those people who assist leaders and make their work possible. Hroch’s concept helps to direct research on early modern nationalism not only to known historical figures, but also to the collective identity encompassed by the term “patriotic.” Since scholars generally agree on the time frame of European nation building, it is possible to study the probable content of the national identity possessed by specific groups of “patriots” at a specific time. This time is defined not chronologically, but according to the phase of nation-building, defined at least with respect to the so-called “new” nations in Europe, when “patriots” are the main actors of new national projects and are ready to become “national activists” and the most enthusiastic adherents of a new national consciousness (Hroch 1985, 13).

For most of the “new” nations in Europe the first stage of national revival belongs to the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when little sociological data was available on collective identities. However, historical analogies enable us to investigate the national identity of “patriots” today in a nation experiencing the first stages of nation building. Hroch suggests that historical analogies can be applied both diachronically and synchronically (horizontally). He explains these comparisons as follows:

1 A diachronic comparison in the narrow sense of the word involves the comparison of different historical processes occurring in different countries at the same time.

2 A synchronic comparison according to analogous historical situations. If we can establish that the objects of comparison passed through the same stages of development, we can compare these analogous stages, even if from the standpoint of absolute chronology they occurred at different times. We can only apply this procedure if we are certain that the societies under comparison have passed through roughly equivalent periods of historical development (Hroch 1985, 14-15).

A synchronic comparison allows us to study contemporary identities of “newly” emerged political nations similar to those of early modern nationalisms.

Ukraine is often referred to as a “newcomer” nation-state. It has full achieved independence only with the collapse of the USSR and its political as well as national identity remains undecided. The “nowhere nation” or “unexpected nation,” as it has been labelled by some scholars (e.g., Wilson 2000), was characterized as having an incomplete national revival by both Western and Ukrainian historians in the early 1990s (Formuvannia ukrainskoii natsii…, von Hagen 1995). It was noted the, that all three phases of national revival (A—the period of scholarly interests; B—the period of patriotic agitation; C—the rise of mass national movement; Hroch 1985), overlapped in Ukraine subsequent to its achieving independence in 1991.

The empirical research described in Appendix 1 suggests that Ukrainian Cossack organizations that appeared after 1991 represent groups of patriots whose aim is to foster a national “revival” in Ukraine. National activists in Ukraine have chosen the name “Cossacks” because, in their opinion, it is Cossacks, free warriors of the steppe, who represent a positive image of the Ukrainian nation. To promote the Cossack idea and, if possible, to turn all the people of Ukraine into Cossacks is the project. The aim is to create ideal Ukrainians, and this is a typical discourse during Hroch’s Phase B of national revival. We have a unique chance to compare synchronically by sociological methods (such as participant observation or in-depth interviews) the national identity constructs of patriots with those of patriots who lived elsewhere two hundred years ago.

There is no satisfactory explanation in the sociological literature for the shift from simple national identification and group allegiance to the action-oriented national identification that typifies “patriots’ groups.” Identification theory suggests a possible explanation of why individuals might decide to join a “group of patriots.” It suggests that people seek positive group identification to obtain psychological security. This is the central argument of all “psychologically” oriented approaches (e.g. Billig 1995; Bloom 1990).

According to identification theory, human beings have a natural tendency to form groups with shared similarities and to distinguish themselves in this way from “the Other.” What remains unclear, in the case of Cossacks, is the relationship between psychological security based on positive group identification, and the readiness to engage in self-sacrifice. A plausible explanation could be based on the social identity theory of Henry Tajfel (1981). Tajfel argues that when exiting from a group or category is not possible and self-esteem cannot be protected in this way, a person may seek to induce social change. Such social change would involve the individual in efforts to influence the relative power and status of the group concerned. By achieving greatness for a group one cannot escape, one achieves a reflected grandeur for the self. Tajfel and others have suggested that this may be the spur to the creation of new militant subgroups, the development of new rhetoric, and various forms of social activities.

Glynis Breakwell argues that identity is “a dynamic social product,” residing in psychological processes, which “cannot be understood except in relation to their social context and historical perspective” (Breakwell 1986, 9, 36-39). Following her suggestion, our analysis focuses on:

1 Cossack identity over time (nationalist memories, myths, stereotypes—i.e., components of self-perception);

2 the identity processes and the principles of their operation (e.g., transition from pre-Cossack to Cossack and sometimes to a post-Cossack identity);

3 the social context of identity (Cossack revival, perception of Cossacks by their wider social communities);

4 the effects of social change upon identity (transformation of Cossack identity under pressure from other social actors and processes, such as alternative Cossack movements and/or state policies);

5 The relation of identity to action (relation between self-images and real actions).

Despite the official and unofficial support of political elites it is clear also that the Cossack revival is a “bottom-up” movement, i.e., it originates in local, regional initiatives that are supported, at a later stage, by officials. The empirical data also shows that there have often been economic interests directly involved in stimulating the growth of Cossack organizations. Cossack claims to revive “traditional” trades such as beekeeping or, indeed, military service suggest that economic factors form at least part of the explanation for the successful revival of Cossack nationalism. Although economic nationalism was developed as a category to be applied to inter-state relations (Burnell 1986; Hieronimi 1980; Johnson 1967), there is good reason to apply it to small-scale (inter-group) social interrelations if competition for limited resources is present in social discourse.

Research undertaken for this monograph shows that the new nationalist movements that constituted the Cossack revival have had two clear paths of development. The first path is toward the further elaboration of an ethnic model of Cossack and wider Russian (supra-)community, as is happening predominantly in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and North Caucasus; the second path has led to the reinvention of a civic model, as in mainstream Cossack organizations in Ukraine. The research suggests that much depends on how the revival of ethno-geopolitics in the region of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) succeeds in promoting economic nationalism and whether this proves beneficial to ethnic and/or national communities. Yet the choice between an ethnic and civic model will have to be made at a cost that is reasonable in terms of nationalist identity, that is, so as not to threaten the societal security of a given national community.

The concept of “societal security” is useful for analyzing violent expressions of nationalism. Traditional state-as-actor theories that predominate in the field of International Security failed to predict the inter-ethnic violence that accompanied the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The empirical findings clearly illustrate that war preparations among nationalist elites in Russia and Ukraine began practically since 1991. Russia’s nation-building project aims at the re-creation of a larger inclusive state within boundaries that historically are associated with the Russian (Tsarist or Soviet) empires. The Ukrainian “irredentist” nation-building project requires the inclusion of all minorities in order to be viable. This, however, contradicts the logic of Russian supra-state expansion that must incorporate most if not all of the Ukrainian nation-state territories. The fact that neither nation-building project is ethnically exclusive does not prevent inter-group violence, as is clearly demonstrated in Donbas, where armed conflict began in 2014. The ethnic composition of fighters on both sides of the conflict is not dissimilar; all nationalities of the former USSR are represented to various degrees and Russian was initially the dominant language of instruction in both militaries.

Scholarly optimists in the 1990s believed that liberalization of developing democracies and the acceptance of extensive non-territorial federal arrangements could be the two factors that would turn the “no war community” of Russia and Ukraine into a “security community” where war is inconceivable. However, Putin’s government opted for an armed solution of its upgrading neo-imperial Eurasianist project and made Ukrainians fight for the survival of their nation-state. The logic of the self-determination principle will endure for the foreseeable future; and the better we understand the mechanisms of mass mobilization for violence, the safer that future will be.