Читать книгу Understanding Contemporary Ukrainian and Russian Nationalism - Olexander Hryb - Страница 12

The next chapter (Chapter 2) will review theories of nations and national and ethnic identity/consciousness and will suggest a synthesis of Western and Eastern (Soviet) approaches that can help with understanding the dominant perspectives in nationalism studies.

The crucial disagreements among various approaches have to do with the actual role of ethnicity in nationalism. Chapter 2 argues that ethnicity is important to national identity only in some cases. Generally, modern identities, including national ones, absorb elements of ethnic history in the form of common narratives (e.g., myths and stereotypes), transforming the ethnic component to suit new purposes. A continuity of ethnicity from pre-modern history is, therefore, not essential for modern societies as it (ethnicity) can always be (re-)introduced like other cultural borrowings from the past. A clearer understanding of how ethnicity functions in modern societies can help to resolve debates about the degree to which ethnicity is reinvented or is perennial in character (while incorporated into national identity).

Chapter 3 analyzes the connection between nationalism and war as ultimate expressions of insecurity and destruction. Although it is commonplace to blame nationalism for war, few studies have examined the conditions under which nationalism causes violent conflict and war. The main conclusion drawn from the literature reviewed in this chapter is that a new, societal sector of security is a useful lens—along with a state’s military, political, economic and environmental security—that can foresee the potential for violent conflict in a given society.

Studies of regional security and nationalist conflict inevitably take researchers into the larger domain of inter-state relations. There is a need, therefore, for methodological clarity concerning levels of analysis, similar to the concern central to International Relations theory. This study traces nationalist conflict from the individual and group level (Cossack movements) to the level of nation-state bureaucracy (governments) and then to sub-system (nation-sates) and system levels (security community of nation-states). These levels are further delineated and discussed in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 also focuses on the New European Order as an expansion of the European Security Community and its threat to the emerging national identities of Eastern Europe. The enlargement of the EU and NATO, as well as the more assertive policies of Russia toward the countries of the former USSR, has made countries such as Ukraine a buffer between East and West. The re-emergence of “cold peace” rhetoric in place of the former Cold War rhetoric has relegated Ukraine, a country once called a “lynchpin of European security,” to the uneasy role of geopolitical buffer. At the same time, hybrid war waged by Russia on Ukraine as a nation-state since 2014 magnifies the threat to societal security as well as state security. With Ukrainian public opinion divided regarding the ability of power-holders to achieve victory and peace because of perceived corruption, the threat of a re-integration with the Eurasian Economic Union and the Russian supra-state nationalist project is existential.

The formation of new political and national identities in Ukraine must therefore be examined in the context of the establishment of a new European order hailed by the West and the new “multi-polar,” “post-West” world order promoted by Putin’s Russia. In Ukraine, profound popular disappointment with debt-fueled, market economic reforms favoring the oligarchic clans more than the relatively poor majority, and the implications of the customs restrictions that accompany EU enlargement may pose a threat to the Ukrainian national identity. To what extent do myths of a Ukrainian “Golden Age” harmonize with the idea of a “People’s Europe” if they do not bring jobs and prosperity?

On the one hand, pro-independence, nationalist elites promote the idea of the EU and NATO integration as a part of the Ukrainian national idea; on the other hand, some studies suggest that threats to Ukrainian national identity from a nationalist (neo-imperialist) Russia and the lack of a real prospect of joining the security community of the NATO-led Western Alliance escalates the security dilemma in Ukraine and might even lead to resolution in policies of nuclear deterrence, following the examples of India and Pakistan.

Threats to national identity threaten “societal security” which, as previously mentioned, is a dimension of state security linked to collective identity. Chapter 3 describes the identity process of the Ukrainian political elite, analyzing the election manifestos of presidential candidates as well as strategic documents relating to Ukrainian military doctrines and national security. This is related to existing studies of both Ukrainian mass national consciousness and possible future directions of the development of Ukrainian national identity. The analysis addresses the question of whether the legacy of Soviet thinking about nation/state-building and the new Western political and military dominance in Europe influences the way Ukrainians think of their future, in terms of national dignity, well-being, and security.

The concept of “societal security” was introduced originally by a group of scholars from the European Security Group at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen (1993). It was designed to draw attention to the significance for International Relations theory of identity politics:

Security studies have traditionally been concerned about relationships amongst collectivities, and we have shown that one can remain within this tradition and yet include completely new dynamics and insights through the elevation of society to the status of a referent object beside the state (Buzan et al 1998, 186).

In general, the issues raised by notions of societal security reflect threats to or influences upon social identity: it is about situations in which societies perceive a threat in identity terms. The authors admit that although a national identity is not necessarily dominant among other constructions of social identity, in specific situations it mobilizes and organizes the other identities around itself. These are first of all situations of threat, either real or imagined.

The concept of societal security is interlinked with the older concept of “security community” introduced by Karl Deutsch (1970). Deutsch’s “security community” is a community in which, over a long period of time, war becomes unimaginable or implausible among its members. The creation of a “security community” depends to a large extent, therefore, on social perceptions. A community in which war is not likely, but where preparations for war are nevertheless made as a precaution is called a “No War Community.” The notion of “societal security,” it is argued, is useful for monitoring conditions under which nationalism might call for war. These include migration, horizontal and vertical competition among peoples of the same region, and depopulation of a country. The political rhetoric and the actual policies of ruling elites, however, are still a decisive factor, as war is only one among many available policy options.

Together, Chapters 2 and 3 will clarify how theories of nations and nationalism developed in the FSU, and how they have affected nationality policy in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the FSU, particularly in Russia and Ukraine, the two biggest countries of the region. A strong inclination toward primordialism in post-Soviet scholarly works as well as policy planning led to the dominance of ethno-geopolitics in the academic and political circles of some countries of the former USSR. Just as the theoretical notion of “societal security” was meant to draw attention to the lack of understanding of relations among societies, as opposed to states, in the West, ethno-geopolitics draws attention to relations among “imagined” ethnic communities in Eastern Europe.

Chapter 4 examines how ethno-geopolitics developed within the discipline of Soviet Ethnography, and how it continues to influence thinking among post-Soviet scholars and policy makers in Russia and Ukraine. Soviet Ethnography, which reached its zenith under the “leadership” of academician Yulian Bromley in the 1970s and 1980s, is now largely ignored in the West. However, it still provides an important framework for Russian and Ukrainian academic thought and policy planning.

The “socio-spherical” approach that dominated Soviet Ethnography was close to the “modernist” paradigm in the Western tradition. But it also featured elements of “primordialism.” “Modernist” and “primordialist” approaches in the Western tradition encompass other schools of thought such as “instrumentalism,” “functionalism,” “constructivism” and “perenniallism,” and logically could be related to what in Soviet terminology was called “socio-spherical” and “bio-spherical” approaches.3

As the current literature on nationalism in Eastern Europe emphasizes, Soviet ethnography was not only an academic discipline, but also a tool to justify and fortify Soviet nationality policy. It might be seen as having directly influenced the creation and “constitutionalization,” not only of numerous Soviet nationalities, but also ethno-national borders from the oblast level up to the republic or, in the case of Russia, the federation level. The heritage of such academic thinking and policy is now often deemed responsible for the ferocious conflicts in the Northern Caucasus and, even, for the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a whole. Yet there has been little research on the extent to which Soviet Ethnography continues to influence current academic thought in Russia and Ukraine. The influence of Western theories in this area has been limited and academic traditions today in Russia and, to a lesser degree, Ukraine are influenced by the “bio-spherical” theories developed by Lev Gumilev and the “new Eurasians.” The latter only dramatized the old Soviet paradigm and, to a great extent, led to the revival (or creation) of ethno-geopolitics.

Chapter 4 examines the relationship between Soviet Ethnography and Soviet nationality policy, and compares it to the current vision of Russian and Ukrainian policy makers and scholars. It also examines the methodological foundations of ethno-geopolitics as a theory, and the implications of ethno-geopolitics as a policy concept.

The Cossack revivals in Russia and Ukraine will be the focus for examining inter-ethnic conflicts within the FSU. Chapter 4 therefore provides a historical background of Cossack movements in Russia and Ukraine. In doing so, it illuminates the relationship between ethno-geopolitical discourse, paramilitary movements and the assertion of national identity.

One of the reasons for the growth of the Cossack movements, as some scholars have indicated (Dawisha and Parrot 1994; Plokhy 1993), is the direct and indirect interest of national elites in using these movements in political and military discourse. Presidential decrees in the NIS established a semi-legislative basis for Cossack activity where the Cossack revival has developed most of all, that is, in Russia (1992 and 1996) and Ukraine (1995, 1999, and 2001). In both countries there was a tendency to subordinate Cossack units to the military authorities despite the Cossacks’ historical tradition of autonomous self-government. The active participation by Russian Cossacks in armed inter-ethnic conflicts in the territories outside of the Russian Federation (Moldova, Georgia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Donbas, etc.) shows the potential danger for regional security.4 This is especially true if one takes into account the danger of involvement by regular armies, as has happened, for instance, in Abkhazia, Trans-Dnestria and Donbas. Another important factor is the direct involvement of security forces and intelligence services in Cossack leadership via retired officers.5 A central question with which this research is concerned is the influence of the ruling elite rhetoric on the development of the Cossack revival, and vice versa.

A comparison of the distinct Cossack revivals in Russia and Ukraine also emphasizes how different theories of nationalist movements can underpin different national policies and, ultimately, different socially constructed realities. Theory and practice in regards to nation and nationalism still go hand in hand in territories where historical revivals, typical in other regions of Europe in the nineteenth century, have only now emerged. So, for instance, in Russia, a Cossack movement established Russian Cossacks as an “ethnic community” with a tendency toward, on the one hand, local self-government and, on the other, Russian supra-state expansionism. Clearly, the dominant perceived threat to Russian Cossacks is the one directed against them as an ethno-cultural community, in addition to other threats directed against Russia as a Supra-ethnos Russian civilization.

The post-Soviet Ukrainian Cossack movement evolved as a public organization and did not develop an ideology separate from that of a moderate Ukrainian nationalism. As a result, Ukrainian Cossacks perceive any external or internal threat directed against Ukraine as one directed against them. The co-existence of Russian and Ukrainian Cossack movements, often in the same geographic and political space, has led to confrontation and nationalist conflict between them. This is a consequence of the inter-nation-state conflict on a regional scale that became clear from Russian designs on Crimea starting in the early 1990s.

The empirical research undertaken for this study, and detailed in Appendix 1, demonstrates the utility of the notion of societal security for explaining the reassertion of national identity in Ukraine, in a situation in which Russian and Ukrainian national projects are competing for the same target audience at the same time. It traces the Cossack revival in Ukraine as a form developing both a national identity and a social structure to fill the void of civil society in post-communist space, and explores social phenomena related to societal security tensions.

The mobilization of people into “patriots’ groups” around the idea of revived Cossackdom suggests that there was a threat to societal security in Ukraine practically since the achievement of formal independence in 1991. Yet the usefulness of the “societal security” concept is that it puts the state-society relationship in a new light, by showing that the security concerns of these two do not necessarily coincide. This theoretical assumption allows this study to compare the different ideological orientations of Cossack groups to each other and with respect to state ideologies, showing the existence of different discourses of societal (in)security or (in)securities in the region.

Chapter 5 suggests the outlines of a normative theory of nationalism and the issues it might address. Some of the basic assumptions of such a theory would include the following:

1 Although often based on pre-modern cultures, nationalism is a distinctly modern political principle that links society and polity in a nation-state;

2 distinctions drawn among varieties of nationalism, such as “cultural” and “political,” “civic” and “ethnic,” “liberal” and “conservative,” while not without some merit, do not in fact constitute real alternatives; nationalism is a political principle used by many ideologies and is not necessarily an ideology of its own;

3 once nationalism is universally recognized as an organizing principle of self-determination, attempts to limit the right of self-determination will be normatively self-defeating; nationalism is embedded in national identity and is based on the belief that mankind is “naturally” divided into nations and nation-states and that this division is important to human development; it is this quality of national identity, of combining rational and irrational or emotional beliefs that makes the denial of national sentiments so explosive.

Yet nationalism is of great importance even for modern liberal democratic societies, as it functions to secure state patriotism in a world of competing nation-states. As European integration illustrates, a post-nation-state world is not impossible. Until, however, nationalism is deconstructed and un-invented, federalism and civil society an only ease the negative excesses of this political principle. Chapter 5 also explores how federalism, together with civil society institutions, is capable of modifying extremes of the internationally enshrined right to self-determination, keeping together peoples within the same polity and easing inter-ethnic (national) confrontation until the possible development of new non-territorial identities solve the dilemma of competing nationalist projects. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the arguments and evidence for using the concept of societal (identity) security as a means of understanding the security concerns of societies, as opposed to states, as well as threats insufficiently evident in existing theoretical frameworks. This is then applied to the existing conflict of Ukrainian and Russian nationalisms and its likely resolution.

1 Benito Mussolini, speech at Naples, 24 Oct. 1922, in Scritti e Discorsi, ii.345, quoted in Nationalism: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs [1939]. Reprints of Economic Classics. New York (1966).

2 The term “nationalist revival” rather than “national revival” is used here to stress the political nature of the former. As Chapter 5 will illustrate national revivals in Eastern Europe became a form of belated nationalist project of economic and social modernization that developed into political movements. “National” and “nationalist revival,” therefore, are equal terms in a wider sense; however, national revival is not always political in the initial stages and therefore not always nationalist in the more narrow sense.

3 Sotsiologicheskiye teorii natsionalisma: nauchno-analiticheskiy obzor. AN SSSR. (Moskva: Nauka, 1991). Also: B. Popov, A. Shkliar, eds., Etnos I sotsium (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1993).

4 G. Mashtakova, “Ih snova khvataet v sherengah po vosem,” in: Moscow News, no.16, 21-28 April 1996, 4.

5 Lola Topchieva, “The Renaissance of Red Russia,” in: Independent, 9 June 1996, 6-7; “The Cossacks,” in: Eastern Europe Newsletter 6, no. 15, 20 July 1992, 5-7.