Читать книгу Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience - P. M. S. Hacker - Страница 6

1  Cover

2  Reviews of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

3  Title page

4  Copyright

5  Dedication

6  Foreword to the Second Edition by Denis Noble

7  Foreword to the First Edition by Denis Noble

8  Acknowledgements to the Second Edition

9  Acknowledgements to the First Edition

10  Introduction to the First Edition

11  Introduction to the Second Edition

12 Part I Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual RootsPreliminaries to Part I1 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical Roots2 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Conceptual Roots1 The Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System1.1 Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: The Origins of the Ventricular Doctrine1.2 Fernel and Descartes: The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine1.3 The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and Its Aftermath1.4 The Concept of a Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall1.5 Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig1.6 The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sherrington1.6.1 The dependence of psychological capacities on the functioning of cortex: localization determined non-invasively by Ogawa and Sokolof1.6.2 Caveats concerning the use of fMRI to determine the areas of cortex involved in supporting psychological powers2 The Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System2.1 Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact2.2 Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism2.3 John Eccles and the ‘Liaison Brain’2.4 Wilder Penfield and the ‘Highest Brain Mechanism’3 The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience3.1 Mereological Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience3.2 Challenging the Consensus: The Brain Is Not the Subject of Psychological Attributes3.3 Qualms Concerning Ascription of a Mereological Fallacy to Neuroscience3.4 Replies to Objections4 An Overview of the Conceptual Field of Cognitive Neuroscience: Evidence, the Inner, Introspection, Privileged Access, Privacy and Subjectivity4.1 On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to a Being4.2 On the Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity4.3 The Inner4.4 Introspection4.5 Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect4.6 Privacy or Subjectivity4.7 The Meaning of Psychological Predicates: How They Are Explained and Learned4.8 Of the Mind and Its Nature

13 Part II Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: An AnalysisPreliminaries to Part II1 Brain–Body Dualism (Searle)2 The Project3 The Category of the Psychological5 Sensation and Perception5.1 Sensation5.2 Perception5.2.1 Perception as the causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities5.2.2 Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz5.2.3 Visual images and the binding problem5.2.4 Perception as information processing: Marr’ s theory of vision6 The Cognitive Powers6.1 Knowledge and Its Kinship with Ability6.1.2 Possessing knowledge and containing knowledge6.2 Memory6.2.1 Declarative and non-declarative memory6.2.2 Storage, retention and memory traces7 The Cogitative Powers7.1 Belief7.2 Thinking7.3 Imagination and Mental Images7.3.1 The logical features of mental imagery8 Emotion8.1 Affections8.2 The Emotions: A Preliminary Analytical Survey8.2.1 Neuroscientists’ confusions8.2.2 Analysis of the emotions9 Volition and Voluntary Movement9.1 Volition9.2 Libet’s Theory of Voluntary Movement and Its Progeny9.3 Refutations and Clarifications9.4 Conflict-Monitoring and the Executive9.5 Man and Machine: Doing Something Like an Automaton, Automatically, Mechanically, from Force of Habit9.6 Taking Stock

14 Part III Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis10 Intransitive and Transitive Consciousness10.1 Consciousness and the Brain10.2 Intransitive Consciousness and Awareness10.2.1 Minimal states of consciousness or responsiveness10.3 Transitive Consciousness and Its Forms10.3.1 A partial analysis11 Conscious Experience, Mental States and Qualia, Neural Correlates of Consciousness11.1 Extending the Concept of Consciousness11.2 Conscious Experience and Conscious Mental States11.2.1 Confusions regarding unconscious belief and unconscious activities of the brain11.3 Qualia11.3.1 ‘How it feels’ to have an experience11.3.2 Of there being something which it is like …11.3.3 The qualitative character of experience11.3.4 Thises and thuses11.3.5 Of the communicability and describability of qualia12 Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace Theory12.1 The Integrated Information Theory of Tononi12.1.1 Axiomatizing Integrated Information Theory12.1.2 The ambiguity of ‘information’12.1.3 Unclarities about experience again12.2 Global Workspace Theory12.2.1 Analysis of Dehaene’s example12.2.2 On Dehaene’s misconceptions of consciousness and information processing12.3 On Finding One’s Way through a Conceptual Jungle with Worthless Tools12.4 What Is Necessary for Neural Correlation12.5 Where to Find the Explanations13 Puzzles about Consciousness13.1 A Budget of Puzzles13.2 On Reconciling Consciousness or Subjectivity with Our Conception of an Objective Reality13.3 On the Question of How Physical Processes Can Give Rise to Conscious Experience13.4 Of the Evolutionary Value of Consciousness13.5 The Problem of Awareness13.6 Other Minds and Other Animals14 Self-Consciousness and Selves, Thought and Language14.1 Self-Consciousness and the Self14.2 Historical Stage Setting: Descartes, Locke, Hume and James14.3 Current Scientific and Neuroscientific Reflections on the Nature of Self-Consciousness14.4 The Illusion of a ‘Self’14.5 The Horizon of Thought, Will and Affection14.5.1 Thought and language14.6 Self-Consciousness15 Concepts, Thinking and Speaking15.1 Concepts and Concept Possession15.1.1 Beginning again15.2 Concept Possession as Mastery of the Use of an Expression15.3 What Do We Think In?

15 Part IV On Method16 Reductionism16.1 Ontological and Explanatory Reductionism16.2 Reduction by Elimination16.2.1 Are our ordinary psychological concepts theoretical?16.2.2 Are everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory?16.2.3 Eliminating all that is human16.2.4 Sawing off the branch on which one sits17 Methodological Reflections17.1 Linguistic Inertia and Conceptual Innovation17.2 The ‘Poverty of English’ Argument17.3 From Nonsense to Sense: The Proper Description of the Results of Commissurotomy17.3.1 The case of blindsight: misdescription and illusory explanation17.4 Philosophy and Neuroscience17.4.1 What philosophy can and what it cannot do17.4.2 What neuroscience can and what it cannot do17.5 Why It Matters

16 AppendicesAppendix 1 Daniel Dennett1 Dennett’ s Methodology and Presuppositions2 The Intentional Stance3 Heterophenomenological Method4 ConsciousnessAppendix 2 John Searle1 Philosophy and Science2 Searle’ s Philosophy of Mind3 Unified Field Theory4 The Traditional Mind–Body ProblemAppendix 3 Further Replies to Critics1 The Mereological Principle2 Essentialism3 A Priorism: Empirical Learning Theory or the Nature of Primitive Language-Games4 Criteria and Constitutive Evidence5 Foundationalism, Linguistic Conservatism, Conceptual Change, Connective Analysis, Tolerating Inconsistencies and Post-Modernism

17  Afterword to the Second Edition by Anthony Kenny

18  Index

19  End User License Agreement