Читать книгу Storms of Controversy - Palmiro Campagna - Страница 12

1 DREAMS

Mr. Speaker, with the leave of the House I should like to make a somewhat lengthy statement on the subject of one facet of the national defence of Canada…. The government had carefully examined and re-examined the probable need for the Arrow aircraft and Iroquois engine known as the CF-105…. The conclusion arrived at is that the development of the Arrow aircraft and the Iroquois engine should be terminated now.

— Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker,

Black Friday, February 20, 1959¹

With the above words, more than 14,000 employees at Avro Aircraft and Orenda Engines were released in a single afternoon. In all, more than 25,000 people, including those working for various subcontractors, would be directly affected. There were rumours of suicide and the reality of a mass exodus of talented personnel from the country. Not only was a military project terminated, but the heart and soul of a nation were destroyed. Canada’s aircraft industry would never embark on such an ambitious project again. Then, incredibly, one final blow was delivered. Five magnificent aircraft — and a sixth ready for taxi trials — were hacked and chopped and blowtorched to scrap metal, along with 31 others in various stages of assembly. Engines, drawings, production line tooling, and the like were all ordered destroyed. Government records on the issue would remain classified for more than 30 years. The question is why.

Since the cancellation, several books and articles have appeared, each trying to explain some facet of the story. Kay Shaw, a former Avro employee, wrote There Never Was an Arrow, James Dow gave us The Arrow, and the Arrowheads provided the best picture and technical book, entitled, simply, Arrow. At least one stage play was produced, The Legend of the Avro Arrow, by Clinton Bomphray, and two books of fiction with the Arrow as the central theme have appeared. Not to be left out, several historians have included references to the Arrow story in various books on military history or on Canada’s aviation heritage.

What exactly was the Arrow? Amazingly, many Canadians have never heard of it, despite the books and recently renewed interest by the news media. Was it truly a world-beater as some have maintained, or was it a mass of technical junk? Officially, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and his colleagues had said that with production behind schedule, the aircraft would be ready at a time when the principal enemy threat would come from the intercontinental ballistic missile, not the manned bomber; therefore, the aircraft would be obsolete. It was also said the range of the aircraft was limited, and its cost was alluded to as high, although this was never put forward as the official reason for termination.

Were the costs of the program beyond reach? If the aircraft was so good, why were other countries, namely the United States and Great Britain, not interested? Why did the government try to obliterate all traces of the aircraft after the project was cancelled? Why were any remaining government records locked away if the project was a disaster? Why have so many denied the truth? Or have they?

The 1950s were years of cold war uncertainty and post–Second World War prosperity. In the United States, Richard M. Nixon had become President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s vice-president. Nixon had already made a name for himself prosecuting suspected Communists, while Senator Joseph McCarthy was stirring anti-Communist sentiments throughout the country. In charge of foreign policy was John Foster Dulles, secretary of state and hard-line anti-Communist, a sharp contrast to the more conciliatory President Eisenhower. In charge of the spy network was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), headed by Allen Dulles, brother to John.²

It was a period of espionage and intrigue. For example, revelations in the 1980s showed that, in the 1950s, the CIA was conducting covert hallucinogenic experiments on Canadians in Quebec, seemingly unbeknownst to the Canadian government. Meanwhile, both the CIA and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) were involved in the hunt for Soviet agents, at least one of whom was actively involved in trying to obtain information on the classified supersonic jet interceptor being built by Avro Canada. Would these people and events play a role in the termination?³

During the Second World War, Britain saw the need to have its Lancaster bomber production augmented by companies in Canada. The National Steel Car plant in Malton, Ontario, was chosen since it was already building aircraft parts for the war effort. In November 1942, this company became a Crown corporation and was renamed Victory Aircraft Limited.

News of superior Lancasters being built by Victory reached Britain. In 1943, Sir Roy Dobson, managing director of A.V. Roe, Manchester, decided to pay a visit, along with Sir Frank Spriggs, managing director of Hawker Siddeley. They were met by a young Canadian, Fred T. Smye, director of aircraft production at Victory, and his superior, Ralph P. Bell, director general, and were escorted on a tour of the existing aircraft companies in Ontario. Scott Young, in his 10-year history of the Canadian A.V. Roe company, recorded the following: “A few days later as the tour of Canadian plants progressed, Fred Smye heard the first hint in conversation that Sir Roy thought Canadians should have their own self-sufficient aircraft industry. From that moment on, Fred Smye never let go of the idea that it could be done.”⁴

Two years later, Sir Roy reached an agreement with the Honourable Clarence Decatur Howe, an American engineer who had become minister of munitions and supply under the Liberal government of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent. It was decided that Victory Aircraft would be taken over by Hawker Siddeley on a rental purchase plan, providing the management at Hawker Siddeley agreed. Fred Smye, who had moved on to become assistant general manager of Federal Aircraft, resigned in order to become the first employee of the new company. Unfortunately, before Hawker Siddeley could sign the agreement, the war in Europe ended and all contracts for more aircraft were cancelled. Weeks passed, and Fred Smye finally travelled to England to learn of any developments. On his return, Sir Roy followed. After a series of meetings with Minister C.D. Howe and Victory officials, A.V. Roe Canada was formed. The date was December 1, 1945. Fred Smye was appointed assistant general manager and would become the administrative force behind many of A.V. Roe’s projects.⁵

In 1946, Turbo-Research Limited, a Crown company engaged in research work in the jet engine field, was acquired by A.V. Roe Canada. On December 2, 1954, it was decided to split A.V. Roe into separate airframe and engine companies. Fred Smye became vice-president and general manager of the aircraft division, renamed Avro Aircraft, and Walter McLachlan was appointed head of Orenda Engines. However, A.V. Roe Canada remained as the overall parent company. Another major company, Canadian Steel Improvements, was soon added to the group, and in September 1955, Canadian Car and Foundry was purchased. In the midst of these acquisitions, the company designed and produced the Orenda, a first-class jet engine; the C-102 Jetliner, which introduced North America to jet transport; and the CF-100, a world-class fighter. Frank Spriggs of Hawker Siddeley would eventually say to the A.V. Roe company, “You have demonstrated beyond question that you can talk with any aircraft or engine design teams in the world,” words that would be echoed by Fred Smye himself over A.V. Roe’s most ambitious project, the CF-105 Avro Arrow.⁶

Edgar Atkin was transferred from A.V. Roe in the United Kingdom to become Avro Canada’s chief engineer. He and Canadian engineer Jim Chamberlin, Avro’s chief aerodynamicist, began thinking about a replacement for the highly successful CF-100 subsonic fighter. In January 1952, with the departure of Atkin, James C. Floyd, also from the A.V. Roe Company in the United Kingdom, was appointed chief engineer. It was now his task to work with Chamberlin on the concept for the new aircraft, the Arrow. Floyd would eventually describe Chamberlin as “without a doubt the best technical man I have ever had the privilege to be associated with.”⁷

Floyd had originally come to Canada in February 1946 to work on the C-102 Jetliner. This was a medium-range intercity jet transport, the first of its kind in North America. The story of the Jetliner is well documented in Jim Floyd’s own book on the subject, but a few points are worthy of note here.

The Avro CF-100 over the white cliffs of Dover, England. (Jim Floyd)

Commercial jet transport had not yet made its mark on the world scene and was considered a new technology. Then, on July 27, 1949, the British-designed DH Comet rose a few feet off a runway in England to become the first commercial jet to fly. Only two weeks later, on August 10, 1949, Canada’s Jetliner flew for the first time. Unlike the Comet, the Jetliner flew for more than an hour on its maiden flight, and up to altitudes of 13,000 feet. Floyd would later be awarded the Wright Brothers Medal for this effort, the first time this medal was awarded to an individual from outside the United States.

The Jetliner design was based on simplicity, safety, high speed, comfort, and economy and was able to operate from conventional airports with no special facilities. On April 18, 1950, the Jetliner delivered the first airmail in the world on a run from Toronto to New York in half the time it normally took. In The Avro Story, Jim Floyd wrote:

On arrival in New York we were whisked downtown, flanked by a siren-blasting escort of New York City police, straight through the city to meet the mayor.

The next day the New York press had pictures of the Jetliner flying over the city, with the following caption: “This should give our nation a good healthful kick in its placidity. The fact that our massive but underpopulated good neighbour to the north has a mechanical product that licks anything of ours is just what the doctor ordered for our overdeveloped ego. The Canadian plane’s feat accelerates a process already begun in this nation — a realization that Uncle Sam has no monopoly on genius.”⁸

The Jetliner broke records with every flight and garnered the interest and admiration of the U.S. military, several airline companies, and Howard Hughes, who owned Trans World Airlines (TWA). Hughes used the Jetliner as his personal plane for several months while he evaluated its characteristics and flight-handling qualities. In Howard Hughes and TWA, Robert Rummel, TWA’s chief engineer, states:

The Jetliner, the first jet transport produced in North America, was an advanced, medium-range, 450-mph plane that first flew an amazing eight years before Boeing’s 707. This extraordinary achievement is all the more remarkable considering that it was the first product of a new company in a country not dominant in the development or construction of aircraft. The design, developed by A.V. Roe Canada (AVRO), was conspicuously ahead of any competitive transport. The programme represented a giant bite for any company to chew in 1946, when the project was undertaken, no matter how extensive its resources or how well qualified the individual participants.⁹

The president of National Airlines, George T. Baker, was also interested in the Jetliner. According to Rummel, Baker was ready to purchase four aircraft at $1 million each with options for six more. The United States Air Force was prepared to order 20 for military training, and preparations were underway to have an American engine sent to Avro for testing. Howard Hughes also entered into serious negotiations for the manufacture of the Jetliner. However, because of the war in Korea, Minister of Munitions and Supply C.D. Howe had ordered all work to cease in favour of accelerated production of the CF-100 fighter. The Jetliner would not be put into production. Ironically, the CF-100 would go into squadron service in 1953 as the Korean conflict was nearing its end. Was the Korean War the true reason behind the Jetliner termination, especially with orders pending for its purchase and manufacture? In 1956, the revolutionary Jetliner would be ordered reduced to scrap. It would later be reported that no one wanted to buy the Jetliner and that it was of poor design. It is unfortunate that this misinformation surfaced in Canada only. It is even more unfortunate that such a diatribe has been believed. The facts prove otherwise.¹⁰

The Avro Jetliner, the first commercial jet to fly in North America. Terminated and then destroyed in 1956. (Jim Floyd)

In January 1952, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) realized that the CF-100 would eventually have to be replaced. After 1951, an All-Weather Interceptor Requirements Team was assembled to study Canada’s air defence needs and to recommend performance specifications for a new all-weather interceptor aircraft to counter the perceived enemy bomber threat. The team consisted of representatives from the RCAF, the Defence Research Board (DRB), the National Research Council (NRC), and the National Aeronautical Establishment (NAE). (The NAE had been established in December 1950 by the Canadian government as an aeronautical research and development centre administered originally by the NRC.¹¹ )

The final report from this team was published on March 20, 1952, with a summary forwarded to A.V. Roe. Avro responded in June with two brochures entitled “C-104 Supersonic All-Weather Fighters.” They described a single-engine and a twin-engine aircraft, neither of which fully satisfied the required combat performance. Still, on August 25, 1952, the RCAF requested that the NAE analyze these proposals. The NAE reply stated that the twin-engine design came closest to meeting the specifications, and that although weight was excessive, aircraft performance estimates were realistic. It was recommended that further studies be undertaken.¹²

In March 1953, the RCAF issued Operational Requirement ORI/1-63, “Supersonic All-Weather Interceptor Aircraft,” followed by RCAF Specification Air-7-3, “Design Studies of Prototype Supersonic All-Weather Interceptor Aircraft.” Both were given to Avro with a requirement for design studies for the most efficient aircraft (in terms of size, weight, and cost) that could be developed for the engines that would be available at the time of some future production.¹³

Avro responded with report No. P/C-105/1, “Design Study of Supersonic All-Weather Interceptor Aircraft,” dated May 1953. It described a series of delta-wing aircraft of varying weights and sizes. It identified the pros and cons, risks and benefits, for each. The report was studied by the RCAF and the DRB, who together concluded that the C-105/1200 — at a weight of 48,400 pounds and having a 1,200-square-foot wing area — would meet the requirement of Air-7-3. The requirements specification would eventually be issued as RCAF specification Air-7-4.

More information was requested on the aerodynamic claims, and it soon became clear that aerodynamic data had to be confirmed by wind-tunnel testing. Avro conducted the tests between August 27 and September 2, 1953, at the Cornell Transonic Wind Tunnel in Buffalo, New York. The resulting reports were sent to the NAE on September 18 for comment. In his September 28 reply to then Air Vice Marshal Douglas M. Smith (air member technical services), John H. Parkin, director of the NAE, stated, “[T]he Cornell wind-tunnel tests indicate that, aerodynamically, the C105/1200 configuration is capable of meeting its performance requirements, although it is important that wind-tunnel measurements be extended to higher Mach numbers as soon as possible.” Parkin was stating that while results were good, they were somewhat limited in terms of the speeds tested and needed to be extended in order to evaluate the aircraft’s performance at higher velocities it was expected to achieve.¹⁴

Smith’s position as air member technical services made him directly responsible for the aircraft program. He reported directly to the chief of the air staff, who in turn reported directly or through the chairman of chiefs of staff to the Cabinet ministers. Hence, Air Vice Marshal Smith reported to Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon, chief of the air staff. Air Vice Marshal Max M. Hendrick would replace Smith as air member technical services in 1955, and Slemon would be replaced by Air Marshal Hugh Campbell in 1957. It would not be until 1957 that a separate project office dealing exclusively with the Arrow project would be created under the chief of aeronautical engineering, Air Commodore Gordon G. Truscott, who would report directly to the air member technical services. Truscott had been a pre-war officer, graduate engineer, and pilot who supported the Arrow project.

As work at the Avro plant continued, the RCAF conducted an investigation to determine if any foreign aircraft could satisfy the requirements. In his submission to the Cabinet Defence Committee on November 30, 1953, Liberal Minister of National Defence the Honourable Brooke Claxton stated the following:

With the object of economy and to avoid unnecessary duplication, every effort has been made to determine whether future U.K. or U.S. aircraft could meet our requirements. In the U.K. the only aircraft for consideration is the Javelin whose performance falls far short of the requirement. In the United States there is the Convair F-102 which is a single-engine, single-seat aircraft designed to carry a fully automatic armament which is now under development. This aircraft does not meet the range requirement set out and its manoeuvrability and ceiling are below our studied requirements. In addition, this aircraft is so highly specialized that if the planned development of any major element breaks down there is little flexibility in the design to permit substitution of alternate equipment. Further, this aircraft because of its design and layout does not have much development potential and is, therefore, liable to become obsolescent in a relatively short time. Adoption by Canada of this aircraft involves calculated risks greater than we are justified in taking. The RCAF, therefore have had A.V. Roe Canada work out an engineering proposal for an aircraft to meet our specification.¹⁵

The minister went on to outline that the Treasury Board had authorized an expenditure of $200,000 on May 8, 1953, and an additional $300,000 on July 21. These monies had been spent on design studies and wind-tunnel testing. He stressed that if the program were begun in earnest, a prototype could be completed by October 1956, with production by 1959. He then sought approval for the development to commence. Expenditures would be $26,925,000 spread over a period extending into 1958 and would include some $4 million in government-supplied equipment. Engines would be the most suitable ones found in either the United States or Britain. Two prototype aircraft would be built. Claxton was successful, and Avro was awarded a design-and-development contract in March 1954; the CF-105 design began in May of that year.

The RCAF specifications, which no foreign aircraft could meet, included a supersonic combat radius of 200 nautical miles, a combat ceiling of not less than 60,000 feet, a maximum speed at altitude of Mach 2, a rate of climb not more than six minutes to 50,000 feet, twin engines, a crew capacity of two, an all-weather capability, and a manoeuvrability of 2 g at Mach 1.5 at 50,000 feet without loss of speed or altitude. Also, the aircraft had to provide as much flexibility as possible for engines and armament capacity due to the uncertain availability of those under consideration. In the words of Claxton, the requirements had been developed by the RCAF “in conjunction with the DRB, the NAE, the United States Air Force, Department of Defence Production and various aircraft manufacturers both in the United States and the United Kingdom.”¹⁶ He had every confidence that Avro would be equal to the task.

Although the NAE had initially agreed that the C-105 configuration would meet its required performance, Air Vice Marshal Smith received another letter from Parkin dated January 15, 1954. This time the NAE director noted that his comments of September had been premature. The full assessment of Avro’s work was now complete and available in NAE report No. LR-87, “Assessment of the Performance Characteristics of the Proposed A.V. Roe C105/1200 All-Weather Supersonic Fighter Aircraft.” Essentially, the report concluded that the aircraft would not meet the required 200-nautical-mile radius nor the 2-g manoeuvrability because the supersonic drag (air resistance) was far greater than Avro’s estimate. Smith, however, countered that even if drag were increased, the aircraft would meet the combat radius due to the increased fuel capacity Avro had included. He states as much in a memo to the chief of the air staff, Air Marshal Slemon, on February 16, 1954. On the question of whether the amount of drag calculated by Avro was correct, Smith noted that wind-tunnel testing to verify the numbers was ongoing. This would prove to be the beginning of a long series of disagreements between the NAE and Avro that would carry through over the length of the project.¹⁷

Despite assurances, the uncertainties about the aircraft’s performance persisted, and the disagreements between the NAE and Avro increased. In an internal NAE memo dated September 29, 1953, the following is noted: “[O]ur opinions differ in various ways from those of the Company or the RCAF, and this has given rise to argument and possibly to some ill feeling, even to the opinion that the NAE is anxious to hinder the straightforward development of the aircraft. Nothing could be further from the truth.”¹⁸

While the NAE saw itself as a legitimate scientific watchdog over a very complex project, its tone may have suggested otherwise; more than one official at Avro and the RCAF recalls that the NAE may have taken the role of honest broker just one step too far. The RCAF finally requested a meeting between the NAE, the DRB, and the U.S. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA, later NASA) to discuss the differences between the NAE estimates of performance and those of Avro. At the time, it was believed that the best aeronautical minds were at NACA. The group published the “Joint Report on an RCAF-DRB-NAE Visit to NACA Langley Laboratories to Discuss Aerodynamic Problems of Avro CF-105 Aircraft,” dated November 19, 1954.

The NAE had made its points, for on December 20 and 21, 1954, Avro was called to the carpet. A second meeting was held at NACA headquarters in Washington, with Avro engineers taking centre stage to explain the reasoning behind their more favourable performance figures. Jim Floyd and Jim Chamberlin were among those present from Avro. Items discussed included the NAE criticisms of drag calculations, use of wing negative camber rather than positive camber, and perceived problems with pitch-up, engine intakes, and overall stability.

On the crucial issue of drag, NACA backed Avro, stating, “It was basically agreed … provided that (a) the intake and ramp bleed area is investigated and cleaned up where necessary, and (b) the afterbody is well faired in after the nozzles, the zero lift drag at Mach 1.5 may be as low as .020…. The Avro estimate from area distribution and skin friction considerations was .0184. The configuration is considered to be generally reasonable with respect to drag.”

Avro had proposed the use of negative wing camber rather than the traditional positive camber, which caused the NAE some consternation. Again, NACA concluded in favour of Avro: “It was agreed that there is little to be gained by conical positive camber for the particular mission of this aircraft…. Avro’s reasons for going to negative camber were also understood and appeared reasonable.”

The NAE thought the aircraft would be susceptible to pitch-up in supersonic flight. NACA stated, “It was agreed that the notch or leading edge extension proposed by Avro should alleviate pitch-up.” Similarly, with respect to engine intakes, “It was generally agreed that the amount and the diffusion angle involved at the intake were not excessive.”

Finally, on stability, Avro was proposing the use of artificial electronic stabilization, a radical departure from conventional design. According to the NAE, it was necessary to afford stability by making the aircraft inherently stable without the use of artificial electronic means. NACA stated:

It was generally agreed that while artificial lateral stabilization is undesirable in itself, the obvious aerodynamic [nonelectronic] cures such as a large increase in fin area could be unacceptable so far as performance of the aircraft is concerned. A concentrated test programme was recommended…. It was noted that problems of this type are not peculiar to the CF-105 configuration but appear to be associated with the mass distributions of modern high performance fighters.¹⁹

Avro had been vindicated on all counts by the NACA specialists. Floyd would later write, “If the NAE had been right, the Arrow would never have flown supersonically.” Furthermore, NACA was affirming that the problems Avro was encountering were to be expected in supersonic aircraft design.²⁰

Although many may not fully appreciate the technical significance of the arguments presented, they have been included because they have remained secret for so long, fuelling the speculation in some circles that the aircraft was technically flawed. Also, they demonstrate the technical expertise of the Avro team.

With the NACA experience behind them, the Avro team went back to work. Wind-tunnel testing continued. In all, 17 scale models ranging in size from one-eightieth to one-sixth scale were tested in the NAE facilities in Ottawa, the Cornell Laboratories in Buffalo, the NACA facilities in Langley Field, Virginia, and the NACA Lewis Laboratory in Cleveland, Ohio.

Due to the limitations in wind-tunnel testing, a complementary program of free-flight-model testing was carried out from 1954 to 1957. Eleven one-eighth-scale models of the aircraft were mounted atop Nike rocket boosters of 45,000 pounds thrust and launched into the sky. At altitude the boosters would separate, allowing the model to continue flying. (The separation technique known as drag separation had been developed by NACA. Essentially, after expending its fuel, the heavier booster would decelerate faster than the model, thereby separating from it.²¹ )

The models themselves were a mix of crude and highly accurate representations of the aircraft designed to provide dynamic stability and control data. Each was fitted with a series of transducers and an FM telemetering system using standard radio broadcast frequencies. The models were tracked using radar and theodolites as well as film cameras. Nine models were launched from the Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment (CARDE) at the range in Point Petre near Picton, Ontario. Two more were fired from the Wallops Island Range of the NACA Pilotless Aircraft Research Division in Virginia. Presumably, all of these models, constructed primarily of stainless steel, remain to this day under the waters where they splashed down decades ago. They were considered expendable, so no attempts were made to retrieve them.²²

Augmenting the scale-model effort, Avro also built a series of mock-ups and test rigs. For example, an engineering wooden mock-up was built to check tolerances and sizing for the engine and armament packs as well as to examine cable and wire runs. To demonstrate pilot visibility during taxiing and ground handling, a mock-up of the front cockpit was mounted to a truck, simulating the height and attitude the pilot would experience. A test rig simulating the aircraft’s electronics was added, as were others to simulate the landing gear and hydraulics. Finally, the most powerful digital computer then available, the IBM 704, was rented from IBM to handle the theoretical computations fed to it by a staff of 30 mathematicians, technicians, and operators.²³

Free-flight rocket models of the Arrow were instrumented and then launched to obtain flight data for the Arrow design. (Jim Floyd)

In four short years, outstanding even by today’s standards, the most modern aircraft in the world was ready for rollout. Along the way, Floyd had become vice-president, engineering, and Chamberlin, chief of technical design. Chief engineer was now Robert N. Lindley, with Guest Hake as project designer. But despite the technical design and production achievement, the aircraft had yet to fly. Would it meet the stringent performance specifications? Would flight testing prove otherwise? Would other countries purchase it?

In a memo dated February 22, 1957, the RCAF officially named the CF-105 the Arrow.²⁴

The Arrow Dream Team. Left to right: Bob Lindley, Jim Floyd, Guest Hake, and Jim Chamberlin. (Jim Floyd)