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2 U.S. AND U.K. INTEREST

If they were in our position, what would be their view in continuing or abandoning the project?

— Question from the RCAF to the USAF During a

Meeting from October 31 to November 1, 1955¹

With all of the activity being carried out with NACA and Avro Canada’s liaison with Hawker Siddeley in the United Kingdom, it is logical to assume that both the United States Air Force (USAF) and the Royal Air Force (RAF) in Britain would have observed what was going on in Canada with great interest. In the case of the United States, General Nathan F. Twining, chief of staff, USAF, had advised the Canadian chief of the air staff, Air Marshal Roy Slemon, that the USAF was interested in a long-rage interceptor and had initiated a design competition among American manufacturers.

It was June 1954, and General Twining was expressing a specific interest in the CF-105, so much so that he had requested the Air Research & Development Command (ARDC) in the United States to evaluate the specifications of the Canadian plane with those in the design competition. On July 15, 1954, Air Marshal Slemon replied and forwarded a copy of A.V. Roe’s design study. He also stated he was pleased to open this exchange of information with the Americans. It was in keeping with the doctrine of requiring “the enemy to compete in the technological field with the combined brains and resources of the English-speaking Allies rather than three components thereof … [because] such collaboration would be superior to the individual and in some cases overlapping efforts.”² Slemon pointed out that approval to proceed with the CF-105 was based on the knowledge that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom had or were planning to develop a similar aircraft.

The exchange of letters resulted in a team of RCAF and Avro officials providing a briefing to the ARDC on August 26, 1954. The briefing was well received, and later in 1955, when USAF assistance was requested in arranging for special wind-tunnel testing at facilities not available in Canada, help was provided without hesitation.

Despite the progress Avro was making and its vindication at NACA headquarters the previous year, Air Marshal Slemon, together with Dr. Omond Solandt, chairman of the DRB, decided an independent evaluation of the project was needed. A high-level technical delegation of USAF personnel was invited to visit Avro and study the program between October 31 and November 1, 1955. The USAF team was headed by Major General G.E. Price, director of requirements and deputy chief of staff (development). It included members from ARDC and the propulsion and fighter branches of USAF headquarters.³

The American team was told by the RCAF that increasing costs had led to a reappraisal of the project, that the defence budget was limited, and that, therefore, continuation could lead to elimination of other desirable programs. The USAF was requested to provide an opinion as to the “essentiality of the 105 Project to the defence of North America” and was asked flat out if it would abandon the program under similar circumstances! The defence of Canada had expanded to include the defence of North America, and it is probable that the Canadians were hoping to interest the USAF in eventual acquisitions. Still, it is inconceivable that the question of continuing or abandoning the project would be put so bluntly, especially when one factors in the “Buy American” mentality that might shape any answer from the USAF. Also, one might ask how well the defence of Canada had been studied by the experts before embarking on the Arrow, and if Canadian confidence was so low that the RCAF had to keep running to the United States for answers and advice. Would this become a factor in the cancellation later on?⁴

The USAF team was also told that the development of a new engine, the PS-13, or Iroquois, was linked to the airframe development, and that cancellation of the airframe would remove justification to proceed with the PS-13. Finally, USAF views were sought regarding choice of missiles, fire control, development costs with respect to similar U.S. projects, and comparisons to other U.S. aircraft under development. To help in its deliberations, the USAF team was handed the latest facts and figures on the project, with the parting comment that Canadian requirements in terms of numbers of aircraft would be small and therefore unit costs would be high. Even at such an early stage, it seems every vulnerability was being exposed and the very future of the project was being placed squarely in the hands of the United States.⁵

During the ensuing discussions, the differences in the performance between Avro’s calculations and those of the NAE and the DRB were again tabled and discussed. The U.S. team also inspected the mock-ups and tooling bays in the plant and was told of the versatility that could be incorporated into the aircraft. A full briefing was provided on the Iroquois engine being developed by Orenda.

On technical soundness, the delegation thought the risks were reasonable for such an advanced design: “In their opinion to attempt to achieve Mach 1.5 and a 2-g turn at 50,000 feet was quite a technical advance, but they saw no reason why the design should get into any particular trouble…. The delegation did not seem unduly perturbed by the fact that there was a difference of opinion about what the performance might actually be.”⁶

The USAF requirement for manoeuvrability was only 1.2 g at combat ceiling. Most aircraft will pull far more than 2 g, but to do it at altitude without losing power or height is quite remarkable even by today’s standards. (G measures the force of gravity on an accelerating body. To appreciate g force, think of the feeling of being pulled sideways when you make a sharp turn in a car. Or think of a roller coaster; as you go screaming down to the trough, g builds up, so that when you abruptly curve and go upward again, you feel g force pinning you to the back of your seat.)

A list of U.S. aircraft under development or consideration was tabled. It included the short-range F-102B, the medium-range F-103 to be available by 1962 or 1963, the long-range F-101B, and the long-range LR-1x1 and LR-1x2. The conclusion drawn by the Americans was that the CF-105 would be the only aircraft available to supplement the limited altitude capabilities of the F-101B prior to service of the LR-1x1 interceptor.

In fact, the U.S. team admitted that if the LR-1x1 was given the go-ahead, it would probably not be ready for service until some five to six years after the Arrow, well into the 1960s. It was also noted that for the LR-1x1 to obtain the hoped for 100-mile acquisition range for targets, a technical breakthrough in radar development would be required, and this could further delay its in-service timing. There were also stated problems with the navigation, communication, and fire-control subsystems of the aircraft.⁷ The long-range project would eventually be cancelled, and some people would use this as justification for the Arrow cancellation, stating that the manned interceptor was considered obsolete. But given all the problems cited by the Americans, was the LR-1x1 not cancelled for technical reasons?

With respect to the F-102B, the Canadians asked if it could operate outside the Semiautomated Ground Environment (SAGE). SAGE was a ground-based surveillance and weapons control system that could transmit data to the aircraft and automatically guide it to the target. The answer was that the F-102 was not the best aircraft to operate outside the SAGE. Hence, the utility of the F-102 for target interception would be limited to the range of the SAGE system, even though the aircraft might physically fly beyond the SAGE perimeter. This range problem would later prove to be one of the limitations of the Bomarc missile, as well. The Arrow, however, was designed to operate well beyond SAGE and did not require the assistance of SAGE during the target-interception process. In his memoirs, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker would intimate that it was the Arrow that could not operate outside of this sophisticated ground environment.

The medium-range F-103 was also discussed, but the USAF pointed out that no funds had yet been committed to this project and that technical advances in electronics would likely be needed to achieve its required performance. The Arrow appeared to remain the best aircraft that would be available in the time required, reinforcing the opinion that no American aircraft were suitable to meet the RCAF requirements.⁸

Considerable opinion was expressed concerning the PS-13, which Orenda was designing as a titanium engine. U.S. engine manufacturers had experienced numerous problems with titanium; however, as pointed out by the Americans, their companies were trying to integrate titanium parts into existing engines, while Orenda was designing with titanium from the start. Therefore, they expected that Orenda would not encounter the same difficulties. Given the expected high performance of the engine, the American team also wondered how the performance of its LR-1x1 could be improved.⁹

The American team believed that the greatest technical risk area would be that of the integrated electronic and fire-control system. The RCAF wanted the aircraft to operate within SAGE for a fully automatic interception of enemy aircraft as well as allowing manual control by the pilot outside SAGE boundaries. The Americans argued this was counter to the flexibility provided by the two-man crew and two engines, and therefore the complexity of incorporating electronic “smarts” for operation within SAGE were not required. They also stated that since the proposed designer for the electronic and fire-control system would be the Hughes Aircraft Corporation, a complicated design would overburden this company, which was already committed to American programs. It was suggested that a less sophisticated system be chosen with only essential components provided by Hughes. RCA and North American Downey were suggested as potential suppliers.

In July 1956, Fred Smye would be told by the chief of the air staff that the RCAF had selected RCA to provide the complete sophisticated system and that co-operation from Avro was expected. Avro had argued, unaware of the American advice, that such a system was too complex, too costly, not necessary, and could threaten the entire project. In short, after soliciting American advice, which in turn was echoed by Avro, the RCAF ignored it, only to have this part of the project terminated due to cost, as Smye had predicted.¹⁰

Finally, the American team was asked which missile suite it would prefer, the Hughes-designed Falcon or the Sparrow 2, currently under development by the U.S. Navy. Avro had argued with the RCAF that the best choice would be the Hughes Falcon because the Sparrow 2 had been designed for lower-performance aircraft. The U.S. delegation essentially stated the same. The Falcon had been designed for greater height, could carry infrared or radar homing, and had the same “kill” probability as the Sparrow. Also, because it was half the size, eight Falcons could be carried by the Arrow instead of four Sparrows. The Falcon was also less expensive. In a conversation with this author in June 1991, Dr. Solandt stated that the DRB had provided similar advice to the RCAF. However, Canadian Air Commodore Jack A. Easton thought that the American team did not know enough about the Sparrow to make an accurate comparison. He believed the Sparrow was better and this would eventually become the weapon of choice. Later, in late 1956, the U.S. Navy would abandon development of the Sparrow, only to have it taken over by Canada, adding yet another major development burden to the program and one that was certainly not required.¹¹

The U.S. team was then asked for its opinion of the Bomarc missile and its impact on the role of the manned interceptor. General Price indicated that this missile was being developed by Boeing aircraft as an addition to the manned interceptor. It was ground-launched, with the Bomarc A having a range of 125 miles and the Bomarc B a range of 250 miles. Bomarc might replace the F-102, but Price “did not foresee the day of the phasing out of the manned interceptors as he felt there would always be a need for judgement and mobility in a weapon system.”¹² In other words, once aimed and launched, the missile would destroy its target regardless of whether the target was truly a hostile aircraft or a civilian plane that had strayed off course and been mistaken for an enemy warplane. A man in an aircraft, on the other hand, could exercise judgment and caution by first identifying the target. Like the F-102, the Bomarc, an unproven missile under development, would be restricted to target acquisition within the SAGE network. The SAGE network itself would be subject to electronic jamming, a technology the Russians were known to possess. Eventually, the Bomarc would, in fact, prove to be a disaster, while the F-102 cum F-106 would remain in service until the early 1980s.

Throughout the two-day meeting, Avro was asked to provide facts and information. The following is recorded by the RCAF within the conclusions of the meeting and speaks to the professionalism of the company:

It should be pointed out that the Company provided the meeting with complete facilities and information exactly as required in terms of quality and content. They made every effort to carry out the spirit of the requests made upon them by the CAS [chief of the air staff] and did this to perfection. There was absolutely no indication whatever of salesmanship or extravagant claims and only the engineering staff made contact with the visiting party. They provided only the information that they were requested to do and stuck strictly to their terms of reference. Mr. Floyd provided a short discussion on the future potential of the aircraft, showed a film of the test models that had been made and fired and explained design characteristics of the mock-up. Mr. Grinyer described the design philosophy of his engine and its present status and timing…. Both engineers were most objective about the problems that they were facing, were not at all reticent to describe their difficulties, and the ways in which they had hoped to overcome them.¹³

A letter dated November 9, 1955, was sent to the Honourable Ralph Campney, minister of national defence, from Donald A. Quarles, secretary of the air force. In it Quarles stated that as a result of the evaluation it was recommended that “development and production of the CF-105 proceed as now planned.”¹⁴ He also included a summary of the meeting that showed a preference for the Arrow in northern areas or offshore by “a fair margin over the F-102B … due to the CF-105 having twin-engine reliability; having with its additional crewman, a better navigation and search radar capability; [and] being better adapted to operations from marginal airfields.”¹⁵

The USAF liked the aircraft, had faith in the design team, believed that Orenda would succeed in developing the Iroquois, and wondered about the utility of this engine in American aircraft. It even gave Canada the go-ahead to proceed with the program. One must wonder, “Which government was controlling the project?” Moreover, although increasing cost had been mentioned as a potential problem by the RCAF, money to continue was made available now that the Americans had spoken. The Americans had issued their decree and this was all that mattered. Still, why was the RCAF persisting on the complex fire control and Sparrow missile? What source of advice was more important than the Americans’ on these issues? In conversation with this author, Dr. Solandt would only proffer that the RCAF wanted the absolute best and placed this above the actual requirements. And what of the NAE and the DRB?

From the same information available to the U.S. team, the DRB and the NAE had somehow concluded that the Arrow would probably be no better than the F-102. This assessment in a letter dated November 3, 1955, perhaps in anticipation of the American reply, prompted the following response from Air Vice Marshal Hendrick, air member technical services, on December 9, 1955. Commenting on the fact that numerous subsequent discussions had been held with the company and the DRB as well as with the CF-105 Aerodynamic Subcommittee, he added:

[T]here is a wide difference of opinion between NAE and A.V. Roe on the possible performance of this aircraft…. We note your statement that you can find no serious grounds for differing with the NAE figures. I think it only fair to say however that we as a Service, can find no serious grounds for differing materially with the Company who are our contractors and the designers of this aircraft…. [U]nder the worst conditions the 105 is likely to be as good as or better than the 102 in aerodynamic performance. This is a statement which you have agreed on more than one occasion…. [T]he tactical and fighting advantages of the CF-105 by virtue of its two men, two engines, large radar, etc., give it such superiority as a weapons system as to justify continuation of the project…. We do not accept the contention that the 102B and the 105 are geometrically similar and that simple arithmetic comparisons of their performance can be made…. [T]he difference between the high wing and the low wing aircraft are sufficiently great to make such forms of comparison oversimplified and dangerous.¹⁶

In January 1956, Orenda received official notification that the USAF was interested in the Arrow only if it were to be fitted with the PS-13 Iroquois engine and not with the lower-powered American J-75 engine, which was also being considered. In addition, it was disclosed that the USAF was interested in the Iroquois for other aircraft, including its B-52 bomber.¹⁷ Clearly, the USAF wanted the engine program to continue. It must be realized that quite apart from the engine itself, the manufacturing and research knowledge gained from both the engine and the airframe programs would be of immense value to similar programs in the United States and other countries, especially if they would eventually prove successful. A.V. Roe would be solving technical problems not only for itself but for the rest of the world, including potential enemies.

By January 1957, John Orr, director of engineering research at the DRB, was reporting that Avro and NAE performance figures were finally coming into agreement. Avro had reduced its 2-g manoeuvrability figure to 1.63, and the NAE had raised its to 1.62. As noted by Orr in a letter to the chief of the air staff, this was still far superior to any other aircraft. Still, the cautions were evident, and by January 21, 1957, the NAE was claiming that its estimates were more accurate than Avro’s. The bottom line, however, was that the Arrow was being shown to be a better aircraft by orders of magnitude above the rest, and later flight testing would show that the 2-g requirement could indeed be achieved.¹⁸

In February 1957, another meeting was held in Toronto. This time it was by the Advanced Interceptor Committee, chaired by General Boyd of the USAF. The committee agreed with Canadian thinking on the design and operational requirements for an aircraft like the Arrow, and in April 1957, the RCAF was informed that the USAF wanted to be kept up-to-date on all developments. It seemed that American aircraft programs were indeed falling behind considerably in their schedules and that the Arrow might fill the gap.¹⁹

As before, though, the NAE sent another letter to the DRB, this one dated June 20, 1957, and signed by the new director, D.C. MacPhail. Now the NAE was claiming the aircraft would break up in flight:

We understand that the CF-105 is to be equipped with an artificial stability augmentation system which goes considerably beyond what is being attempted in the design of other high speed aircraft. The essential difference is that the CF-105 system is required to provide augmentation of static directional stability, as well as the now generally required damping. The result of this development is that failure of the servo system can be expected to cause nearly instantaneous breakup of the aircraft in several regions within its normal flight envelope…. The reason for this work is, of course, that we believe it should be possible to design the airframe so that even if artificial damping is needed to provide acceptable handling characteristics, the safety of the aircraft is not dependent on its functioning satisfactorily. We know that the attainment of this standard of safety is being demanded and achieved by the British, French, and Americans and we are continually astonished that it is neither being demanded or achieved in Canada in the case of the CF-105 aircraft.²⁰

The letter is most curious. By this time, the subjects of safety, lateral stability, and so on had been well addressed by the Avro team in its presentations to NACA and, as will be shown later, as discussed with experts from the United Kingdom. The tone in the letter is also somewhat strong and could lead one to believe that the NAE was again being more obstructionist than helpful.

In fact, the question of safety was paramount in Jim Floyd’s mind and led him into several heated discussions with Harvey Smith, vice-president of manufacturing. It was Floyd’s opinion that if engineering realized during production — perhaps as a result of additional testing — that a given component might have a higher risk associated with it, then the component should be corrected if possible. This, of course, could lead to delays in production; with the tight schedules involved, delays would be unacceptable to Smith. The matter was resolved by Fred Smye, the president and general manager, who stated, “[I]n regard to safety of the first airplane, it is Floyd’s unqualified decision as to whether or not the change is to be incorporated…. [I]f engineering feels that they must make the change for safety sake, it will be made immediately and it is not a matter to be discussed.”²¹

The NAE must have been aware of these policies through the DRB: in 1955, Crawford Gordon, then Avro’s president and general manager, had personally supported a proposal to have a DRB individual attached to the project in the plant in Toronto; also, records show that the NAE fully supported the formation of aerodynamic and structural subcommittees of which they enjoyed participation. Under these circumstances, such a letter seems quite ludicrous.²²

July 18, 1957, saw the visit of Dr. Courtland Perkins, chief scientist, USAF, to Avro. Dr. Perkins told Floyd that the USAF had issued a contract for a design study on a long-range interceptor complete with engine, missiles, and fire-control system. The project was losing support in view of the aircraft weight and the situation in dollars for defence. He stated that should the aircraft be cancelled, there was a good chance that the USAF would consider the Arrow and that it should be kept abreast of all developments. He then outlined the requirements, which included the abilities to fly out to 250 nautical miles, loiter for one hour, proceed at Mach 3 for another 325 nautical miles, and to engage targets up to 70,000 feet at 1.2 g and Mach 3. It was a tall order, but Avro thought it might be achievable with some modifications and if refuelling were allowed during the loiter. Dr. Perkins asked to be kept abreast of all ideas.²³ One must indeed begin to wonder if, in a very subtle way, the USAF wanted Avro to do much of the work, perhaps thinking that U.S. manufacturers were unable to handle the project. On the other hand, maybe the USAF’s strategy was a surreptitious attempt to find out just how capable the Avro was. This author contacted Dr. Perkins several times during the preparation of this book in 1991. Dr. Perkins admitted to having visited Avro, but said he was not connected with the project in any way and did not recall what had been discussed at the meeting other than the circular wing flying saucer (Avrocar) being developed by John Frost of Avro. His parting comments on the Arrow were that he was not involved then and still is not today.

The whole subject of the Arrow was again reviewed, this time in Washington, between the Canadian vice chief of the air staff, Air Vice Marshal Larry Dunlap; the air member technical services, Air Vice Marshal Hendrick; and high-ranking officers of the USAF. Results of this meeting were reported at the 273rd Air Council meeting held October 19, 1957, in Ottawa. The vice chief of the air staff stated that the Americans thought North America must be defended against manned bombers and the intercontinental ballistic missile for the period 1960 to 1970. The United States also believed that the Soviet Union could have a supersonic intercontinental bomber by 1965, possibly even a nuclear-powered one. Therefore, the American concept of defence was to counter with an in-depth array of complementary weapons: long-range interceptors that would attack oncoming bombs at a great distance with nuclear weapons, followed by surface-to-air missiles within the heartland should some enemy bombers get through the initial long-range encounter.²⁴

The Americans had stated that surface-to-air missiles would necessarily be limited in range to 250 miles. (Presumably, this was due to the distance limitations of radar acquisition that would guide the missile to the target; that is, SAGE.) Therefore, they would likely replace short-range interceptors as mentioned earlier, and perhaps some medium-range interceptors, as well, in the 1963–1965 period. There still remained the requirement, though, for a long-range interceptor that had the inherent advantages of flexibility, range, and human discrimination.

The Avro Arrow was regarded by the Americans as a long-range interceptor because of its radius of action and because of the geographical location of the bases from which it could be operated. Indeed, Dr. John J. Green, the DRB scientific adviser to the RCAF, had written the following in a memorandum dated June 10, 1954:

In computing combat radius different conditions are stipulated by the RCAF and the USAF. For instance, the USAF permits the use of external tanks, whereas the RCAF specification does not. If the combat radius of the CF-105 is calculated in accordance with the conditions permitted by the USAF specification, a figure of 782 nautical miles is obtained, which is not far short of the 1,000 nautical miles specified by the USAF. Incidentally, the combat radius based on the RCAF specification but with full internal tanks is 635 nautical miles for JP4 fuel and 665 nautical miles for JP1 fuel.²⁵

Calculation of combat radius must also consider the type of mission to be carried out, but the memorandum from Dr. Green does point out some of the numerous other factors to be considered. This issue of combat radius would later become a source of confusion; the prime minister and others would state the figures incorrectly, giving rise to the mistaken belief that the Arrow’s range would be so limited as to render it useless.

In addition to being regarded as a long-range interceptor, the air member technical services who was responsible for the Arrow development program added that the aircraft would not only fill the gap from 1962 to 1965 but that its true potential could be exploited after 1965 to deal with the supersonic bomber threat through increased range and speed. Limitations to speed were thought to be due to thermal heating of the aircraft skin in supersonic slight, but the air member emphasized this might not prove to be the problem once thought. In supersonic flight, airborne particles and molecules strike the aircraft with such force that the skin heats up due to friction. This can cause the wings and other parts to distort because of uneven heating, possibly resulting in the loss of the aircraft.²⁶

Meanwhile, at the Ottawa 273rd Air Council meeting, members were told that the Americans were pushing ahead with the Bomarc missile and were planning to improve the SAGE system. But the Bomarc and SAGE combination would only be useful against manned bombers and would be used primarily against the bombers that got through the initial encounter from the defending long-range interceptors. What about the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), against which interceptors and the Bomarc would be useless? No decisions had yet been reached on how to counter the ICBM threat, but several weapons were under development. In an interview with this author on July 31, 1991, Air Vice Marshal John Easton confirmed that an anti-ICBM capability was being considered for the Arrow. The Americans had provided charts and estimates of proposed defensive weapons, performance capabilities of Soviet bombers to 1965, costs of the Bomarc in relation to aircraft such as the F-106, hypothetical attack scenarios, and defence strategies against the supersonic bomber threat. It seemed the old subsonic Soviet bombers were slowly being replaced with supersonic bombers.²⁷

The air member technical services stated that his own view, like the Americans’, was for an all-encompassing program of Arrow, Bomarc, and improved radar defences. The vice chief of the air staff agreed, but did not believe the economy could afford a variety of expensive weapons. At this same meeting, the air member personnel, Air Vice Marshal J. Gordon Kerr, questioned the value of continuing with the Arrow given that it would be in use for only two or three years before the American long-range interceptors were ready and that less expensive Bomarcs would also soon be available. His position was to improve the ground environment and build missile bases. He, too, expressed the opinion that together “the cost of both Bomarc and the Arrow was prohibitive.” This combined cost would eventually erroneously translate into only the cost of the Arrow as being prohibitive.²⁸

Unfortunately, it appears that Air Vice Marshal Kerr did not fully understand the technical discussion that had preceded his comments on the need for long-range interception and the differences between aircraft and missiles for varying roles. This lack of understanding is not surprising, as he was a non-technical participant. The question, though, is whether his comments deflected the course of the conversation or influenced the outcome. Did he expect the Americans to handle Canadian long-range requirements, or were they expected just to provide their aircraft without charge? The Bomarc was short-range, yet why did he think it could replace the long-range Arrow? Was the Canadian air defence strategy truly thought out? And what of the future potential of the Arrow discussed at this same meeting? Was this group truly capable of discussing the question of defence and the role of the Arrow in an intelligent fashion, or were the concepts beyond their comprehension?

Like the United States, the Royal Air Force in the United Kingdom was well aware of the CF-105 developments. In December 1955, the British minister of supply requested permission from the Canadian government for a team of experts to visit Avro. The director of the Royal Aeronautical Establishment, the deputy chief of staff of the RAF, and others descended upon Avro in January 1956. It was acknowledged at the outset that the Arrow had been designed with Canadian geography in mind. However, this geography would not be unlike Britain if one considered the North Sea to be akin to the vast stretches of the Canadian northwest.

Conclusions from the British report agreed generally with the Americans. The U.K. team thought that Avro’s claims were reasonable. They pointed to the differences of opinion between Avro and Canada’s NAE and said that further wind-tunnel testing would be needed to augment the numerical calculations. Still, they addressed the contentious point of drag due to trim at supersonic speed. Explaining that this drag results when the elevators are deflected upward to help control and stabilize the aircraft, the report goes on to state:

For the control derivatives (a), an analysis of NACA data on delta wings, suitably corrected for minor variations in geometry along the lines suggested by theory, would seem to support the values being quoted by the firm. We are therefore in disagreement with NAE on this point since they are suggesting lower control effectiveness…. Broadly speaking, the firm’s estimates for thrust and drag are not seriously in error, i.e., probably not more than 5–10% optimistic. If we have understood the NAE estimates for trim drag correctly, we would say that they are over estimating the value of this quantity…. The amount of work done by the firm at this stage on the intake is especially laudable.²⁹

The British experts were essentially agreeing that Avro’s numbers were probably correct and that those of the NAE might be in error by a greater amount. It is known that the NAE received a copy of the U.K. results, but Jim Floyd does not recall having seen them. Still, this type of assessment might have upset those in the NAE who were certain the NAE was correct.

Further on, the report discusses, in some detail, the electronic automatic stability augmentation system, failure of which the NAE thought would cause the aircraft to break apart while in certain regions of the flight envelope. NACA had already stated electronic stability was feasible. Noting that failure of such a system could create severe problems, the British experts concluded:

Any aircraft of the performance of the CF-105 will require artificial stability and damping of some kind…. [W]hile most firms are adopting the philosophy of designing the aircraft to have the best possible inherent stability characteristics, and then bringing the aircraft to the required standard by the minimum of artificial means, this firm has taken the view that since artificial stability is required it should be exploited to the full…. Their arguments include the saving of weight … and better handling characteristics generally. The clear indication is that a high degree of reliability will be required from the system which may cause delays in development, since it is in any case very advanced in concept…. We were however impressed with the thorough and realistic manner in which they are tackling the project. Their avowed objective is to obtain a system reliability equivalent to that demanded of the engines on a twin-engine aircraft…. The CF-105 has a higher performance than the F-153 (Javelin) and the RCAF intends to equip it to a more effective standard than we could achieve in the same time. When fitted with British equipment the CF-105 would still be better than the F-153 but our less versatile weapons would tend to reduce its margin of superiority.³⁰

The artificial stability system being discussed in this and the NAE letter are today part of the fly-by-wire systems that are used in the most advanced jets, including the F/A-18 Hornet, Canada’s newest fighter. More will be explained later, as fly-by-wire was indeed built into and successfully flown in the Arrow. Unlike the Avro engineers who were thinking toward the future, it is clear that the NAE wanted to take the lower-risk traditional approach, but as had been pointed out by NACA and now the British team, the traditional approach would give poorer performance. In fact, given that the British report was released to the NAE before its memo of June 20, 1957, one wonders if the NAE was not simply extracting from selected portions of the report, leaving out the comments regarding the high degree of confidence the British team had in Avro. The F/A-18 is also inherently unstable, but it is precisely this feature that gives it its agility and manoeuvrability. The British report goes on to say that these types of controls will be “essential in higher speed aircraft and experience of them in the CF-105 would be invaluable.” Indeed, this has proven to be the case.³¹

The visiting U.K. team also undertook to examine closely the building and manufacture of the engines and airframe and to look at planning, scheduling, salary, morale of employees, and numerous other factors. The report states:

There is no doubt that the firm is capable with its present labour force and space of meeting the likely demands for the RCAF and in fact exceeding them considerably. An output of over 10 CF-105s per month on a single shift basis is well within the capabilities of the firm…. Orenda Engines Ltd…. Is excellently equipped and there is no doubt whatever in its ability to match the aircraft programme in mind by Avro Aircraft Ltd.³²

The report finds remarkable the friendly relationship between the design and manufacturing staffs and the care taken in measuring the progress at every stage. In conclusion the report states that the best choice for the RAF would be the Arrow “as is.” So, yet again, independent experts from another country informed the RCAF that the project was sound, that they had great confidence in the Avro engineers, and that they disagreed with the NAE on the major technical issues.

With respect to purchases, though, it was believed that the aircraft might be too costly if manufactured in Canada. To keep costs in check, licensing arrangements were proposed. The report itself had included cost and scheduling estimates for various production scenarios involving 100 aircraft produced in Britain at costs ranging between $3.2 and $3.7 million per copy. Then, in May 1956, Air Marshal Pike (RAF) stated that although the Arrow was a very attractive aircraft, its proposed delivery date would be too late to meet the RAF requirement. Therefore, the chances of obtaining the aircraft would be small since Britain would rather obtain an aircraft that would be available sooner. Interest from the United Kingdom seemed to dwindle at this point only to re-emerge after the cancellation for the purpose of obtaining reports and technical data that might assist Britain in developing the TSR-2 aircraft.³³

Meanwhile, on January 29, 1958, the Canadian ambassador to Washington, Norman Robertson, was the luncheon guest of James H. Douglas, secretary of the air force. It proved to be a fateful meeting! With him were Lieutenant-General D.L. Putt, deputy chief of staff, research and development; Major-General H.M. Estes, assistant chief of staff for air defense systems; and Dudley C. Sharp, assistant secretary (matériel), Department of the Air Force. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the CF-105. Douglas displayed considerable knowledge of the Arrow, Canada’s concerns about foreign sales to reduce cost, and continental defence. He stated categorically that there was no place in the USAF inventory for the CF-105. He stated that the USAF was going ahead with the F-108 long-range interceptor because it believed that fighter would be more advanced and capable. Later, of course, it would be cancelled.³⁴

Still, the door had not been completely closed. The secretary stated his personal view that in the context of continental defence the USAF could purchase the Arrow in squadron strength to operate from Canadian bases and to be manned and maintained by the RCAF. The Canadian ambassador interpreted this as some form of charity and suggested that Canada wished to be a contributor to defence and not a beneficiary. He further stated there would be political problems with this arrangement.

General Putt speculated whether a plan through North American Air (later Aerospace) Defense Command (NORAD) could not be established that would call for more CF-105 squadrons than currently envisaged by Canada, with the difference being funded by the USAF. As an alternative, he mentioned that eight Strategic Air Command (SAC) refuelling bases were being planned for installation in Canada and that perhaps a swap could be arranged; the purchase of CF-105s in exchange for work done in Canada in readying the refuelling bases.³⁵ On the one hand, it seemed the USAF was saying no, while on the other it seemed the Americans were saying the Arrow was wanted and needed, especially for protection in the continent’s north.

In a priority message back to Canada, air staff in Washington indicated that the meeting had been far from conclusive, but that the opportunity was at hand for an official approach to the USAF. The message stated that the climate was favourable, and that apart from the meeting with the secretary, there had been many indications that the CF-105 was being recognized as a very fine weapon. It does not appear, though, that General Putt’s ideas for a swap were ever followed up, and it is not known what Norman Robertson’s personal report on the meeting showed.³⁶

As an early strategy at trying to interest the Americans further, notwithstanding this meeting, it was proposed that the Arrow be compared with the F-106 and F-108 aircraft to demonstrate the Arrow’s superior capabilities. Performance characteristics for the American aircraft would be needed, and it was expected the information would be made available since Canada had always shared data willingly. This would not prove to be the case. In 1958, repeated attempts at trying to obtain the data on the American aircraft failed. A request was even made through Air Marshal Slemon, now deputy commander-in-chief of NORAD, but this, too, yielded nothing. An exasperated staff officer would note, “The purposes of the letter are a) to pt. out to Senior Officers the importance of exactly comparable missions … and b) a last ditch effort to obtain F-106 operating data…. It would almost appear that the USAF are withholding this data…. 16 June 1958.”³⁷

American interest in the Arrow was changing at a time when the aircraft was beginning to prove its capabilities. Was the USAF truly disinterested in a project it had supported since inception? Had the USAF obtained the solution to the technical problems its own manufacturers were facing and was it now pulling back, or was it being told that it no longer had an interest in the Arrow by some other authority that felt threatened? According to John Orr, then director of engineering research at the DRB, it is claimed that the USAF submitted a confidential evaluation of the technical and operational capabilities of the aircraft to the Canadian officials. This report had supposedly been written by a junior officer subject to influence by U.S. aircraft manufacturers who might see the Arrow as a threat to business. This author located one other individual who claims to have seen such a report, but the report itself, if it exists, has not yet come to light. Still, why would anyone go to such lengths?³⁸

The facts clearly demonstrate that the USAF kept the project moving, with the RCAF seemingly following orders. American officials had not only been sought after for consultation on the project but were asked directly for the go-ahead to continue. The situation evolving was not unlike that in the late 1980s with the design and development of the Israeli fighter, the Lavi. Just as the prototypes were commencing flight tests, the United States removed support and effectively killed the program. The primary difference was that the United States was actually subsidizing the development of the Lavi and was likely well within its rights to pull out of the development if it so desired. Still, why did it not stop the project sooner? It is as if the Arrow and Lavi developments were simply a means of conducting research and development by exploiting foreign talent. In the case of Canada, this talent was being made available free of charge and always with the hope of a sale. But also in the case of Canada, why not purchase the aircraft? Was it really a problem with U.S. industry or were other factors involved? It is as if the more Avro and the Arrow proved themselves, the more important it became to stop the program.

What is perhaps most distressing is the seeming lack of Canadian confidence in the program, most notably from certain quarters of the NAE. Independent experts in both the United States and the United Kingdom were most impressed by A.V. Roe’s technical talent and its grasp of the problems being faced. Both were also in disagreement with the NAE, and still the NAE persisted in raising problems that seemingly were not there, giving every impression, perhaps inadvertently, of trying to thwart the program just to prove it was right.

What was it about this aircraft, which on the one hand was hailed by the international technical community, but on the other sparked a delayed lack of interest from foreign governments? Was it superior or not, and in which ways? What about that first flight? Would it prove to be Avro’s undoing?