Читать книгу New South African Review 2 - Paul Hoffman - Страница 43

Regardless of the ANC’s massive support base, the DA argues consistently and robustly that South African democracy is dependent upon one crucial factor, namely a strong and committed political opposition. Before handing over the reins of power to Helen Zille in 2007, Tony Leon (2006) referred to the political objectives he and a few others had set out to achieve: ‘In 1994 I set out – with a handful of colleagues – with a mission and a purpose: to establish and entrench the concept of opposition as a legitimate and absolutely essential cornerstone of our new democracy.’ While the DA cannot be faulted for its efforts to fashion a sturdy opposition, its attempt to make inroads into the African community – the country’s richest electoral resource – remains hampered by the fact that race and ethnicity significantly influence voter preferences.

A consistent theme running through DA literature is the political profit enjoyed by the ANC from racially angled policies such as affirmative action. Nevertheless, the DA exhibits confidence that the black/ANC relationship can be challenged.

In the light of the correlation between race and voter allegiance, and a fractured but unbroken ANC, effective oppositional politics in contemporary South Africa requires an openness to building coalitions. The DA-led multiparty coalition governments in the Western Cape and in the Cape Town municipality have generally worked well and demonstrate what can be achieved when smaller parties unite on the basis of a shared minority status.

These experiences will no doubt help bolster the party further. Although the party won the Western Cape in the 2009 provincial elections with 51.46 per cent of the vote, it cannot afford to take electoral support for granted – not least because this province was once a post-apartheid stronghold for the NP. In 1994, the NP won twenty-three seats in the Western Cape before slipping to the point of embarrassment when, as the NNP, it won only five seats. The unpredictability of the province largely derives from parties vying for the non-African vote in the most multicultural and ethnically plural part of the country. The DP went from three seats in 1994 to five in 1999, to twelve as the DA in 2004. The 2009 provincial elections then saw the DA grow yet further to capture twenty-two seats. This was a considerable achievement in only fourteen years (albeit assisted by divisions along African/coloured lines within the provincial ANC) and leaves the Western Cape as the only province that currently is not under the control of the ANC.

The significant concentration of electoral support for the DA in the Western Cape has both positive and negative aspects for the party’s prospects. On a positive note, the province allows the DA’s performance, in relation to its delivery of services to the people of the province, to be assessed. However, should the politics of racial identity continue to determine how South Africans vote then what happens in the Western Cape might count for little.

As mentioned above, the DA has not drawn the same level of support in the Northern as it has in the Western Cape. The 2009 provincial result for the DA in the Northern Cape indicates that coloured voters in this province were not as convinced as their Western Cape counterparts by the DA’s campaign. As leading party strategist, Jonathan Moakes, has pointed out:

… the DA has traditionally been more present among coloured voters in the Western Cape than in the Northern Cape. The party has more of a base in the Western Cape from which to start. Furthermore, the platform of being in government in the Western Cape is very significant with voters experiencing DA delivery in very tangible terms. Voters in the Northern Cape have not had that experience yet (Noakes to Southern, private communication, 3 August 2010).

From a strategic perspective, the significance of the Western Cape to the DA’s preparation for the next national elections lies in the potential example it can set of good provincial government, but when we compare the vastly different position the DA is presently in from the position it occupied both nationally and provincially following the 1994 elections, it becomes clear that the party has been able to sell its message to an increasing number of South Africans. As mentioned above, Davis (2004) explains the DP’s success between 1994 and 1999 as resulting from the party’s capitalising on a sense of alienation felt by non-black groups in general. But the DP came under serious criticism from the ANC for its allegedly negative approach to opposition politics. As the 2004 elections drew near the ANC’s take on their opponents was that they were nation wreckers, bent on polarising South African society along racial lines. As argued by Mbeki (2004):

White minority power in our country, in all its forms and manifestations, was necessarily always founded on the division and polarisation of our people and the denial of our common nationhood, sharing one destiny … This approach finds expression today in the view advanced by some opposition parties that the litmus test defining whether we have a genuine democracy or not is the strength of the Opposition, and therefore the division of our country into permanently antagonistic camps. The principal task of this Opposition is then defined as opposing everything the government does, with no concern about participating in the effort to address the fundamental challenge our country faces to eradicate the legacy of colonialism and apartheid.

Mbeki equated political opposition with racial opposition. Given the history of South Africa, the ANC could not attack its political opposition in a more menacing fashion. From a strategic perspective, it was profitable to convey a message which tethered ‘white’ opposition parties to a racist past because to do so would dissuade voters from conducting a deeper inquiry into the actual policies advocated by the opposition. Mbeki’s statement, however, displays a flawed logic regarding the electoral benefits of racial polarisation. The DA is far from being backward in calculating the political costs of racial division. So long as black politics remains a contest among a few ‘black’ parties (especially if the ANC does not experience serious fractures) to follow a line that promotes race entrenchment would spell electoral marginalisation and minority political status in perpetuity for the DA; whites and other non-African groups are simply too small in number for other possibilities to be countenanced. On the other hand, where a large racial majority exists, to kindle race consciousness with its inevitably attendant racial political loyalty would work to the advantage of the ANC.

In essence, a refusal by the DA to bridge the racial divide would be politically unstrategic and the party is going about winning black votes in two ways. First, if race continues to influence voting patterns and the perceptions of voters are influenced by the racial profiles of parties, then parties need to consider how they are perceived across the racial spectrum. It is undeniable that in the long-term a party that claims to stand for racial inclusivity would probably lose credibility if an electorate sees little evidence of this in its racial composition. But the racial membership of parties cannot be expected to change suddenly or instantly. Progressing through the ranks is a gradual process which rewards hard work and dedication, and also rewards those who are patient and long-suffering of spirit. So, what can be said about the current racial profile of the DA? According to the DA parliamentary leader, Athol Trollip:

We have invested considerable resources in building a body of political representatives that reflect the country’s racial diversity. The DA’s caucus is more diverse than that of any other party – which is a testament to the party’s efforts. We have put our money where our mouth is, so to speak. It is critical that we don’t just say we are a party of all South Africans, but show that we are (Trollip to Southern, personal communication, 18 May 2010).

According to Trollip and others, ANC propaganda has sought to obscure the multiracial character of the DA. For rural blacks who have limited access to modern technologies and little actual contact with members of particular parties there may well be a low level of awareness of the DA’s racial composition, but this is less likely for urbanised members of the black community. Hence, making all South Africans knowledgeable, not only about DA policies but also about its racial makeup, becomes a strategic imperative.

A second way the party is choosing to make inroads into the black community is by on-the-ground contact. Grassroots campaigning reinforces the message that the party is serious about its nonracial message. Electioneering can take different forms – door to door contact or mass rallies – but if it is done by parties that are perceived to be ‘white’, and in places where they have had no historic presence, then this helps add weight to verbal claims of nonracialism. Here, however, the DA is at a disadvantage. In addition to persuading blacks that the DA is nonracial, it has to contend with the black community’s political veneration of the ANC as the party that liberated South Africa from apartheid and often at great personal cost to its members. In other words, the ANC suffered with its people and this is particularly significant for older black voters with first-hand experience of the destructiveness of white racism. But attitudes can change with the passing of a generation. A party’s credentials as the party of black emancipation will only take it so far. If a new generation of black voters – with only a second-hand knowledge of apartheid – becomes disillusioned with the ANC because of its poor record in addressing such social problems as high crime rates, poverty, insufficient housing and HIV/AIDS, then the historical role the party played in the black struggle is likely to become a less influential factor when votes are to be cast. But will this add up to a better future for the DA?