Читать книгу The Digital Big Bang - Phil Quade - Страница 42

It is in the third scenario, international relations and autonomous lethal weapons, that speed may pose risks to humanity itself. That is a dramatic statement to be sure, but one that is not alarmist when the future of technology is considered in a military context. The problem is that human thinking and the processes humans have established to manage their international affairs do not map to Moore's law—we do not become exponentially faster over time.

In the last century, intercontinental ballistic missiles shortened military response times from days to minutes. Since then, the introduction of cyberwarfare capabilities has arguably reduced response times further. As General Joseph Dunford, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in 2017, “The speed of war has changed, and the nature of these changes makes the global security environment even more unpredictable, dangerous, and unforgiving. Decision space has collapsed and so our processes must adapt to keep pace with the speed of war [emphasis added].” To take advantage of the remaining decision space, Dunford noted, there must be “a common understanding of the threat, providing a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the joint force, and then establishing a framework that enables senior leaders to make decisions in a timely manner.” This suggests the need for greater pre-decisional planning, from collecting better intelligence about adversaries' capabilities and intentions to better scenario planning so that decisions can be made more quickly.

At the same time that we attempt to adapt, we must also grapple with a fundamental question: As the need for speed increases, will humans delegate decision making—even in lethal situations—to machines? That humans will remain in the loop is not a foregone conclusion. With the creation of autonomous lethal weapons, some countries have announced new policies requiring a “human-in-the-loop” (see Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.09, November 12, 2012). Additionally, concerned individuals and organizations are leading calls for international treaties limiting such weapons (see https://autonomousweapons.org/). But as we have seen with cybersecurity norms, gaining widespread international agreement can be difficult, particularly when technology is new and countries do not want to quickly, and perhaps prematurely, limit their future activities. And as we have seen recently with chemical weapons, ensuring compliance even with agreed-upon rules can be challenging.