Читать книгу The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France - R. Knecht J. - Страница 23

Louis next turned his attention to Naples, where many of his courtiers had lordships they hoped to recover. He revived the idea, first mooted under Charles VIII, of taking the king of Aragon into partnership. In the secret Treaty of Granada (11 November 1500) the two monarchs agreed to conquer Naples jointly and then divide it between them. Louis was to get Naples, Campania, Gaeta, the Terra di Lavoro, the Abruzzi and the province of Campobasso along with the titles of king of Naples and of Jerusalem; Ferdinand was to get Apulia and Calabria and the titles of king of Sicily and duke of Calabria and Apulia. However, for some unknown reason, two provinces – Basilicata and Capitanata – were overlooked in the treaty.

In the spring of 1501, Louis raised a new army and placed it under the command of Stuart d’Aubigny. After a general muster at Parma on 25 May, the army crossed the Appenines. Meanwhile, Ferdinand sent an army under Gonzalo da Cordoba to establish a foothold in Calabria and along the coast of Apulia. Early in July, the French invaded the kingdom of Naples using the same terror tactics as in the Milanese. Any town offering resistance, however slight, was brutally sacked. The worst massacre was at Capua where all the defenders were put to the sword and the entire population – estimated at 8000 – was wiped out. The streets flowed with blood as the French and Swiss raped, looted and burned. Against such barbarity Federigo III of Naples offered no resistance. On 4 August the French entered Naples. Federigo, who threw himself on their mercy, was better treated than Sforza had been. He was allowed to travel to France in regal style and given a pension and the county of Maine, spending his last years peacefully in the Loire valley.

While planting garrisons in the kingdom of Naples, d’Aubigny sent La Palice to occupy the Abruzzi and the provinces of Capitanata and Basilicata. The period between August 1501 and June 1502 was marked by the greatest expansion of French power in Italy. Louis XII’s Italian dominions, including Milan and Asti, covered an area of 75,000 square kilometres. No king of France had ever owned as much territory since the start of the Capetian dynasty in AD 887; none was to have as much again before 1789. Realizing the economic potential of his new dominions, Louis took steps to exploit them. Early in August 1501 he appointed Louis d’Armagnac, duc de Nemours, as viceroy in Naples. Nemours, however, was a mediocrity incapable of standing up to his Spanish rival, Gonzalo da Cordoba.

The Spaniards had carefully avoided collaborating with the French in the conquest of Naples. Working strictly for themselves they had occupied the territories – the two Calabrias and Apulia – given to them by the Treaty of Granada. Soon, however, squabbles developed between the allies. A major difficulty concerned the two provinces that had been overlooked by the treaty. After the French had occupied them, Gonzalo claimed them for Aragon. In the spring of 1502 he entered Capitanata and expelled the French from several forts. Following the breakdown of talks between Nemours and Gonsalo, on 9 June the Spaniards captured Tripalda. There followed months, even years, of desultory warfare without, it seems, any overall strategy. Each captain did more or less as he thought best. Certain engagements caught the imagination of chroniclers. One was the famous duel between the French knight Bayard and the Spanish captain Alonso de Sotomayor, which ended in the latter’s death. Another was the epic encounter between French and Spanish knights – eleven on each side – which was watched by a thousand people from the walls of Trani.

Louis XII returned to Italy in the summer of 1502. His presence raised the morale of his troops. They invaded Apulia in July and soon afterwards Calabria. By the end of the summer the Spaniards held only a few towns along the Adriatic coast, including Barletta, where Gonzalo had his headquarters. Though Nemours disposed of larger forces, he allowed them to succumb to disease, hunger and desertion. As his army dwindled in size, the Spaniards received reinforcements by sea. Gonzalo was not only a brave soldier but a brilliant tactician. His military reforms led to the creation of the tercio in the sixteenth century. Abandoning the use of light cavalry, he relied mainly on infantry and provided it with better protection than in the past. The old companies which were too small for modern warfare were grouped into larger coronelias, each supported by cavalry and artillery.

In April 1503, Gonzalo launched an offensive. He defeated d’Aubigny at Seminara on 21 April and a week later crushed Nemours at Cerignola. The duke was killed and the bulk of his army had to retreat to the Capua region where it awaited reinforcements. A relief army under La Trémoïlle arrived in Rome just as a new pope was being elected and remained there for three months, supposedly to protect the conclave. Meanwhile, the French position in the south crumbled away. In mid-July, Gonzalo entered Naples effortlessly. He failed, however, to capture Gaeta where the two French armies joined forces at the end of the summer. During the harsh winter that followed both sides suffered hardships. Eventually, Gonzalo offered the French generous surrender terms which they accepted, much to Louis XII’s dismay. He ordered Chaumont d’Amboise to detain troops returning from southern Italy who had served him ‘so badly’, and rounded on his own fiscal officials, accusing them of not paying the army. About twenty were tried and two at least were executed. The disaster in southern Italy, however, was irreversible. On 31 March 1504, Louis and Ferdinand signed a truce of three years.