Читать книгу The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France - R. Knecht J. - Страница 39

Francis I incurred heavy expenses from the start of his reign. Having inherited a deficit of 1.4 million livres from Louis XII, he had to pay for that king’s funeral and for his own coronation. The overall cost of the Marignano campaign has been estimated at 7.5 million livres. The Peace of Fribourg cost the French crown one million écus and inaugurated a system of pensions to the Swiss. In 1518, Francis paid 600,000 écus for the return of Tournai. The imperial election campaign may have cost him another 400,000 écus and the Field of Cloth of Gold at least 200,000l. In June 1517 the king’s council decided to levy supplementary taxes worth 1,100,0431. in an attempt to reduce the government’s deficit of 3,996,5061.

Francis did not substantially change either the burden or the structure of taxation during his reign. Royal income from taxes rose by an annual average of 1.44 per cent, which is moderate by comparison with the average of 2.38 per cent per annum under Louis XII and 5.7 per cent per annum under Henry II. The taille rose most in absolute terms: from about 2.4 million livres in 1515 to some 4.6 million in 1544–5 with a fall to 3.6 million in 1547. The rate of the gabelle in north and central France trebled during the reign, but over the whole kingdom its value was only 700,000l. in 1547 as compared with less than 400,000 in the early part of the reign. The aides and other indirect taxes are said to have risen from about 1.2 million to 2.15 million. Domainal revenues did not rise at all. The only tax created by Francis was one on walled towns to pay for infantry.

However, taxation estimates based on the central records are misleading, for a high proportion of the receipts were disbursed at the collection point and never reached the royal treasury. The actual burden of taxation was also heavier than is suggested by the central records, the sums imposed by local collectors being often in excess of the legal limits. The yield was also eroded by the costs of collection.

Although in theory the French church was exempt from direct taxation, the reality was different. In theory the clerical tenth or décime was a voluntary gift to assist the king in an emergency, yet in practice it became virtually a regular tax. Following the Concordat of Bologna, the pope allowed Francis to levy a tenth on the French clergy and he did so again in 1527 and 1533, but papal authorization was not regarded as essential; the initiative was often taken by the king alone. Altogether 57 tenths were levied under Francis and may have yielded a total of 18 million livres.

It was outside his regular income that Francis innovated most. To meet his immediate needs, he borrowed from merchants and bankers, most of them Italians who had settled in Lyon. They lent to the crown sometimes under constraint or in exchange for commercial concessions, but usually as a result of free speculative choice. The king was often prepared to pay high rates of interest. For example, a loan of 100,000 écus raised for the Field of Cloth of Gold carried an annual interest of 16.2 per cent. By 1516 the crown was already heavily in debt to the Lyon bankers.

Francis also borrowed heavily from his own tax officials, who were invariably men of substance. If for some reason the tax yield was lower than expected, a tax official might be asked to advance money from his own pocket. In return, he would be allowed to reimburse himself from the next year’s tax receipts. This was how taxes were ‘anticipated’. On a number of occasions the king helped himself to the inheritance of a wealthy subject. His first victim was the seigneur de Boisy who died in May 1519.

Although many towns were exempt from the taille, they were often asked for forced loans, which could be even more burdensome. In 1515 and 1516, for example, Francis asked for sums ranging from 1500 to 6000 livres each from Toulouse, Lyon, Troyes and Angers. Paris was asked for 20,000l. to help pay for the defence of the kingdom. Sometimes a town was allowed to recoup by levying a local tax or octroi on some commodity such as wine. An expedient much used by Francis was the alienation of crown lands by gift or sale. This was repeatedly opposed by the parlement, which pointed to the adverse effect on the king’s ‘poor subjects’ of any diminution of his ‘ordinary’ revenue, but Francis always managed to get his way.

Two other expedients were the sale of titles of nobility and of royal offices. As far as is known, Francis issued 183 letters of ennoblement during his reign of which 153 were sold. They cost between 100 and 300 écus before 1543 and considerably more afterwards. As for offices, Francis turned their sale into a veritable system. They were sold directly to bourgeois anxious to acquire them as a means of social advancement (for many offices conferred noble status on the holders) or were given away as rewards for services rendered or as repayment of loans, leaving the recipients free to sell them if they wished. Francis also sold résignations and survivances which enabled office-holders to nominate their successors. The price of a councillorship in the Parlement of Paris was fixed by 1522 at 3000 écus; other offices commanded variable amounts. The sale or venality of offices created a dangerous situation in the long term as they tended to be monopolized by a limited number of families.

The trésoriers de France and généraux des finances (known collectively as gens des finances), who administered the crown’s finances between 1515 and 1527, were closely related to each other and shared their interests. Alongside their royal duties they ran very profitable businesses of their own. Consequently, their public and private functions overlapped, offering speculative temptations. An outstanding member of this financial oligarchy was Jacques de Beaune, baron of Semblançay, the son of a rich merchant of Tours, who became the king’s chief financial adviser after serving his mother and, before her, Anne of Brittany. As général of Languedoïl, he played a leading role in funding the Marignano campaign. In January 1518 he was given overall powers of supervision over all the king’s revenues, but it was probably as an agent of credit that he proved most useful to the crown. Important as they were, the gens des finances did not have ultimate control of the crown’s financial policy. This was vested in the king’s council among whose members one, usually the Grand Master, was singled out to oversee financial business. The king himself was by no means uninterested in such business. In April 1519 he spent three days with his gens des finances looking for ways to fund the army.