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Of what force circunstance is in matters of action, and how warily authorities be to be vsed, where the contemplatiue reason receiues the check of the actiue circunstance, if they be not well applyed. Of the alleadging of authors.

Some well meaning man, when he will perswade his countrie to this or that thing, either by penne or speache, if he find any good writers authoritie, which fauoureth his opinion, he presumeth streight waie therby both his owne perswasion to be sufficiently armed, and his countries execution to be strongly warranted. Which his assuraunce is sometime chekt by wisdome, sometime by experience: By wisdome, which forseeth, that the circunstance of the countrie will not admit that, which he would perswade: by experience, which giuing way at the first to some probability, is in the end borne back by vnfitting circunstance. So that in those cases, where authorities perswade, and circunstances controwle, such as vse writers for their credit, must feare circunstance for her chek. Bycause the misse in circunstance makes the authour no authour, where his reason is altered, and the alledger no alledger, where discretion wanteth. Seeing therefore my selfe deale with these two pointes of authoritie and circunstance, both to confirme mine owne opinion the surer, and to confute the contrarie sounder, where difference in opinion shall offer to assaile me, I thought it good in the verie entrie to say somwhat of both, considering their agreement doth promise successe, and their disagreement doth threaten defeat.

I do see many very toward wittes, of reasonable good reading, and of excellent good vtterance, both forreine abroad, and freindes at home marueilously ouershoot themselues by ouerruling the circunstance, and ouerstraining authoritie. For vpon some affiaunce in their owne wittes, that they see all circunstances, and some small assurance, that the authours which they reade, do soothe all that they say: they will push out in publike certaine resolute opinions, before either their wittes be settled, or their reading ripe: which is then to be thought wisely ripe, when after the benefit of many yeares, after much reading of the most and best writers, after sound digesting of that which they haue red, and applying it all to some certaine ende: time hath fined their iudgement, and by precise obseruing and comparing, both what others haue said, and what themselues haue seene, hath made them maister the circunstance. Which mastering of the circunstance, is the only rule, that wisemen liue by, the only meane, that wisedome is come by, the only ods between folie and witte. The marking wherof is of so great a force, as by it eche countrie discouereth the travellour, when he seeketh to enforce his forreine conclusions, and clingeth to that countryman, which hath bettered her still, by biding still at home. It discrieth the young student, which is rauished with the obiect, eare he can discern it, and honoreth the wise learned, whose vnderstanding is so staied, as he may be a leader. The consideration of circunstance is so strong in all attemptes, where man is the subiect, as it maketh of all nothing, and of nothing all. The skill to iudge of it is so lingring, and so late, bycause man is the gatherer, and so long eare he learne it, as it seemes to be reserued, till he be almost spent. It is not enough to rule the world, to alleadge authorities, but to raunge authorities, which be not aboue the world, by the rule of the world, is the wisemans line.

I am to deale with training, must I entreat my countrey to be content with this, bycause such a one commendes it? or to force her to that, bycause such a state likes it? The shew of right deceiues us, and the likenes of vnlike things doth lead vs, where it listeth. Differences and ods discouer errors, similitude and likenes lead euen wise men awrie. The great philosopher Aristotle1 in fining of reason, maketh the abilities to discerne these two pointes, where thinges like be vnlike, and where the vnlike be like, two of his principall instrumentes to trie out the trueth. Which skill to discern so narrowly, as it is not in all, so where it is, there is great discretion, there will nothing be brought from authoritie to practise, but that circunstance will praise, and yet hardly winne. For though circunstance in our countrie and others do seeme verie like, nay rather almost one, yet if our countrie do admit, where any ods appeareth, though it offer the relenting, when it comes to proufe, she auentureth her selfe, and we which perswade. haue great cause to thanke her, that she will harken vnto vs, as she also will thanke vs, if she praise at the parting. Wherfore seeing the ground is so slipperie to deale by authoritie, and therfore to approue it, bycause such a one sayth it till iudgement haue subsigned, and circunstance sealed, I thought it good, as I said before, to speake somwhat therof, that I may therby stay my selfe the better, marching by them, and thorough them: and also remoue some scrupulouse opinion, that I vse them not strangely, when I vse them so, as they wishe themselues to be vsed.

But for the better vnderstanding, with what warynes authoritie is to be vsed, may it please you to consider, that there be two sortes of authours wherwith we deale in our studie: wherof the one regardeth the matter only, and by ineuitable argument enforceth the conclusion. In this kinde be the Mathematicall sciences, and all such naturall philosophie, as proceedeth by necessitie of a demonstrable subiect. The other ioyneth the circunstance with the matter, as Morall, and politike Philosophie, as the Professions, as Poetes, as histories do, when they enforce not the necessitie of their conclusion, by necessitie of the matter, though by the fourme of their argument, which concludeth of force, in matters of least force. The argumentes of those Artes and Professions, which be in this second kinde, do depende vpon apparence in probable coniecture, and be creatures to circunstance, wherin as man is the mainest subiecte, so the respectes had to man haue the raine in their hand.

Hence commeth it that lawes in seuerall landes do differ so much, that Phisicke in seuerall subiectes is so seuerall in cure, that Diuinitie in ceremonies admitteth change, where the circunstance is obserued, and yet the truth not tainted.

Hence it cometh that in diuersitie of states, there be diuersities of staie, whereby men gouerne, bycause circunstance commaundeth. Whervnto, he that affirmes, must still haue an eye, bycause it sheweth, what is seemely and conuenient, not in great states alone, but also in the meanest thinges of all: bycause it moderateth both what soeuer men do: and in what soeuer respect they do. In the first kinde of authours and authorities, the truth of the matter maintaines it selfe, without he said or he did: bycause it is true by nature, which staied it, not by authour which said it. And being so setled, it ministreth of it selfe no matter to debate, or at the least verie little. For in pointes of necessitie, naturally inferred, the difference of opinion is no proufe at all, that the matter is debatable, but it is a sufficient argument of an insufficient writer, if he penne his opinion, or of an vngrounded learner, if his error be in speeche, which harpeth still about some outward accident, and neuer perceth the inward substance. So that in such conclusions there is but one currant, what forceth the matter, and not what sayeth the man: what commandes the immutable truth, and not what commendes the changeable circunstance. All the controuersie is in the second kinde, where circunstance is prescription, wherin the writers credite oftimes authoriseth the thing, and the truth of the thing doth make the man an authour: wherin vnles he take verie good heede, which is the alleadger, he may do his writer exceeding great iniurie, by bringing him to the barre, and forcing that vpon him, which he neuer dreamed on, and harme himselfe to, who mistaking his ground, misplaceth his building, and hazardeth his credit.

Hence commeth it, that so many fantasticall deuises do trouble the world, while euerie man being desirous to breede somwhat worthy of commendacion either for shew of learning, or for shield of opinion, bringeth in the poore writers, and enioyneth them speach, where in deed they be mute: and if they could speake, they would aske the alledger why he did so abuse them. A generall and a verie hard case in these our dayes, when the most erronious opinions be fathered vpon the most honest writers, which meant nothing lesse, then that which is threpte vpon them. In matter of Pollicy this man wrote thus, and was verie well thought of, an other in some schoole pointes gaue his censure in this sorte, and became of account. Transport the circunstance the allowance is misliked, the alleadger laughed at: and yet the worthinesse of the writer not empayred at all, when he is rightly weyed, bycause he was forced: In this kinde of argument wherin I presently deale, it is no proufe, bycause Plato praiseth it, bycause Aristotle alloweth it, bycause Cicero commendes it, bycause Quintilian is acquainted with it, or any other else, in any argument else, that therfore it is for vs to vse. What if our countrey honour it in them, and yet for all that may not vse it her selfe, bycause circunstance is her check? Nay what if the writers authoritie be alledged without consideration of their owne circunstance? who then offereth his countrey the greatest wrong? is it not he which wringeth the writer, and wreasteth his meaning? And yet such alledgers there be, which passe it ouer smoothly, till they be espyed, where then their owne weaknes appeareth, the writers worthinesse is euident, and his wrong reuenged, by discouering the wreaster. Wherfore he that will deale with writers so, as to deriue their conclusions to the vse of his countrey, must be verie well aduised, and diligently marke, that their meaning, and his applying be both of one ground, and also how much of their opinion his countrey will admit, which, as she will not be forced by idle supposalles, so pronounceth she him to be but a fleeter, who so euer shall offer to force her that waye. If the matter be well pikt, and properly applyed, she embraceth it forthwith, and giues it the growing. Whether I shall perfourme so much my selfe, as I require in others, I dare not warrant, but I will do my best, to vse my authour well, and to obserue the circunstance, and not once to profer any thing to my countrey, which shall not haue all those foundations, that I promised before, so much as I can, Nature to lead it, reason to back it, custome to commend it, experience to allow it, and profit to preferre it.

For alledging of Authours.

But here by the waye, I must aduertise my reader thus much, that I thinke a student ought rather to inuest himselfe in the habite of his writer, then to stand much vpon his title, and authoritie, in proofe or disproofe, seeing who knoweth not, that all our studies be generally detters to the first deuise, and fairest deliuerie? Therfore to auoide length therby, I will neither vse authoritie, nor example, seeing matter is the maine, and not the mans name, sauing onely where one mans deposition vpholdes or ouerthrowes: and the ground of the example is so excellent in that kinde, as it were to much vnkindenesse, not to let the person be knowen, where the fact is so famous. I will reste vpon reason the best, where I finde it, the next where that failes, and coniecture is probable, to proue such thinges, as reason must paterne. If the triall be in proofe, and experience must guide it, I will binde vpon proofe, and let triall be the tuche.

For with the alledging of authours, either to shew, what I haue read or to tuche common concordes, where any thing is to much, and nothing is enough, I meane not at all to buisie my selfe. Bycause we heape but vp witnesses, which be nothing needeful, in such cases, as be nothing doubtfull, when we vse many gaie names all agreeing in one, and none saying but so: wheras the naturall vse of testimonies is, to proue where doubt is, not to cloye, where all is cleare. In such cases for want of sound iudgement, a catalogue of names, and a multitude of sentences, which say but that is soothed, and no man denyes, are forced to the stage, to seeme to arme the alleadger, which fighteth without foe, and flyeth without feare.

In pointes of learning, which be wonne from quarrell, or resolute groundes, which be without quarrell, and neede no assurer, I referre my dealing to the iudgement of those, which can trace me, where I tread and shall finde my truth, without the authours name, whom they will confesse to be well alleadged, when I saye, as he sayeth, and proue as he proueth, either by habite got by reading, or by likenesse in iudgement, though I neuer red.

If controuersie arise, and be worth the recounting the matter shall not sleepe: if it hange of the man, and without him be lame, the man shall not slyp: but otherwise, no. Those that be learned know that witnesses, and wise mens names be verie good ware, where the question is, whether such a thing be done, and they be said to know it, and that Rhetorick takes testimonies for a principall proofe, and very neare the harte, as Logick placeth them in the utmost of her argumentes, being themselues of small pith, though their stuffe be worth praise, and both bind and loose, where reason beares the swaie, and probabilitie is to purpose. I do honour good writers but without superstition, nothing addicte to titles. But for so much as Reason doth honour them, they must be content to staie without them selues, and vse all meanes to preferre her to presence, as their ladie and mistresse, whose authoritie and credit procures them admission, when they come from her. It is not so, bycause a writer said so, but bycause the truth is so, and he said the truth, the truth giues him title, and that is it, which must passe, strong enough of it selfe, and oftimes weakened in the hearers opinion, though not in it selfe, by naming the writer: which commonly proues so when the hearer is wedded vnto names, and sworn to authoritie, not so much eying the thing which is vttered, as the persons title by whom it is vttered. If truth did depend vpon the person, she would oftimes be brought into a miserable plighte, and looke rufully vpon it, being constrained to serue fancie, and to alter vpon will, wheras she is still one, and should be bent vnto, neither will her selfe bend, howsoeuer opinatiue people do perswade them selues.

This the learned and wise know, whose curtesie I craue as I wish them well: for whose helpe and health, I vndertooke this paine, whose wisedom I appeal to, if either, diffidence do wrangle, or ignoraunce do quarrel. As for the vnlearned, I must needes ouertreat them, not to stand with me in pointes, where they cannot iudge themselues, if not for mine owne, yet for their sakes, which beleue me themselues, and will giue their word for me. In such pointes, as be intelligible to both, I must praie them both to waie me well, and euer to haue before them, that my will wisheth well, howsoeuer I perfourme, wherin will deserues well, and weaknes prayeth excuse.